Ambassador Tareq AlBanai,

Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations in New York

Co-Chair of the IGN*

 

The question before us is not new. For decades, Member States have recognized that the composition of the Security Council no longer fully reflects contemporary geopolitical realities or the expectations of the wider membership. Yet what has changed in recent years—and particularly during the current phase of the Intergovernmental Negotiations—is the emergence of more structured and concrete approaches to reform.

A particularly important turning point occurred during the 77th Session of the General Assembly, when the IGN process—under the co-chairmanship of Kuwait and Austria—introduced, for the first time, a structured discussion of reform models. This development marked a significant evolution in the process. For many years, the debate had largely remained at the level of principles: discussions about representation, legitimacy, and effectiveness. While these principles remain vital, the introduction of models shifted the conversation from the conceptual to the concrete.

This transformation has allowed Member States to engage with reform in a far more substantive manner. Instead of speaking in generalities, delegations have increasingly begun to articulate specific institutional designs and operational arrangements for a reformed Council. As a result, positions have become clearer, and the debate has gained the level of precision that any meaningful negotiation requires.

Across the IGN, we now have a set of concrete proposals on the table—from the G4, L.69, CARICOM, the Uniting for Consensus group, Liechtenstein and Mexico—that differ along clear fault lines. One is composition: some models call for expanding both permanent and non-permanent membership, while others reject new permanent seats and instead support the expansion of elected seats only, including longer-term, renewable seats to improve continuity. Another is the question of the veto: approaches range from extending the prerogatives of the P5 to any new permanent members, to non-extension and various forms of veto restraint and transparency, including stronger accountability and transparency around veto use.

These proposals collectively represent an important step forward. They demonstrate that Member States are increasingly willing to engage in structured thinking about the architecture of a reformed Council. At the same time, we look forward to the long-anticipated African model, which I was pleased to hear was endorsed by the C-10 Heads of State and Government last month.

The model will be a critical contribution to the ongoing discussion, given Africa’s longstanding and legitimate call for enhanced representation within the Security Council. In parallel, the broader political momentum for reform has also been reinforced by the Pact for the Future, which explicitly mandates the Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations to work toward the development of a consolidated model. This mandate reflects a growing recognition among Member States that the process must gradually move from the presentation of multiple proposals toward identifying areas of convergence.

However, we must also acknowledge the reality of the negotiations as they stand today. At this stage, we are not yet in a position where the wider membership can rally behind a single model. The fundamental division between those advocating for an expansion of the permanent category and those favoring an expansion limited to non-permanent seats remains deeply entrenched.

This polarization has been one of the central obstacles to progress in the reform debate. It is precisely within this context that the idea of fixed regional seats has emerged as a possible bridge between these two positions. The concept is relatively straightforward but potentially transformative. Under this approach, the Security Council would be expanded by approximately six to seven additional seats, allocated on a regional basis. These seats would be fixed to specific regions, ensuring that the major regional groupings of the United Nations receive more equitable representation within the Council. Importantly, these seats would not be permanently assigned to specific states. Instead, they would be elected through the General Assembly, ensuring that the selection process remains democratic and consistent with the broader membership’s role in shaping the Council. States occupying these seats would serve longer, renewable terms, and could be reelected up to two additional times. This structure would provide greater continuity and institutional memory within the Council while still preserving accountability to the wider membership.

In terms of privileges, these seats would carry the same prerogatives of the P5, including the veto. While this aspect of the proposal may generate debate, its purpose is to address the structural imbalance between different categories of membership while avoiding the creation of new permanently entrenched seats.

In many ways, this approach seeks to bring the Council closer to the principle of sovereign equality of states, which remains a foundational principle of the United Nations. While no reform model can perfectly realize this principle, fixed regional seats offer perhaps the closest approximation within the institutional framework of the Council.

To ensure both effectiveness and accountability, the model would also include a review clause, allowing Member States to periodically assess how the new structure is functioning and whether adjustments may be deemed necessary.

Finally, careful attention must be paid to the overall size of the Council. Any expansion should avoid creating a body that becomes too large to operate effectively. For this reason, this proposal envisions a Council of no more than approximately 22 members, balancing the need for broader representation with the imperative of maintaining operational efficiency.

In closing, the reform of the Security Council remains one of the most complex negotiations within the United Nations. Yet the developments we have witnessed in recent sessions—particularly the move toward structured models—suggest that the conversation is gradually entering a more mature and constructive phase. However, if we are to translate this momentum into real progress, we will need greater flexibility and a stronger willingness to explore bridging options. Too often, entrenched positions—held as absolutes rather than starting points for negotiation—have kept us locked in familiar debates instead of moving us toward workable compromise.

Our collective task now is to build on this momentum, identify areas of convergence, and continue working toward a reform that strengthens both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Security Council.

Thank you.

* This was delivered online during the Amani Africa-Japan joint high-level policy dialogue on UN Security Council Reform held on 4 March 2026 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia