Disaster Management in Africa: Challenges and Perspectives for Human Security
Amani Africa
Date | 29 October, 2021
Tomorrow (29 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1043rd session on ‘Disaster Management in Africa: challenges and perspectives for human security’ at the level of Heads of State and Government. This session takes place under the chairship of Mozambique, which also hosted a virtual meeting of the Committee of Ministers Responsible for Disaster Risk management from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 26th May 2021 with the aim to review progress on regional Disaster Risk Management programmes and ensure effective coordination at the regional level.
The session is expected to have two segments, an open and a closed session. In the open session invited guests will deliver their statements. Following the opening Statement by Felipe Jacinto Nyusi, President of the Republic of Mozambique and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of October, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, is expected to make remarks. Further remarks are expected from the President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, in his capacity as the AU Champion for Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, as well as President of Gabon, Ali Bongo Ondimba, in his capacity as the Leader of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSOC). AU Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development, Amira EL Fadil, and AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment, Josefa Leonel Correia Sacko, are scheduled to deliver presentations.
This session comes on the heels of the International Day for Disaster Risk Reduction, which is observed on 13 October to raise awareness about disaster risk reduction. This year’s commemoration took place under the theme of ‘international cooperation for developing countries to reduce their disaster risk and disaster losses’, the sixth target of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The session also takes place ahead of the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow, which is scheduled for 31 October-12 November 2021. As Africa bears the brunt of climate change but has contributed least to climate emissions, the summit may also present an opportunity to remind commitments around climate finance and adaptation.
This high level engagement on disaster management becomes all too important as Africa continues to face evermore frequent disasters and increasing vulnerability with a devastating repercussion on the lives and livelihoods of its people. According to World Risk Report 2021, Africa has the second highest disaster risk next to Oceania while it is the continent with the highest overall societal vulnerability—12 of the 15 most vulnerable countries in the world are located in Africa. The risk has been evident from multiple disasters that hit the continent in recent years including the volcano eruption on Mount Nyiragongo in the city of Goma in DRC, locust swarms and flooding in Horn of Africa, cyclones and storms that led to heavy rains and flooding in Southern Africa countries such as the Comoros, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 90 percent of the major disasters in Africa have been climate related.
Over the years, the AU has put in place policy and institutional frameworks to effectively respond to the increasing disasters confronting the continent. The African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (ARSDRR), which was adopted by the Assembly (Assembly/AU/Dec.38) during its third ordinary session held in July 2004, guides the continent’s disaster risk reduction efforts. The AUC has further developed the Programme of action (PoA) for the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. To address the humanitarian consequences of disasters, the Union also adopted, among others, the Kampala Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa and the Common African Position (CAP) on Humanitarian Effectiveness that shaped Africa’s new humanitarian architecture.
On the institutional aspect, the African Risk Capacity (ARC)—a specialized agency of the AU established in 2012—comes at the center of Africa’s ‘disaster risk architecture’. The ARC aims to help African governments improve their capacities to better plan, prepare, and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters by combining the concepts of early warning, disaster risk management, and risk finance. The Special Emergency Assistance Fund (SEAF) is also established to support African countries affected by drought and/or famine although it needs to be replenished. The African Humanitarian Agency (AUHA) is also expected to facilitate coordination in humanitarian response. The African Standby Force (ASF) is another mechanism that has the mandate to respond to natural disasters.
While there are notable progress in terms of laying down the necessary structures to address disaster risks in the continent, many challenges remain. One of the significant challenges in this respect is, as captured by Lesley Ndlovu (CEO African Risk Capacity Limited) in her recent remarks on the international day for disaster risk reduction, that ‘disaster response is extremely slow and inefficient and, by the time governments and NGOs have raised enough money to respond meaningfully, the problem has become much worse, and more funding is needed’. In most cases, not only the response is ‘slow and inefficient’ but also it is largely reactive focusing on relief and immediate rehabilitation while ignoring preventive disaster reduction measures.
Hence inadequate early warning system and the gap in translating early warning to early action remain critical hurdles. As captured in the notes prepared for this session, ‘in most countries, early warning systems are sectoral in nature and hardly coordinated’. A positive development in this respect is a recent conference convened this month by the AU Commission to validate a Multi-Hazard Early Warning/Early Action (MHEWS/EA) Framework. The development of the Framework is a step forward in building the resilience of African countries as it ensures a functional early warning system. It is also to be recalled that the Council, at its 864th session held in August 2019, suggested the ‘establishment of command centers which operate on a 24 hour basis to closely monitor and timeously issue early warning alerts on impending natural disasters’, something that the Council find it worth following up in terms of strengthening the early warning system.
Inadequate funding has heavily affected disaster management. Not only there is a huge gap between the needs of people at risk to disasters and the available funding but also most of African countries and the continental mechanisms lack sustainable and predictable funding as they rely largely on external sources. Though there is an Assembly Decision to increase AU Humanitarian Fund from 2% to 4% of member states’ assessed contributions, meant to ensure predictable and sustainable resources for the AU to enable fulfil its humanitarian responsibilities, its practicality and buy-in from member states remain questionable. As indicated in the notes prepared for tomorrow’s PSC session, there is a growing trend of establishing uncoordinated disaster specific funds, and hence there is a need to embrace ‘multi-hazard funding mechanisms’.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. Among others, while commending the existing AU structures that are established to address disaster risks, the PSC may emphasize on the need to operationalize and strengthen the capacity of these structures, and in this respect, there much to be desired from member states in supporting the mechanisms. In addition, the Council may also stress the importance of enhancing coordination among the plethora of AU mechanisms for disaster management to ensure complementarity as well as avoid duplication of efforts. The PSC may underscore the importance of shifting the focus from treating the effects of disasters (reactive measures) towards a proactive approach that is more economical and efficient. On the funding challenge, the Council may stress not only on the need to rely on Africa’s own resources in the spirit of pan-Africanism but also highlight the imperative of diversifying sources of finance, as well ensuring predictable and sustainable funding for the AU to effectively discharge the expected role in addressing disaster risks. In this regard, the Council is likely to explore options to raise funds from non-traditional donors from non-traditional donors including African civil society, private sector and the diaspora, in addition to traditional sources of funding. The Council may further reiterate its support for the upcoming African Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference in Malabo, which is expected to serve as impetus to operationalize the African Humanitarian Agency and mobilize required financial resources to address the ever growing humanitarian needs of the continent. In relation to building effective early warning system and bridging the gaps between early warning and early action, the Council may also urge for the finalization of the Multi-Hazard Early Warning/Early Action (MHEWS/EA) Framework and the development of Continental MHEWS/EA Situation Room, which are pivotal in providing operational guidance on Multi-Agency and Multi-Sectoral coordination and communications at member states, regional and continental level. Finally, the Council may reiterate its 864th session which underscored the need for the ‘Regional Standby Forces to reinforce their engagement in responding to natural disasters’.
Emergency Session on the Situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 26 October, 2021
Tomorrow (26 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene an emergency session on the situation in Sudan.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Sudan as the country concerned may also make a statement. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) as the relevant regional organization may also deliver statement.
On 25 October 2021, Sudan’s military successfully staged a coup by arresting Prime Minister Hamdok and other civilian officials. A few hours later, head of the Sovereign Council and army chief, Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announced the dissolution of the transitional government, declared state of emergency and announced that the military will oversee Sudan’s transition until the conduct of elections and formation of a democratically elected government.
This is a very troubling development that not only violates the AU norm banning unconstitutional change of government, involving the dissolution of government by the military but also the AU facilitated constitutional declaration of August 2019 that established the transitional power-sharing government with civilian and military components. If the transitional process is not brought back on track with full respect of the Constitutional Declaration through restoration of the transitional government with its civilian leadership under Prime Minister Abdela Hamdok, this coup and the decision by the military to be in charge of the transition will completely reverse the gains achieved thus far and jeopardize the hope for a successful democratic transition in Sudan.
There have been warning signs that this military coup has been in the making. The relationship between the civilian leadership and the military has from the very beginning been fragile, although this does not make today’s events inevitable. Disagreement and tension have been expanding for more than a year. The two sides disagreed over foreign policy, the issue cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) relating to the prosecution of alleged crimes perpetrated in Darfur, including the handing over of former president Omar Al Bashir to ICC, and importantly the reform of the security sector in Sudan.
Despite the efforts of the transitional government to secure debt relief and obtain foreign investment to revive it, Sudan’s economy has been on a downward spiral since 2019, with recent inflation rates reaching a shocking level of 400% per year. This has added to the complexity of the situation creating citizen discontent and complaint over the rising cost of living. During the previous months, Sudan experienced a crisis involving the blocking in Eastern Sudan of the path to port Sudan, causing serious shortage of supplies in the country and thereby endangering processes for easing the dire economic situation in the country. While the public protests spurred by the economic difficulty have undermined the transitional civilian authorities, the public has also remained opposed to the military, expressing their unwillingness to have a military rule in the country and endangering the gains made towards establishing a civilian government.
In September, there was an announcement of the foiling of an attempted coup by some security personnel associated with the previous administration of Bashir. This brought the growing tension between the civilian leadership and the military to a low point with the two sides trading accusations. While the military accused the civilians of alienating the military and failing to effectively govern the country, the civilians accused the military of trying to create conditions for countering the revolution and grabbing power by force.
Though the ‘remnants of al-Bashir’s regime’ were scapegoated for the aborted coup, it clearly signalled not only the rocky transition towards a democratic rule but also revealed the deep divides and the simmering tension within civil-military coalition. Immediately after the attempted coup, it was reported that military component of the Sovereign Council suspended all meetings with its civilian counterpart while removing the security details of the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 1989 Regime, Removal of Empowerment and Corruption, and Recovering Public Funds—a committee established by the interim transitional government with the aim to claw back assets from the ousted government of al-Bashir.
As reflected in the Constitutional Declaration, the power-sharing arrangement between the two was for military to chair the Sovereignty Council for 21 months before a civilian takes over for the remaining 18 months of the transitional period leading to elections. Many have been casting their doubt on whether the military will honour the terms of the power-share deal given its history and reluctance for accommodating reform that limits its role in the politics of the country. Indeed, the coup happened only weeks away from the time for transferring the leadership of the Sovereign Council to the civilian leadership.
The absence of a mechanism for resolving disputes between the military and the civilian leadership in a context of mutual distrust and with the slow pace of the establishment of the transitional assembly, there has been increasing tendency for mobilizing rival public protests. Against the background of the deteriorating relationship since the attempted coup in September and in the context of the deterioration of the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military and in the face of the impending handover of the leadership of the Sovereign Council by the military to the civilian leadership headed by Prime Minister Hamdok, a pro-military sit-in was staged in front of the presidential palace. This pro-military protest not only put the blame on the civilian leadership for the contestations and ‘ineffective governance’ of the country but also called for, among others, the overthrow of the civilian leaders. It was reported that Sudanese and observers of Sudan feared that this was the pretext for a hostile takeover of power.
In a show of public support for the civilian leadership and their rejection of the military’s manoeuvre to frustrate the reform process, protests countering the pro-military demonstration took place not only in Khartoum but also other parts of the country. This mobilized various sectors of society from different walks of life.
International organizations and states responded to the situation unfolding in Sudan. The Chairperson of AU Commission, for instance, issued statement calling for the ‘immediate resumption of consultations between civilians and military within the framework of the Political Declaration and the Constitutional Decree’, in addition to urging authorities for the release of political leaders. The Executive Secretary of IGAD ‘strongly’ condemned ‘any attempt to undermine the transitional government’ while urging all parties to ‘exercise utmost restraint’. The Secretary-General of the Arab League issued statement as well expressing concerns over the military take-over and called for all parties to ‘full abide’ by the constitutional declaration signed in August 2019. The UN Secretary-General also called for the immediate release of Prime Minister Hamdok and other officials. Governments like the US and France also condemned the act.
Most significant is the mobilization of civilian protesters in Sudan. Unsurprisingly, protestors took over Khartoum and its twin city Omdurman in apparent opposition to the military coup. This has made it clear that there is widespread opposition against military rule. It also signifies that many civilians are determined to put their lives on the line for reversing the military takeover of power. In this context, there is heightened risk for confrontation by the military that will put the lives, safety and bodily security of civilians in grave peril. It is to be recalled that the PSC sanctioned Sudan on 5 June 2019 following the 3 June violent crackdown by the military against civilians that claimed the lives of many civilians and on account of lack of progress towards the establishment of a civilian-led Transitional Authority as prescribed by the Council in its previous sessions.
From a security perspective, the military coup not only brings the military on a deadly collusion course against the civilians who have been mobilized for defending the revolution throwing the country into deep instability but also threatens the Juba sponsored peace process that led to the integration of various armed groups from Darfur and the two areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile into the transitional process. All indications are that unless the situation is reversed and the transitional process is put back on track, fragile security conditions in Darfur and other parts of Sudan may deteriorate further.
Tomorrow’s session will be followed very closely not only by the wider African public and the international community but also by Sudanese themselves, including the civilian leaders of the transition. Members of the PSC may consider recent experiences involving military seizure of power. These have been witnessed among others in Chad, Mali and Guinea. Considering the gravity of the situation in Sudan including its adverse impact not only on the transitional process but also on the stability and peace and security of the country and the region, there seems to be very little legally viable and politically legitimate option other than following the approach taken to the military seizure of power in Guinea. Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry made this clear in a statement that expressed strong condemnation of today’s military coup d’état in Sudan and called for immediate restoration of the transitional government.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC may express grave concern about the military takeover of power in Sudan and its very adverse implications for the transitional process and the peace and security of Sudan and the region. It may condemn the dissolution of the government and the arrest of the civilian leadership of the transitional government contrary to the Constitutional Declaration of August 2019. The PSC may also welcome the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson and the call of others including IGAD rejecting the attempt to derail the transitional process. It may also reiterate its zero tolerance for military coup and its rejection of the announcement by the military to be in charge of the transitional process contrary to applicable AU norms on democracy and constitutional rule. It may in this context consider the situation in Sudan as unconstitutional change of government in line with Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. In line with its established practice and invoking Article 7(1) (g) of the PSC Protocol, the Council may suspend Sudan from all AU activities until restoration of the transitional process involving the civilian leadership. The Council may further demand the immediate and unconditional release of Prime Minister Hamdok and other civilian leaders and their return to their positions. Following its best practice and to facilitate implementation of these decisions and restore stability in Sudan, the PSC may request the Chairperson of the Commission to send a special envoy who helps the parties in the process of restoring the transitional process on the basis of the Constitutional Declaration and facilitate agreement between the civilian leadership under Prime Minister Hamdok and the military on ways of implementing the transition process within the framework of the Constitutional Declaration and on the basis of mutual respect and establishment of an agreed upon dispute resolution mechanism.
The African Union Peace and Security Council Handbook - 2021
Amani Africa
2021
INTRODUCTION
The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the organ of the AU that is tasked with the responsibility of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. The norms underlying the mandate of the PSC and the methods and instruments for executing its mandate are enunciated in the Protocol to the AU Constitutive Act Establishing the PSC, which was adopted in Durban, South Africa in 2002.
The peace and security landscape of the continent and the nature of the mandate of the PSC demands that the PSC is organized and operates at a high level of effectiveness. Indeed, how the PSC functions and delivers on its mandate impacts not only the effectiveness of the continental response to the peace and security challenges, but also on global multilateral engagements. Various factors, including political will of member states, mobilization of consensus, and capacity, critically shape the level of effectiveness of the PSC.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Continental Efforts in Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 22 October, 2021
Tomorrow (22 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1040th session at a ministerial level to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on continental efforts in prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa.
The session is expected to have two segments, an open and a closed session. In the open session invited guests will deliver their statements. Following the opening statement by Verónica Nataniel Macamo Dlhovo Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mozambique and PSC Chair for October, the Chairperson of the AUC Moussa Faki Mahamat is expected to deliver remarks. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is scheduled to deliver a presentation. Ramtane Lamamra Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of Algeria and Champion in Combating Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa is also expected to deliver remarks. The Chairpersons of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as the representatives of the European Union and the United Nations are expected to present their statements. During the closed segment Bankole Adeoye will present the report of the Chairperson of the AUC on continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa. The Secretary General of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) is also scheduled to present its statement.
The report of the chairperson is in line with the Assembly decision (/AU/Dec.311 (XV)) during its 15th Ordinary Session, held in July 2010, which requested the Commission to submit regular reports on the status of the fight and cooperation against terrorism in Africa. During its 249th meeting held in November 2010, it is to be recalled that the Council also requested the AU Commission to submit reports and briefings on the state of terrorism in Africa and the efforts made at continental and international level to address the scourge. Since then the Chairperson of the Commission has been reporting to the Council regularly, on the challenges related to terrorism in Africa and on continental efforts being undertaken towards combating the problem. The Council thus far held three of its sessions on the theme at the level of Heads of State and Government (455th, 571st, and 749th meetings). This makes the thematic issue the most addressed at a summit level.
On the state of terrorism and trends, the report underscores persistence of Africa’s vulnerability to the threats of terrorism and violent extremisms despite the progress achieved by member states in preventing and combating the scourge. Citing African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) data, the report provides that, from 1 January to 30 June 2021, the continent witnessed a total of 950 terrorist attacks resulting in 3,883 deaths—showing a 10 percent increase in the number of attacks as compared to the same period in 2020. Civilians continued to bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. On a positive note, the report indicates that counter terrorism operations neutralized 1,943 terrorists. Recently, major successes have been also registered in neutralizing top ranks of terrorist groups operating in Africa though its implication in reducing their lethality remains to be seen.
In terms of geographic distribution of terrorist attacks, the report highlights that Central Africa registered the highest number of attacks with 595 attacks resulting in 1,758 deaths (constituting 45 percent of the total death registered in the continent) while North Africa recorded the least both in number of attacks and deaths (11 attacks and 32 deaths). West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa come second, third and fourth, respectively. Mai-Mai groups, Allied Democratic Front (ADF), Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Al-Sunnah Wa Jummah (ASWJ) were the most active terrorist groups during the reporting period. Among these, ADF that operates in eastern DRC is the deadliest while Boko Haram remains the most lethal terrorist group in Africa.
The report attributes the spread of terrorism in Africa to several factors. First is the surge in the influx of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from outside the continent. Despite the military defeat of ISIL and its affiliates in Iraq and Syria, its spillover effect has continued to reverberate across Africa and elsewhere. On one hand, the return and relocation of FTFs pose a huge security risk by enhancing the operational capability of local terrorist groups and affiliates, particularly in the area of using and manufacturing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). On the other hand, the threat posed by ISIL and Al-Qaida has morphed into a ‘less visible network of autonomous individuals and cells’, which makes efforts of combating terrorism more challenging. Growing trend has been also witnessed among terrorist groups operating in Africa in terms of pledging allegiance to ISIS and Al-Qaida though there is little evidence suggesting strong link between them. It is against this context that the PSC, during its last session on FTFs (957th meeting), requested the AU Commission, African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) and ACRST to ‘develop a comprehensive “guideline framework for countering FTFs”, as well as to expedite the development of a “database” of persons, entities or organizations involved in or supporting, in any form, the activities of terrorist organizations…’.
The second factor is the intricate linkage between terrorism and trans-national organized crime where not only illicit economies have become major source of financing for terrorists but also its profitability has become financial motivation for them to continue with their activities. Hence, as noted by the report of the Chairperson, depriving terrorist and violent extremist groups of their sources of funding should be a central element of any counter terrorism strategy. Terrorist groups also derive their funding from kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR), which showed a dramatic rise in 2021 as compared to the same period last year. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the rise of mercenarism—phenomenon particularly aggravated by the instability in Libya and Sahel—are also mentioned as factors contributing to the spread of terrorism in the continent. It is also worth noting that terrorists have taken advantage of the porous nature of African borders and ungoverned spaces in some of African countries due to weak national institutional capacities in this regard.
On the continental efforts to address the scourge, AU has made strides in building strategic partnership with UN and other stakeholders including through the launch of Coordination Committee between the AU Commission and UN Office of Counter-Terrorism on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. The AU has also continued its support to RECs/RMs and member states to strengthening their capacity in countering terrorism through the available mechanisms notably ACSRT, AFRIPOL, and CISSA. The ACSRT, for instance, have been providing assistance in the areas of developing/reviewing their respective counterterrorism strategies and plan of actions, building technical capacities, as well as sharing information and analysis. AFRIPOL, on its part, is also working to assist member states in their efforts to prevent and combat terrorism and transnational organized crimes through training and technical expertise. The establishment of the African Police Communication System (AFSECOM), which is intended to facilitate easy and security communication and sharing of information and data among police agencies of member states is a positive step towards the operationalization of AFRIPOL. The establishment and functioning of the 55 AFRIPOL National Liaison Offices (NLOs) within member states is another notable development having an impact on the functioning of AFRIPOL as well as its linkage with police agencies of member states. Financial, human and infrastructural issues however remain huge challenges in effectively discharging their mandates.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. Among others, the Council is expected to express its concern over the surge in influx of FTFs into Africa and its implication on the peace and security of the continent, and in this regard, the Council may reiterate its warning to ‘name and shame’ all those involved in sponsoring FTFs. In addition, the Council may recall its 1035th session that emphasized the need to expedite the implementation of the establishment of an African list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including FTFs. Towards strengthening continental mechanisms to counter terrorism, the Council may follow up on its previous decisions as well as the decision of the 14th extraordinary session of the Assembly on Silencing the Guns including the development of a comprehensive strategy for countering terrorism in Africa; the urgent need to operationalize AU Special Fund on the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; the establishment of special unit on counter-terrorism within the ASF; and the reactivation of the Council’s sub-committee on counter-terrorism. The PSC may also stress the need to strengthen the capacity of the specialized agencies including CISSA, ACSRT and AFRIPOL to fulfill their mandates effectively and to enhance their horizontal cooperation to create more synergy. The Council may reiterate its previous decision on the need to address the root causes including poverty and marginalization, which provide breeding ground to terrorism. Drawing on the recommendation of the report of the Chairperson, the Council may also highlight the need to mainstream counterterrorism and prevention/countering of violent extremism in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Assessment of implementation of the PSC work plans 2020-2021: achievements, challenges and way forward
Amani Africa
Date | 19 October, 2021
Tomorrow (19 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1039th session to assess the implementation of its work plans for 2020 to 2021. The assessment is aimed at reflecting on Council’s achievements, its challenges and ways forward in undertaking its works. In addition, Council may also consider the report of the technical early response mission to Comoros at tomorrow’s session.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement.
The indicative annual programme of activities for the years 2020 and 2021 would both suggest that while Council has been able to conduct significant number of its planned activities for these years, there is still substantial backlog of undertakings that were not completed within Council’s anticipated timeline or at the predetermined frequency. Tomorrow’s session presents Council the opportunity to reflect on the underlying reasons for the presence of a gap between its plan of activities and their implementation, and to discuss approaches for resolving the challenges faced in that regard.
In terms of sessions that were planned to take place during 2020, most of the country specific ones were successfully convened within the year despite extraordinary circumstances due to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic and resulting changes to Council’s working methods. On the other hand, there was considerable gap in the convening of thematic sessions that were included in the annual plan of 2020. While some of these thematic sessions were not convened altogether, some did not take place at the planned frequency. For instance, the annual indicative plan included a session dedicated to climate change, which did not take place throughout the year. Similarly, Council planned to have a consultative meeting with the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and another one with the Pan-African Parliament, both of which were not convened. A briefing by the Panel of the Wise, to take place twice within the year and every six months was another one of Council’s plans for 2020, which was not implemented.
Regarding the frequency of planned sessions, one example is Council’s plan to receive briefings on elections in Africa every three months, making the projected briefings on the topic four. However, only one briefing session was convened during the year on elections in Africa. Another example is Council’s plan to review post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) efforts in the Continent, twice within the year, although only one session was dedicated to the theme. Similarly, while Council was planned to receive once every three months, a briefing from the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA) on terrorism and violent extremism in the continent, two sessions were committed to the theme itself and neither one was a briefing by CISSA. Other thematic topics such as ‘women, peace and security’, ‘children affected by armed conflicts’ and ‘plight of migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)’ which form part of Council’s standing agenda items were on the other hand successfully convened at the planned regularity.
In addition to the sessions planned for 2020, Council was also unable to carry out some of its regular activities, principally the induction of new PSC members and carrying out field missions. While four field visits were planned to take place to conflict affected AU member States within the year, only one field mission – to South Sudan – was conducted. It is also to be recalled that Council did not develop programme of work or assign official chairs for the months of August and December 2020.
Council’s annual indicative plan for 2021 has been largely similar to that of 2020’s with a few changes such as the plan to convene two sessions on children affected by armed conflicts (only one session was dedicated for that theme in 2020). So far into the year, Council has been able to convene multiple sessions, which were included in its yearly indicative programme, as well as some, which were introduced in its monthly programmes due to developing changes in the continent’s peace and security landscape. It has also been clear that the current year has shown progress in terms of achieving implementation of Council’s planned activities, as compared to 2020. For example, Council has been able to consider AU Commission Chairperson’s reports on elections in Africa twice already and has also convened a session on the impacts of Covid-19 on elections on the continent. This comes closer to meeting its projected plan of convening a session on that theme once every three months. Moreover, Council has also been able to convene its 13th retreat during the year in addition to conducting field visits to three countries (Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Sudan) as well as a fact-finding mission to Chad and its evaluation mission to Mali. Predictably, Council’s ability to adopt to its new working mechanisms developed in response to Covid-19 pandemic has contributed to its ability to better implement its planned annual activities in 2021. In addition, Council’s 2020 programme was more or less seized with sessions on the novel Covid-19 pandemic and its impacts on peace and security in Africa, making it difficult to maintain the original plan of activities.
While the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic has seriously impeded the implementation of Council’s programmes according to plan, there were also other contributing institutional issues which continue to impose challenges to the successful implementation of the Council’s work plans. Among these and perhaps a primary one is the shortage of human, financial and material capacity. Activities such as field missions and visits to conflict affected AU member States as well as the day-to-day activities of the PSC Secretariat and the regular meetings of Council members require considerable resources. Overcoming these challenges will require commitment from member states to make adequate contributions to enable the Council carryout all of its activities.
Another challenge which was also observed in PSC’s 2020 Activities Report – submitted to the AU Assembly’s 33rd Ordinary Session of February 20201 – is the lack of eligible, accredited ambassadors of PSC member States. Despite the requirement under Rule 18 of the PSC Rules of Procedure for each member state of the PSC to be represented at Council meetings by accredited representatives, this hasn’t always been the case. As the 2020 Activities Report indicates, of the fifteen PSC member States, five had no representatives. The appointment of ambassadors at the AU Headquarter to take part in Council’s activities including undertaking the rotational task of chairing the Council and drafting monthly programmes is not only a requirement but also essential for the smooth functioning of the PSC.
The current year has also shown that despite progress obtained in Council’s efforts to address conflict situations on the continent, there have also been cases of regress and outbreak of new conflicts. In relation to that, certain crises and conflict situations did not feature in the Council’s agenda.
On the other hand, the changing landscape of peace and security, mainly the clear resurgence of coups in Africa during 2021 has also meant that Council had to accommodate emerging situations in its work plan. These challenges notwithstanding, Council has been able to manage most of its planned activities for the current year so far. However, the experience has been an opportunity to reflect on the timeliness of early warning and early action. This will assist not only in identifying and averting possibilities of crisis and conflicts, it will also contribute to the PSC’s ability to prepare on how it may respond to such situations more quickly and effectively.
The new structure of the AU Commission particularly the merger of the Peace and Security Department and the Department of Political Affairs, leading to the formation of the new PAPS Department presents a new policy environment. It is therefore important to reflect on such changes and their implication on the mandate and work of the PSC. With the current increased engagement between AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), it is also important to reflect on policy coordination towards more effective response and management to conflicts.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is unknown at the time of drafting this insight. Council may reflect on the challenges including the ones identified above and discuss the practical steps to address such challenges. It may call on AU member states and partners to consolidate their support and collaboration with the PSC. Council may particularly emphasise the importance of strict application of Article 5(h) of the PSC Protocol in the selection of PSC member States in order to ensure that elected members are fully capable of shouldering the responsibilities entailed by membership to the Council. It may call on member states and the AU to support its work. It may also underscore the importance of policy harmonization and coordination of efforts between the PSC and the various AU mechanisms and policy organs, which contribute, to the maintenance of peace and security including the RECs/RMs. Council may also recall and recommit to the agreements listed under section III of the Conclusions of its 13th Retreat (Mombasa Retreat) relating to challenges on compliance to PSC instruments and the ways forward in addressing these.
