Fikir Getachew
Assistant Researcher, Amani Africa

Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa

On 22 November 2024, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Peace and Security Committee (PSC) are scheduled to hold their 15^th annual consultative meeting hosted by the AUPSC at the AU Headquarters. This annual joint consultative meeting is being held under a cloud of uncertainty. For the past two consecutive years, the two organs had failed to adopt a joint communiqué capturing the outcome of their deliberations in the consultative meeting held in Addis Ababa in June 2022 and in Brussels in May 2023. It is feared that when the two sides meet this Friday, they may end up in another deadlock on the adoption of a joint communiqué.

The dealbreaker both in 2022 and 2023 has been the inclusion of a language in the communiqué on the war in Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 understandably triggered a strong reaction from the EU. For European countries and the EU, this war represents the first major war on European soil since World War II and is often characterised as being existential. EU and its member states thought that the longstanding partnership they have with the AU and its member states would enable them to secure support from the AU and its member states.

Indeed, the AU-EU partnership remains to be of significant value for the AU and is among the long-standing partnerships. For example, more than any other partnership, EU’s partnership is recognised as the most consequential, particularly in terms of peace and security. The EU receives and should receive a well-deserved recognition for its critical partnership in peace and security in Africa since the early 2000s. One can argue that the development and operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the deployment and sustenance of the large number of AU peace support operations from Darfur Sudan to Somalia and in between would not have been financially possible without the EU support.

The expectation in the EU was accordingly that African countries would automatically align with the position of the EU. While representatives of many African countries appreciate EU’s position,  particularly in terms of the fact that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a violation of fundamental principles of UN Charter and international law, they did not see their position vis-à-vis this war to be one of taking side with the EU. African countries, while against aggression of one country against another and hence a breach of fundamental principles of international law, did not see the war only through the lens of legality. As one observer of EU-AU relations also rightly pointed out, ‘for many African governments, the war in Ukraine is a result of great power contestation between the West and Russia, and they perceive a need for equidistance from these powers to hold space for the pursuit of African agency.’

There may be many AU member representatives who share the view that the breach of the sovereignty of one country by another is contrary to the UN Charter and international law. Yet, reluctant to be taking a position against Russia for this is not seen as a legal but a geopolitical issue. Admittedly, the reluctance of AU member states on joining the EU and others in taking a position against Russia is informed by various considerations. But one of the major factors is the belief on the part of many member states that this war is not just about legality but in the main constitutes a geopolitical war reminiscent of the Cold War. Since the Cold War was not actually cold when it played itself on the African continent but led to hot wars, there are many who are weary of being caught up in the crossfire of similar confrontations involving major powers.

EU countries and EU bodies expressed shock about the fact that African countries did not side with the EU. The sense of being let down was of such a nature on the part of some that they went as far as suggesting that they have to reconsider their partnership with the AU and their funding. A news report in July 2022 reported that ‘European diplomats have argued in a confidential report for a more ‘transactional’ approach to foreign aid that would tie funding for African countries to their willingness to work ‘based on common values and a joint vision’.

While there is increasing appreciation of the concerns of African countries, there is a continuing expectation on the part of the EU for having a language referencing the war in Ukraine. Further reinforcing this expectation at this material point in time is the current escalation of the war. As in the past two annual consultative meetings, the issue of Ukraine is not part of the formal agenda of the consultative meeting. Yet, as in the past, it is expected that the EU side would raise the matter from the floor.

As the two sides finalise their preparations for the meeting this coming Friday, there is no indication of a shift in the position of AU member states. AU member states still lack a common AU position to enable the PSC members adopt a policy position on the issue. From a process and policy-making perspective, the implication of this is that where there is no common AU position on a matter of global interest with major geopolitical implications such as this one, it would be very difficult for the PSC to take any position.

In view of the foregoing, a major issue is whether the AUPSC and EUPSC are going to have a repeat of what transpired during the past two consultative meetings and fail to adopt a communiqué or avoid a repeat of the same. Apart from causing frustration, the inability to adopt a communique can also strain the relationship between the two sides. It also signals that despite 12 years of convening annual consultative meetings the two don’t even have an understanding of what should and should not go into their joint consultative meeting.

Thus, whether the AUPSC and the EUPSC would have the same experience as the past two years and fail to adopt a joint communiqué depends on whether they are able to find avenues for mutual understanding of each other’s positions. This may be achieved if both sides show willingness to give each other an empathetic hearing. EU member states may show understanding of the political and institutional predicament AU member states face. On their part, the AU member states may reciprocally show their understanding and empathy for the gravity of EU’s concern regarding the war in Ukraine. They can agree to set aside an issue that the EU understandably consider to be of enormous importance and instead affirm their shared interest and common position on the various other agenda items of their consultative meeting.

Within the framework of the foregoing, consideration may be given to have the views of the EU PSC reflected as an annexe to the joint communiqué considering that it was not part of the agenda of the consultative meeting while the communiqué is confined to the agenda items agreed to for the joint consultative meeting. Additionally, they need to agree on terms of their working methods around the negotiation and adoption of a joint communique on issues not on the agenda of the joint consultative meeting.