Tomorrow (3 July), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1287th session at the ministerial level to receive an update on the situation in Somalia and the operations of the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).

The session is expected to commence with opening remarks by Uganda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chair of the PSC for July 2025, General Jeje Odongo, followed by an introductory statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Somalia, Ali Mohamed Omar, as well as representatives from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU), are also expected to deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s ministerial meeting comes as the timeline for the completion of the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM came to an end on 30 June 2025. The last briefing to the PSC on AUSSOM operations took place during its 1276th session, held on 29 April. It focused on ongoing efforts towards the operationalisation of the mission. During that session, the PSC endorsed the Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) for AUSSOM, along with the breakdown of the contribution of each T/PCC. The PSC also called on the T/PCCs and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), in coordination with the AU Commission, to finalise the necessary steps for the full and expeditious deployment of the mission.

As 30 June marked the end of Phase I of the mission, during which all AU troops were envisaged to transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM, a major development likely to be highlighted by the AU Commission is the negotiation on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). Pending the finalisation of the signing of the MoU and Status of Force Agreement as well as the completion of ‘the AU and UN procedures to expediate the deployment of Egyptian troops,’ Burundian troops and Ghana’s Formed Police Unit (FPU), as well as the Sierra Leone FPU would need to remain. PSC is expected to extend the timeline for the repatriation of Burundian troops and Ghanaian FPUs as well as the relocation of Sierra Leon’s FPUs.

The session is also expected to follow up on the outcome of the Kampala Summit of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) on 25 April 2025. It is to be recalled that the TCCs Summit underscored the need to augment AUSSOM troop strength of 11,146 by at least 8,000 through a bilateral arrangement to address the deteriorating security situation in Somalia. The summit also endorsed the proposal for enhancing air assets and capabilities, as well as strengthening Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

The outcome of the Kampala Summit illustrates the gap between what is required for the effective functioning of AUSSOM and the achievement of its mandate on the one hand and the ‘operational shortfalls’ and the financing gaps facing the mission. While the Summit reiterated that ‘the best solution to adequate, predictable and sustainable funding is the application of the UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) on Somalia,’ the lack of support from the US meant that this option could not be applied for funding AUSSOM.  On 12 May 2025, the UN Security Council failed to authorise the activation of Resolution 2719, even in the hybrid format proposed by the UN Secretariat on the basis of Resolution 2767. The resultant lack of a reliable source of funding has cast serious doubt not only over AUSSOM’s effective functioning but also its continuity.

The estimated budget for AUSSOM from July 2025 to June 2026 is $166.5 million, based on a troop reimbursement rate of $828, according to the UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council dated 7 May 2025. However, the financial demands of the mission extend well beyond this figure. AUSSOM needs $92 million in urgent cash requirements for liabilities incurred from January to June 2025. Furthermore, arrears owed to TCCs from 2022 to 2024 total $93.9 million. In contrast, currently committed funding amounts to only $16.7 million, of which $10 million comes from the AU Peace Fund’s Crisis Reserve Facility. The mission’s liabilities continue to mount, with a need for at least $15 million per month.

With Resolution 2719 no longer presenting a viable funding pathway, the AU, T/PCCs, Somalia, and the wider international community now need to work on Plan B for addressing the existential financial crisis facing AUSSOM. The European Union (EU), the single largest direct contributor to AU missions in Somalia—with nearly €2.7 billion provided since 2007— is understandably not keen on maintaining previous levels of support, amid shifting geopolitical priorities. While some EU contributions may still be forthcoming, they are unlikely to bridge the funding gap. Similarly, support from non-traditional donors appears limited, as evidenced by the modest pledges from China, Japan, and South Korea, which amount to no more than $5.6 million.

Against this backdrop, a major area of interest to PSC members during tomorrow’s session is to receive an update on the options being explored and most notably the ongoing effort to organise a pledging conference for AUSSOM. The AU sees this as a potential lifeline for the mission. Although previous attempts to convene the conference in Doha, Qatar, during April and May did not materialise, efforts are underway. While the date is yet to be confirmed, the AU and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) are jointly proposing the convening of an AUSSOM Financing Conference. Tomorrow’s session is therefore expected to provide strategic guidance on fast-tracking the convening of the pledging conference, as well as on strategies to secure the necessary financial commitment from international partners.

An update on security and political developments in Somalia is expected to be another key focus of the session. AUSSOM and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) are working to reverse the recent territorial gains made by Al-Shabaab. A major development in this regard is the three-day joint operation code-named ‘Operation Silent Storm,’ launched in June by AUSSOM and SNAF against Al-Shabaab positions in the Lower Shabelle region. The operation, undertaken to recapture the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) of Sabiid Anole, Aw Degeele and Bashir that were lost to Al Shabaab, registered some success, most notably the recapturing of the key villages of Sabiid and Anole.

On the political front, tensions are escalating as divisions deepen over critical national issues, including the constitutional review process and the electoral model that will be used for the 2026 presidential election. Despite a lack of consensus, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appears determined to replace the long-standing clan-based indirect voting system with a one-person, one-vote model for the upcoming election. This has further deepened the rift in the political arena, with various political forces mobilising mounting opposition against the president, with some concerned by the disruption that the shift in the electoral model could cause to the delicate clan-based power-sharing arrangement.

In a development that added another layer of political disquiet, President Sheikh, along with several regional and political leaders, launched a new political party, the Justice and Solidarity Party, ahead of the 2026 election. The party includes leaders from three federal member states—South West, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug, with Puntland and Jubbaland, which remain at odds with the Federal Government, condemning the initiative as lacking constitutionality.

While recent efforts, including the National Consultative Conference (some of whose members were co-opted into the new political party) and the President’s engagement with opposition groups are encouraging, progress on key national issues should be grounded in careful negotiation and inclusive political engagement. As Somalia enters its electoral season, the shifting political landscape is expected to have significant implications for national security. Prolonged and deepening political infighting risks undermining collective and sustained action in bolstering security measures, including the fight against Al-Shabaab. As in the past, Al-Shabaab is likely to exploit such fractures for its own strategic gain.

Against this background, members of the PSC may also reflect on the kind of arrangement that needs to be put in place for stronger collaboration and accountability between the AU, FGS, and donors. As the PSC weighs on the quest for financing of AUSSOM, there is a need for considering a) the options for the immediate future of AUSSOM, b) the plan and options for its exit, c) the alternative security support for Somalia that may be required (including bilateral deployments) both for complementing AUSSOM and ensuring continuity as it draws down and exists and d) the kind of political process, including national reconciliation and negotiation, necessary for the resolution of the conflict involving Al Shabaab.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the successful bilateral negotiations on the draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which outlines the roles, responsibilities, and operational modalities for troop and police contributions to AUSSOM. The PSC may request the AU Commission to expedite the signing of the MoUs as one of the key steps in ending Phase I of the mission (realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM). The PSC may extend the timeline for repatriation of Burundian troops, while commending them for their irreplaceable contribution to the stabilisation of Somalia and calling for the finalization of deployment of Egyptian troops. Regarding the pledging conference, the PSC may urge the AU Commission, in collaboration with the Government of Somalia and international partners, to work on a solid plan that guarantees success in mobilising the funds required for addressing the dire shortfalls threatening the continuity of AUSSOM. The PSC is also expected to encourage international partners to make the necessary financial commitments. As the AU prepares for the Mid-Year Coordination Meeting later this month, the PSC may also request a continued allocation of an additional amount from the AU Peace Fund. The PSC may also task the AU Commission to develop a plan and options on the immediate future and the steps needed for a smooth drawdown and exit of the mission. Regarding the political situation in Somalia, the PSC is likely to encourage the Government of Somalia to engage in an inclusive political dialogue on key national issues and to ensure that political divisions do not undermine efforts to safeguard and strengthen the stabilisation process in Somalia.