5th Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC

5th Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC

Date | 9 June 2022

Tomorrow (9 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 5th informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 13th annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 10 June. This year’s joint retreat is expected take place physically, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Starting from 2015, the AUPSC and EUPSC have institutionalised the practice of convening informal joint retreats ahead of their joint annual consultative meetings, with aim of facilitating constructive dialogue through informal engagements. As such, the joint retreats mainly serve the two organs to discuss issues of partnership and exchange views on how to enhance cooperation on various aspects of peace and security. The last time the two convened a joint retreat was in 2018, ahead of the 11th joint consultative meeting, which constituted their 4th joint retreat. In 2020, although the 12th joint consultative meeting between the two bodies took place, the joint retreat was not convened, making this year’s retreat the 5th one.

Two main agenda items are expected to feature at this year’s joint retreat – first the issue of multilateralism, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy and second, the sustainability of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). From the AUPSC side, there was interest in discussing the issue of humanitarian situation in the continent. However, given that the thematic issue was considered to be beyond the mandate of the EUPSC, the topic was not taken forward in the final agenda for the retreat. On the other hand, the EU proposed to discuss the war in Ukraine as one of the agenda items of the joint retreat. Similar to the EUPSC, it was considered to be beyond the mandate of the PSC for discussing it in the joint retreat. It is however expected that individual members of the EUPSC would in their intervention raise the war in Ukraine.

The first agenda item expected to feature at the 5th joint retreat is envisaged to focus on multilateralism, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. In ways more than one, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy are in crisis in Africa, as in other parts of the world. As highlighted in our report on Major Peace and Security Issues in Africa, the number and geographic spread of conflicts in Africa has grown exponentially.  Further highlighting the precarious state of peace and security on the continent, Africa witnessed the largest number of coups (five) since AU came into existence in a matter of 10 months period between April 2021 and February 2022. The PSC in the communique of its 1000th session expressed ‘deep concern over the persistence and resurgence of conflict and crisis situations in some parts of the Continent, including the growing threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism and armed groups.’ All these are on account of the persistence or further deterioration and expansion of existing protracted conflicts such as those in Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali and the eruption of new conflicts or crisis situations include those in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. AU Commission Chairperson in his opening address to the 35th AU Assembly warned that these trends raise ‘serious questions about the future of our flagship project to silence the guns’.

There are at least three issues that the worrying peace and security trends and the challenges they pose to conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy give rise to. The first of this concerns the adequacy and effectiveness of the approach to the management and resolution of existing protracted conflicts. In the face of lack of sustained collective continental and international support and diplomatic attention as well as failure of national actors to assume their responsibilities for achieving peace, both peace support operations and mediation efforts as currently deployed are struggling to deliver. The second issue relates to the effective operation of conflict early warning and early response systems. While information on potential risks of conflicts is ubiquitous, there are questions on the quality of early warning reports and their timely communication for decision-makers. There is also the issue of the formation of common understanding among various decision-making actors both within the AU and between the AU and various security actors including RECs/RMs and multilateral partners such as the EU. The existence of quality early warning without catalyzing such shared understanding would not trigger early action. The third issue that perhaps presents the most serious challenge to conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy is the refusal or reluctance of concerned states to cooperate for actions for conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. This is due to the pervasive culture of denialism and the increasing use of the defense of sovereignty. As AU Commission Chairperson rightly pointed out, ‘a restrictive, even dogmatic reading of the intangible principle of the sovereignty of the Member States raises an iron wall against any intervention by the continental organization, either as a preventive measure through early warning, or as a remedy when the crisis breaks out.’

In the light of the foregoing and against the background of the 6th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of AU and EU which took place from 17 to 18 February 2022, it is right that the two bodies focus on addressing the challenges facing conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy as part of a commitment for multilateralism and find ways of investing in and enhancing the effective use of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy in Africa including through enhancing regular interaction, joint analysis and exchange as well as complementary actions for prevention and preventive diplomacy, by among others focusing on channeling resources to social spending and addressing governance and development fragilities and linking the provision of support for transitions to concrete governance reforms and investment in provision and expansion of social services. Equally important is the imperative of the provision of both high-level and sustained diplomatic attention and resources support for preventive diplomacy and mediation or peacemaking processes. Success of the informal retreat on this theme would depend on the specific commitments that the two make for joint action and the mechanisms they put in place for delivering on such specific commitments along the foregoing lines.

The second agenda item to be discussed at the 5th joint retreat is the issue of ensuring sustainability of AU PSOs. An issue which may also be of central focus in the discussion on financing AU PSOs is the end of the EU funding through the Africa Peace Facility (APF) and what it could mean for collective African decision making on peace and security and AU leadership in peace efforts. The shift from APF to the European Peace Facility (EPF) which aims to explore the option of financing African peace efforts through bilateral agreements has been cause for concern among African stakeholders, not only in terms of its implications to multilateral engagement of the two continents, but also with respect to the financing gap it would entail for AU PSOs. With agreement on accessing UN assessed contributions for financing AU PSOs still pending, the funding gap created due to the shift from APF to EPF will surely have a significant impact on the capacity of AU PSOs that previously benefited from the APF scheme.

It is also to be recalled that at the 6th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of AU and EU which took place from 17 to 18 February 2022, the two Unions adopted a joint vision for 2030 which includes commitment to support ongoing discussions on the utilisation of United Nations (UN)-assessed contributions for financing AU PSOs authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The importance of ensuring sustainable and predictable financing for AU-led PSOs including through UN-assessed contributions also remains a key point of discussion at AUPSC-UNSC consultative meetings while the AUPSC continues to dedicate sessions to deliberate on the issue. Despite the weight that has been given to the issue, reaching agreement on a UNSC Resolution on utilising UN assessed contributions to co-finance AU PSOs has proven to be an on-going challenge. While the adoption of a ‘zero-draft African consensus paper on accessing sustainable and predictable financing for AU peace and security activities’ has been a welcome progress, agreement on a final version of the consensus paper is yet to be achieved. At the forthcoming joint retreat, the AUPSC and EUPSC may reflect on the primary responsibility of the UNSC for ensuring global peace and security, including in Africa, which serves as the basis for financing of AU PSOs through UN assessed contributions. In addition, the AUPSC may particularly wish to draw attention to the human cost Africa continues to pay as the most invaluable contribution to international peace and security, whose significance has never been appreciated in discussions on Africa’s contributions.


Prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa

Prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa

Date | 7 June 2022

Tomorrow (7 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1088th session on the theme ‘prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa’. The session is to be convened in line with the Communiqué of the 678th session of the PSC that decided to convene annually an open meeting on hate crimes.

The PSC Chairperson for the month Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo, Daniel Owassa, is expected to deliver opening remarks followed by a statement from the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye. Presentations will also be delivered by the Representative of the Republic of Rwanda.

Tomorrow’s session forms part of the annual commemoration of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi’s in Rwanda, which was observed on 7 April in accordance with AU Assembly Decision Assembly/ AU / Dec.695 of 2 July 2018. The PSC designated the theme of the session for remembering both the lives lost and the destruction caused in Rwanda on the one hand and the lessons learned from the genocide on the other hand. It thus serves as an occasion both to pay tribute to the women and men as well as children brutally massacred during the genocide and express solidarity with the survivors of the genocide and renew AU’s and its member states responsibilities to renew its commitment to the lessons from the genocide for addressing contemporary challenges.

As widely documented including through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) International Panel of Imminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events, ethnic based incitement of hate, particularly through the instrumentality of the media, was one of the drivers of the genocide against the Tutsis. Hate crimes and genocide are known to occur, not as isolated events, but rather as a result of sustained campaigns of hatred and violent incitement which develop and strengthen over a period of time. Indeed, the perpetration of ethnic violence does not start with the physical attacks against members of the target ethnic group. It starts with propagation of hate, the production and circulation of narratives having the effect of rendering members of target ethnic groups objects of both hate and dehumanization.

The impact of new communication technology and social media is another area of interest for the PSC, particularly in terms of their role in the propagation of fake news, hate speech and incitement of violence and the impact thereof. Both the speed of dissemination/circulation harmful content and the role of social media in magnifying extreme views have made incitement of hate more dangerous not only in hardening social polarization but also in inflaming tensions.

There is increasing concern that new communication technology and social media platforms have also proven to negatively impact peace and security, mainly by serving as a platform for incitement of violence and exacerbation of hate speech, including for mobilizing and recruitment by terrorist groups. The key issue arises here is promoting responsible use of social media platforms, ensuring that the companies owning the platforms institute inbuilt mechanisms both for limiting the use of the platforms for propagation of hate and incitement of violence and for encouraging content that promotes harmony, social cohesion and civil discourse.

Council may reflect on ways in which the traditional and social media space can be used for advancing the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and for promoting respect for democratic norms and international human rights and international humanitarian principles.  Central to the prevention of incitement of ethnic hatred and genocide is to find ways of facilitating both responsible use and inhibit the abuse of such platforms for causing harm on other people. This requires various non-legal measures including the critical role of civil society, the media, community leaders and public intellectuals in the promotion of a culture of peace and ethno-cultural and religious tolerance. Of equal importance is also the role of education, including but not limited to, civic education in nurturing civil discourse. The vital role of youth and women in this regard is of particular importance. These non-legal policy measures can be supplemented as secondary and last resort instruments by the promulgation and enactment of the necessary legal frameworks on the prevention of hate speech, hate crimes and genocide. Accordingly, Council may urge Member States to sign, ratify, domesticate and implement relevant international legal instruments on hate crimes and genocide, as well as ensure proper prosecution of perpetrators of such atrocious crimes in line with international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

Additionally, as the PSC repeatedly highlighted at its previous sessions on the theme, combating impunity of genocide perpetrators and denialism is an essential part of seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth and reconciliation. This requires strengthened cooperation and coordination among Member States to prosecute or extradite suspected fugitives. Just as important is fighting against denial and revisionism of the genocide against the Tutsi which deprives healing and justice to victims/survivors, and prevents a successful process of reconciliation from taking place.

This year’s commemoration and tomorrow’s session comes in a context of some worrying developments in the Great Lakes Region. The social media space in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is awash with inflammatory narratives and speeches that incite hate against particular ethnic groups. Given existing tensions and mistrust among communities in the region, there are concerns that such incitement of ethnic hate would further inflame tensions. The Special envoy of the UN Secretary-General during his visit to the region expressed the firm stance of the UN against hate speech which cannot be justified against anyone, anywhere and anytime. What compounds the situation further is the diplomatic raw and trading of accusations between the DRC and Rwanda in the context of the resurfacing of the M23 armed rebel group and its fighting with the DRC army, FARDC that uprooted tens of thousands of civilians from their homes. While DRC accused Rwanda of supporting the M23, Rwanda accused FARDC of ‘kidnapping two members of Rwandan armed forces from the border with DRC’ and collaborating with Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) Rwandan Hutu armed group operating in Congo, some of whose members took part in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and had attacked Rwandan forces.

It is thus of immediate concern for the PSC that steps for both disrupting the dangerous rhetoric and narratives inciting hate and violence against particular groups and for initiation of steps for de-escalation of the raw between Rwanda and DRC. The PSC may also welcome the initiative of Senegal’s President, who chairs the AU, and Angola’s President, who chairs the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), to facilitate dialogue between the leaders of the two countries.

It is to be recalled that the 1994 genocide was made possible by, among others, the failures of African and international actors to take preventive measures before the mass violence started or to stop it once it has started. As the Panel of Eminent Personalities concluded that ‘If there is anything worse than the genocide itself, it is the knowledge that it did not have to happen. The simple, harsh, truth is that the genocide was not inevitable; and that it would have been relatively easy to stop it from happening prior to April 6, 1994, and then to mitigate the destruction significantly once it began.’ Despite the move away from the dogmatic application of non-interference to the norm of non-indifference as enshrined in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act as part of the transition from the OAU to the AU, as recent events from some of the recent major conflict situations in Africa show, the continental body is experiencing a reversal of the principle of non-indifference envisaged under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act as the politics of indifference in the face of grave circumstances takes hold in the continent’s peace and security diplomacy. The AU Commission Chairperson pointed out in his opening address to the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly that ‘a restrictive, even dogmatic reading of the intangible principle of the sovereignty of the Member States raises an iron wall against any intervention by the continental organization, either as a preventive measure through early warning, or as a remedy when the crisis breaks out.’ This defense of sovereignty has come to render the AU’s commitment to non-indifference as encapsulated in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act hallow, by serving, as the Chairperson aptly put it, as ‘a protective shield against all sorts of abuses occurring in a member country.’

The expected outcome of the session, if previous sessions are any guide, is expected to be a press statement. The PSC may welcome the progress that Rwanda registered in the reconstruction of the country and consolidating stability and development. It may reject denialism and revisionism of the genocide against the Tutsi, which not only denigrate the memory of the dead and the suffering of survivors but also undermines the effort to prevent its recurrence. The PSC may reiterate the need to reinvigorate the early warning mechanism as a preventative tool to enable an early response before hate speech and crimes degenerate into violent conflicts and genocide. It may also emphasize the importance of responsible use of the media in general and social media platforms in particular and of promoting civic education, particularly among the youth, dialogue and the culture of peace, national reconciliation and healing, as well as prevention of hate crimes and genocide. The PSC may also express concern about recent trends in the ethnic-based propagation of hate targeting particular groups and the resurgence of tension in eastern DRC. It may accordingly condemn the abuse of social media platforms for engaging in such propagation of hate. The PSC may also condemn in the strongest terms the hostile acts of the M23, including its attacks against UN peacekeepers and urge that full implementation of the decision of the Nairobi summit for addressing the threat of armed rebel groups. The PSC may express concern about recent trends of the use of the defence of sovereignty by states to block the exercise by the AU of its role in supporting the effort to prevent and stop the occurrence of identity-based atrocities in accordance with the principles of non-indifference. It may reaffirm its readiness to uphold and ensure respect for AU’s legal commitment to the principle of non-indifference and remind member states of their obligations to collaborate with the AU for the implementation of this principle.


MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022

Date | June 2022

During June, the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), under the chairship of the Republic of Congo, convened five sessions. Three of these were committed to thematic issues while the other two addressed a country/region specific issue. All sessions convened during the month took place at Ambassadorial level. The outcomes for the four sessions were adopted as Communiqués while no outcome document was released for one session. On average, it took about two weeks for the release of outcome documents.

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MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022

MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - JUNE 2022

Date | June 2022

During June, the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), under the chairship of the Republic of Congo, convened five sessions. Three of these were committed to thematic issues while the other two addressed a country/region specific issue. All sessions convened during the month took place at Ambassadorial level. The outcomes for the four sessions were adopted as Communiqués while no outcome document was released for one session. On average, it took about two weeks for the release of outcome documents.

Read Full Document

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