Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon

Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon

Date | 22 October 2023

Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1180th session to receive updates on developments in Niger and Gabon following the recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in the two countries.

Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements on Niger and Gabon respectively as the concerned Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

At its 1168th session held on 14 August, the PSC decided to suspend Niger from all activities of the AU, and its organs and institutions until effective restoration of constitutional order. At its 1172nd emergency session convened on 31 August, the PSC also adopted a similar decision with respect to Gabon.

Over the past several weeks, the situation in these two countries evolved quite differently. In Niger, the tension that ensued between the military junta and ECOWAS following ECOWAS decisions slapping raft of sanctions on Niger and threatening military intervention for reinstating the ousted government of President Mohammed Bazoum has persisted. Mali and Burkina Faso, two other West African countries being ruled by military leaders, pledged to come to Niger’s aid in the event of a military intervention by ECOWAS.  Accordingly, the three countries signed what they called the Liptako-Gourma charter to forge a collective defense and mutual assistance pact. The charter was named after the border triangle between the three countries which has been the source of instability in the Sahel. The fate of G5 Sahel remains unclear in the face of this development. G5 Sahel has been “paralyzed” for quite some time following Mali’s decision to withdraw after it was blocked from assuming the rotating chairmanship of the group. The security situation appears to have worsened in all these three countries with a significant surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists recently.

At the moment, it appears that the possibility of an ECOWAS military intervention has lost steam in the face of division within West Africa but also lack of wider African support as illustrated by the decision of the PSC declining the request of ECOWAS for receiving endorsement for its decisions including for undertaking military intervention for reinstating the deposed President. ECOWAS maintained that it is keeping all options open for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In this regard, it sent delegations to Niamey on several occasions to engage in talks with military leaders who later proposed a three-year transition of power and appointed a civilian prime minister. Although there were media reports about proposed timelines by ECOWAS for the transition in Niger, the organization refuted these claims and insisted that the military leaders in Niamey should restore constitutional order immediately.

Algeria, which shares a long border with Niger, has offered its mediation to resolve the crisis in that country. It reportedly proposed a six-month transition period with the participation of all parties in Niger. This proposal envisages the establishment of a consensual civilian authority accepted by all sides of the Nigerian political class to lead the transition and pave the way for the restoration of constitutional order. The military leaders in Niamey reportedly accepted Algeria’s mediation but insisted that the timeline for the transition should be determined by Nigerians themselves. Although there were expectations for follow-up engagement in Niamey, Algeria reportedly suspended its initiative because of concerns over public pronouncements by the Nigerian military leaders which seems to have cast doubts about their willingness to accept the mediation.

The Nigerian military leaders had altercations with France, the former colonial power which maintains a military presence in Niger, making Niger a major hub for its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region following the ejection of French troops from Mali.  France came out strongly in support of the ECOWAS decision on Niger which led the military leaders in Niamey to demand that the country withdraw its forces from Niger. Although it initially resisted to heed the demand disputing the legitimacy of the military junta to make such decisions, France has already started withdrawal. The United States also maintains a military presence in Niger and has sent its acting deputy secretary of state Victoria Nuland to engage in talks with the military leaders in Niamey. The US had refrained from characterizing the situation as a coup d’état, but on 10 October the state department issued a statement concluding that a coup d’état took place in Niger. While this would lead to freezing of security and related assistance, the implication of this announcement on its military presence in Niger remains unclear. The country has already suspended its assistance to Niger but said that it will maintain life-saving humanitarian, food, and health assistance to the Nigerian people.

The UN General Assembly in New York saw high-level engagement on the Nigerian issue, including a meeting between several ECOWAS leaders and the US Secretary of State.  There has also been tension between the UN and the Nigerian military leaders who wanted to take part in the General Assembly but were excluded from attending the meeting. In response to this development, they have ordered the UN resident coordinator in Niamey to leave the country within 72 hours.

In Gabon, the situation appears to have unfolded differently. While the military junta seems disposed to diplomatic engagements and expressed their commitment to restore constitutional order, they have not as yet indicated any timeline for the transition period. This lack of commitment for timeline is not totally surprising. Given that the opposition presidential candidate performed well in the elections but the military coup interrupted the electoral processes to play itself out to its logical conclusion, it may not be in the interest of the military junta to proceed to elections in a short period of time. There is indeed a risk that if elections were to be held in a short term, the leading opposition candidate may win the election and this may not settle well with those that would like to sustain the status quo.

The Gabonese military also released the deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba but his wife, under house arrest since the coup, has now been reportedly charged with money laundering, forgery, and falsification of records. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa Abou Abarry was allowed to meet with the military leaders and the deposed president. The new prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima attended a Security Council high-level meeting in New York on 20 September that discussed the situation in Ukraine.

Gabon happened to be the chair of ECCAS, the REC for the central Africa region, when the coup took place in Libreville. ECCAS suspended Gabon from all activities of the organization but stopped short of imposing sanctions on the country. The regional leaders also decided to temporarily move the ECCAS Headquarters from Libreville to Malabo until the restoration of constitutional order. The president of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was the Vice-Chair of ECCAS, assumed the rotating chairmanship of the organization, and the president of the Central African Republic Faustin Touadera was appointed as ECCAS facilitator to engage with the Gabonese military leaders to restore constitutional order in that country. Subsequently, Touadera traveled to Libreville in a bid to carry out his mandate.

General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, who is the leader of the Gabonese military government, has been on a regional tour, which took him to Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and recently the Democratic Republic of Congo (he is also expected to travel to Cameroon). He is doing so to request countries of the region to allow Gabon back to the regional fold and seek their support for the lifting of the suspensions imposed by the PSC. Past week, he also undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi where he met with the presidents of the two countries as well.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may recall its previous decisions on Niger and Gabon urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed upon transitional civilian authority and reiterate its stand in that respect. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts and in that vein, urge military leaders in both countries to engage with initiatives led by the relevant regional organisations as well as the AU towards charting a proper transitional process for the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may decide that a dedicated mechanism is established that follows on the decisions of the 1168th session and meets the requirements of the Lomé Declaration which requires that the AU Commission Chairperson deploy robust diplomatic efforts involving the establishment of engagement with the perpetrators and enlisting of the contribution African leaders and personalities. With respect to Gabon, the PSC may reinforce the decision it adopted during its 1172nd session by calling for transfer of power by the military junta to a transitional civilian authority representative of the various political and social forces in the country and requiring that the transitional authorities specify the timeline for restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the deployment of a high-level mission to Gabon specified under paragraph 8 of the communique of the 1172nd session which is along the lines of what is required in the Lomé Declaration.


Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon

Briefing on the situations in Niger and Gabon

Date | 22 October 2023

Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1180th session to receive updates on developments in Niger and Gabon following the recent unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) in the two countries.

Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are also expected to deliver statements on Niger and Gabon respectively as the concerned Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

At its 1168th session held on 14 August, the PSC decided to suspend Niger from all activities of the AU, and its organs and institutions until effective restoration of constitutional order. At its 1172nd emergency session convened on 31 August, the PSC also adopted a similar decision with respect to Gabon.

Over the past several weeks, the situation in these two countries evolved quite differently. In Niger, the tension that ensued between the military junta and ECOWAS following ECOWAS decisions slapping raft of sanctions on Niger and threatening military intervention for reinstating the ousted government of President Mohammed Bazoum has persisted. Mali and Burkina Faso, two other West African countries being ruled by military leaders, pledged to come to Niger’s aid in the event of a military intervention by ECOWAS.  Accordingly, the three countries signed what they called the Liptako-Gourma charter to forge a collective defense and mutual assistance pact. The charter was named after the border triangle between the three countries which has been the source of instability in the Sahel. The fate of G5 Sahel remains unclear in the face of this development. G5 Sahel has been “paralyzed” for quite some time following Mali’s decision to withdraw after it was blocked from assuming the rotating chairmanship of the group. The security situation appears to have worsened in all these three countries with a significant surge of attacks by armed groups and terrorists recently.

At the moment, it appears that the possibility of an ECOWAS military intervention has lost steam in the face of division within West Africa but also lack of wider African support as illustrated by the decision of the PSC declining the request of ECOWAS for receiving endorsement for its decisions including for undertaking military intervention for reinstating the deposed President. ECOWAS maintained that it is keeping all options open for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In this regard, it sent delegations to Niamey on several occasions to engage in talks with military leaders who later proposed a three-year transition of power and appointed a civilian prime minister. Although there were media reports about proposed timelines by ECOWAS for the transition in Niger, the organization refuted these claims and insisted that the military leaders in Niamey should restore constitutional order immediately.

Algeria, which shares a long border with Niger, has offered its mediation to resolve the crisis in that country. It reportedly proposed a six-month transition period with the participation of all parties in Niger. This proposal envisages the establishment of a consensual civilian authority accepted by all sides of the Nigerian political class to lead the transition and pave the way for the restoration of constitutional order. The military leaders in Niamey reportedly accepted Algeria’s mediation but insisted that the timeline for the transition should be determined by Nigerians themselves. Although there were expectations for follow-up engagement in Niamey, Algeria reportedly suspended its initiative because of concerns over public pronouncements by the Nigerian military leaders which seems to have cast doubts about their willingness to accept the mediation.

The Nigerian military leaders had altercations with France, the former colonial power which maintains a military presence in Niger, making Niger a major hub for its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel region following the ejection of French troops from Mali.  France came out strongly in support of the ECOWAS decision on Niger which led the military leaders in Niamey to demand that the country withdraw its forces from Niger. Although it initially resisted to heed the demand disputing the legitimacy of the military junta to make such decisions, France has already started withdrawal. The United States also maintains a military presence in Niger and has sent its acting deputy secretary of state Victoria Nuland to engage in talks with the military leaders in Niamey. The US had refrained from characterizing the situation as a coup d’état, but on 10 October the state department issued a statement concluding that a coup d’état took place in Niger. While this would lead to freezing of security and related assistance, the implication of this announcement on its military presence in Niger remains unclear. The country has already suspended its assistance to Niger but said that it will maintain life-saving humanitarian, food, and health assistance to the Nigerian people.

The UN General Assembly in New York saw high-level engagement on the Nigerian issue, including a meeting between several ECOWAS leaders and the US Secretary of State.  There has also been tension between the UN and the Nigerian military leaders who wanted to take part in the General Assembly but were excluded from attending the meeting. In response to this development, they have ordered the UN resident coordinator in Niamey to leave the country within 72 hours.

In Gabon, the situation appears to have unfolded differently. While the military junta seems disposed to diplomatic engagements and expressed their commitment to restore constitutional order, they have not as yet indicated any timeline for the transition period. This lack of commitment for timeline is not totally surprising. Given that the opposition presidential candidate performed well in the elections but the military coup interrupted the electoral processes to play itself out to its logical conclusion, it may not be in the interest of the military junta to proceed to elections in a short period of time. There is indeed a risk that if elections were to be held in a short term, the leading opposition candidate may win the election and this may not settle well with those that would like to sustain the status quo.

The Gabonese military also released the deposed president Ali Bongo Ondimba but his wife, under house arrest since the coup, has now been reportedly charged with money laundering, forgery, and falsification of records. The UN Special Representative for Central Africa Abou Abarry was allowed to meet with the military leaders and the deposed president. The new prime minister Raymond Ndong Sima attended a Security Council high-level meeting in New York on 20 September that discussed the situation in Ukraine.

Gabon happened to be the chair of ECCAS, the REC for the central Africa region, when the coup took place in Libreville. ECCAS suspended Gabon from all activities of the organization but stopped short of imposing sanctions on the country. The regional leaders also decided to temporarily move the ECCAS Headquarters from Libreville to Malabo until the restoration of constitutional order. The president of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who was the Vice-Chair of ECCAS, assumed the rotating chairmanship of the organization, and the president of the Central African Republic Faustin Touadera was appointed as ECCAS facilitator to engage with the Gabonese military leaders to restore constitutional order in that country. Subsequently, Touadera traveled to Libreville in a bid to carry out his mandate.

General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, who is the leader of the Gabonese military government, has been on a regional tour, which took him to Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad, and recently the Democratic Republic of Congo (he is also expected to travel to Cameroon). He is doing so to request countries of the region to allow Gabon back to the regional fold and seek their support for the lifting of the suspensions imposed by the PSC. Past week, he also undertook a mission to Rwanda and Burundi where he met with the presidents of the two countries as well.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may use the session as an opportunity to reiterate AU’s commitment to democratic norms and principles underpinning the rejection of and zero tolerance for UCG. It may recall its previous decisions on Niger and Gabon urging the military leaders to immediately hand over power to an agreed upon transitional civilian authority and reiterate its stand in that respect. The PSC may further emphasise the importance of diplomatic engagement and mediation efforts and in that vein, urge military leaders in both countries to engage with initiatives led by the relevant regional organisations as well as the AU towards charting a proper transitional process for the restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may decide that a dedicated mechanism is established that follows on the decisions of the 1168th session and meets the requirements of the Lomé Declaration which requires that the AU Commission Chairperson deploy robust diplomatic efforts involving the establishment of engagement with the perpetrators and enlisting of the contribution African leaders and personalities. With respect to Gabon, the PSC may reinforce the decision it adopted during its 1172nd session by calling for transfer of power by the military junta to a transitional civilian authority representative of the various political and social forces in the country and requiring that the transitional authorities specify the timeline for restoration of constitutional order. The PSC may also reiterate the need for the deployment of a high-level mission to Gabon specified under paragraph 8 of the communique of the 1172nd session which is along the lines of what is required in the Lomé Declaration.


Update on the Situation in the Republic of Niger

Update on the Situation in the Republic of Niger

Date | 13 August 2023

Tomorrow (14 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene under its revised provisional program of work, its 1167th session to consider the situation in Niger.

The PSC Chair for the month and Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU, Ambassador Willy Nyamitwe will be delivering the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make a statement. As a country of concern, the Permanent Representative of Niger is also expected to make a statement. The PSC may also hear a statement from the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Tomorrow’s session is the second time for the PSC to dedicate a session on the coup in Niger and the third time to discuss it. When the PSC Program of work initially set to consider the situation in Niger on 17 August after the expiry of the two-week timeline the PSC set in its initial session on 28 July, the next course of action of ECOWAS was unknown. The date was brought forward following ECOWAS decision to hold its second extraordinary summit on Niger. As a session that comes two days after the ECOWAS summit, it is expected that PSC will dedicate significant portion of its session on considering the outcome of the summit.

As noted, the first time the PSC met on the current coup in Niger was on an emergency meeting held virtually on 28 July 2023 for its 1164th session, with a communiqué adopted as an outcome of the session. Apart from strongly condemning the coup, the PSC set 15 days for the junta to restore constitutional order. This timeline expired on 11 August.

On its part ECOWAS in its communiqué, following its extraordinary session on 30 July 2023, imposed a series of sanctions such as: closure of land and air borders, institution of a no-fly zone, suspension of all commercial and financial transactions, asset freeze, travel bans, and suspension of financial assistance and transactions. Additionally, it demanded the coup leaders to return the country to constitutional order within 7 days against the threat of the use of force.

The UN Security Council like the PSC also held a briefing and issued a statement. Among others, it called for the release of President Bazoum, underscored the need for constitutional order and expressed support for the role of ECOWAS.

Since the PSC’s last session on 28 July, the grip of the junta on Niger has continued to deepen. Apart from the establishment of Conseil National Pour la Sauvergarde de la Patrie (CNSP) [in English: National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland], composed of senior officials from various branches of the defence and security forces and the emergence of the chief of the Presidential Guard, General Abdourahamane Tchiani as the leader of the junta (while  General Salifou Moudi, who was appointed as chief of staff by former Nigerien President in 2020 and demoted by President Bazoum in March 2023, became the second in command), on 7 August the junta named former Finance Minister Lamine Zeine Prime Minister. On 30 July, large number of people took to the streets in support of the coup. Just before the convening of the ECOWAS summit, the junta announced a new cabinet. The 21-member new government involves two members of CNSP responsible for ministers of defense and interior.

On the diplomatic front as well, ECOWAS took a lead. It sent various delegations. After he volunteered to mediate, ECOWAS sent the Chadian leader Mahamat Idriss Deby, who himself seized power through military means, to Niamey, although this mission accomplished nothing despite meetings for photo with the coup leader and the deposed President. Earlier on the same day the unfolding of the coup was first reported on 26 July, Benin’s President was also reported as planning to travel to Niger. Designated by ECOWAS Chairperson, President Tinabu of Nigeria as official mediators, another delegation headed by former Nigerian President and member of the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and involving the Emir of Sokota traveled to Niger on 6 August but was unable to meet the head of the junta. On 8 August, a joint ECOWAS-AU-UN mission destined to Niger was unable to undertake its mission, on account of, in the words of an ECOWAS statement, ‘a late-night communication from the military authorities in Niger indicating their unavailability to receive the tripartite delegation.’

Rather than this plethora of diplomatic missions, what received the most attention and concentrated the minds of the members of the junta and people in Niger as well as many others in the region are the raft of sanctions that ECOWAS slapped on Niger and most significantly the threat of use of force. In addition to ECOWAS’ sanctions, Nigeria has cut power supply to Niger. On 2-4 August, the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defense staff met in Abuja to draw up and agree on an intervention plan. Countries such as Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire announced their plan to send troops as part of ECOWAS intervention force.

The pressure and the threat of force, instead of dissuading the junta from continuing on the unconstitutional path it embarked on, seemed to have had the opposite effect. They hardened its position. The coup leaders have dismissed the sanctions as ‘inhuman’ and have vowed to resist them. The threat of force also stirred nationalist fervor of the Nigerien public, making it easier for the junta to galvanize public support. However, it is also worth noting that the junta is not without opposition. On 10 August report emerged that a former Tuareg rebel leader and politician in Niger, Rhissa Ag Boula, announced the launching of a rebel movement opposing the military junta and seeking to restore President Bazoum’s rule.

Regionally as well, despite unity in condemning the coup and the call for restoration of constitutional order, some of the measures by ECOWAS particularly the threat of use of force divided views both on the part of countries and the wider public in countries neighboring Niger. Niger’s neighbors outside ECOWAS who support the position of ECOWAS on restoration of constitutional order such as Algeria and Mauritania expressed concern over the threat of force, with Algeria indicating its strong opposition to it. Chad on its part stated that it would not join military intervention against Niger. On the other hand, Burkina Faso and Mali announced that military intervention in Niger amounts to a threat of war against them as well, while Guinea also rejected the threat of use of force.

In Nigeria, which chairs ECOWAS, concerns have been expressed over the adverse peace and security implications of military force particularly for northern parts of Nigeria that share border with Niger. When requested for its support, Nigeria’s Senate advised against military intervention. Highlighting the geopolitical dynamics that complicates the position taken by ECOWAS particularly on the use of force, one open letter, addressed to President Tinabu by some Nigerian personalities including a former Commander of the UN Mission in Darfur, pointed out ‘the apparent rising wave of popular support for the putschists might create a situation in which the role of Nigeria is seen as being at variance with the interest of the Nigerien people and in support of external interests.’

It was against the background of the foregoing that ECOWAS convened its second extraordinary session on 10 August. Apart from ECOWAS member states, the summit also saw the presence of the Chairperson of the PSC at heads of state and government level, President Evariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi and the President of Mauritania. Apart from PSC Chairperson, the presence of the AU involved the Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye.

Despite the emphasis it put on pursuing diplomatic avenues, the communique of the summit decided to uphold and enforce all the earlier decisions from the first summit. Doubling down on its threat of use of force, the ECOWAS Authority directed ‘the Committee of the Chiefs of Defense Staff to immediately activate the ECOWS Standby Force with all its elements’ and most importantly ‘order(ed) the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Niger.’ ECOWAS also called on the AU to ‘endorse all the decisions taken by the ECOWAS on the situation in Niger’. (Emphasis added)

As the PSC meets tomorrow, the issue it is facing is not one that is amenable to any easy policy choices. Considering the continuation of the coup after the expiry of the 15 days deadline, the only policy course of action that is easy for the PSC is to invoke Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol and slap Niger with suspension from participating in AU activities as per Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU. The PSC may even agree to further measures but only to the extent of that they involve the targeted sanction of the authors of the coup.

Any measure going further than the foregoing would not be easy for the PSC. It would be difficult to find consensus in the PSC on the wholesale endorsement of all the sanctions on Niger, particularly those that are not targeted and will directly affect ordinary Nigeriens. Apart from the political and legal challenges, it would be even more difficult for the PSC to agree on the endorsement of the use of force for purposes of reversing the coup in Niger. It is to be recalled that the threat of use of force was the main factor why the PSC was unable to secure consensus when it discussed the outcome of the 30 July ECOWAS Summit during its 31 July session.

There are thus two potential scenarios as outcome for the PSC. Understandably, PSC members from ECOWAS by the dictates of protocol will seek to have the PSC endorse the decision their principals at heads of state and government level adopted. This brings forward as potential outcome of the session the scenario of endorsement of ECOWAS decisions as a whole. On the other hand, for PSC members from other regions, such endorsement of ECOWAS decisions as a package may not be as straight forward. They may therefore agree only to endorsement of the targeted sanctions.

On military intervention, one possibility is that instead of endorsement, the most members of the PSC can agree to take note of the decision of ECOWAS on the matter. Going further, the PSC may need to get clarity on the peace and security implications of military intervention in Niger for making responsible and well considered decision. Given the principal mandate of the PSC for peace and security, it would be difficult for the PSC to proceed with endorsing military intervention without it being both presented with careful assessment of the risks and satisfied that the risks of intervention would not be worse than the adverse consequences of the military coup. Indications are that the risks of military action in the particular context of Niger could far outweigh the adverse consequences of the military coup on its own. It may not only quickly degenerate into regional war as Burkina Faso and Mali get drawn in but also expose Niger to risk of collapse and be overrun by terrorist groups.

It is to be recalled that the PSC, following the military seizure of power and suspension of the constitution in Chad in April 2021, went as far as avoiding the activation of Article 30 of the Constitutive Act in respect of Chad let alone to consider the use of force for upholding constitutional process. The factors for such position, per the terms of the communiques of the PSC, include, ‘the complexity of the political and security situation in Chad.’ Yet, in Chad PSC’s position was informed more by what it called ‘the pivotal role being played by Chad in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security, particularly in the countering terrorism and violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel regions’, it is in Niger the PSC faces most intensely in a way it never did before the tension between its mandate to uphold constitutional order and its primary role in the maintenance of peace and security.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Expressing concern about the lack of progress towards restoration of constitutional order, the PSC is expected to immediately suspend Niger from all AU activities on the basis of Article 7(1(g)) of the Protocol establishing the PSC until the restoration of constitutional order. It is also expected to reiterate the call on the coup leaders to ensure the physical integrity of the President, his family and members of his government that are detained. The PSC may express its support for the leadership of ECOWAS in the search for finding solution to the constitutional crisis in Niger. In this respect, the PSC underscoring the importance of pursuing the effort for resolving the situation in Niger through diplomatic means, may urge the junta in Niger to collaborate with ECOWAS and engage constructively with the diplomatic initiatives. With respect to the decisions of ECOWAS both from its 30 July and its 10 August summits, the PSC may endorse the targeted sanctions that specifically single out perpetrators of the coup. On the proposal on the deployment of military intervention, the PSC may request that the AU Commission provides it with legal opinion indicating the legal basis under AU legal instruments for use of military force for reversing military coup and the African Standby Scenario under which such intervention is to be undertaken. Both for purposes of enabling it take informed decision on the peace and security implications of the proposal on military intervention and for instituting robust diplomatic process towards the restoration of constitutional order in Niger, the PSC may decide for the establishment of a mechanism that operates on a full time basis on Niger like a high-level Panel of leading African personalities who, in addition to their diplomatic role, working together with the AU Commission, would present to the PSC their carefully considered assessment of the nature of the peace and security risks of military intervention in Niger. Given the gravity of the situation in Niger, in addition to such standing mechanism, the PSC may also decide to establish an ad hoc committee of five at the level of heads of state and government from the various regions of the continent to provide strategic guidance.


PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 207TH MEETING AT THE LEVEL OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

Niger

Date | 29, OCTOBER 2009
ABUJA, NIGERIA

COMMUNIQUÉ

COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE 207TH MEETING OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 207th meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, at the level of Heads of State and Government, on 29 October 2009, adopted the following decision on the situation in the Republic of Niger:

Council,

1. Takes  note  of  the  briefings  by  ECOWAS  and  the  AU  Commission  on  the  latest developments in the situation in Niger;

2. Endorses the decisions on the situation in Niger adopted by the Extraordinary Summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held in Abuja, on 17 October 2009, and commends the efforts deployed by ECOWAS towards finding a speedy and consensual solution to the crisis in Niger. Council also commends the initiatives taken by the Chairperson of the Commission to help resolve the crisis;

3. Requests the Chairperson of the Commission to intensify his efforts and to continue to work closely with ECOWAS to facilitate the speedy resolution of the crisis in Niger and the democratic functioning of the institutions of the country, with the participation and support of all political forces of Niger;

4. Further requests the Chairperson of the Commission to report to it, within a month, on developments in Niger and the outcome of his efforts and those of ECOWAS;

5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.