The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 22 April 2025
Tomorrow (23 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will discuss the imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Following opening remarks by Rebecca Amuge Otengo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU and stand-in Chair of the PSC for April 2025, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to deliver a statement. It is also expected that presentations will be delivered by Moses Vilakati, Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), Emmanuel Budu Addo, Director of Administration, Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), the Coordinating Commander of the Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) and the Representative of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, representatives of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are expected to deliver statements.
The development of the Maritime Task Force by the PSC has evolved progressively. The first mention of the initiative was in the PSC’s 1012th session on 23 July 2021, where the Council called on the AU Commission, in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), to promote cooperation and establish a Maritime Task Force among African littoral states. Building on this, the PSC’s 1128th session on 19 December 2022 acknowledged efforts by the Chiefs of Naval Staff, who met in Port Harcourt, Nigeria, in May 2022, to advance the establishment of the Regional Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea. This marked a transition from political commitment to concrete regional action, with a call for broader support from Member States and stakeholders. By the 1174th session on 18 September 2023, further institutional advancements were made, particularly through a follow-up Technical Committee Meeting in Dakar in August 2022, where a technical expert committee was established to guide the Task Force’s development. The PSC urged continued support from Member States and stakeholders to sustain these efforts. Finally, the 1209th session on 18 April 2024 marked a significant milestone as the PSC welcomed the formal establishment of the CMTF in May 2022 and the adoption of its Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by ten Gulf of Guinea countries, solidifying the Task Force as a regional mechanism for collective rapid response to maritime security threats. This trajectory demonstrates a structured approach to addressing maritime security challenges, moving from initial policy discussions to concrete operationalisation. However, ensuring the sustainability of the Task Force and enhancing inter-agency coordination remain critical considerations for the future. It is therefore expected that the PSC’s discussion will mainly focus on those two aspects.
The imperative to sustain and institutionalise maritime security mechanisms in the Gulf of Guinea stems from its strategic significance as the largest contiguous maritime space in Africa. Unlike the relatively narrower maritime spaces of North Africa’s Mediterranean coast or East Africa’s corridor near the Middle East, the Gulf of Guinea opens into the vast Atlantic Ocean, linking Africa to North and South America. This strategic positioning makes it one of the most navigable and economically significant maritime regions on the continent. Its importance is further amplified by continent-wide initiatives such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which depend on secure and efficient maritime trade routes.
Regarding the scope of discussions during tomorrow’s session, it is important to note that while the agenda indicates the PSC will focus on the role of ‘the CMTF in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea’, the region’s security challenges extend well beyond piracy. The Gulf of Guinea faces a complex and evolving array of maritime threats, including hijackings and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Fishing vessels are often linked to broader illicit activities, worsening economic losses, depleting marine resources, and driving coastal communities into poverty—conditions that increase vulnerability to piracy and transnational crimes such as drug and human trafficking, illicit trade, and arms smuggling. Adding to the instability is the growing threat of terrorism closer to coastal states. Moreover, as maritime domains become contested spaces for geopolitical rivalry and competing claims, the risk of undermining unified security efforts deepens.
In this context, tomorrow’s session presents a critical opportunity to reassess how the CMTF can be effectively leveraged not only to combat piracy but also as a broader platform to address the interlinked maritime and coastal security threats facing the Gulf of Guinea.
While the decline in incidents of piracy by 22% in 2024 from the 2023 levels, representing only 22% of all the incidents reported in 2020, highlights the contribution of regional collective action, experts caution that piracy networks remain active and capable of resurgence if current security efforts are not sustained. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus not only on maintaining the downward trend but also on ensuring the long-term institutionalisation of maritime security mechanisms and ensuring the implementation of the Lome Charter and the AU’s blue economy plans.
As outlined in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) adopted in April 2023 by the Chiefs of Naval Staff and Coastguards of 10 countries in the GoG region, the CMTF is envisioned as a multinational, rapid-response force led by the AU and operating in coordination with regional bodies such as ECOWAS and ECCAS. Designed to provide real-time operational capacity, the CMTF aims to address a range of maritime threats, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, transnational organised crime, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and maritime terrorism. Recognising the vast and complex maritime landscape of the GoG, the CONOPS divides the area into three operational sectors to enhance coordination and responsiveness: Sector North, headquartered in Senegal; Sector Central, based in Lagos, Nigeria; and Sector South, located in Pointe-Noire, Congo. This tri-sector approach treats the GoG as a single operational theatre, enabling integrated and collaborative maritime security efforts across national boundaries. In line with this structure, President Bola Tinubu, during the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, called on the PSC to formally establish the CMTF and reaffirmed Nigeria’s readiness to host its headquarters in Lagos.
The establishment of the CMTF raises an important question: how does it align with the Yaoundé Architecture? According to the CMTF Coordinating Commander, Mohammad Saghir Shettima, the establishment of the CMTF aims to address a key limitation of the Yaoundé Architecture—its reliance on voluntary state responses, which often delays operational action due to resource and priority constraints. While the Yaoundé Architecture has proven to be effective in coordination and intelligence-sharing, the CMTF could enhance it by providing a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid, coordinated maritime responses. He also indicated that this bridges the gap between early warning and action, strengthening regional maritime security. However, despite its strategic relevance, progress toward the full establishment and operationalisation of the CMTF has been limited since its establishment in 2022. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to focus on outlining the financial and logistical commitments required from the side of the AU to ensure the effective deployment and functionality of the Task Force.
In addition to the foregoing, tomorrow’s session is also expected to follow up on other initiatives for coordination and enhanced collective action in the maritime domain, including those envisaged in the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS). This provided for a coordinated approach to maritime security, the establishment of a Naval Component within the African Standby Force (ASF), and the formation of a Committee of Heads of African Navies and Coastguards. The Council may also follow up on the first ASF maritime exercise. Noting the financial, logistical, and institutional challenges, the AU Commission is expected to provide updates on the planning of the upcoming maritime command post exercise, based on the concept note developed during the AU Continental Maritime Exercise Concept Development Workshop held in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2024. Members of the PSC will be particularly interested in receiving detailed information on budgetary requirements, logistical arrangements, and organisational planning. It is also anticipated that any developments regarding the establishment of the CHANs working group will be shared. More broadly, it would be of interest for PSC members to receive update on the establishment of a Group of Experts or a Task Force to provide technical support to Member States and other stakeholders in delivering on the AU 2050 AIM Strategy and the implementation of the Lomé Charter and the establishment of a coordination mechanism or Unit on Maritime Security within the AU Commission.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a communique. The PSC may reiterate the importance of strengthening collaboration with regional partners to improve intelligence sharing, coordinate joint patrols, and bolster counter-terrorism efforts for maritime security and regional stability in the Gulf of Guinea. Along those lines, the PSC may urge Gulf of Guinea Commission Member States to strengthen political backing for the effective launch of the CMTF to boost regional maritime security efforts. The PSC may in this respect take note with commendation the interest that Nigeria expressed for hosting the headquarters of the CMTF. It may also reiterate its request for the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of a dedicated Maritime Security Coordination Unit to provide institutional leadership, coordination, and oversight of the CMTF and broader continental maritime security initiatives. In this regard, the PSC may also request the Commission, in collaboration with RECs/RMs and Member States, to develop a costed implementation plan and resource mobilisation strategy for the CMTF. To enhance operational coherence, the PSC may recommend strengthened coordination between the CMTF and existing Yaoundé Architecture structures—particularly the Interregional Coordination Centre (ICC), CRESMAC, and CRESMAO—supported by the development of standard operating procedures to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and response. Furthermore, the PSC may reiterate the call for the immediate activation and formal institutionalisation of CHANs as a continental advisory and coordination mechanism, and request the AU Commission to report on its operationalisation. Lastly, the PSC may also retreat its previous decisions calling for the establishment of a Group of Experts or Task Force to provide technical assistance to Member States in implementing the AU’s maritime security agenda, including the 2050 AIMS, Lomé Charter, and CONOPS of the CMTF.
