Tomorrow (5 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a session to receive an update on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). The representative of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in its capacity as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), may also deliver statements.

The PSC last considered Guinea-Bissau at its 1315th session on 28 November 2025, following the 26 November military seizure of power that interrupted the 23 November electoral process – a process that had been characterised as free, transparent and peaceful by election observation missions, including from AU and ECOWAS. At that session, the PSC determined that the military takeover constituted an unconstitutional change of government and suspended Guinea-Bissau from participation in all AU activities. Both the PSC and ECOWAS adopted an aligned position: restoration of constitutional order required the completion of the interrupted electoral process.

In the same vein, the extraordinary session of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, held on 27 November 2025, called on the coup leaders to respect the will of the people and allow the National Electoral Commission to proceed without delay with the declaration of election results. Recognising the need for swift, high-level engagement, it mandated the Chair of the ECOWAS Authority to lead a high-level mediation mission to Guinea-Bissau to engage the military authorities.

Similarly, the PSC urged the military authorities to respect the popular will, finalise the tabulation and proclamation of results, and accompany the process through to the inauguration and assumption of office of the duly elected winner. It also decided to establish an AU Monitoring Mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and to convene a Summit-level PSC meeting on the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.

Tomorrow’s session provides an opportunity to assess steps taken towards restoring constitutional order and progress in implementing the PSC’s earlier decisions. ECOWAS is expected to brief on its diplomatic engagements with the transitional authorities of Guinea-Bissau in this regard. The session may also serve to explore a more coordinated approach between the PSC and ECOWAS in engaging the military authorities and securing a swift return to constitutional order. This includes ensuring compliance with Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), which prohibits perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government from contesting subsequent elections, as well as adherence to the same commitment undertaken in the transitional charter.

Initially, both the PSC and ECOWAS were unequivocal that restoration of the constitutional order meant concluding the November elections rather than pursuing negotiations or interim arrangements for transition. These calls went unheeded. The military authorities consolidated their position, swearing in coup leader General Horta N’Tam as interim president for a one-year period and scheduling presidential and legislative elections for 6 December 2026. Although the transitional charter bars N’Tam and his prime minister from contesting, questions remain as to whether this commitment will be upheld, particularly in light of recent transitions elsewhere on the continent and the AU’s uneven application of Article 25(4) of ACDEG. In cases such as Gabon and Guinea, the PSC lifted suspensions following elections conducted in apparent contravention of this provision.

As noted in a recent analysis featured in Amani Africa’s Ideas Indaba, the ECOWAS and, by extension, the AU did not follow through on their earlier decisions. Despite the firm and appropriate initial response from both ECOWAS and the PSC, neither was able to follow through on their initial demand nor on the warning from ECOWAS that it reserved the right to use all options ‘including sanctions on all entities deemed culpable of disrupting the electoral and democratic process.’ Thus, when the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government met in mid-December 2025, ECOWAS changed its approach from seeking the conclusion of the electoral process and safeguarding the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau to a short transition that will culminate in another election. Thus, despite reiterating its earlier decision and noting that the elections held on 23 November were free and fair, ECOWAS called for ‘institution of a short transition to be led by an inclusive government that reflects the political spectrum and society in Guinea-Bissau, with a mandate to undertake constitutional, legal, and political reforms and the organisation of credible, transparent and inclusive elections.’ Meanwhile, ECOWAS rejected the one-year transition timetable announced by the military authorities, calling for a shorter timeframe.

At its ordinary session of 14 December 2025, ECOWAS further requested its Chair to undertake another high-level mission to Guinea-Bissau and directed the immediate dispatch of a delegation from the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff to engage the military authorities. While intensifying diplomatic engagement, ECOWAS also reiterated its readiness to impose targeted sanctions on individuals or groups obstructing a return to constitutional order through an inclusive process. It called for the immediate release of political detainees and for their full participation in the country’s political processes.

Relations between the military authorities and ECOWAS appeared to deteriorate in December. The authorities requested the immediate withdrawal of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission and reportedly cancelled a planned visit by the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. In January 2026, however, the military authorities appeared to take steps aimed at easing tensions. In late January, they announced measures including the release of some political leaders and improvements in the detention conditions of former Prime Minister and PAIGC leader Domingos Simões Pereira, who had been arrested following the coup. They also indicated plans to form a more inclusive transitional government by allocating three ministerial portfolios to the PAIGC and three to the political group led by Fernando Dias Da Costa, a candidate in the November presidential election. In addition, ten representatives from the two groups would be appointed to the National Transitional Council, the transition’s legislative body. It should be noted, however, that opposition leaders reportedly declined participation. The authorities also withdrew their earlier request for the departure of the ECOWAS Stabilisation Support Mission in Guinea-Bissau.

In its communiqué of 31 January 2026, ECOWAS welcomed the measures announced by the transitional authorities and urged all stakeholders to work collaboratively in support of a peaceful and credible transition leading to democratic elections. It further called for the full and effective release of Domingos Simões Pereira and for guarantees of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens.

It appears that both the AU and ECOWAS have stepped back from their earlier firm position that restoration of constitutional order required completion of the interrupted electoral process. As argued in the recent Ideas Indaba analysis, a range of options remained available to the continental and regional bodies. ECOWAS, for example, could have drawn on its experience in upholding the outcome of the December 2010 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, including through the use of sanctions. Measures aimed at increasing the cost to the coup leaders—such as leveraging the West African Economic and Monetary Union, as it did in the Côte d’Ivoire case—were within its reach. Additionally, both ECOWAS and the AU could have initiated a process towards giving recognition of the outcome of the election results, as they did both in respect to Côte d’Ivoire and The Gambia in 2011 and 2017, respectively. Such steps would have slammed shut any route for the military leaders in Guinea-Bissau to entrench their illegal usurpation of power. As a show of their seriousness about their zero tolerance for coups, ECOWAS and the AU could also have launched an investigation into the circumstances leading to the interruption of the electoral process and the attempt to frustrate the will of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

With the military authorities entrenching themselves in political power, and given that both the AU and ECOWAS failed to act swiftly in following up on their decisions, the issue before the Council at tomorrow’s session will be, first, securing a shorter transition timeframe in place of the proposed one-year period. The second will be to ensure that the military authorities do not contest the planned elections, in compliance with Article 25(4) of ACDEG. Third, reinforcing coordination between the AU and ECOWAS in order to exercise greater leverage on the military authorities and secure the country’s swift return to constitutional order.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may welcome recent measures taken by Guinea-Bissau’s transitional authorities, including the release of opposition political figures, while echoing ECOWAS’s call for the ‘full’ and ‘effective’ release of Domingos Simões Pereira. It may urge the adoption of a shorter transition period led by an inclusive government and emphasise the need for a swift return to constitutional order through credible elections. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its earlier request for the AU Commission to provide the necessary support to Guinea-Bissau to facilitate a return to constitutional order, including through national dialogue, institutional as well as constitutional, legal and political reforms, and the organisation of credible, transparent and inclusive elections. It may also reaffirm the obligation to adhere to Article 25(4) of ACDEG, underscoring that the military authorities should not participate in the upcoming elections. Finally, the PSC may follow up on its previous decisions regarding the establishment of a monitoring mechanism on Guinea-Bissau and the convening of a Summit-level meeting dedicated to the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government.