Briefing on the situation in Libya
Briefing on the situation in Libya
Date | 29 June 2022
Tomorrow (29 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1091st session to receive a briefing on the situation in Libya.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver a statement. Wahida Ayari, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Libya; the representative of the State of Libya as the country concerned and representative of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) are also expected to deliver statements. Other invited guests expected to participate at the session include representatives of the immediate neighboring countries of Libya – Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger and Tunisia and representatives of the relevant regional economic communities and regional mechanisms (RECs/RMs) – Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN-SAD), North African Regional Capability (NARC) and Arab Maghreb Union (UMA).
The AU position on Libya is encapsulated in the relevant AU Assembly and PSC decisions. The 997th PSC Communique which was adopted on 18 May 2021 following the holding of a Ministerial level meeting on the situation in Libya stressed the importance of an inclusive, comprehensive national reconciliation process, as well as the need to implement confidence-building measures such as a framework to put to an end to divisions and to restore social cohesion among Libyans. Tomorrow’s meeting will afford an opportunity for PSC members to take stock of the developments in Libya since their last meeting and pronounce themselves on the deteriorating political and security situation in the country, the political consultation process in Cairo and the holding of elections to conclude the prolonged transition period which is deemed critical to respond to the needs and aspiration of the Libyan people.
After more than a decade since the Libyan revolution, the country remains mired in a protracted political crisis. There was hope that the organization of inclusive, free, fair and credible elections would have helped in ending the long transition period. Although 2.8 million people were registered to vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections which were scheduled to be held on 24 December 2021 based on the roadmap agreed within the framework of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), the elections were postponed and the Libyan political stakeholders have yet to agree on a new timeline. The mandate of the Libyan Government of National Unity within the framework of the LPDF is set to expire by the end of this month. The transitional phase was due to expire on 22 June, according to the LPDF roadmap, had the Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held on 24 December 2021, which did not happen.
Following the postponement of the elections, the Tobruk based House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha, a former minister of interior and one of the presidential candidates, as the new prime minister for the remaining transition period arguing that the incumbent prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh failed to organize elections. However, Debeibeh insisted that he will only handover power following the holding of elections. The political rivalry between the Dbeibeh and Bashagha has escalated tensions in Libya leading to clashes in Tripoli in May when Bashagha tried to take over the government but was met with resistance from Dbeibeh’s forces. Another round of fighting took place on 10 June between rival forces supporting Dbeibeh and Bashagha. This latest crisis is threatening to divide the country and plunge it into yet another cycle of conflict and violence. It also led to the partial blockade of Libya’s oil facilities.
UN Special Advisor Stephanie Williams has been trying to resolve the political impasse and engaged with both Dbeibeh and Bashagha to encourage them to resolve their disputes through dialogue. She is also facilitating a discussion on the constitutional basis for the holding of elections through the establishment of a Joint Committee comprising of representatives from the High State Council and the House of Representative. The Joint Committee has met three times and the latest meeting taking place in Cairo. During the two previous sessions held in April and May, the Joint Committee reached agreement on 137 of 197 articles on the form and nature of the state; basic rights and freedoms, including women rights; the structure and powers of a bicameral Parliament; and some of the prerogatives of the President and Prime Minister, including on the prerogative of president and Prime Minister”, according to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosmary Dicarlo who briefed the Security Council on the matter on 26 May 2021.
There are, however, outstanding issues that need to be addressed and the hope was that during the third and final round the joint committee will finalize the constitutional arrangements for the holding of national elections. Stephanie Williams underscored the need to continue working towards building the necessary consensus on the constitutional framework to pave the way for the holding of elections. As the final round came to a close on 20 June, Stephanie Williams released a press statement stating that ‘the Joint Committee achieved a great deal of consensus on the contentious articles in the Libyan Draft Constitution’ also highlighting differences on the ‘measures governing the transitional period leading to elections’. The Special Advisor urged the Presidencies of the two Chambers ‘to meet within ten days at an agreed upon location to bridge outstanding issues’.
Some observers have been expressing concerns about the ongoing consultation process including the lack of openness to involve the wider Libyan populace. The other complication is the involvement of regional and international actors in the situation in Libya through their backing of different parties. In the meantime, Stephanie Williams is expected to leave her position as Special Advisor by the end of June. Consultations are underway to appoint a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The AU has been insisting that this post should be filled by an African and the African members have been advancing this same position in the Security Council.
The AU is part of the Libya Quartet which involves the UN, the EU and League of Arab States. The UN has been in the lead in terms of facilitating the Libyan political dialogue but it is not clear how much the AU has been involved and/or consulted within the framework of the latest UN led talks in Cairo. The AU has a Liaison Office which was based in Tunis. The 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to relocate the office to Tripoli.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to express its concern over the recent flare up of tension between armed groups in support of the two rival governments. Council may further urge the rival groups to avoid any violence and resort to dialogue to reach at a consensus on a unified Libyan government that would steer the country towards the Presidential and Parliamentary elections. It may also urge all international actors to refrain from taking any actions that may re-ignite divided foreign support and engage instead in a more constructive role that will contribute to ensuring peaceful resolution of the current impasse. It may further call on the AU High-Level Committee on Libya chaired by H.E. President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, to convene a consultative meeting on the current infighting between rival parties. While noting the consultations made by the Joint Committee of the House of Representatives and High Council of State on the constitutional basis for the holding of the elections and progresses made in this regard, Council is also expected to call upon them to reach agreement over the remaining outstanding issues.
Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
Date | 28 June 2022
Tomorrow (28 June 2022), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1090th session to discuss maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
Following opening remarks by Daniel Owassa, Permanent Representative of Congo to the AU and Chairperson of the Council for the month of June, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security is expected to deliver statement while the representative of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC) is scheduled to make presentation. The representatives of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola will also make statements in their capacity as members of the GGC. In addition to the representatives of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the representatives of the Indian ocean Commission, United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), and the European Union (EU) are also expected to make statements.
The last time Council considered the issue of maritime security in Africa was at its 1012th session, which was convened on 23 July 2021 under the chairship of Nigeria. In that session, Council, among others, expressed its ‘deep concern over the challenging situation in some regions and areas of Africa’s maritime security domain’. Council also condemned the ‘illegal exploitation of Africa’s maritime resources and the dumping of toxic waste in Africa’s maritime domain’. This session is expected to focus on the maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, which has overtaken the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa over the past few years, turning the region into the world’s major hotspot for piracy, armed robbery at sea and other forms of maritime crime including transnational organized crime, oil and cargo theft, illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal trade and smuggling, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). As such, tomorrow’s session presents Council the opportunity to assess the maritime security situation of the Gulf of Guinea and explore ways and means to effectively respond to the situation. It is to be recalled that a resolution on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea (S/RES/2634 (2022)) – co-sponsored by Ghana and Norway – was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on 31 May, a decade after its last resolution on the issue.
Stretched from Angola to Senegal and covering around 11,000 square kilometres (4,247 sq. miles), the Gulf of Guinea remains one of the world’s most important shipping routes for both Gulf of Guinea oil exports from the Niger Delta and consumer goods to and from central and southern Africa, accounting for 25 % of African maritime traffic. Piracy has continued to emerge ‘almost exclusively’ from Nigeria’s oil rich Niger Delta though attacks also take place elsewhere, according to Dryad Global.
Although it is difficult to establish the exact cost of maritime insecurity in the region, a recent report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) revealed direct, indirect and opportunity costs to the region and beyond. One source claim that piracy in the region costs the coastal states some 2 billion USD a year. As UNODC’s study rightly pointed out, the cost will not be however limited to the coastal states but also ‘trickle along trade corridors to the heart of the continent’, highlighting the importance of the issue for countries beyond the coastal states.
The maritime security landscape of the Gulf of Guinea has been changing over the years. Maritime incidents are no longer restricted to territorial waters but increasingly occurring further offshore often outside of the Exclusive Economic Zones. The threat has spread outward from the shore with pirates operating over a vast region extending hundreds of miles from the coast, showing a worrying trend of increasing operational capability of pirates. While incidents have turned increasingly violent, kidnap for ransom has also become the most significant risk to commercial operations in the region. Moreover, a dangerous linkage between piracy and terrorism is also evolving in the region as the tentacles of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel is reaching to the Gulf of Guinea. In this connection, members of Council could be interested to know more about how piracy and armed robbery in the region interact with the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism as well as the resurgence of coups, and how these can impact the peace and security situation of the West and Central Africa regions.
Despite the grim picture however, the maritime security landscape of the region recorded a notable improvement in 2021 though the sustainability of such gain remains questionable. The 2021 annual report of Dryad Global, a maritime risk company, indicates that piracy off West Africa in 2021 declined dramatically with 56% drop from previous year. It further highlights that incidents of actual and attempted attacks and vessels being fired upon decreased by more than 85%. The number of vessels boarded throughout the region fell by 54% while incidents of crews being kidnapped declined by 60%.
Many attributes the decline in piracy in the region with Nigeria’s 195 million USD Integrated National Security and Waterways Protection Infrastructure, otherwise known as the Deep Blue Project (DBP), though some like the Dryad Global doubts this. On the other hand, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, United Representative at the UN, during UN Security Council meeting on maritime security in May associated the crimes decrease with enhanced international collaboration. The blue project of Nigeria, initiated in 2017 but officially launched this month, brings together a mix of special mission vessels, fast interceptor boats, special mission aircraft, helicopters, and drones to patrol the shipping lanes off Nigeria’s coast. It is to be recalled that the country passed an anti-piracy bill, the Suppression of Piracy and Other Maritime Offences Act in 2019, to stem the rising trend of piracy in the region. During the launch ceremony on 10 June, President Muhammadu Buhari stated that the Deep Blue would ‘advance the security architecture and ensure greater enforcement action in Nigerian waters and beyond’, particularly in the prosecution of suspects under the Suppression of Piracy and other Maritime Offences Act.
While the project is a significant positive development to tackle the immediate maritime security concerns in the region, the long-term success of this initiative in turning the tide against piracy is not guaranteed nor the gains of last year remain sustainable without addressing the underlying causes of piracy and armed robbery. The absence of economic opportunities and governance deficit have become major drivers of piracy and other criminal activities in the region. It is imperative that the security measures are complimented with addressing such underlying conditions if the threat is to be resolved sustainably. On a related note, it is worth noting that the UN Security Council resolution 2634 (2022) requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and its underlying causes, including any possible and potential linkages with terrorism in West and Central Africa and the Sahel.
Another important factor to stem maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea is the need to strengthening the existing frameworks and institutions created to address the security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as enhancing cooperation and coordination between the plethora of structures. In this respect, the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Security and Safety, a culmination of a meeting between ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in 2013, is at the centre of such mechanisms designed to address the maritime insecurity in the region. While significant progress has been made towards its operationalization and strengthening cooperation with international partners, limited capacity continues to remain a challenge for the effectiveness of the architecture. Yaoundé Code of Conduct, Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) 2050, African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter) are also relevant instruments available at regional and continental level.
The presence of different structures and initiatives at national, regional, and international levels to address maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea also raises the question of coordination. One notable development of interest to the Council in this respect is the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Collaboration Forum and Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (GoG-MCF/SHADE) last year. The platform was created by Nigeria and the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre (ICC) – representing 21 countries in the Gulf of Guinea – to serve as a platform for navies, industry partners and other relevant stakeholders from across the Gulf of Guinea and beyond with the view to harmonising counter-piracy efforts and communication in the region. International partners such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea and the European Union have also stepped in to support regional efforts against piracy.
Adding to the above structures, the PSC in its last session on the theme also envisioned a naval capacity within the African Standby Force (ASF) for promoting maritime and security and safety in Africa though its practicality would remain a problem. This will be in addition to the Counter-terrorism unit which Council decided to establish within the ASF at its 960th session held on 28 October 2020.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Among others, Council is expected to express concern over the persistent threat posed by piracy, armed robbery, and other forms of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea. It may further express concern over the trend of the expansion of the threat posed by pirates far from the coast, as well as the economic implications of the threat on the coastal states. Council is likely to welcome the launch of Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project on 10 June 2022 and may appeal to international partners to provide the necessary support to the effective implementation of the project. It may also re-emphasize the importance of adopting a comprehensive solution to the multidimensional underlying causes and drivers of maritime insecurity in order to sustainably address the problem. Echoing UN Security Council Resolution 2634 (2022), Council may urge member states in the region to criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea under their domestic laws, and may further call to investigate, prosecute, or extradite, in accordance with applicable international law, perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Taking note of the decline of piracy in the region over the past year, Council may encourage coastal states to keep the momentum and sustain the gains through continued collaboration and strong coordination among states of Gulf of Guinea as well as the different initiatives and institutions including the Yaoundé Architecture, AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at the sea of Gulf of Guinea.
13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC
13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC
Date | 10 June 2022
Tomorrow (10 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 13th annual joint consultative meeting, preceded by the 5th joint retreat taking place today. With AU hosting this year’s round of meetings, the consultative meeting will be taking place physically, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The AUPSC and EUPSC have been convening joint consultative meetings since 2008 in the context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. These meetings mainly serve to discuss thematic and conflict related agendas of common interest to the two counterparts. Within that framework, previous joint consultative meetings have addressed thematic issues such as migration and terrorism and violent extremism as well as country/region focused situations including conflicts and crises in Libya, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and others.
This year’s joint consultative meeting is expected to commence with opening remarks by Chairperson of the AUPSC and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the AU, H.E Ambassador Daniel Owassa and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Ambassador Delphine Pronk. The meeting is expected to address four country/region specific situations. These are situations in the Great Lakes Region (GLR), the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and Sahel Region, Libya, and Somalia. It is to be recalled that the Sahel Region and Somalia were also on the agenda of the previous joint consultative meeting convened on 26 October 2020, along with the situation in Sudan.
In relation to the GLR, Burundi is expected to be the lead speaker on behalf of the AUPSC. Insecurity in the GLR continues to be a matter of grave concern despite positive developments having been recorded in the areas of cooperation, integration and dialogue in the region. Dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda paving the way for reconciliation, and the normalisation of relations between Rwanda and Uganda through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2019 as well as the recent reopening of the Gatuna border are some of the examples of encouraging trends in regional cooperation and integration which may be welcomed. On the other hand, the AUPSC and EUPSC may take note of the recent tensions between Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda and call up on all relevant stakeholders including the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC to engage both sides within the framework of the Nairobi process before the tensions grow any further. In this respect, AUPSC and EUPSC may also welcome the initiative of the AU Assembly that tasked the President of Angola, as Chairperson of the ICGLR, to engage both countries and the initiatives taken by Angola’s President meeting with the leaders of both countries. As a measure of de-escalation, the two bodies may also welcome the report on the release of the two Rwandan soldiers taken from the border with the DRC.
On the security and humanitarian track, the operation of ‘negative forces’ in eastern DRC continues to destabilise the region creating a cycle of forced displacement. Intensified military activities of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group implicated for affiliation with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and the resumption of military activities by the March 23 (M23) Movement have particularly been major causes for concern in the early months of 2022. In late March, following the resumption of its activities, M23 expanded its operations over North Kivu at an alarming rate leading to the displacement of thousands of people. By the end of May 2022, the number of displaced persons as a result of the recent fighting in North Kivu had reached over 72,000. Operations by the ADF in North Kivu and Ituri provinces have also resulted in widespread violence against civilians including abductions and destruction and pillage of properties. According to data presented by the UN, the number of civilian deaths between June 2021 and March 2022 increased to at least 1,261 from 559 recorded for the period from June 2020 to March 2021, in North Kivu province. In this regard and as necessary measure for containing the crises involving these armed groups, the AUPSC and the EUPSC may also welcome and urge Kenya, as host of Nairobi process initiated to deal with the threat these negative forces present both through a diplomatic track and a security track, to convene the participants of the process towards supporting Rwanda and DRC in the effort to deescalate the growing tension between them and work on achieving political resolution of their disputes.
On the LCB and Sahel region, it is expected that Nigeria will take the lead speaking in representation of the AUPSC while Cameroon will be a supporting speaker on the agenda. The LCB and Sahel region are experiencing deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions. Despite the death of Abubakar Shekau – leader of Boko Haram’s Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad (JAS) faction – in May 2021, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter Boko Haram faction took the opportunity to expand its operations by taking over former JAS territories and fighters. Taking an approach aimed at establishing itself as a better alternative to State authority, ISWAP’s attacks have mainly been targeted against government forces and infrastructures while it extorts funding from civilian communities in its areas of operation, in exchange for essential services. Fighters from JAS have on the other hand continued attacks against civilian populations. Terrorist insurgency and spread of violent extremism in the Sahel region also continue to frustrate military efforts including operations by the G5 Sahel Joint Force. A recent development worth reflecting on is also the decision of Malian transition authorities to withdraw from the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force and its consequent impact on regional security.
Despite some success attained in degrading insurgencies in the region, emerging trends in the means and methods used by terrorist groups have demonstrated the need for a more enhanced focus on non-military approaches that address, what our latest report called, the political and socio-economic pathologies that create grievances enabling the emergence and growth of terrorist insurgencies. The need for prioritising a multipronged political, socio-economic and humanitarian strategy towards whose fulfilment the security instruments are geared cannot be overemphasised. The important role of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the need for enhancing support for the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS) also remains key.
According to the UN, violence and insecurity across countries in the LCB has severely frustrated basic social services and natural resources leaving about 11 million people depending on humanitarian aid. As of April 2022, 4.1 million people in the region are facing food insecurity with 300,000 children severely malnourished. The insecurity induced humanitarian crisis in Sahel also continues to intensify. Burkina Faso in particular is faced with severe humanitarian condition, with the number of internally displaced persons reaching over nearly 2 million in 2022.
In addition to security challenges, 2021 and early 2022 have seen the Sahel region’s political situation characterised by the upsurge in unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and prolonged transitions. Coups in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali have occupied much of the AUPSC’s deliberations while relevant regional bodies – mainly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – have also been actively engaged in efforts aimed at returning constitutional order in these countries.
With regards to Libya, Morocco will be the lead speaker from AUPSC’s side. The challenging political context, the fragile security situation and the dire condition of migrants are the main areas of concern the AUPSC and EUPSC may reflect on in relation to the situation in Libya. On the political front, the lack of agreement on the necessary legal framework for the conduct of the general elections which were scheduled to take place on 24 December 2021 have resulted in the postponement of the elections indefinitely. This has led to the challenge against the legitimacy of the interim Prime Minister based in the capital by the east-based House of Representatives which appointed a new Prime Minister, leading to the country’s slide back to having parallel governments. While the rivalry between the two executives has not yet turned into full armed conflict, it has already rekindled economic, political and military disputes. The halt of the unification process of parallel security forces which was already facing significant challenges entails serious concerns to the sustainability of the October 2020 ceasefire agreement. Moreover, Russia has officially recognised the east-based government, reigniting divided foreign support for the two executives and taking the country back to the pre-October 2020 situation.
The challenge for AU and EU is to achieve a shared concern and perception of threat about the continuation of the crisis in Libya. Africa, particularly countries in the Sahel, have born and continue to bear the brunt of the fall out from the military campaign that precipitated the collapse of Libya in 2011. The marginalization of the AU from active role in the effort for resolving the crisis in Libya remains a source of disaffection in Addis Ababa. For the EU, the deterioration of the political situation in Libya creates complications in the context of the confrontation with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. First, it hampers Europe’s plans to reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas by resorting to Libya as one of the main hydrocarbon suppliers. Second, the impasse between Libya’s executives and the resulting insecurity will further fuel the migration crisis in the region. According to the International Organisation on Migration (IOM), the number of displaced persons in various parts of Libya had reached 635,051 by the end of January 2022. Given that no one actor can on its own address the complex political and security crisis in Libya, it is of particular significance that the AUPSC and EUPSC affirm the interest of each for the resolution of the crisis and the need for full involvement of the AU in the multilateral effort for achieving political resolution and national reconciliation in Libya.
Regarding Somalia, Djibouti will be lead speaker while Uganda will assume the role of supporting speaker from the side of the AUPSC. In Somalia, the completion of the much delayed parliamentary and presidential elections, with the appointment of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has been a welcome progress. The final reconfiguration of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is another milestone met in 2022 although the funding requirements for the new mission remain unmet. While the EU was a principal funder of AMISOM and has already committed to continue financing AU’s peace support efforts in the spirit of the Joint AU-EU vision for 2030, EU’s proposed funds for financing ATMIS are said to fall short of the required amount. Despite the progress noted in the political situation and AMISOM’s transition, the security situation in Somalia remains volatile with Al-Shabaab sustaining its activities and carrying out intensified attacks throughout the country. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in its various areas of operation has particularly been a notable trend in Al-Shabaab’s more recent attacks. In addition to civilian causality and humanitarian toll due to insecurity, Somalia is also experiencing an escalating severe drought. According to the latest UN data, 4.8 million people are currently facing severe food insecurity while 4.2 million people are experiencing life-threatening water shortages.
The expected outcome of the meeting is a joint-communiqué. With regards to the GLR, the AUPSC and EUPSC may urge the international community to strengthen support for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). They may further highlight the importance of exploring parallel non-military approaches aimed at addressing underlying root-causes of conflict and instability in the region and commend countries of the GLR for the formation of the Contact and Coordination Group which is aimed at overseeing non-military measures to assist in the neutralisation of armed groups in eastern DRC. Regarding the LCB, in addition to reaffirming their commitment to support the Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and LCBC, the AUPSC and EUPSC may emphasise the importance of sustained support for the implementation of the Stabilization Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin in order to address the security and humanitarian crisis in the region in a comprehensive manner. Regarding Libya, they may stress the need for sustained efforts between the AU, EU and UN, with active and full participation of the AU, for the adoption of a comprehensive plan providing concreate steps towards resolving the dispute between the two parallel governments and providing the framework for the conduct of elections. They may also call on all relevant stakeholders including the UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to sustain the momentum on the implementation of the action plan adopted in October 2021 for the gradual and sequenced withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from the country. With respect to the political situation in the Sahel region, the two Councils may emphasise the importance of addressing the common underlying root causes of coups in the region such as democratic and governance deficits, manipulation of constitutional term limits, damaged state-society relationships and grave violations of human rights and freedoms. They may further stress the instrumentality of addressing root causes for resolving the security challenges in the region including the high rate of terrorist insurgency. On Somalia, the two may welcome the completion of the national elections and congratulate the newly elected President. They may reflect on how sustainable, predictable and sufficient funding for ATMIS can be secured including through contributions through joint mobilisation of resources, including by leveraging the EU Peace Facility, which provides the lions share of financial support for ATMIS.
