Tomorrow (23 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will hold their 20^th annual joint consultative meeting in New York, covering four agenda items: identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, and the situations in Sudan, South Sudan and eastern DRC.

The Consultative meeting will be co-chaired by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and PSC Chairperson for October, and Aghi Balta, Permanent Representative of Greece to the UN and UNSC President for October. Rosemary DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, are expected to deliver remarks during the meeting.

On the situation in Sudan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia will co-lead the PSC, while Liberia, Russia, Panama and Pakistan will lead from the UNSC side.

Discussions are expected to build on recent engagements, including the UNSC’s open briefing and closed consultations on 16 October and the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum. The PSC may share its observations on the widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis, while discussions are likely to focus on diplomatic initiatives and coordination among mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.

The Councils may also welcome the first joint high-level meeting of the Quad and Quintet on 23 September. A follow-up meeting scheduled for 20–21 October in Switzerland aims to coordinate ceasefire efforts and preparations for political transition. The consultative meeting therefore offers an opportunity to assess progress towards a ceasefire and an inclusive political process leading to civilian rule.

On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, the Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and criticised the statement of the AU Commission, warning that a political process under military control without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division.

External involvement in the conflict may also feature prominently. The September 2026 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. At its 1218^th session in June 2024, the PSC also tasked its Sub-Committee on Sanctions with identifying external actors supporting the warring parties and proposing measures to contain their involvement. The Councils may therefore explore closer coordination between the PSC’s Sub-Committee and the UNSC Sudan Sanctions Committee to address external support networks undermining peace efforts.

On identifying and optimising future resources and support mechanisms for AUSSOM, Uganda and Nigeria will represent the PSC, while Somalia and the United Kingdom will co-lead from the UNSC.

The discussions come ahead of the UNSC’s consideration of the mission’s mandate renewal in December, which provides the two Councils to exchange views on the future of the mission. Since commencing operations in January 2025, AUSSOM has faced severe financial constraints, having deployed without predictable and sustainable funding. The AU has consistently advocated applying Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM as its first test case, considering it the most viable framework for securing adequate, predictable and sustainable financing. However, the United States has strongly opposed this approach. It is to be recalled that the application of Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM was one of the most contentious issues at last year’s consultative meeting.

The financial crisis has been compounded by the US announcement in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires on 31 December 2026. UNSOS provides essential logistical support, including fuel, rations, medical and casualty evacuation, aviation, communications and reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment. (For further analysis of the financial and logistical challenges facing AUSSOM and their implications for the future of the mission, see here and here.)

Against this backdrop, the second Extraordinary Summit of AUSSOM Troop-Contributing Countries and Somalia, held in Kampala on 31 July, called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UNSC to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. This would facilitate agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated foreign ministers of troop-contributing countries, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.

Given the financial and logistical challenges, sustaining AUSSOM until its envisaged exit in 2029 appears increasingly difficult. Yet an abrupt withdrawal risks reversing security gains, underscoring the need for a realistic, well-supported transition. With little prospect of reversing US opposition to applying Resolution 2719, discussions may shift toward interim support arrangements and an orderly, coordinated and phased drawdown.

On the situation in eastern DRC, Gabon, Cameroon and Sierra Leone will represent the PSC, while DRC, France and China will co-lead from the UNSC.

The Councils are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across mediation tracks. The UNSC received briefings on DRC and MONUSCO on 29 September and the Great Lakes region on 13 October, while the PSC is scheduled to hear from AU facilitators on 27 October. Attention may focus on the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ October shuttle diplomacy, involving meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October to advance existing peace commitments.

Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including establishing its secretariat and conducting reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. A trilateral planning conference involving DRC, Rwanda and the US was envisaged for October.

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire. During his October UNSC briefing, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes highlighted persistent hostilities, increasing use of armed drones and civilian suffering. He also warned about the spread of Ebola and continued regional distrust, reflected in tensions between Kigali and Kinshasa and between Kinshasa and Burundi. Another significant development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition under former President Joseph Kabila, potentially further complicating the situation.

The main question for the Councils will be whether diplomatic progress is translating into reduced hostilities and tangible improvements on the ground. Discussions may therefore emphasise coordination among the AU-led, Doha and Washington processes, effective implementation and verification of commitments, and avoiding fragmented mediation efforts that could undermine a durable political settlement.

On the situation in South Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda and DRC will co-lead from the PSC, while the United States, Denmark, Latvia, Bahrain and Colombia will represent the UNSC.

Discussions are expected to focus on the elections scheduled for 22 December 2026 and the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The UNSC will consider South Sudan in November, while the PSC last addressed the situation at its 1364^th session on 26 August. Despite serious political, security, operational and financial obstacles to credible elections, the PSC reiterated that the transitional mandate ‘must conclusively end in February 2027 without further extension’. Although it decided to hold a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October, it does not appear in its October Programme of Work, missing an opportunity to receive the latest updates on electoral preparations and consider appropriate preventive measures.

The AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) has recently intensified its engagement, including the July visit to Juba and virtual C5 Plus summits in February and on 29 September. The Councils may therefore draw on the PSC’s 1364^th session, the AU Pre-Election Assessment Mission held in August and the latest C5 Plus Declaration.

One of the main questions facing the consultative meeting will be whether prevailing conditions allow credible elections without further exacerbating political tensions and insecurity. The government appears determined to proceed with polls in December. In July, President Salva Kiir signed constitutional amendments delinking permanent constitution-making and the national census from elections. In September, he unilaterally dissolved the transitional unity government, including the national legislature and state governments, removed five Vice-Presidents and appointed a caretaker administration accountable only to him and operating outside the R-ARCSS.

Against this backdrop, the 29 September C5 Plus Declaration acknowledged electoral preparations but stressed outstanding political, technical, operational, financial, legal and security requirements for peaceful, credible, inclusive and transparent elections. It also called for urgent confidence-building measures, including considering the release of political detainees, particularly Dr Riek Machar, to promote national cohesion and reconciliation.

Importantly, the Declaration requested the AU Commission, in consultation with IGAD and the UN, to establish a joint AU–IGAD–UN task force under C5 auspices. Working closely with the AU High Representative, the task force would support preventive diplomacy, strengthen coordination, monitor implementation of agreed measures, and provide political oversight and strategic guidance to support South Sudanese ownership of the peace process and the electoral transition. Given the heightened risk of violence, the two Councils may reiterate and follow up on the operationalisation of this mechanism as a practical avenue for coordinated preventive diplomacy for facilitating inclusive agreement on the convening of the elections, including on the timing and conditions of the elections.

It remains uncertain whether the two Councils will adopt a joint communiqué, having failed to do so last year due to disagreements over several contentious issues (for details, see Amani Africa’s Monthly Digest on the AUPSC for October 2025). Instead, the meeting concluded with a joint press statement. For this year’s meeting, the UNSC, as host, has initiated a relatively shorter draft joint communiqué. The PSC travelled from Addis Ababa to New York on 17 October, with negotiations on the draft scheduled for 19–20 October. If the Councils fail to agree even on the shorter draft, they may once again settle for a joint press statement.