Tomorrow (6 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 17^th annual joint consultative meeting, following the 9^th informal joint retreat taking place today.

Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to deliver opening remarks.

The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting. During the negotiation on the agenda for the informal retreat and the consultative meeting, there were some items that were proposed by both sides that did not make it to the final agenda due to a lack of agreement. These include Peace Support Operations and UNSC Resolution 2719, the role of exploitation of natural resources in conflicts, Somalia, the situation in the Horn of Africa & Ukraine as a standalone agenda.

The agenda remains largely unchanged from last year, except that the item previously framed as Somalia and AUSSOM now focuses exclusively on AUSSOM. Other agenda items include the situations in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Notably, South Sudan remains absent from the agenda despite the significant deterioration in its political and security situation since March and the country’s planned first elections since independence in 2011, scheduled for 22 December 2026. As in last year’s meeting, the two sides are also expected to discuss global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’, at the initiative of the EUPSC.

On AUSSOM

Ethiopia, Uganda, and Côte d’Ivoire are expected to take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Finland, Cyprus, Slovakia and Denmark from the EU side. The engagement comes at a critical juncture for the AU mission in Somalia, as AUSSOM faces mounting financial, logistical, political and operational challenges that cast uncertainty over its immediate future.

On 2 November, Uganda’s acting military spokesperson announced the commencement of troop withdrawals from Somalia after two decades of deployment. According to the spokesperson, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) had begun withdrawing troops deployed under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government of Somalia, effective immediately. The withdrawal of around 2,000 troops under these arrangements is expected to be completed within days, while Ugandan troops serving under AUSSOM will be withdrawn gradually by the end of 2027.

This development adds to the uncertainty surrounding AUSSOM, which has faced severe funding shortfalls since its launch in January 2025. These challenges were further compounded by the announcement from the US in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires at the end of this year.

It was against this context that AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs) convened their second Extraordinary Summit in Kampala on 31 July. The Summit called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UN Security Council to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. Such an arrangement would facilitate the achievement of agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated the foreign ministers of TCCs, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.

While the US later on announced that it would allow a one-year period for the drawdown of UNSOS by the end of 2027 without a commitment to extend the logistical support by UNSOS to AUSSOM, there is so far no plan on how to fill in the end of the logistical support from UNSOS.

In tomorrow’s consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are therefore expected to exchange on options for managing the financial and logistical uncertainty facing AUSSOM at the end of its current mandate by the end of December 2026 and the associated security vacuum this may create. The application of Resolution 2719 is likely to remain a key issue, particularly as successive PSC–UN Security Council consultations have failed to reach agreement on its application to AUSSOM due to US opposition. It remains to be seen whether the PSC and EUPSC will reaffirm their common position on the framework as a viable financing mechanism, as they did last year. It is recalled that the joint communiqué adopted at their previous consultative meeting stressed the need to fully and effectively implement Resolution 2719 to ensure predictable, sustainable and adequate financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations, including AUSSOM, as the only viable way of securing the gains that have been made so far. Given that the EU has been the largest single financial contributor to the AU missions in Somalia, providing nearly €2.7 billion since 2007, the two sides may also call on other international partners to increase their support for AUSSOM.

Most significant for tomorrow’s consultation is the preparation and implementation of a realistic transition plan for the managed unwinding of AUSSOM, as well as mitigating security risks that may arise from an unplanned and rushed withdrawal of AUSSOM.

Sudan

In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that DRC, Ethiopia, Algeria and Somalia will make statements from the AUPSC side and Slovenia, Poland, the Netherlands, France and Germany will make lead remarks for the EUPSC side.

Discussions are expected to build on the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum, with some from the PSC likely to share observations on what they encountered and established during the field mission. There have been notable developments since then, both in the conflict dynamics and the regional and extra-regional entanglement in the conflict, which may also attract some engagement. The consultation is also expected to focus on ongoing diplomatic initiatives and peace efforts. In this regard, both sides may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.

Efforts to coordinate diplomatic initiatives would also receive attention. On 23 September, the Quintet and Quad held their first joint high-level meeting, bringing together the two coordination mechanisms. This was followed by the sixth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination of peace initiatives in Sudan, held in Geneva on 21 October. The meeting brought together countries sponsoring major peace initiatives, members of the Quad, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Quintet, and neighbouring and regional countries, with the aim of aligning diplomatic efforts around the urgent needs of the Sudanese people.

On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded from the process. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and criticised the position of the Commission, warning that a military-controlled political process without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division. Against this backdrop, the PSC and EUPSC are likely to reaffirm the need for a humanitarian truce and cessation of hostilities as steps towards a permanent ceasefire, followed by an inclusive national dialogue and civilian-led political transition.

External involvement in the conflict may also feature in tomorrow’s discussion. The September 2026 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. The two sides are therefore expected to condemn external interference and call on external actors to cease providing support to the belligerents.

Eastern DRC

The draft agenda envisages that France, Croatia, Belgium and Germany will take the lead in delivering intervention from the side of the EU, while South Africa and Gabon will take the lead on the side of the AU. The two sides are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across the various mediation tracks, particularly AU-led mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ shuttle diplomacy in October, which included meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October, aimed at advancing existing peace commitments.

Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including the establishment of its secretariat and reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. This was followed by a meeting of military officials from the DRC and Rwanda, alongside representatives of the AU, the US and Qatar, in Garmisch, Germany, on 20–22 October. However, tensions have persisted, with the US imposing financial and asset-blocking sanctions on Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and the Zagima Credit and Saving Society, a financial institution serving Rwanda’s security services, on 28 October, citing continued support for M23. On 2 November, the US also announced the termination of Rwanda’s eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire, with continued fighting in North and South Kivu, increasing use of armed drones and mounting civilian suffering. According to Africa CDC figures, the latest Ebola outbreak has surpassed 10,000 cases and 5,000 deaths. Another notable development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition comprising M23 and other groups under former President Joseph Kabila, further complicating the conflict dynamics. During a recent engagement with UN officials led by MONUSCO head James Swan, the coalition reportedly threatened to withdraw from the Doha Framework Agreement if the government proceeded with its proposed constitutional referendum.

As in previous consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are expected to condemn the destabilising activities of armed groups in eastern DRC, call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and demand the unconditional withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). They may also call for the dismantling of parallel administrative structures established by M23 in areas under its control and reiterate their condemnation of the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in eastern DRC.

Sahel and Lake Chad

The draft agenda envisages that Spain, Czechia, Malta and Denmark will take a lead in making an intervention from the side of the EU, while Morocco, DRC, Nigeria, Algeria and Cameroon will lead the intervention from the side of the PSC.

The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated further since the October 2025 PSC–EUPSC consultative meeting, marked by intensified terrorist attacks. On 25 April, JNIM and Tuareg separatist fighters launched coordinated attacks across Mali, targeting Bamako and military installations. In Niger, the January attack on Diori Hamani International Airport by Islamic State Sahel Province was followed by another attack by JNIM in June.

PSC may highlight the AU’s intensified diplomatic engagement with Sahelian states. AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf visited Mali in July and subsequently Burkina Faso, reaffirming the AU’s commitment to constructive engagement. At its 1356^th session, the PSC welcomed these efforts and called for continued high-level engagement, including with Niger, to support political transitions and confidence-building. The AU High Representative Mamadou Tangara also participated in the inaugural ECOWAS–AES ministerial dialogue in Dakar on 17 October, reaffirming the AU’s readiness to facilitate cooperation between the two blocs through MISAHEL.

On the EUPSC side, it may also highlight that the EU has recalibrated its engagement, including the appointment of Birgitte Nygaard Markussen as its new Special Representative for the Sahel in July to advance its renewed regional approach and strengthen political dialogue. The European Parliament also examined options for re-engaging with the Sahel in July.

The Dakar talks between ECOWAS and AES, which established joint working groups to develop a framework for future cooperation, offer an opportunity to rebuild regional security coordination despite the AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS. The PSC and EUPSC are likely to welcome this development during tomorrow’s consultations and may explore ways to better coordinate their approaches and support efforts to comprehensively address the multidimensional challenges of the region.

With respect to Lake Chad, as in previous years, tomorrow’s consultations are expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, progress in implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR), and the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The two sides are likely to express concern over the persistent threats posed by Boko Haram, ISWAP and other terrorist groups despite the MNJTF’s efforts to degrade their operational capabilities. Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 has further complicated regional security efforts. At its 1347^th session, the PSC expressed deep concern over the resulting security vulnerabilities and urged Niger to reconsider its decision and resume full participation in the MNJTF, a call the two sides may reiterate.

The MNJTF’s financial constraints and operational gaps are also expected to feature during the consultation. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its position from the 1318^th session and explore with its EU counterparts the possibility of applying UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to support the MNJTF. The two sides may also commend the EU’s sustained support for the MNJTF and broader peace, security, stabilisation, recovery and resilience efforts in the region.

AOB (for information only)

As in last year’s meeting, the agenda also includes an item under Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments, proposed by the EUPSC. While Cyprus, Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania are envisaged to lead the intervention on the side of the EU, no representation is envisaged from the side of the AU. As in past years, it is anticipated that the situation in Ukraine is expected to be the main focus of the intervention of the representatives of the four countries from the EU side.

The consultative meeting will conclude with closing remarks by the joint chairs of the consultative meeting, the EUPSC Permanent Chair and the AU PSC Chairperson.

Joint communiqué

As host of the consultation, the PSC initiated a draft joint communiqué, which it finalised and shared with the EUPSC on the afternoon of 3 November. It is recalled that the two sides failed to adopt a joint communiqué between 2022 and 2024 due to disagreements over the inclusion of language referencing the war in Ukraine. Last year, however, they broke this trend and succeeded in adopting a joint communiqué, raising expectations that they will do so again at this year’s consultative meeting. It is anticipated that, while there will be no standalone statement or paragraph dedicated to Ukraine, the formulation used during the last consultative meeting will cover Ukraine in a list of conflict situations about which the two sides are concerned.