Emerging technologies and new media: Impact on democratic governance, peace and security in Africa
Emerging technologies and new media: Impact on democratic governance, peace and security in Africa
Date | 04 August 2022
Tomorrow (04 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 1097th session on a relatively new thematic issue on “Emerging technologies and new media: Impact on democratic governance, peace and security in Africa”.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. The Director of the AU Commission Department of Infrastructure and Energy, representative of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and expert on emerging technologies, Thompson Chengeta, will deliver presentations. Representatives of Amani Africa and Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also expected to make intervention.
While the PSC discussed specific issues relating to emerging technologies and new media, this is the first time that the Council has a dedicated session on emerging technologies and new media in general, with a focus on their impact on democratic governance and peace and security in Africa. This strategically important session helps the PSC to grapple with a theme whose ramifications and significance have been expanding at a pace that continues to widen the gulf between the rate of change of these technologies and media and the response of policy makers.
The use of emerging technologies and new media including access to the internet and mobile technology continue to contribute positively to democratic governance and the promotion of peace and security in Africa, as in other parts of the world. For example, drones have improved the way healthcare is provided in Rwanda as they are being used to deliver blood in remote areas, thus enhancing access by overcoming geographic limitations. Mobile phones and social media also present opportunities to empower citizens and transform their relationship with the state. Real-time photos and videos uploaded to social media can expose government corruption or abuse and increase government responsiveness to citizen concerns. These technologies have also revolutionized people’s ability to organize and coordinate protest movements as well as electoral campaigns.
A case in point is the 2016 elections in the Gambia. According to one study, 92% of people interviewed believed that social media played the most role compared to traditional media. Especially, they affirmed that social media platforms such as WhatsApp or Facebook allowed the population to receive and spread information, even when the then incumbent government closed the access to the Internet. Furthermore, social media allowed locals to get in contact with Gambians living abroad. The interviewees affirmed that WhatsApp and Facebook ‘dominated the transmission of ideas’ and were able to ‘educate a larger number of people about the necessity of change’. In Mali, the mobile application ‘MonElu’ has been utilized as a medium to strengthen citizen participation in governance by facilitating dialogue with elected officials and in the process increasing accountability to citizens. In Kenya, Kenyan civil society successfully deployed crowd-sourcing technologies (Ushahidi) to map out the unfolding post-election violence in the country in 2008 election.
Council has taken note of the contribution of new media in various at its various sessions including the 589th, 791st and 1062nd sessions convened under the theme of “Elections in Africa”. For example, at its 1062nd session it stressed ‘the important role of … responsible media, both print and electronic, in electoral processes and encouraged these entities to always contribute more positively towards promoting the integrity and credibility of elections and maintenance of peace and stability in Member States, especially by promoting civic education and accurate public information, as well as refraining from inflammatory reporting and miscommunication that may incite violence.’
In terms of the role of new technologies for promoting clean elections and limiting the rigging of elections, there is a need for identifying optimal conditions under which technologies contribute for enhancing the confidence of the electorate in the role of elections for advancing democratic governance in Africa. This is also important in terms of strengthening the quality of AU election monitoring through the use of relevant technologies and new media both for planning and conducting the election monitoring work of the AU.
In terms of positive contribution of emerging technologies for peace and security, the use of these technologies helps in timely exposing risks of violence and crises thereby strengthening early warning capabilities. Increasing use of these technologies by conflict actors also mean that it has increasingly become possible to establish the positions, motivations and movement of conflict actors, thereby enabling the planning of informed policy responses and mediation and peace-making efforts. The use of these technologies in peace processes has not only enabled mediators and peace support operations to have strong situational awareness, but to also engage in public diplomacy. These technologies also contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of peace processes by enabling engagement with various stakeholders. Admittedly, the extent to which AU peace processes, whether in mediation or in peace support operations, are able to harness these positive contribution of these technologies depend on their possession of the requisite skills and capabilities for using these technologies for such ends.
In the light of the foregoing, one issue that would be of interest to the PSC is the need for examining the current state of how AU and Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) peace processes are using and harnessing the potentials of emerging technologies and new media for their work in conflict management and resolution.
It is clear from the foregoing that emerging technologies and new media have significant actual and potential contribution for the achievement of AU’s Agenda 2063 broadly and those relating to democratic governance and peace and security in particular. But the optimization of their current contributions and the harnessing of their enormous potentials depends on expanding access to these technologies and the technical know-how of and digital literacy for various areas of public life.
Emerging technologies and new media are not however without peril. Indeed, previous engagements of the PSC and recent and current experiences illustrate the adverse impacts of emerging technologies and new media in Africa.
Internet and social media platforms have been misused for spreading misinformation and inciting violence, particularly during election periods, undermining democratic processes and imposing serious risk to peace and security. In this regard, Council’s 653rd and 713th sessions have been particularly critical in drawing attention to the abuse and misuse of the media space by some political actors, which has the impact of undermining the credibility of electoral processes. A relatively newer trend Council may wish to note at tomorrow’s session is also the manipulation of algorisms by social media platforms to shape perceptions of people during elections, with the core purpose of precipitating artificially engineered electoral outcomes.
Aside from the context of elections, the more general abuse of media space for spread of hate speech and incitement of violence has also been a matter of serious concern in the continent. For example, in cases where it is difficult to trace the individual(s) or group(s) engaged in disinformation or misinformation operations, the distribution of content, such as images, memes, videos, and even voice messages, leads to a high level of violence among communities. In Nigeria, images of corpses in mass graves were used to fuel animosity between the Fulani Muslims and Berom Christians, which resulted in violence and killing. The perilous use of these technologies is something that the PSC has addressed, particularly in the context of its thematic agenda on hate crimes and prevention of genocide. At its 761st session for example where Council highlighted how the misuse of social media has the potential of escalating the ideology of hate and genocide and how the abuse of media space can disrupt social cohesion and endanger national unity, it urged member States to set up mechanisms for monitoring the use of media.
The use of new technologies for surveillance and disinformation by state actors has also become a major source of concern as it dampness the positive contribution of these technologies and new media by exposing people with dissenting voices to serious peril. The 2020 titled a roadmap for digital cooperation noted, ‘new technologies are too often used for surveillance, repression, censorship and online harassment’ and that ‘greater efforts are needed to develop further guidance on how human rights standards apply in the digital age.’ The PSC may in this regard welcome the initiative of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ under its resolution 473 on artificial intelligence, robotics and other new and emerging technologies.
Council’s 850th session addressing the theme of “Cyber Security” has highlighted the ‘importance of a safe and secure cyber space for reaping the dividends of digital transformation of Africa’. On the adverse side, a number of PSC’s sessions on terrorism and violent extremism have expressed concern over the growing use of technologies and media by terrorist groups. In addition to emphasising the concerning use of technologies such as UAVs by terrorist groups, as well as the manipulation of internet for purposes of radicalisation and recruitment, it is also important for Council to reflect on the use of new technologies in armed conflicts and the impact thereof. In recent years, the demand for military drones in Africa has significantly been on the rise, driven by a growing number of internal conflicts and counter-terrorism operations. Libya for instance is often even called the world’s largest ‘drone war theatre’, with multiple countries supporting one of the warring parties militarily in the civil war through the delivery of drones. France is deploying armed drones in the Sahel region against militants in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and both US and French air strikes in Africa are notorious for injuring and killing civilians, often without any transparency or accountability regarding civilian casualties.
According to the latest drone study reports, African countries have also increasingly acquired and used (armed) drones themselves in their fights against armed groups. At the same time, armed groups are increasingly putting effort into weaponizing small commercial drones, turning these into surveillance and combat drones, of which Boko Haram is a primary example. These developments make clear that military drones have become an essential tool for armed forces in their operations, but that their use gives rise to questions about clear legal norms, wider military-strategic considerations and improved export controls.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. Council may recognize the enormous contribution and potential of emerging technologies and new media in addressing the socio-economic, governance and peace and security challenges and for the implementation of AU’s Agenda 2063. It may call for the imperative for enhancing Africa’s participation both in the development of and access to emerging technologies and use of new media for the advancement of the wellbeing of the people of the continent. It may express concerns about the threats posed by actors that use emerging technologies to disseminate malicious online contents that diminish trust for democratic governance. The Council may call for the development of regulatory framework for ensuring that technology firms strengthen their supervisory mechanisms to prevent the use of their technologies for destructive purposes. It may request for greater collaboration between member States, RECs/RMs, the AU Commission, and the Private Sector in promoting the development and responsible use of emerging technologies and new media. Having regard to upcoming elections in the continent, particularly Kenya’s general elections scheduled to take place 09 August, Council may also urge all relevant stakeholder to refrain from misuse of new media and task the AU election observers to pay particular attention to the impact of new media with a view to propose ways of more effectively addressing the increasing adverse use to which new media and technologies are used in tampering electoral processes. It may also call on member States to ensure respect of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) standards in their use of new technologies including weapons such as battle drones and UAVs.
Updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa
Updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa
Date | 04 August 2022
Tomorrow (4 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1097th session for an updated briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa.
The PSC Chairperson for August, The Gambia’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Jainaba Jagne, is expected to start the session with an opening remark. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is also expected to make statement. AU Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, is expected to deliver an updated briefing on the situation in Ethiopia and his activities since the last meeting of the PSC. The representatives of Ethiopia, as a concerned country, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are also expected to deliver statements through their representatives.
The last time the High Representative addressed the Council on the situation was during its 1064th session held on 10 February. It is to be recalled that a briefing session was planned to take place on 4 May and then on 5 July but both sessions were later canceled. Tomorrow’s briefing would provide update on the activities of the High Representative since his last briefing in February and overall developments regarding the situation in the country.
One of the major developments Obasanjo is likely to highlight is the 24 March declaration of an ‘indefinite humanitarian truce effective immediately’ by the government of Ethiopia. This was reciprocated by the Regional Government of Tigray expressing their commitment to respect the truce and cessation of hostilities provided that humanitarian assistance is delivered adequately and timely. Regional and international actors including AU, UN, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) also welcomed the said truce. The Chairperson of the Commission, in a statement issued on 25 March, welcoming the truce, stated that he ‘continues to advocate for a negotiated permanent comprehensive ceasefire.’ The 25 March statement by UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, also commended the humanitarian truce while stressing that the positive development should ‘translate into immediate improvements on the ground’. Guterres further urged for the ‘restoration of public services in Tigray, including banking, electricity and telecommunications’ and for all sides to ‘enable and facilitate the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian assistance across all affected areas’.
PSC members may be interested to hear about the state of the implementation of the declared truce and how far it moved the needle on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Northern Ethiopia, particularly Tigray. The first humanitarian convoy of 20 trucks since mid-December arrived in Tigray through the Semera-Abala-Mekelle route a week after the declaration of the truce on 1 and 2 April.
On the activities he carried out, Obasanjo is expected to brief the Council about the outcome of his interaction with the Federal Government and the leadership of the Tigray region in late May and early June. During his media engagement on 1 June, Obasanjo told BBC Focus on Africa that the peace process was progressing ‘very slowly but steadily’. Indeed, the ‘truce’, though fragile, has continued to hold. While highlighting next steps, Obasanjo is likely to point out his expectations that the truce would translate into a negotiated ceasefire, paving the way for peace talks for a comprehensive political agreement for the full resolution of the conflict.
Both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The government announced the establishment of a seven-member committee for the peace talk. On the other side, the President of the regional government of Tigray in an open letter he issued on 13 June expressed readiness to participate in a ‘credible, impartial, and principled peace process’. But, the same letter also raised concern that ‘the proximity of the High Representative to the Prime Minster of Ethiopia has not gone unnoticed by our people’. On 18 July, the regional state also reportedly set up a team of negotiators for the talks with the federal government. There is apparently disagreement between the two parties on who should lead the negotiation – the federal government wants the peace talk to be held under the auspice of the AU while Tigray regional state prefers peace talks facilitated by Kenya with the support of international partners, including US, EU, UAE, UN, and the AU. There are reports that peace talks may start soon in Kenya. In this respect, members of the PSC may seek from Obasanjo on the level of preparations for the start of the talks and ways of addressing the deficit of trust undermining progress for starting peace talks.
On the security front, the situation remains relatively calm, although tense and volatile. In May, clashes were reported between Tigray forces and Eritrea though it did not worsen into a full blown conflict. The leaderships in Tigray and the federal government have also continued trading accusations of mobilization of forces, raising the spectre of renewed conflict.
During his last engagement with the PSC, Obasanjo stated that ‘we …continue to call on all parties to fully withdraw from occupied territories and to return to their original positions…in order to lay the foundation for the commencement of dialogue and negotiations.’ On 12 April, the authorities in Tigray announced the withdrawal of their forces from Erebti, in the Afar region. Subsequently, they also announced the withdrawal of all their forces from Afar and declared their expectations for unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid into Tigray. One territory that remains major site of contention from which Tigray forces call for withdrawal of forces that seized the region since the start of the war is Western Tigray.
Obasanjo’s briefing is also expected to touch on the humanitarian situation in the northern part of the country. In this connection, the High Representative may highlight the relative increase of aid deliveries to Tigray region following the humanitarian truce. According to OCHA’s 22 July situation report, ‘in Tigray Region, since the resumption of humanitarian convoy movement on 1 April, and as of 19 July, 4,308 trucks have arrived in Mekelle via Afar through 30 humanitarian convoys.’ The convoy movement also included 1,081,155 liters of fuel, though partners requires 2 million litres each month. Although the government rejected it as ‘myth’, an EU official who visited Tigray pointed out that shortage of fuel is preventing the delivery of much-needed humanitarian aid. In a press conference after the meeting of the Council of the EU, Joseph Borrrel, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, told reporters that progress made ‘not enough for full normalization of relations’ and underscored the need for ‘restoring basic services in Tigray and lifting restrictions on fuel and fertilizers…to save millions of people from death.’ Given that this is also a farming season, Obasanjo may also touch on the need for ensuring that fertilizers and other farm inputs are promptly released and availed to farmers.
Despite progress in aid delivery, the humanitarian situation in the northern part of the country remains alarming with high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. The 27 June OCHA humanitarian update indicates that the number of people in need of food assistance in northern Ethiopia has increased from 9 million in November of last year to more than 13 million people, of which 4.8 million in Tigray, 1.2 million in Afar and over 7 million in Amhara regional states. The other issue that the High Representative may also touch on is the non-resumption of basic services such as banking, electricity, telecommunication. In his last briefing on 10 February, he pointed out that ‘the continued limitations in access to essential services is worsening the dire humanitarian situation in Tigray and other areas directly affected by the conflict.’ He went on to tell the PSC that ‘[w]e should collectively continue to urge the Federal Government to lift the blockade and restore services as critical confidence-building measures.’
The other issue that Obasanjo touched on from his last briefing was release of prisoners. It is to be recalled that Tigray forces reportedly announced the release of over 4000 prisoners of war, while it is reported that a few thousands more remain in prison in Tigray. In a statement it issued on 30 June, Ethiopian Human Rights Commission report called for the immediate release of 8560 Tigrians held in two camps in Afar region noting that they ‘are detained illegally and arbitrarily based on their ethnic identity.’
It is to be recalled that no outcome document by way of communique or press statement came out of the previous sessions including the previous 1064th session during which the High Representative briefed the Council. This time, the PSC may issue a communique. The PSC may recognize the humanitarian truce as an encouraging development towards addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the north, but at the same time, express concern over the prevailing gap between the humanitarian needs on the ground and the level and pace of delivery of aid so far. In this respect, members of the Council may appeal to all parties to ensure that the humanitarian truce holds and act in good faith to allow flow of aid commensurate with the needs on the ground including by creating conditions such as increased access to fuel that enable humanitarian actors to execute emergency relief efforts. The PSC may also reiterate Obasanjo’s call from his February briefing for release of all political prisoners and prisoners of war. Members of the Council may also stress on the importance of building on the humanitarian truce and reiterate the call made by the High Representative during his February briefing for the restoration of disconnected social services including telecommunication, banking and electricity and urgent distribution of fertilizers and other farm inputs for farmers. The PSC may also recognize as positive step withdrawal of Tigray forces from Afar and may reiterate the call Obasanjo made in February for ‘all parties to fully withdraw from occupied territories and to return to their original positions.’ On security and peace process front, while welcoming the fact that the truce the parties declared is holding, PSC may request that further steps are taken towards negotiating permanent ceasefire and peace agreement. It may encourage the parties to build on the pronouncements they made expressing their commitment for starting peace talks.
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - AUGUST 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - AUGUST 2022
Date | August 2022
In August, The Gambia chaired the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). From the eleven sessions initially inscribed in the Provisional Program of work, two were postponed. Another agenda item was added in the course of the month. Seven of the sessions were committed to thematic agenda items while two addressed a country/region specific issue.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Date | 02 August 2022
Tomorrow (02 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1096th session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa conducted during the first half of 2022.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement and introduce the report.
The Chairperson’s report on elections in Africa is regularly submitted to the PSC in line with the Council’s request made at its 424th session to receive quarterly briefings on national elections conducted in the continent. In recent years, the report is presented twice a year. Following the report of the Chairperson on elections conducted during the second half of 2021 (July to December 2021), which was considered by the PSC at its 1062nd session convened on 31 January 2022, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to provide updates on elections conducted from January to June 2022 as well as preview of those expected to take place during the second half of 2022.
In the first half of 2022, a major milestone achieved in the conduct of elections in Africa was the finalisation of Somalia’s much delayed parliamentary and presidential elections on 15 May. It is to be recalled that Somalia’s general elections were originally agreed to commence in December 2020 but was not honoured as the then incumbent President sought to extend his term of office plunging the country into a constitutional and political turmoil. On 14 April 2022, senators and members of the parliament were sworn in and on 15 May, they voted for the president and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as the new president of Somalia, bringing to conclusion the protracted electoral process. The peaceful handover of power from outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo to the elected incoming President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was not only a great achievement for Somalia, but also an exemplary record of democratic practice for the Horn of Africa region where such a tradition is in short supply. Despite its successful completion, the election was unfortunately marred by procedural irregularities and incidents of violence which resulted in multiple civilian casualties. Moreover, the election modality of “one-person-one-vote” incorporated in the provisional constitution could not be implemented in the election of the members of the House of the People. The 30% quota for women in parliament agreed in the September 2020 Electoral Agreement could also not be met with women constituting only 21% of elected members of the parliament. This is a notable decrease from the 24% achieved in the 2016 election, suggesting a concerning regression in efforts aimed at increasing women’s meaningful engagement and participation in politics.
The election of members of the National Assembly of The Gambia was another one of the elections that was anticipated to take place in the first half of 2022. In December 2021, Gambia successfully completed its first Presidential election since the defeat of former President Yahya Jammeh in 2016. As a test for democratic transition, the completion of the presidential election, preceded by political wrangling among various political parties and on the record of the incumbent, was an important milestone for the country. The National Assembly election was conducted against the backdrop of the presidential election and was successfully concluded on 09 April 2022. According to the statement issued by the AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) to Gambia on its preliminary findings, the election was conducted under a peaceful atmosphere and in an orderly manner, a standard that is becoming common in describing elections in Africa but qualitatively lower than the standards of ‘free, fair and credible’. A shortcoming noted by the AUEOM was the delay experienced in legal reforms to address gaps in the legal framework for elections, including promotion of women and youth participation through affirmative action. Indeed, the lack of such reforms has contributed to the very low participation of women – out of the 246 candidates nominated to occupy seats in the National Assembly, only 19 were women.
Mali was also among the member States anticipated in the previous report of the AU Commission Chairperson, to conduct general elections during the first half of 2022. In line with the 2020 Transition Charter of Mali, the country was set to conduct general elections on 27 February 2022, putting an end to the transition period. As highlighted in the Chairperson’s previous report, the new political dynamics, following the May 2021 coup, made the 2022 elections timeline infeasible. Based on the recommendations made at the “National Refoundation Conference”, Mali’s transition authorities decided to extend the transition period for over three years of additional period, provoking imposition of sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After continuous diplomatic efforts and engagements between Mali’s transition leaders and ECOWAS Mediator for Mali, Goodluck Jonathan, Mali adopted a new transition timetable on 01 July which adjusts the duration of the transition to be 24 months, starting from 29 March 2022. At its 61st Ordinary Session which took place on 3 July 2022, ECOWAS lifted the economic and financial sanctions it imposed against Mali, having regard to the new transition calendar. It did however maintain Mali’s suspension from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies as well as individual sanctions imposed against specific groups and personalities.
During the second half of 2022, three key AU member States are expected to conduct elections – Angola, Kenya and Senegal. Angola is set to have its presidential and legislative elections on 24 August, with reports indicating registration of over 14 million voters expected to head to the polls. President João Lourenço, who will again be running for president, and his party, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), will be confronting a newly formed opposition coalition, the United Patriotic Front which is led by Costa Junior of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
Kenya’s general elections are scheduled to take place on 09 August. While the incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta is standing down after his two terms in office and setting a good example against third-termism for the rest of the continent, the contest between Deputy President William Ruto and opposition leader Raila Odinga – now backed by current President Kenyatta – is already creating much tension. Given the country’s recent history of highly contested polls and election violence, the forthcoming elections will be among those that will require close monitoring by relevant actors including the AU. In that spirit, the AU, along with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC), has already deployed a joint high-level pre-election assessment mission to Kenya from 14 to 21 May 2022. Following the invitation by the Kenyan Government, the AU will also be deploying an international election expert mission to observe the general elections.
Following the local elections which took place on 27 January, Senegal’s parliamentary elections were just concluded successfully on 31 July, paving the way for the 2024 presidential election. In the local elections, the presidential party conceded defeat in the capital city, Dakar as well as the southern city of Ziguinchor and confronted tougher competition at the parliamentary elections with the key opposition coalition parties having forged a deal to unite and join forces ahead of the elections. Reportedly, about 7 million voters participated in the parliamentary elections to elect 165 representatives in the National Assembly. A short-term EOM was also deployed by the AU to observe the elections and the findings of the mission are expected to feature in the report of the AU Commission Chairperson for the upcoming reporting period (second half of 2022).
The peaceful as well as credible and transparent conduct of the elections in these three countries will be critical in consolidating electoral processes and advancing democracy in the continent.
Further to the three member States, Libya and Chad are also among those States with 2022 set as their timeline for conducting elections. Libya’s general elections postponed from December 2021 still remain indefinitely postponed despite some proposals having been made with recommended timelines within 2022. The political crisis involving the contestation between the interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and Fathi Bashagha, appointed Prime Minister by the east-based House of Representatives, punctuated by armed confrontations, continues to undermine progress. It seems most unlikely for the country to hold the elections in 2022. Chad is also expected to conduct national elections in September. However, having regard to the slow transition process, including the delays experienced in setting the date for national dialogue – finally announced to commence on 20 August – which is expected to serve as a precursor for the elections, there is a high likelihood for the transition timeline to be extended.
In addition to reflecting on elections in these and other relevant member States, the Chairperson’s report is also expected to highlight some of the key trends observed in the continent’s electoral and political governance. In that regard, tomorrow’s session is expected to pay attention to the democratic backslide recently experienced due to unconstitutional changes of government in multiple member States and the unique challenges of conducting elections in the context of countries in transition. Election related violence, electoral malpractice, and high political tensions could also be some of the concerning trends that may be highlighted.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. Council may congratulate those member States that peacefully finalised their elections during the reporting period and encourage their fortified efforts towards ensuring democratic governance in their respective countries and the continent at large. It may also note the conclusion of the protracted elections in Somalia and welcome the peaceful transfer of power from the incumbent to the newly elected President, setting an example for the Horn of Africa region. It may call on those member States preparing to conduct their elections in the second half of the year, to put their utmost efforts towards ensuring the conduct of peaceful, fair, credible and transparent elections in accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. It may also urge political parties and independent election candidates to make full use of all available legal channels to settle any election disputes that may arise and to refrain from any recourse to election-related violence and to this end urge national electoral bodies and dispute settlement mechanisms to ensure that they abide by and uphold the highest standards to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes and afford all parties reliable and trustworthy avenues for dispute settlement. Council may further commend the AU Commission for the support provided to member States which conducted elections during the reporting period and encourage its further engagement and provision of support to those member States currently preparing to organise elections during the next reporting period.
Joint Engagement Between the PSC and the PRC Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG)
Joint Engagement Between the PSC and the PRC Subcommittee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (HRDG)
Date | 1 August 2022
Tomorrow (1 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1095th session to hold a joint engagement session with the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) subcommittee on human rights, democracy and governance (HRDG).
During the opening segment of the session Jainaba Jagne, Permanent Representative of The Gambia and PSC Chair for the month of August, the PRC subcommittee on HRDG and Bankole Adeoye Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security are expected to deliver statements. Following the opening remarks, three presentations are expected to be delivered. The first is by the PRC subcommittee on HRDG which will introduce the mandate and work of the subcommittee. The second presentation will be delivered by the PSC Chair and will provide an overview of the monthly program of the PSC. The third presentation will look into the possible areas of cooperation and engagement between the PSC and the subcommittee.
The session is proposed by the chair of the PRC Sub-committee on HRDG, Taonga Mushayavanhu Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe. The relevant background information of the session was prepared by the secretariat of the subcommittee.
The joint engagement and interaction session between the two bodies will be taking place for the first time. Tomorrow’s session will present the PSC the opportunity to interact with the subcommittee that engages the wider organs working on human rights, governance and democracy. The PRC subcommittee, which was operationalized in October 2019 has been mandated to promote AU shared values on human rights, democracy and governance. The subcommittee has a wide range of functions including receiving briefings from the AGA Platform members comprising the PSC itself, AU Commission, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), African Court on Human and Peoples Rights, Pan African Parliament, African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), AU Advisory Board Against Corruption, Economic, Social and Cultural Council, African Committee of Experts on the Right and Welfare of the Child, AU Commission on International Law, AU Development Agency- New Partnership for Africa’s Development and all the Regional Economic Communities. The sub-committee also engages in the formulation of policies, drafting of decisions on all matters related to human rights, democracy and good governance.
An important aspect of tomorrow’s deliberation may also be on the synergy between APSA and AGA. The complementarity between the two structures may also be enhanced in relation to preventing conflicts through the promotion and consolidation of democracy, governance, and human rights in the continent. Through information sharing and joint analysis the organs can further strengthen not only early warning but also mobilizing political consensus around early action. The PSC as a key pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture and as a member of the African Governance Platform has a strategic role in strengthening this complementarity. The aim of synergy is to also avoid duplication of efforts while ensuring complementarity among the various actors.
One of the main objectives of the session, as highlighted in the concept note, is to identify joint programs and initiatives that can be conducted by the two bodies. This may take the form of strengthening joint areas of intervention through promotional visits to popularize the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) as a tool to advance good governance and prevent conflict. Indeed, there is a wide convergence between the PSC protocol and the ACDEG particularly around deterrence of unconstitutional changes of government. The concerted effort and collaboration between the two bodies is also important given the recent spike in military coups and erosion of democratic rule in the continent. The session is timely given the momentum generated towards strengthening response mechanism and application of norms vis a vis unconstitutional change of government. It is also important to note that military coups are increasingly occurring in certain security situations or in countries and regions that are already experiencing insecurities. Hence this reality and developments on the ground make the policy coherence and synergy between the two bodies particularly strategic and fundamental.
Another area of engagement that can further consolidate the close coordination between the two is in election processes. PSC has as its standing agenda the monitoring of elections in Africa through periodic reports. This converges with the mandate of the subcommittee in promoting the ACDEG. There is a great role that can be played in accompanying conflict affected countries and countries that are experiencing complex transitions which the PSC is currently seized with and are integrated in its agenda. Supporting electoral processes in such sensitive conditions would require the joint engagement of these bodies to ensure that conditions for the holding of credible elections are created and electoral violence and instability are prevented, managed and resolved.
The outcome of the session remains unknown. Yet, it is expected that the PSC would welcome the operationalization of the PRC subcommittee and may commend the work it has done over the years. It may highlight the importance of the engagement to consolidate efforts around early warning, preventive diplomacy, deepening democratic values and the respect and promotion of human rights. To this end the outcome document may also stipulate arrangements for sharing of information and for establishing a more robust and institutionalized engagement. The PSC may emphasize that democracy, human rights and governance constitute the foundation and are prerequisites for a peaceful continent. In this context, the PSC may call on the AUC to support the coordination between the two organs as well as their secretariats.
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of August 2022
Provisional Programme of Work for the Month of August 2022
Date | August 2022
In August, Gambia will be chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The Provisional Program of Work adopted on 13 July and updated on 26 July, envisages that PSC will convene nine sessions during the month. Out of these, one will address country/region specific situation, whereas the remaining eight sessions will be committed to various thematic agenda items. All sessions are envisaged to take place at Ambassadorial level and there will be one open session.
On 1 August, the PSC will convene its 1st session of the month to engage for first time, one of the Sub-Committees of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), focusing on the PRC Sub-Committee on Human Rights, Democracy and Governance (SC-HRDG). This session is envisaged to enhance coordination and information sharing between the PSC and the Sub-Committee on the areas on which their respective mandate converges.
The second session of the month is set to take place on 02 August. The session will be committed to consideration of the report the AU Commission Chairperson on election in Africa. This is an agenda carried from June and July programs. Following the previous report of the AU Commission Chairperson on elections in Africa conducted in the period from July to December 2021 – considered at Council’s 1062nd session – the coming report is expected to provide details of elections conducted during the first half of 2022 (January to June 2022) and offers an overview of those expected to be held during the coming months.
On 04 August, the Council will convene its third session of the month which will be committed to a relatively new theme – “Emerging Technologies and New Media: Impact on Democratic Governance, Peace and Security in Africa”. Although this will be the first time for Council to address emerging technologies and new media as they relate to democratic governance and peace and security, it has made reference at its various previous sessions, to the use of new technologies and the media for anti-peace purposes such as the spread of fake news and propagation of hate speech. Council has also dedicated two sessions so far – the 627th and 850th sessions – to the theme of cyber security where the misuse of the cyber space for purposes contrary to peace and security was discussed at length. In addition to reflecting on some of the contemporary trends around emerging technologies whose negative impacts on democratic governance and peace and security has become a growing concern, Council may use the coming session as an opportunity to brainstorm the various ways through which new technologies and media space on the one hand, and democratic governance and peace and security on the other hand can serve for a more comprehensive policy engagement.
During the same session on 4 August, the PSC is scheduled to have an update briefing on the situation in the Horn of Africa. This briefing has been scheduled a number of times in previous months but was cancelled in each of those previous occasions. This briefing is expected to provide update by the AU Commission Chairperson’s High Representative for the Horn of Africa, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obadanjo, on the situation in the conflict in northern Ethiopia since his last briefing to the PSC in February 2022.
The fourth session of the month is set to take place on 8 August and will be committed to the third annual consultative meeting of the PSC and Policy Organs of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The first consultative meeting between the PSC and RECs/RMs Policy organs was convened on 24 May 2019 where it was agreed to institutionalise the meeting as an annual consultation. Accordingly, the second consultative meeting took place on 26 August 2021, 2020 being missed due to COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to following up on implementation of key decisions adopted at their previous consultative meetings, the third annual consultative meeting could serve to reflect on the practice and experience in how the PSC & RECs/RMs policy organs coordinate their policy responses to crises and conflicts that they are commonly seized with.
On 11 August, the PSC will convene an experience sharing session between the PSC and the members of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) Platform. It is to be recalled that within the framework of Article 19 of the PSC Protocol and taking into account the mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in responding to human rights issues in conflict and crisis situations, the PSC & the ACHPR have institutionalized annual consultative meeting. This has been held annually since 2018 culminating in communiques that outlined rich modalities for close working relationship & addressing human rights issues in conflict and crisis situations. Instead of displacing this institutionalized engagement, it is expected that tomorrow’s session, during which the Chairperson of the AGA Platform will brief the PSC, will focus on finding ways of enhancing synergy between the AGA & the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
On 12 August, Council will consider and adopt the draft provisional programme of work for the month of September 2022.
The sixth session of the month is expected to take place on 15 August, on the topical theme of “Sanctions and Enforcement Capabilities: Deterrence against Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG)”. Based on some of the observations made at the Accra Forum on UCG conducted from 15 to 17 March 2022 and the Malabo Summit on Terrorism and UCG convened on 28 May 2022, the session will be aimed at reflecting on the extent to which AU sanctions against UCG are working meaningfully, if they are serving the purpose of deterrence and what needs to change going forward in order to ensure their enforceability.
The seventh session is planned to take place on 18 August and it will be an open session on children affected by armed conflicts (CAAC). CAAC has been a standing agenda item of the PSC since its 420th session convened on 18 February 2014 where the Council decided to dedicate an open session annually to the theme. At the upcoming session, Council may welcome the adoption by the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Security and Safety (STCDSS) of two key policies on CAAC – the Policy on child protection in AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and the Policy on mainstreaming child protection in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) – in line with the request of PSC’s 994th Communiqué. Council may also draw attention to some of the emerging concerns with regards to CAAC and start to address records of plight of children in country specific conflict situations.
On 22 August, Council will convene a session on “Lessons Learning session on the Implementation of the AU Transitional Justice Policy: Impact on National Resilience and Democratisation”. Though this is the first time that Council dedicated a session on the AU Transitional Justice Policy since the Policy’s adoption by the AU Assembly in February 2019, the issue of transitional justice has been considered by the Council under the theme of ‘peace, justice and reconciliation’ since at least 2013. It is also to be recalled that the Council, at its 899th meeting held on 5 December 2019, decided to convene an annual session on “experience sharing and lessons learning on national reconciliation, restoration of peace and rebuilding of cohesion in Africa”. The coming session is expected to serve as a platform for member States such as Gambia to share their experiences including successes and challenges in their transitional justice processes. This will be essential to assist those member States who are currently undergoing transitional justice processes, such as South Sudan.
The last session of the month is scheduled to take place on 29 August. The session will be committed to an updated briefing on the deployment of the 3000 Troops in the Sahel. The decision to deploy 3000 troops to Sahel was made by the AU Assembly at its 33rd Ordinary Session [Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII)]. At its 950th session, the PSC also endorsed the ‘Revised Strategic Concept Note on Planning Guidance for the deployment of an additional 3000 troops to the Sahel’. More recently, at its 1006th session, the PSC also requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to “continue consultations with the concerned stakeholders on the deployment of the 3000 troops in the Sahel region”. However, despite the decision for deployment having been made, progress in implementation has been slow, mainly owing to lack of clarity on the issue of financing. This challenge of funding is not unique to this proposed deployment but currently affects existing AU missions, including those in Somalia and in the Central African Republic (CAR). Yet, there is a need for revising the deployment of the 3000 troops, given the need for reinforcing counter terrorism operations in the Sahel due to changing regional and geopolitical developments affecting the region including withdrawal of Mali from the G5 joint force.
In addition to these, Council’s provisional programme of work also envisages in footnotes, possible meetings on Chad/Guinea/Mali/Sudan/border situation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The footnotes also envisage an informal consultation between the PSC and the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), on 03 August.
