Tomorrow (16 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1154^th session to receive a briefing on the activities of the African First Ladies Peace Mission (AFLPM). The session aims to contribute towards mobilisation of African stakeholders for effective mediation and preventive diplomacy.

Following opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Aisha M. Buhari, First Lady of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Chairperson of the AFLPM will present tomorrow’s briefing to the PSC. Benita Diop, AU Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security (WPS) may also deliver a statement.

The AFLPM was formally inaugurated in 1997, as an outcome of the commitment made by the First Ladies of Benin, Burundi, Gambia, Lesotho, Nigeria and Uganda at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Conference), to undertake peace missions throughout Africa. The mission’s central objective is focused around promotion of women’s inclusion and active engagement in mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts, with the aim of contributing to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent. Despite the complementarity of the mission’s mandate to that of the PSC’s, tomorrow’s session constitutes the first time for the PSC to be briefed on the activities of the AFLPM. It is however to be recalled that at its 987^th session committed to the WPS theme, the PSC underscored the necessity for revitalising the AFLPM ‘for the promotion of peace and harmony, as well as their advocacy for advancing women and girls’ interests, provision of support to the victims of armed conflict, refugees and displaced people’.

Theoretically, the AFLPM is an initiative that could contribute significantly to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts through an effective deployment of humanitarian and diplomatic actions. A Plan of Action adopted at the 7^th Summit of the AFLPM in 2012 underscores some critical strategies and activities to enable the mission realise its goal in this respect. Centred on the core objective of capacity building of women groups in conflict resolution and peace building, the Plan of Action elucidates the various roles that can be played by African First Ladies in key areas such as promotion of the culture of peace, protection of women and girls in conflict zones and facilitating humanitarian assistance for communities affected by armed conflicts. Within this context, the AFLPM has recorded notable progress, some of which include the provision of relief materials to refugee and IDP communities in Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.

In practice, beyond such ad hoc solidarity activities the AFLPM has very little, if any, visibility nor is it known for engaging in championing peace or resolution of conflicts in relation to specific conflict situations. This session and the apparent effort to bring the AFLPM to the limelight may inject some much-needed energy for it to take active role in peace efforts in relation to specific conflict situations. Having been established as an initiative of First Ladies of few countries, it has been elusive to some whether the mission operates as a continental non-governmental organisation (NGO) or a project of involved First Ladies. This lack of clarity has barred the mission from attaining the necessary level of support and visibility to realise its goals. By creating better clarity on its legal status and methods of operation as well as by clearly placing itself within the existing continental architecture for the maintenance of peace and security, the AFLPM could work better for advancing peace.

Additionally, despite its establishment in 1997, little is known about its works over the years or its engagement with key AU organs that play a lead role in securing peace and in promoting women’s involvement in decision-making processes related to peace and security.

One positive development towards the institutionalization of the AFLPM has been the inauguration of the mission headquarter, in Abuja, Nigeria, alongside the convening of the 10^th AFLPM General Assembly held from 8 to 9 May 2023. Another notable development is the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the AFLPM and the AU at the 10^th AFLPM General Assembly, which marks an important stride.

While these developments including the establishment of the headquarters constitutes significant progress, the effective functioning of the AFLPM takes more than having headquarters. It requires among others clarifying its working methods.

Although it is not clear why the PSC has to convene a session on this body that has been dormant and has no specific history of engaging in peace processes, tomorrow’s session beyond affording visibility for AFLPM will also be used for ensuring that it also serves the purposes of the mandate of the PSC with members of the PSC calling on the AFLPM to fully operationalize its role, in coordination with the relevant AU structures, namely Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise) and the AU Special Envoy on WPS.

If it lives up to its mission, the AFLPM operating with clear working methods can contribute meaningfully to peace and security including by leveraging and working with relevant AU structures. For this it is also critical to address other issues affecting the functioning of the AFLPM. The potential political proximity to power and associated sensitivities and issues related to technical and financial sources of support are among the other issues that may also warrant attention. It is not also farfetched that, despite the (potential) huge influence the members of the AFLPM wield, they face the impacts of deeply entrenched patriarchal norms. Such perceptions inevitably shape national policies and inform decision-making, including on matters related to peace and security, in a non-inclusive manner that fails to take account of women’s perspectives and contributions. While a more comprehensive approach is necessary to combat the impacts of patriarchy in Africa, the AFLPM needs to strengthen its lobbying strategies to attain full support of relevant national actors.

It may also interest the PSC to reflect on the opportunities the AFLPM presents in terms of supplementing its works. One example of such opportunities is advancing the WPS agenda and promoting its enhanced implementation at the national level, including through sustained advocacy for the adoption of national action plans (NAPs). Through close collaboration with the Office of the AU Special Envoy for WPS, the AFLPM could make considerable contributions, such as sensitisation of relevant policy actors at the national level, on the significance of WPS for the success of peace processes as well as realisation of development agendas.

Mobilisation of the AFLPM in mediation and preventive diplomacy forms another key area in which the mission could contribute. Lending support to existing AU mechanisms such as the Panel of the Wise, FemWise and Network of African Youth on Conflict Prevention and Mediation (WiseYouth), the AFLPM could be deployed strategically not only to assist in the conduct of mediation and preventive diplomacy missions, but also through raising necessary funds for the successful undertaking of such operations.

The expected outcome of the session was unknown at the time of developing this insight. The PSC may welcome the objectives for which the AFLPM is established and take note of its potential to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. It may take note of the signing of an MoU between the AFLPM and the AU, represented by PAPS Commissioner Bankole Adeoye, and encourage it to take advantage of the opportunities this presents for AFLPM to work with and avail its influence for the effective functioning of relevant AU structures working on conflict prevention, management and resolution, including the Panel of the Wise, FemWise and Special Envoy for WPS. The PSC may also welcome the appointment of the First Lady of Burundi, Angelina Ndayishimiye as the incoming president of the AFLPM and commend the outgoing president, first lady of Nigeria, Aisha Muhammmadu Buhari for her role during her presidency of the mission. It may call on all relevant AU actors to work towards strengthening engagement and co-operation with the mission.

Tomorrow (19 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1039th session to assess the implementation of its work plans for 2020 to 2021. The assessment is aimed at reflecting on Council’s achievements, its challenges and ways forward in undertaking its works. In addition, Council may also consider the report of the technical early response mission to Comoros at tomorrow’s session.

Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement.

The indicative annual programme of activities for the years 2020 and 2021 would both suggest that while Council has been able to conduct significant number of its planned activities for these years, there is still substantial backlog of undertakings that were not completed within Council’s anticipated timeline or at the predetermined frequency. Tomorrow’s session presents Council the opportunity to reflect on the underlying reasons for the presence of a gap between its plan of activities and their implementation, and to discuss approaches for resolving the challenges faced in that regard.

In terms of sessions that were planned to take place during 2020, most of the country specific ones were successfully convened within the year despite extraordinary circumstances due to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic and resulting changes to Council’s working methods. On the other hand, there was considerable gap in the convening of thematic sessions that were included in the annual plan of 2020. While some of these thematic sessions were not convened altogether, some did not take place at the planned frequency. For instance, the annual indicative plan included a session dedicated to climate change, which did not take place throughout the year. Similarly, Council planned to have a consultative meeting with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and another one with the Pan-African Parliament, both of which were not convened. A briefing by the Panel of the Wise, to take place twice within the year and every six months was another one of Council’s plans for 2020, which was not implemented.

Regarding the frequency of planned sessions, one example is Council’s plan to receive briefings on elections in Africa every three months, making the projected briefings on the topic four. However, only one briefing session was convened during the year on elections in Africa. Another example is Council’s plan to review post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) efforts in the Continent, twice within the year, although only one session was dedicated to the theme. Similarly, while Council was planned to receive once every three months, a briefing from the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA) on terrorism and violent extremism in the continent, two sessions were committed to the theme itself and neither one was a briefing by CISSA. Other thematic topics such as ‘women, peace and security’, ‘children affected by armed conflicts’ and ‘plight of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)’ which form part of Council’s standing agenda items were on the other hand successfully convened at the planned regularity.

In addition to the sessions planned for 2020, Council was also unable to carry out some of its regular activities, principally the induction of new PSC members and carrying out field missions. While four field visits were planned to take place to conflict affected AU member States within the year, only one field mission – to South Sudan – was conducted. It is also to be recalled that Council did not develop programme of work or assign official chairs for the months of August and December 2020.

Council’s annual indicative plan for 2021 has been largely similar to that of 2020’s with a few changes such as the plan to convene two sessions on children affected by armed conflicts (only one session was dedicated for that theme in 2020). So far into the year, Council has been able to convene multiple sessions, which were included in its yearly indicative programme, as well as some, which were introduced in its monthly programmes due to developing changes in the continent’s peace and security landscape. It has also been clear that the current year has shown progress in terms of achieving implementation of Council’s planned activities, as compared to 2020. For example, Council has been able to consider AU Commission Chairperson’s reports on elections in Africa twice already and has also convened a session on the impacts of Covid-19 on elections on the continent. This comes closer to meeting its projected plan of convening a session on that theme once every three months. Moreover, Council has also been able to convene its 13th retreat during the year in addition to conducting field visits to three countries (Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Sudan) as well as a fact-finding mission to Chad and its evaluation mission to Mali. Predictably, Council’s ability to adopt to its new working mechanisms developed in response to Covid-19 pandemic has contributed to its ability to better implement its planned annual activities in 2021. In addition, Council’s 2020 programme was more or less seized with sessions on the novel Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts on peace and security in Africa, making it difficult to maintain the original plan of activities.

While the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic has seriously impeded the implementation of Council’s programmes according to plan, there were also other contributing institutional issues which continue to impose challenges to the successful implementation of the Council’s work plans. Among these and perhaps a primary one is the shortage of human, financial and material capacity. Activities such as field missions and visits to conflict affected AU member States as well as the day-to-day activities of the PSC Secretariat and the regular meetings of Council members require considerable resources. Overcoming these challenges will require commitment from member states to make adequate contributions to enable the Council carryout all of its activities.

Another challenge which was also observed in PSC’s 2020 Activities Report – submitted to the AU Assembly’s 33rd Ordinary Session of February 20201 – is the lack of eligible, accredited ambassadors of PSC member States. Despite the requirement under Rule 18 of the PSC Rules of Procedure for each member state of the PSC to be represented at Council meetings by accredited representatives, this hasn’t always been the case. As the 2020 Activities Report indicates, of the fifteen PSC member States, five had no representatives. The appointment of ambassadors at the AU Headquarter to take part in Council’s activities including undertaking the rotational task of chairing the Council and drafting monthly programmes is not only a requirement but also essential for the smooth functioning of the PSC.

The current year has also shown that despite progress obtained in Council’s efforts to address conflict situations on the continent, there have also been cases of regress and outbreak of new conflicts. In relation to that, certain crises and conflict situations did not feature in the Council’s agenda.

On the other hand, the changing landscape of peace and security, mainly the clear resurgence of coups in Africa during 2021 has also meant that Council had to accommodate emerging situations in its work plan. These challenges notwithstanding, Council has been able to manage most of its planned activities for the current year so far. However, the experience has been an opportunity to reflect on the timeliness of early warning and early action. This will assist not only in identifying and averting possibilities of crisis and conflicts, it will also contribute to the PSC’s ability to prepare on how it may respond to such situations more quickly and effectively.

The new structure of the AU Commission particularly the merger of the Peace and Security Department and the Department of Political Affairs, leading to the formation of the new PAPS Department presents a new policy environment. It is therefore important to reflect on such changes and their implication on the mandate and work of the PSC. With the current increased engagement between AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), it is also important to reflect on policy coordination towards more effective response and management to conflicts.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is unknown at the time of drafting this insight. Council may reflect on the challenges including the ones identified above and discuss the practical steps to address such challenges. It may call on AU member states and partners to consolidate their support and collaboration with the PSC. Council may particularly emphasise the importance of strict application of Article 5(h) of the PSC Protocol in the selection of PSC member States in order to ensure that elected members are fully capable of shouldering the responsibilities entailed by membership to the Council. It may call on member states and the AU to support its work. It may also underscore the importance of policy harmonization and coordination of efforts between the PSC and the various AU mechanisms and policy organs, which contribute, to the maintenance of peace and security including the RECs/RMs. Council may also recall and recommit to the agreements listed under section III of the Conclusions of its 13th Retreat (Mombasa Retreat) relating to challenges on compliance to PSC instruments and the ways forward in addressing these.

Tomorrow (25 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1000th session dedicated to an appraisal of the 17 years journey of the Council. While the Council came into operation in March 2004, it was during its 10th session held for first time at the level of Heads of State and Government that the PSC was officially launched on the occasion of the celebration of Africa Day on 25 May 2004.

In marking the 17th years anniversary of the launch of the PSC and its 1000th session during tomorrow’s session, the PSC will conduct the session in a hybrid form combining a physical meeting with participation virtually. For the occasion, the PSC has invited all the former AU Commissioners for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, Ramtane Lamamra & Smail Chergui and Directors of the Peace and Security Department, El-Ghassim wane and Kambudzi Ademore Mupoki.

Highlighting the level of institutionalization of the PSC and its working methods, the number of PSC meetings between 2004 and 2021 shows a fourfold increase from the 21 meetings that the PSC held during its first year of operation. Since 2015, the PSC meets on a monthly basis for an average not less than six times. While its Rules of Procedure came into operation when the PSC became operational and served, together with the PSC Protocol, as the framework for guiding the work of the PSC, the PSC elaborated the specifics of its working methods through the Conclusions of the Dakar Retreat of the PSC held in August 2007. In 2019, the PSC consolidated the Conclusions of the Dakar Retreat and the conclusions of the subsequent 11 retreats on its working methods into the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC. The PSC Secretariat has become not only the technical arm for the standardized conduct of the business of the PSC but also the custodian of its institutional memory. The two main subsidiary bodies of the PSC, the Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee, have achieved full operationalization, availing the PSC useful support despite capacity limitations.

As at the end of December 2020, 52 of the 55 member States of the AU are parties to the PSC Protocol. The three countries that are not yet parties to the Protocol are Cabo Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. Following the elections held in February 2020, out of the 52 States Parties to the PSC Protocol, the number of States that served as members of the PSC reached 40. The States Parties to the PSC Protocol that never served on the PSC include the Central African Republic, Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritius, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Somalia.

Disaggregating the 1000 sessions of the PSC offers useful insights about how the PSC deployed its very finite time and resources over the years. Of the total number of PSC sessions, about 70% have been on country/region specific situations. The PSC used the remaining 30% of its sessions for thematic issues, consultative meetings with other AU organs and institutions, the UN Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the EU, LAS and the ICRC.

Although situations from all parts of the continent featured on the agenda of the PSC, the regional distribution of the sessions of the PSC shows notable variations in terms of PSC engagements across the five regions of the continent. 46% or nearly half of the sessions of the PSC dedicated to county/regional situations dealt with situations in the East Africa region. Much of the focus of these sessions focusing on this region have been on Somalia and the two Sudans. Both Somalia and Sudan have been on the agenda of the PSC since its establishment in 2004. And regardless of progress achieved over the years in relation to the situations in both countries, they continue to face major political and security challenges and are therefore still in the agenda of the Council. South Sudan, which has been on Council’s agenda since 2012 has also been considered at a relatively high frequency, although Mali and Sahel and Guinea Bissua featured more on the agenda of the PSC than other situations in this region.

After East Africa, West Africa featured most regularly on the agenda of the PSC, accounting for more than 25% of the sessions of the PSC. Compared to East Africa, where Somalia and the Sudans account for more than 2/3 of the activities of the PSC in the region, more countries in West Africa were on the agenda of the PSC more regularly. The political instability and ever-increasing terrorist threat in Mali and the Sahel region continue to be one of the major security concerns for the PSC. Central Africa, with 19% of sessions, comes next in place. Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all been on Council’s agenda since the early days of its establishment. CAR and DRC, which make the highest number of PSC’s sessions in the region respectively, are still part of Council’s agenda.

In comparison to the three regions, there are fewer number of PSC sessions on the situations in Northern and Southern Africa. Of the two, northern Africa takes the lead with 9% of the total sessions. From the northern region, the situation that dominates the agenda of the PSC is that of Libya. Other situations that featured on the agenda of the PSC include those of Western Sahara, Egypt and Tunisia. Sothern Africa is the region with the least number of situations on the agenda of the PSC making up only about 1 % of the total country/region specific sessions. Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe have all at some point been considered by Council although none have continuously featured on its agenda. South Africa has also been addressed by the PSC in the context of the 2019 xenophobic attacks in the country.

Though the peace and security framework of the AU anchored on the PSC is still relatively young, the foregoing shows that it has come a long way both in terms of its institutionalization and in initiating efforts for maintaining peace and security on the continent. Its 17 years of journey make the PSC well positioned to become the leading platform for peace and security decision- making on the continent. As its engagement witnessed huge expansion and acquired increasing, though sometimes challenged, authority, the PSC has come to significantly affect the politics of AU member States, the relations between them and ultimately Africa’s relations with the wider international community and the latter’s engagement on peace and security issues on the continent.

Perhaps more than the successes registered, tomorrow’s session is of particular importance for reflecting on the challenges facing the PSC and the gap between the ambitions of the PSC protocol and the practice of the PSC. Indeed, as the PSC marks its 1000th session, increasing number of questions are emerging on the effectiveness of the work of the PSC and the way it conducts its business and the adequacy of some of its tools. The relapse of countries in transition back to conflict, the persistence of existing conflicts and the eruption of new conflicts and crises as well as the violence and insecurity from the spread of terrorism have put a spotlight on the effectiveness of the PSC conflict prevention, peacebuilding and conflict management and resolution activities.

Despite the decline witnessed in the number and scale of conflicts during 2000s, there has been notable increase in the number and nature of conflicts in the conflict from around 2011. The changes in the nature of conflicts and the challenges arising from emerging security threats call for response mechanisms that are prompt, agile and robust. These raise major questions on a) the security instruments that best fit for responding to changing security challenges, b) the adequacy of the political and institutional frameworks of the AU and c) the provision of the required level of leadership and resources by member States.

Addressing both the persistence of violent conflicts & crises and the enormous gap between the ambitions of the PSC Protocol and the actual practice of the PSC requires that the PSC addresses the various issues undermining its effectiveness.

The first set of challenges relate to the uneven implementation of the mandate of the PSC. This has two dimensions. The first relates to the fact that the level of implementation of the conflict prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding functions of the PSC. The PSC has predominantly operated like a ‘fire-brigade’. Hence, fire-fighting – dealing with conflicts after they have erupted – has become the dominant feature of the work of the PSC. As a result, other dimensions of the mandate of the PSC, notably conflict prevention, have been poorly implemented. Second, the PSC has not been consistent in its approach of putting conflict situations on its agenda. The PSC faces a charge of applying a double standard by intervening in some conflicts and failing to do so in other conflicts of similar, or even more serious, gravity.

The second set of challenges relate to capacity issues. In terms of diplomatic resources and technical expertise, despite the requirements of the PSC Protocol for member States to be in good standing and to have the capacity to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, a number of states still lack the required staff complement and technical expertise at the AU headquarters and the material capacity to effectively support the implementation of the decisions of the PSC. A number of member States also lack the required technical expertise that provide dedicated analysis for and follow up on the activities of the PSC. Similarly, the size and technical capacity of the AU Commission (AUC) is inadequate to support the PSC in all aspects of its mandate. Additionally, there are several subsidiary bodies of the PSC that are not operationalized. There is also the perennial issue of the mismatch between the diplomatic, logistic, technical and financial resources that the AU and its member States are willing to commit and what the implementation of the decisions of the PSC requires.

The PSC also faces political challenges. Despite the fact that member States of the AU made commitments under various AU instruments including the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC, on various occasions the pursuit of national policy interests in member States engagement on peace and security issues without due regard to AU policy and normative requirements undermined PSC’s efforts and frustrated the emergence of timely and robust response. Recently, this has led to major retrogression when the PSC failed to uphold its zero tolerance policy for military seizure of power, severely denting its credibility as far as the application of AU’s norm banning unconstitutional changes of government is concerned. Additionally, there is a trend of States invoking sovereignty for blocking or resisting the role of the PSC as witnessed during the previous few years and in the course of this year.

The other set of challenges lie in the realm of policy and operational coordination between the PSC and regional economic communities and/or mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The AU and RECs/RMs have experienced increasing interaction punctuated by tension over the leadership of, and division of responsibility in, the management of various crises.

As it did during the 10th anniversary of the PSC, it is anticipated that the PSC will issue a communique. The communique is expected to acknowledge the progress registered in the execution of the mandate of the PSC. It is also expected to set out proposals for addressing the challenges that the PSC faces in dealing with the peace and security challenges of the continent, including those outlined above.