Abdul Mohammed, Senior Fellow at Amani Africa and Former Senior UN Official and Chief of Staff of AU High-level Panel on Sudan

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD, Founding Director, Amani Africa

A Moment of Convergence — and Risk

After nearly three years of devastating war, Sudan stands at a dangerous but decisive moment. Millions are displaced. Famine advances. Civilians are targeted deliberately. The state has been hollowed out. What began as a power struggle within the security establishment has evolved into a regionalised conflict system sustained by external actors, war economies, and geopolitical competition.

Yet, amid this devastation, something important is happening. Mediation efforts that once moved in parallel — African, trans-regional, and international — are slowly, painfully, and hesitantly moving toward some form of convergence. This convergence, however incomplete and thin, opens a window of opportunity.

That window must not be wasted.

The immediate imperative is clear: the war must stop. An immediate humanitarian truce is indispensable. It is not a concession. Sparing Sudanese from further death, mayhem and displacement is a moral and political necessity. But a truce cannot become an end in itself. It must be explicitly and credibly linked to a parallel political process aimed at restoring civilian authority and democratic self-determination.

This is very difficult — but it is doable.

War dynamics and deal-making among powerful external actors, particularly within the Quad, may shift the sequencing of negotiations. Adjustments may be necessary. The order in which security, humanitarian, and political tracks unfold may need recalibration. But if the overarching objective remains Sudan’s unity and sustainable peace, then maintaining convergence around a common political end-state of a comprehensive political settlement is indispensable.

Sudan’s predicament cannot be remedied by reverting to failed ideologies or procedural fixes. The crisis reflects long cycles of militarisation, exclusion, and broken democratic promises. Yet across decades and in the current difficult context— from uprisings to neighbourhood resistance committees — the Sudanese people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a persistent demand for dignity and self-rule.

The challenge now is to craft a political order that finally matches the integrity and democratic aspirations of the Sudanese populace. That will require honesty, new thinking, and a break from formalistic responses that confuse activity with progress.

Sudan’s war has outgrown the mediation models currently applied to it. Unless that mismatch is addressed directly, even well-intentioned initiatives risk stabilising violence rather than resolving it.

A War Beyond Traditional Mediation

Sudan’s war is no longer primarily sustained by internal political disagreement. It has evolved into a regionalised conflict system driven by three forces: a struggle over sovereignty and coercive authority inside Sudan; a transnational war economy benefiting domestic and external actors; and sustained political, military, and financial intervention by regional and extra-regional powers.

Most mediation efforts have focused on elite bargaining between belligerents while treating war economies and external sponsors as secondary factors. The result has been repeated cycles of talks that unravel as battlefield realities or external incentives shift.

Mediation has been procedural when it needed to be structural.

Against this backdrop, five possible trajectories now confront Sudan.

Scenario One: Procedural Mediation and Strategic Drift

Under this scenario, mediation continues largely as it has. Ceasefires are negotiated. Conferences are convened. Civilian actors are consulted but not empowered. External actors are acknowledged but not structurally engaged.

The assumption is that persistence and incremental sequencing will eventually yield progress.

The likely outcome is a prolonged stalemate. Armed actors participate tactically. Civilian forces grow disillusioned. Institutional credibility erodes slowly. Mediation becomes a permanent process without transformation — a technical ritual bereft of strategic significance and outcome.

Scenario Two: Humanitarian De-escalation Without Political Settlement

Here, the immediate priority becomes stopping violence through negotiated truces and humanitarian access arrangements, even if political questions are deferred.

This approach may save lives in the short term. Such an outcome is of itself significant for civilians. It should not be dismissed. Indeed, a humanitarian truce is urgently needed.

But if such de-escalation is not explicitly linked to a political process, it risks entrenching militarised governance. Ceasefires become instruments of consolidation rather than transition. Relief becomes conditional on compliance by armed actors.

The danger is a frozen conflict — quieter, but structurally unchanged.

Scenario Three: Civilian Convergence Without Leverage

In this trajectory, Sudanese civilian forces and segments of the international community align around a shared vision for civilian rule. Declarations multiply. Political clarity increases. Fragmentation is reduced.

This convergence is necessary and welcome, although the pathway to that is yet to be found.

But without leverage over war economies and external sponsors, alignment alone cannot shift power on the ground. Expectations rise without mechanisms to meet them. Civilian unity risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative.

Convergence without leverage produces frustration.

Scenario Four: Deal-Driven Stabilisation — The Board of Peace Model

A more consequential trajectory is emerging. With the establishment of a Board of Peace under U.S. chairmanship and the growing centrality of the Quad, Sudan may become a candidate for essentially a deal-driven stabilisation.

Under this model, similar to scenario two, the priority is immediate cessation of fighting. Negotiations focus on belligerents and their sponsors. Political settlement is deferred. Unlike scenario two, material incentives and strategic bargains replace structural transformation.

Multilateral institutions may provide retrospective endorsement, converting power arrangements into formally legitimate ones.

Such a model may produce rapid de-escalation. It may mobilise leverage unavailable to traditional mediation.

But such an arrangement could entail:  Sovereignty may be functionally outsourced. Civilian politics may be indefinitely postponed. Sudan could enter a trusteeship-like condition governed through external deal-making.

For Africa, the precedent could be consequential: the deferring of multilateralism in favour of ad hoc power arrangements and the total loss of any agency on the governance of the affairs of the continent.

Scenario Five: Re-Engineered Mediation — Convergence with Leverage

The final scenario does not reject the others. It learns from them.

From Scenario One, it retains procedural discipline and institutional continuity. From Scenario Two, it affirms the urgent necessity of a humanitarian truce. From Scenario Three, it preserves and deepens civilian convergence. From Scenario Four, it recognises that real leverage — including that held by powerful external actors — cannot be ignored.

But it integrates these elements into a redesigned, power-aware mediation architecture.

This approach would secure an immediate humanitarian truce; explicitly link that truce to a parallel, time-bound political process; structure engagement with external sponsors; introduce mechanisms to disrupt war economies; reframe neutrality as principled engagement with power; and preserve African multilateral relevance while utilising available leverage responsibly.

Sequencing may shift. Tactical adjustments may be necessary. But the end-state — a united Sudan governed through a constitutional trajectory — must remain explicit and non-negotiable.

Durable stability for citizens, neighbours, and investors alike depends on democratic self-determination. Anything less will produce only temporary calm.

Choosing Intention Over Drift

Sudan is at a crossroads — not only between war and peace, but between competing doctrines of mediation.

Stopping the war is imperative. A humanitarian truce is urgent. But peace cannot be reduced to containment, nor politics postponed indefinitely.

Sudan’s people have repeatedly demonstrated courage, dignity, and resistance. What is required now is a mediation strategy worthy of that resilience — one that matches moral clarity with structural realism.

The choice before Sudan and its partners is not between realism and principle. It is between managed disorder and intentional transformation.

Peace remains possible — but only if convergence is secured and preserved, leverage is structured, and Sudanese political agency, buttressed by pan-African multilateral support, is placed at the centre.