On 29-30 July, once again Kampala plays host to the technical, ministerial and summit-level meetings of the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) Troop Contributing and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) plus Somalia. The meeting kicked off yesterday with a session of the Chiefs of Defence Forces of TCCs/PCCs of AUSSOM.

Initially, this meeting was requested by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU in view of the existential financial crisis facing AUSSOM. It was the 1317th session of 15 December 2025 of the PSC that tasked ‘the Commission to urgently convene a meeting of the AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs at the level of Chiefs of Defence Forces, to discuss the proposed three options, including their implications on the sustainability of AUSSOM and its operations; and to submit a detailed report with their recommendations for Council’s consideration.’ This request was further reiterated by the PSC during its 1342nd session of April 2026.

It was the letter that the United States (US) Mission to the AU (USAU) sent to the African Union on 1 July 2026 that led to the speedy convening of this meeting. In the letter, the US informed the AU that when the renewal of the mandate of AUSSOM comes up in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in December 2026, the US would not support the renewal ‘if it includes UNSOS or any UN logistical or operational support.’

While the decision was not completely surprising given that it came in a context in which the US has been reconsidering its funding of UN missions and an earlier decision cutting 25% of UNSOS budget, it came before the AU and Somalia acted timely on PSC’s request and put in place a plan on the immediate future of AU’s long-running and largest peace operation to date.

As pointed out in an earlier Amani Africa article, the end of UNSOS and the critical logistics support on which AUSSOM depends for all its operations would practically make the continuation of the AU mission, which suffers from major funding shortfalls, untenable. The unplagging of UNSOS from AUSSOM is like pulling the life support from a patient whose life depends on it. While AUSSOM has sustained and can continue its operation while facing a major shortfall of funds, it cannot continue with its operations without UNSOS logistics support or without finding, within the short time left, an alternative logistics support arrangement fully replacing UNSOS.

The Kampala meeting comes following a series of meetings in response to the US letter, including ‘an information briefing’ of 3 July for the Defence Attachés of the TCCs and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) of AUSSOM, an informal consultation of the PSC of 8 July, and a meeting of experts of TCCs & PCCs of AUSSOM plus Somalia of 24 July. The key meeting of 24 July deliberated on the three options on the future of AUSSOM referenced in the 1317th session of the PSC of 15 December 2025.

The three options PSC proposed for further interrogation, were initially outlined in the AU Commission Chairperson’s report to the 1317th session of the PSC. The first option envisages maintaining the status quo with respect to AUSSOM and UN support structures, under which the AU and UN would continue implementing the UNSOS contingency plan and absorb the mandated USD 130 million reductions. The second option involved transforming the AU mission into a regional cooperation framework based on bilateral deployments, whereby some military or police components currently under AUSSOM would be replaced or supplemented by regional or bilateral arrangements between the Federal Government of Somalia and its partners. The third option proposes an organised mission withdrawal and transition to full Somali ownership, involving a jointly planned and orderly withdrawal of AUSSOM at the end of the CONOPS lifespan, supported by a detailed exit framework, clear timelines, and close coordination with TCCs and PCCs.

It emerged from the meeting of 24 July that the options further updated without UNSOS were not deemed feasible due to the significant risks they posed to operational continuity, force sustainment and the potential for security gaps. The meeting proposed the presentation of the three options to the Chiefs of Defence Forces of AUSSOM TCCs/PCCs along with this conclusion on the options and a proposal for engaging the US ‘to negotiate for the continuation of’ the 2024-2029 transition supported by UNSOS. The three options as updated and the report of the 24 July meeting were presented to the meeting of Chiefs of Defence Forces held yesterday in Kampala, Uganda.

The proposal for preserving UNSOS for the duration of the transition is understandable from the point of view of avoiding a security gap, getting Somali forces to a level where they are able to preserve the security gains made and ensuring a planned withdrawal. However, its feasibility is contingent on having the US reverse its decision. Addressing the Chiefs gathered in Kampala, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces called for ‘African-led alternative arrangements that would sustain the mission beyond 2026,’ noting the indications that the US would not support the current UN support framework. As a recent policy brief cogently argued, another option that the Kampala summit may consider envisages minimal logistic support through a hybrid mechanism from funds other than UN assessed contributions, including AU, anchored on a negotiated transition compact.

These are best-case scenario options but with significant variation. They assume either reversal of the US decision on unplugging UNSOS or the possibility of the establishment of a viable alternative option within the very short time available to ensure the sustenance of AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

In addition to a plan for exploring these options, the Kampala summit needs to consider and adopt a contingency plan for the worst-case scenario too. This is a scenario where reversal of the US decision on supporting UNSOS mandate beyond December 2026 could not be secured, or an alternative to it or any middle ground could not be arranged to sustain AUSSOM beyond December 2026.

Given the risks identified during the 24 July meeting of experts and the dangers that AUSSOM’s withdrawal by December 2026 poses, planning for this worst-case scenario should accordingly involve ways of managing such risks. This necessitates the designing and implementation of measures that mitigate the risks to the minimum possible and ensure as orderly a withdrawal as possible while simultaneously facilitating alternative security support to Somalia that may involve a combination of bilateral support along with a regional joint force modelled on the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin adapted to the Somalia context.

The worst-case scenario is not necessarily inevitable. Nor is it one to be embraced. However, the AU, TCCs/PCCS of AUSSOM and Somalia could not afford not to plan for it.