Mapping of AU decision-making actors and processes
Amani Africa
April 28, 2022
2022 marks the 20th anniversary of the inauguration of the African Union (AU) as the continental organization taking over from its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This is also the first year of the transition of the AU Commission (AUC) into its new structure under the process for the institutional reform of the AU that has been launched in 2017. During the two decades since its establishment, the AU has evolved not only in its institutional development but also in terms of its working arrangements and decision-making processes and practices. These evolutions and developments are not simply a product of the norms that set the mandate, power and functions of the AU but also importantly the practice of the AU in the implementation of its mandate and the exercise of the powers and functions entrusted to it based on the demands and needs of African states and the continent as a whole.
Reflection meeting on Youth, Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date |25 April 2022
Tomorrow (25 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1080th session to have a reflection meeting with the African Youth Ambassadors for Peace (AYAPs) on issues related to Youth, Peace and Security in Africa. The meeting will be held in Burundi in a hybrid format.
Following the opening remark by Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi and the Chairperson of the PSC for April, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. The Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AUC on Youth, Chido Cleo Mpemba and the five new AYAPs are also expected to make statements. President of Burundi H.E. Evariste Ndayishimiye will be the guest of honor at tomorrow’s session.
The PSC has held five sessions on Youth, Peace and Security since its inaugural 807th session on the topic held in November 2018 in which it decided to ‘institutionalize and regularize an annual open session dedicated to the theme of Youth, Peace and Security in Africa’. This year the Council held an annual open session on 3rd March 2022 during PSC’s 1067th meeting. Tomorrow’s session is a follow-up on this year’s session and will offer the council to engage with the new cohort of AYAPs, on the status of progress in the implementation of the 10-Year Implementation Plan of the Continental Framework on Youth Peace and Security. The meeting is also an occasion for the host country and PSC Chair for the month of April, Burundi to showcase its experiences and lessons learned about youth, peace and security. Thus, the session would be beneficial in making the linkage between national-level initiatives and continental efforts.
It is to be recalled that, towards promoting youth efforts in the peace and security agenda AU Youth Envoy was appointed by the AU Chairperson in November 2018. Moreover, the first cohort of AYAPs were appointed in 2019 and 33rd AU Summit endorsed the appointed ambassadors. The AYAPs are mandated to promote meaningful youth participation at all levels of peacebuilding across Africa for two years non-renewable. The mandate of AYAPs is in line with Article 17 of the AU Youth Charter (2006) and the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2250 (2015). The second cohort of AYAPs who were selected in November 2021 and endorsed by the 35th Ordinary Session of the AU Heads of State and Government in February 2022. Thus, tomorrow’s session serves as a platform for the AU Youth Envoy and AYAPs to discuss their work and plans for advancing the YPS agenda at various levels.
Tomorrow’s session is preceded by a Continental Youth Dialogue that brought together the AU Youth Envoy, the AYAPs and more than two hundred youth participants across Africa and aimed at strengthening youth engagement in peace and security and enhancing their meaningful participation. The platform allowed various national youth advocates to engage with a wide range of youth leaders operating at the regional and continental levels. The key outcomes of the dialogue are expected to feed into and contribute to the reflection meeting taking place tomorrow.
Since PSC’s inaugural session, major steps have taken place in developing the necessary policy frameworks that laid the foundation for the YPS agenda. The PSC at its 933rd PSC session, considered and adopted the two PSC mandated documents, the ‘Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security (CFYPS)’ along with the 10-year implementation plan (2020-2029), and the ‘Study on the Roles and Contributions of Youth towards Peace and Security in Africa’. The subsequent sessions of the PSC have shifted their focus towards the operationalization and implementation of the various policies through the development of National Action Plans (NAPs).
Indeed in this context, the most recent PSC session, the 1067th meeting held on 3 March 2022 among others requested the AUC to submit the final document of the Guidelines for the Development and Implementation of National Action Plans for the AU Continental Framework on Youth, Peace and Security for its review. It further requested its Committee of Experts (CoE) to comprehensively review the Guidelines and enrich ahead of PSC’s consideration. The session may provide an update on the work that is being undertaken in line with this decision.
It is to be recalled that the PSC has stated its recognition in its several communiques that youth contribution to peace and security across the continent is critical. Thus, the PSC has played pivotal roles in advancing the YPS agenda and going forward it’s importance to build on these existing steps. The PSC in its 1067th session highlighted, the important role played by the youth at the national, regional and continental levels in the prevention of violence, the promotion of good governance, peace, security, stability and socio- economic development. Similarly, the PSC at its 963rd meeting emphasized the need for regular convening of stakeholders’ meetings to update and plan implementations, as well as facilitate experience sharing, lessons learned and best practices to support the advancement of youth, peace and security agenda. Thus, tomorrow’s session will be an important platform to exchange knowledge and best practices and further sharpen the YPS agenda.
It would of interest for the meeting to reflect on the persisting gaps and challenges that are hurdles to enhancing the role and agency of youth in peace and security. In this respect, the session may deliberate on some of the issues identified by the AU Continental Framework on YPS including limited technical resources for youth programs; financial constraints for such programs; weak organizational capacities of youth groups; limited coordination among youth groups and networks; limited visibility and adequate documentation and evaluation of their contributions to peace and security and lack of evidence-based approach to programming on youth, peace and security.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The Council may underline the significance of the youth in peace and security and in advancing continental agendas. It may once again welcome the AU Youth Envoy and AYAPs and underline their critical role in realizing the goals and aspirations enshrined in continental peace and security norms and policies. The PSC may also commend the work of the Youth for Peace (Y4P) program in terms of coordinating and facilitating the meaningful participation of youth in all spectrums of peace and security. The PSC may also underscore the need to address the gaps and challenges that hinder youth from actively participating in peace and security issues. The PSC may commend the work undertaken by member states, the AU Commission and the RECs and RMs for their pivotal role in advancing the YPS agenda and their efforts to implement the continental framework on youth, peace and security. The Council may request the AU Commission, in close collaboration with the RECs/RMs, to continue supporting member states to develop NAPs; and may reiterate its request to the AUC to regularly brief the Council on the status of progress in the implementation of the Continental Framework on YPS and its 10-Year Implementation Plan and challenges faced, including through periodic reports and annual briefings. In this regard, the Council may note that given the implementation efforts and programs on YPS agenda are context- specific, it is imperative that there is coordination and synergy among the various stakeholders namely the AU Youth Envoy and the AYAPs, as well as Youth Focal Points in the RECs/RMs and various youth networks for peace.
Debate on climate change, peace and security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 21 April 2022
Tomorrow (21 April), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1079th session to deliberate on climate change, peace and security in Africa.
Tomorrow’s session is expected to proceed in open and closed segments. In the open segment of the session, following an opening remark by Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi and the Chairperson of the PSC for April, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make statement. AU Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment, Josepha Sacko, is envisaged to deliver presentation. Egypt, in its capacity as the host of the 27th session of Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27), and the United Nations are also expected to make statements.
Climate change and security is one of PSC’s standing thematic agenda items that has been regularly discussed particularly since its decision, during 585th session in March 2016, to dedicate an annual open session on the theme. Since then, the Council dedicated around 10 sessions including the last one at its 1051st meeting convened on 26 November 2021. Tomorrow’s session is therefore in line with Council’s decision to hold an annual session on climate change and security.
In 2021, PSC convened three sessions on climate change and natural disaster, two of them held at summit level. The PSC has adopted several communiques that clearly acknowledged the climate-security nexus and highlight the different pathways in which climate change, peace and security interact. For instance, at its 774th session that took place on 21 may 2018, Council underscored the linkage between climate change and peace and security in Africa. Furthermore, a communique adopted at the 1051st session also recognized the risks of climate change, as ‘threat multiplier’, to the African peace and security landscape as it is leading to greater food and water insecurity, loss of livelihoods, depletion of natural resources, and more climate-linked human displacements.
Although it is hardly possible to establish a direct causal link between climate change and violent conflicts, the potential impact of climate change in aggravating existing vulnerabilities, tensions and conflicts, thereby triggering inter-communal violence has been highlighted by the PSC. It is also in this context that climate change is described as ‘threat multiplier’. The Concept Note prepared for the session further notes the possible impact of climate change in increasing the frequency and intensity of conflict and human security issues in the continent, leading to ‘protracted and multifaceted humanitarian and security crisis’. The fact that seven of the ten countries that are most vulnerable to climate change are in Africa tells the relevance of the theme to the continent.
Tomorrow’s session may also reflect on how rapid urbanization dynamics and demographic change that the continent is witnessing are adding additional layer to the impact of climate change on Africa’s peace and security landscape. Despite a general understanding and consensus within the Council on the security implication of climate change in Africa, the issue of how exactly climate change intersect with peace and security, the causal link between climate change and security, and how climate-related security risks could be integrated within the existing African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) need to be further explored.
In terms of AU’s intervention to respond to climate change, it is to be recalled that Council, at its 585th session held in March 2016, stressed the imperative of mainstreaming climate change in all AU activities, particularly in early warning and conflict prevention efforts. The recent launch of the Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) in the AU Commission is a step forward in improving continental early warning capacity on disaster risks for early action. The development of AU Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan to guide, coordinate and support the continent’s response to climate change for the period 2022-2032 is another positive step taken by the Union. Sacko’s presentation may also touch on AU’s efforts to support the work and operationalization of the three Climate Commissions which were set up in Marrakech, Morocco in November 2016, namely the African Islands Climate Commission, Congo Basin Climate Commission, and Sahel Climate Commission. The issue of building synergy and maintaining closer coordination and cooperation between the AU Commission and the three climate Commissions remain extremely important.
As the next round of climate talks, COP27, is around the corner which is slated to take place in November 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, this session could also serve as a platform to converse on areas of priorities that should be put forward by the continent and how to factor in the climate-security nexus in the discussions. In the recent meeting of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) held on 6 February, the current coordinator of the Committee, Kenya’s President, Uhuru Kenyatta, outlined ‘Climate Finance’, ‘loss and damage’, ‘Global Goal on Adaptation’, ‘Keeping 1.5 degrees C alive’, and ‘recognition of the Special needs and circumstances for Africa’ as Africa’s priorities in the upcoming COP27 and highlighted the need to focus on mobilizing support towards these priority areas. The Assembly during its 35th Ordinary session held in February this year also highlighted different priorities that are expected to shape Africa’s negotiating points at COP27.
Tomorrow’s session also presents members of the Council the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of the different initiatives and decisions agreed in previous sessions with the aim to take the agenda forward. The first of such decision which becomes particularly important in light of the upcoming COP27 is the need for developing a Common African Position on Climate Change. This was decided by the Council at its 984th session held at a summit level. The 1051st session reiterated its call for the development of the Common Position on climate change, and in particular on climate finance and operationalization of the Global Goal on Adaptation.
The second decision worth following up is the finalization of a study on climate-security nexus. As highlighted before, it was at its 774th session that Council mandated the Commission to undertake the study. In its last session on the theme, it is to be recalled that Council requested the Commission to ‘expedite the finalization of a climate-related security risk assessment study… to define the varying security impacts of climate change on the African continent…’
The third is on the appointment of an AU Special Envoy for Climate Change and Security pursuant to Council’s decision at its 774th session. During the 984th session, Council asked the Chairperson of the Commission for a feedback on the status of progress regarding the appointment of the Special Envoy who will work closely with CAHOSCC. Moreover, the PSC may follow up on the establishment of AU Special Fund for Climate Change which the Council agreed to establish at its 984th session convened under the chairship of Kenya.
Africa’s leadership on climate change and security has also been visible in the UNSC. It is to be recalled that Niger during its presidency of the UNSC in December 2021, tabled the first draft resolution on climate change and security jointly with Ireland. The draft resolution was not adopted after Russia vetoed it. However, it is to be recalled that the UN Security Council recognized the link between climate change and violence in its region specific agenda items including in the context of West African and the Sahel through a Presidential Statement adopted on 30 January 2018.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. Council is expected to once again recognize the negative and disproportionate impact of climate change on the peace and stability as well as socio-economic development of the continent despite its low contribution to global warming. Council may welcome the establishment of the Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) Situation Room for disaster risk reduction. In terms of enhancing AU’s capacity to provide effective support for Member States as well as Regional Economic Communities in addressing climate related risks, as pointed out in the Concept Note prepared for the session, PSC may consider the possibility of increasing the staffing and elevating the Climate Change Unit to a Climate Change Division. In relation to the issue of enhancing coordination and cooperation with the three Climate Change Commissions, Council may consider joint sessions with the Commissions. On the climate change-security nexus study it mandated in May 2018, Council may wish to set a timeline for the finalization and submission of the study for its consideration. Similarly, it may also request the Commission to expedite the appointment of a Special Envoy on climate security, which is expected to enhance the advocacy efforts and African leadership on the issue. On the upcoming COP27, Council is likely to underscore the importance of maintaining the unity of Africa and speaking in one voice in the climate change negotiations at COP27 including through strengthening support provided to the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change (AGN).
Briefing on the Great Lakes and the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for DRC and the Region
Amani Africa
Date | 19 April 2022
Tomorrow (19 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the High-Level Meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the region signed in Addis Ababa in February 2013. The last time the PSC met on the Great Lakes Region was at its 1005th session under the previous Chairship of Burundi in June 2021.
The session will start with the opening remark of the Willy Nyamitwe, Chairperson of the PSC for the Month of April. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to give an update to the Council. The Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson and the Head of AU Office in DRC, Michelle Ndaye, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN and the Head of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), Bintou Keita are also expected to deliver briefings. Representative of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) may also make an intervention.
It was more than three years since the ROM held its meeting in Kampala in October 2018. The tenth high-level meeting of the ROM held in Kinshasa on 24 February 2022 saw the participation of several regional leaders and guarantor institutions of the PSCF including the UN, the AU, the ICGLR, and the South African Development Community (SADC). During the meeting, Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni handed over the rotating chairmanship to DRC President Felix Tshisekedi.
The ROM assessed the political and security situation in the region, including progress and challenges in the implementation of the national, regional and international commitments under the PSCF to consolidate peace and security in eastern DRC and to promote cooperation among countries of the region based on a comprehensive report submitted by its Technical Support Committee covering the period from October 2017 to February 2022. The meeting was concluded with the adoption of a communiqué that reaffirmed the regional leaders’ commitment to the full implementation of the PSCF ‘as an important vehicle to address the causes and drivers of conflict and instability in the region’.
The ROM meeting took place against the backdrop of positive developments in the Great Lakes region with the reproachment between and among countries of the region. High level exchanges of visit facilitated the improvement in bilateral relations between DRC and its neighbours in the Great Lakes. The reopening of the Gatuna/Katuna border between Rwanda and Uganda in January was also another welcome development. This followed a visit by Lieutenant General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the Commander of the Land Forces of the Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Forces and President Yoweri Museveni’s son, to Kigali, where he met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame. The border had been closed for three years because of strained relations between Rwanda and Uganda. Recently, the US and the EU decided to lift the economic sanctions imposed against Burundi in 2015, when former President Pierre Nkurunziza sought to change the constitution and run for a third term. The decision was said to be an acknowledgment of the reform progress under the leadership of his successor, President Evariste Ndayishimiye. Another development of significance in advancing regional integration is the admission of the DRC as the 7th member of the East African Community (EAC) on the occasion of the 19th ordinary summit of the EAC on 29th March 2022.
Despite these and other positive developments which the ROM has welcomed in its Communique, the Great Lakes region continues to face persistent security challenges, including the activities of negative forces operating in eastern DRC that pose a major threat to regional peace and stability. The Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO), an armed group active in Ituri province, has intensified its attacks particularly targeting internally displaced persons. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) which is implicated in several attacks in eastern DRC and Uganda has also increased its military activities. What is even more worrying lately is the fact that the March 23 (M23) Movement, a rebel group previously operating in North Kivu Province, has resumed its military activities.
In its Communique the ROM expressed its concern that negative forces with networks across the region and beyond, some with affiliations to international terrorist groups, continue to pose a threat to civilians and fuel mistrust and tensions among countries in the region. The ROM particularly condemned the resumption of military activities of some ex-M23 members in eastern DRC. In this regard, it commended the military operations carried out by the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) with the support of the MONUSCO, against negative forces in the eastern parts of the country. The Congolese government has been implementing what it calls the ‘state of siege’, measures similar to a state of emergency imposed since May 2021 to address security challenges in the Ituri and North Kivu provinces. The ROM also took note of the joint military operations by DRC and Uganda launched in November 2021 targeting the ADF. Despite the implementation of the state of siege and the joint military operations by DRC and Ugandan armed forces, however, the activities of the negative forces have continued unabated.
In this context, one of the issues that Ndaye and Keita are expected to reflect on in their briefings is the recent very concerning resumption of military activities by the M23 movement. The fighting involving the M23 reportedly started on 27 March. Within few days of the resumption of this fighting, it has led to the displacement of 13, 000 people. Deputy Spokesperson of the FARDC blamed the M23 for the shooting down of a MONUSCO helicopter whose crush led to the death of eight Un personnel. With officials of FARDC blaming Rwanda and Rwanda rejecting accusations as baseless, it is feared that this renewed fighting may undermine the rapprochement between and among countries of the region. The AU and UN representatives may shed light on the trajectory of the M23’s renewed armed operations and the steps that are being taken to control it and ultimately end it.
In his latest report to the Security Council on the implementation of the PSCF, the UN Secretary-General urged the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda to conclude the repatriation of all remaining former M23 combatants, in accordance with previous decisions of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and in full respect of international human rights and humanitarian law. He stated that his Special Envoy remains ready to support such efforts, in collaboration with MONUSCO and the other guarantor institutions of the PSCF.
These developments once again underscore the need to address the root causes of conflict and instability in the Great Lakes region. This in turn also reaffirms the significance of implementing the PSCF for a comprehensive and holistic solution to the peace and security challenges facing great lakes countries through enhanced regional cooperation. Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda established what they called the Contact and Coordination Group and its Operational Cell in Goma (eastern DRC) with the support of the Guarantor institutions to facilitate coordination among them on security matters, including the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. The launching of this group as part of a comprehensive approach comprising non-military measures to complement ongoing military efforts against negative forces in the region was considered a step in the right direction and very much welcomed by the ROM. Burundi has offered to host the 11th meeting of the ROM in 2023.
Tomorrow’s PSC session provides an opportunity to review progress made in the implementation of the PSCF and existing and new challenges facing the Great Lakes region. The AUPSC is expected to encourage countries of the region to build on the positive momentum generated recently to accelerate the implementation of the PSCF and enhance their regional cooperation to address persistent security challenges. The outcome of these deliberations could feed into the United Nations Security Council as it is scheduled to receive its biannual briefing from the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes on 27 April 2022.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC expected to welcome the outcome of the February 2022 High-Level Meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism (ROM) of the PSCF for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region and reaffirm the importance of the PSCF for enhancing peace and security in the region. The PSC may welcome the positive developments that took place in the region, including the admission of the DRC into the EAC and commend the contribution of MONUSCO. The PSC may express concern over the continuing presence of negative forces including the ADF and the recent resumption of fighting by the M23. It may call for enhanced dialogue and cooperation in order to curtail the threat posed by the presence of various negative armed groups and the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources. The PSC may reiterate its support for the Contact and Coordination Group (CCG) established to implement non-military measures that complement military operations against negative forces in the Great Lakes region. The Council may also underline the importance of political commitment and the strengthening democratic institutions for the effectiveness and sustainability of peace agreements and other political endeavors. The Council may also reiterate its plan to undertake a visit to the DRC and signatories of the PSCF.
Update on countries in political transition
Amani Africa
Date | 14 April 2022
Tomorrow (14 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1076th session to receive updates on political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan.
Following opening remarks by Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to deliver a statement. Other participants that will be delivering statements and presentations include: Professor Mohammed Al-Hacen Lebatt, Principal Strategic Adviser of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and AU Special Envoy to Sudan; Representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Secretariat; Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chair of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Basile Ikouebe, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Office in Chad; Representative of the Republic of Ghana, Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and Maman Sidikou, High Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Mission for the Sahel (MISAHEL).
This session is convened in line with the PSC’s request of the Commission for a regular update on Chad, Mali, Sudan, Guinea and Burkina Faso at its different sessions held to consider the situation in each of these countries after experiencing unconstitutional change of government (UCG). Previously, the Council has dedicated separate sessions to receive updates on the situations in each of the above countries, and this will be the first time that the Council will consider them in one session. Tomorrow’s session is an opportunity for the Council to take stock of latest developments around the transition towards the restoration of constitutional order in member States that have experienced UCG in 2021 and early 2022. It is worth recalling that the PSC has imposed sanctions against all of these countries with the exception of Chad.
It is the second time that the Council considers the situation in Burkina Faso after the 24 January 2022’s military coup against the democratically elected President Marc Roch Christian Kabore, the first meeting being held at its 1062nd session convened on 31 January. In that session, it is to be recalled that the Council suspended the country from all AU activities until the effective restoration of normal constitutional order. Council also endorsed the 28 January 2022 communique of the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS, which among others requested the immediate restoration of constitutional order without specifying timeline. However, in the subsequent Summit held on 3 February, the regional bloc asked military authorities to ‘establish the Transition institutions, adopt a transition calendar and facilitate the return to constitutional order within the shortest time’.
Since its last session on 31 January, Burkina Faso adopted a Transition Charter on 1 March, setting a three-year transition period. The Charter was adopted after consultations between the military leaders, political parties, civil society groups, and other stakeholders. Among the provisions of the Charter is the one that bars the interim President and the coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba (he was sworn in as President on 2 March to lead the transition), as well as members of the transitional government from running for elections. A civilian Prime Minster and a cabinet consisting of 25 ministers were also appointed on 4 and 5 March. On 19 March, a transitional assembly was appointed as well, which will serve as the legislative body during the transition. The reported release of President Roch Kabore is another welcome development.
While all these developments are positive steps towards the restoration of a constitutional order, the 36 months duration of the transition period will remain issue of concern for the Council though it did not put any specific timeline for the transition at its previous session. On the part of ECOWAS, it has already expressed its concern over the duration of the transition at its most recent extraordinary summit convened on 25 March. The communique adopted at the Summit further demanded the ‘finalization of an acceptable transition timetable no later than 25th April 2022’, failure to which the regional bloc threatened to impose an immediate economic and financial sanctions. On the security front, terrorists have continued to stage their attacks which has exacerbated the humanitarian situation in the country.
The last time the Council considered the situation in Chad was in August 2021 during its 1016th session. Hence tomorrow’s meeting will be the first session of 2022 where the Council considers the developments in the country. It is to be recalled that following the military seizure after Idriss Deby’s death on 20 April 2021, the PSC decided not to suspend Chad contrary to AU norms. The event in Chad was not referred as a coup or unconstitutional change of government by the PSC. However, the Council urged the military to hand over political power to civilian authorities and authorised the urgent deployment of a fact-finding mission to Chad. Moreover, in its 996th session the Council requested, among others, the completion of the transition to democratic rule within 18 months, effective from 20 April 2021; guarantee that the Chair of Transitional Military Council (TMC) and its members do not run in the upcoming national elections; and the urgent revision of the Transition Charter. The Council also requested Chadian authorities to ‘urgently establish the National Transition Council’. During the 996th session the PSC also decided for the establishment of an AU-led Support Mechanism (AUSM) for Chad. The PSC, in its last session on Chad, at its 1016th session has urged for ‘dialogue between the Transition Government and all relevant Chadian stakeholders including opposition political parties and armed groups’.
Tomorrow’s session will be critical in assessing the level of implementation of the various requests made by the PSC and to examine the overall status of the transition process. The National Transition Council has been announced in September 2021 to serve as an interim parliament during the transition period. On the other hand, considerable delays have been witnessed around the national dialogue process. The TMC has declared amnesty for various rebel armed groups to facilitate their participation in the planned dialogue. However, there are still concerns around the inclusivity of the national dialogue, as key civilian groups are still missing and the focus has been more on the inclusion of politico-military groups. It would be also important for the PSC to underline the importance for respecting the 18-month transition period.
Council’s last deliberation on Guinea took place at its 1064th session convened on 10 February 2022. At that session, Council welcomed some of the key positive developments in Guinea’s political transition which include the establishment of a Transition Government with complete appointment of members of the National Transitional Council (NTC), the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister and the adoption of a Transition Charter. The release of former President Alpha Conde was also another positive development highlighted at the 1064th session – although Conde has returned to Conakry on 8 April, after which the transition government announced he shall remain in Guinea as long as his health allows.
Despite taking some positive steps, the transition authorities are also yet to meet the key requirements fundamental to ensuring the restoration of constitutional order. Notwithstanding the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister, key government positions continue to be held by military figures. The transition authorities were also unable to conduct national elections within the six months period stipulated by ECOWAS at its Extraordinary Summit of 16 September 2021 and endorsed by the PSC at its 1036th session of 5 October 2021. Not only have Guinean authorities failed to respect the stipulated timeline for the conduct of elections, they are also yet to announce a clear transition timetable. Having regard to the slow progress of restoring constitutional order and particularly in light of the missed deadline for the conduct of elections, ECOWAS, at its Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022, demanded the “finalisation of an acceptable transition timetable no later than 25 April 2022”. It further threatened the immediate imposition of economic and financial sanctions upon the expiry of this deadline without submission of the transition timetable.
In addition to following up on some of the key decisions of its previous session including its request for the AU Commission to ensure provision of technical support to Guinea, Council may urge Guinean authorities to finalise and submit a transition timetable which presents a reasonable and acceptable timeline for the conduct of elections and restoration of constitutional order.
At its last session dedicated to the situation in Mali – the 1057th session held on 14 January 2022 – the PSC endorsed the Communiqué of ECOWAS’s 4th Extraordinary Summit of 9 January 2022 which imposed economic and political sanctions against Mali, following the latter’s adoption of a transition calendar which delays the national elections until the end of December 2025. Council also strongly rejected the calendar submitted by Mali and referred to the timeline suggested as an “undue elongation of the transition process in Mali” as well as an “unconstitutional, impermissible, inappropriate and a grave obstruction to democratic processes”. Accordingly, it called on Malian authorities to ensure completion of the transition period within 16 months.
Despite the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and PSC’s endorsement of the regional block’s decision as well as condemnations from the international community, the transition in Mali remains very slow. On 4 February 2022, the European Union (EU) adopted sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, against five members of Mali’s transitional Government, in support of ECOWAS’s decisions. In response, members of the transition authority organised a rally against EU’s sanctions. Recent developments including the request for Danish forces, deployed as part of the Takuba Task Force to leave the country on 24 January as well as France’s Ambassador to Mali to leave the country within 72 hours on 31 January demonstrate the deteriorating relationship of Mali’s transitional government with various partners. Moreover, on 11 April, the EU decided to halt its military trainings in Mali voicing concern over the interference and operation of Wagner Group.
On 21 February, Mali’s National Transition Council (NTC) unanimously adopted a draft law tabled by the Government for amending the 2020 Transition Charter. Among the contents of the revision is the modification of the transition timeline in line with recommendations of the national dialogue of December 2021. Key political oppositions, particularly the Cadre d’échange or “Exchange Framework” have completely rejected the revision of the Transition Charter. Meanwhile, efforts to resolve the impasse between Malian government and regional and international partners have continued. Particularly, ECOWAS’s Mediator for Mali has been actively engaging the transition government, although no agreement could be reached so far. At its recent Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022, ECOWAS showed flexibility and indicated possibility for gradual lifting of its sanctions on the condition that Malian authorities adhere to the timeline established by the joint technical team of ECOWAS, AU and UN, to extend the transition period for additional 12 to 16 months, effective from 15 March 2022. However, Mali’s interim President did not take part at the 15 March ECOWAS Summit, despite invitation extended by the regional body. On the other hand, upon ECOWAS’s communication of the proposed addition of 12 to 16 months to the transition period, Malian authorities engaged the ECOWAS mediator for Mali and successively proposed a period of 36, 29 and then 24 months. ECOWAS has however maintained the 12 to 16 months proposed by the joint technical team.
In light of this discourse, Council may urge Mali’s transition authorities to adhere to the new timeline agreed by ECOWAS, AU and UN and to work towards resolving the stalemates faced with regional and international stakeholders. It may also reiterate its previous calls for Malian transition authorities to commit to not participate in the elections at the end of the transition period.
The Council was last updated on the situation on Sudan during its 1060th session held on 25 January 2022. In this session, the Council is expected to hear about latest developments in the country and AU’s engagement to resolve the crisis following the 25 October 2021 coup. The anti-coup protests have continued and the absence of any political agreement that would break the dangerous political stalemate over the future of the transition. The military has continued its grip on power while regular protests against military rule have persisted in Khartoum and elsewhere, leaving at least 94 people reportedly dead and thousands injured.
Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts have intensified to help Sudanese parties find way out of the current crisis. The Chairperson of the Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, visited Sudan in February where he met Sudanese parties for consultation on the political situation in the country. Professor Mohammed Al-Hacen Lebatt, the AU Special Envoy, also visited Sudan on several occasions to ensure consultations are inclusive. A field mission was also scheduled to take place from 27 to 28 February, but this has been postponed pending the readiness of Sudan. The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) also released its report on 28 February highlighting areas of convergence and divergence among stakeholders, which is an outcome of more than 110 consultations. The regional bloc, IGAD, also undertook a fact-finding mission to Sudan from 29 January to 1 February 2022. Though diplomatic efforts by UNITAMS, AU and IGAD were not coordinated initially, this has changed in recent weeks as they agreed to join efforts in supporting Sudan to resolve the crisis.
As noted by Volker Perthes, the Special Representative for Sudan and Head of UNITAMS, in his latest brief to the UN Security Council on 28 March, reaching an agreement on: interim constitutional arrangement, the criteria and mechanisms to appoint a Prime Minster and a cabinet, a roadmap for the transitional period, and the type and timing for the elections remain ‘urgent priorities’ to address the current impasse and put the political transition back on track.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Having addressed the key issues specific to each of the countries on its agenda, Council may generally emphasise the importance of adhering to AU norms on democracy, good governance and constitutionalism in order to avert the occurrence of coups and the resulting disruption to constitutional order as well as peace and security. On Burkina Faso, Council may take note of the positive developments notably the adoption of the Transition Charter, establishment of transitional bodies and the release of President Roch Kabore. However, echoing the 25 March 2022 Communique of ECOWAS, it may express its concern over the duration of the transition period set for 36 months under the Transition Charter.
Similarly, Council may emphasise its concern over the slow progress in Guinea’s transitional process. Based on its previous practice, it is possible for Council to endorse ECOWAS’s decision with respect to Burkina Faso and Guinea adopted in the Communiqué of its Extraordinary Summit of 25 March 2022. It is however possible that some members of the Council may find the threatened imposition of immediate sanctions in ECOWAS’s Communiqué counterproductive to diplomatic efforts and engagements with the transitional authorities of each country, particularly having regard to the recent experience of Mali. With respect to the transition in Mali, Council may welcome and commend the engagements between Malian authorities and ECOWAS Mediator. It may also welcome the initiative of the Malian Minister of Foreign Affairs to set up a Framework for dialogue at the political and technical level, which led to the formation of the joint technical team of ECOWAS, AU and UN that proposed an electoral timetable of 12 to 16 months.
On Chad, the PSC may urge the military council to honor its pledges to limit the transition to eighteen months and exclude its own members from running in the planned election. The PSC may further underline the importance of holding an inclusive and genuine national dialogue.
Regarding Sudan, the PSC may express its concern over the lack of political agreement on the future of the transition and its impact on the economic and security conditions of the country. Council may welcome the joint efforts of AU, UNITAMS and IGAD to facilitate consultations among Sudanese stakeholders. It may also urge both the military and the civilian political forces to reach a deal on a transitional arrangement that would steer the country to the election. The PSC may reiterate its call upon the Sudanese authorities to refrain from using excessive force against protesters and hold perpetrators to account.
