PSC Heads of State and Government session on Libya and the Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 8 February, 2020
Tomorrow (8 February) the African Union (AU) Peace
and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting at the Heads of State and Government level on the situations in Libya and the Sahel. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Cergui, are expected to brief the Council. President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, is expected to deliver a statement on behalf of the A3. Also expected to deliver a statement is President of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Chair of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya.
The fighting in Libya that intensified following the launch of an offensive by the opposition militia Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar against the internationally recognized Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj has worsened an already dire security situation in the country. Fragmentation of the country among warring factions has increased. Flow of weapons has spiked despite a UN Security Council arms embargo. Various reports show that over 218 civilians have been killed and over 289 civilians have been injured due to the ongoing conflict from attacks that use indiscriminate weaponry, being directly targeted, or being casualties to Explosive Remnants of War in conflict-affected areas including Tripoli and Murzuq. As a result of the renewed fighting, 2019 represented the highest level of displacement since 2014-2015, with a 305 per cent increase in new displacement from 2018.
Further compounding the situation and even making the resolution of the conflict in Libya nearly impossible is the intensification of regional and global rivalry and proxy war on Libya. Over the years, the Libyan conflict has increasingly transformed into a proxy war where a number of countries in the region and global powers have made the country a theatre for advancing their competing political, ideological and economic interests in the country by sending financial, political and military support for the warring parties in Libya.
On the one hand Al-Sarraj’s administration is recognized and backed by the UN and other actors including the US, Turkey, Italy and Qatar. While Egypt and UAE are aiming at curbing the spread of GNA’s faction affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey are supporters. On the hand Russia, France, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan have provided support to Haftar. Mercenaries, which are considered to be affiliated with Russia, are involved in the fighting in support of the LNA. The rivalry over the control for the country’s oil reserves among warring parties has also exacerbated the dire security situation. On 8 January, the two major actors in the conflict Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated a truce in Libya commencing on 12 January. Although an attempt was made to bring both Haftar and al-Sarraj together to sign the ceasefire, this was not successful given that Haftar left Moscow without signing the agreement.
On 19 January, a high-level conference was convened in Berlin in an attempt to contain the heavy external interference in Libya. The Berlin Conference, in which the AU Commission Chairperson and the Foreign Minister of Congo participated, ended with the conference conclusions articulating the six baskets including: ceasefire, arms embargo, political process, security, economic and financial, international humanitarian law and human rights law matters. As part of the follow up process Serraj and Haftar have each
nominated five representatives to be part of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, which was proposed by UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) towards the operationalization of the conclusions. In the midst of this highly complex external actors’ involvement, the AU continues to urge for restraint of foreign powers and for a stronger African led political process. The AU PSC during its ministerial meeting held on 27 September 2019, has stressed the need ‘for an effective and urgent involvement of the AU in the search for a lasting political solution to the crisis in Libya’. The Council also supported and reiterated the decision of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, taken at its meeting of 8 July 2019, on the appointment of a joint African Union/United Nations Envoy for Libya towards ensuring a more robust, coordinated and AU led peace process. Tomorrow’s session may further reiterate the importance of AU’s role in resolving the crisis. The session also follows the recently concluded 8th meeting of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, held in Brazzaville, on 30 January. Three African Heads of State including the Chair of the Committee and the host of the meeting President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, Chairperson of the PSC for February, and Mohamed Ould Ghazouani of Mauritania were in attendance. The committee decided to convene an inter-Libyan Reconciliation Conference in consultation
with Libyan parties, neighbouring countries and the United Nations. The committee condemned the continued
external interference in Libya, although commitments were made during the Berlin conference, which was held
ten days earlier.
Despite the effort by Germany in bringing the various stakeholders, there are still sharp divisions. Although Germany urged for a UNSC resolution supporting the outcome of the Berlin conference, the divergent position within UNSC, particularly between the US and Russia prevented the adoption of a binding document. Moreover, the UNSMIL in a statement released on 25 January indicated the continuation of ‘transfer of foreign fighters, weapons, ammunition and advanced systems to the parties by member states, including several who participated in the Berlin Conference’.
The situation in the Sahel
The second agenda item that is expected to be discussed is the situation in the Sahel. Perhaps more than any other part of the continent, where the sound of the guns has become loudest is the violence region of the Sahel. The number of violent incidents in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has increased sharply. In geographic scope as well, the violence in the Sahel has during 2019 spread across the region. As the UN Chief Representative for West Africa said in a briefing to the UN Security Council on 8 January 2020, this geographic expansion of terrorist attacks ‘is increasingly threatening West African coastal States’. The other layer of violence that has also become recurrent and increasingly lethal in the region is inter-communal clashes. One of the key aspects to this security threat is the adverse effect of climate change and the failure of governments to put in place mitigating measures, thereby creating a situation for rivalry over increasingly depleting scarce resources to erupt into violent conflicts. Over the course of 2019, fighting and terrorist attacks in Mali forced more than 80,000 people flee their homes. Burkina Faso witnessed the most surge in violence in 2019, the number of people displaced increased by tenfold to over 560,000, with the figure predicted to skyrocket to 900,000 people by April 2020. Across the three affected countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, since the start of 2019, more than 670,000 children have been forced to flee their homes. According to UNICEF, between April 2017 and December 2019, the three countries witnessed a six-fold increase in school closures due to violence.
The instability in Libya has contributed to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region. The ECOWAS extra-ordinary Summit held on 14 September 2019 has also underlined the effect of the crisis in Libya in the region by labelling it as the ‘hotbed for terrorism in West Africa’. Towards preventing and combatting terrorism the Summit adopted a priority action plan for 2020-2024 on selected priority areas.
In addition to the activities of terrorist groups in the region, the PSC may also discuss on the kind of peace and security tools required to effectively address the crisis in the Sahel beyond and above the use of conventional military response and peacekeeping response, which has faltered to deliver contain the situation. President Macron and the G5 Sahel Heads of the State held a meeting in Pau on 13 January. While they agreed on “new political, strategic and operational framework” that is anchored in four pillars: the fight against terrorism, capacity building for states forces in the region, restoring state authority and development assistance, much of the focus remains on reinforcing military responses with France announcing to increase its military presence in the Sahel by adding 600 troops to its existing 4500 in Mali and the four other countries in the region.
Such security heavy approaches that have been dominant delivered little result. If anything, such approaches have worsened the situation. There is a need for national actors of affected countries and regional bodies to assume leading responsibility and foregrounding political and governance efforts including by addressing the lacklustre implementation of the 2015 peace agreement in Mali. The PSC may recall its previous 863rd session on the Sahel, which decided to undertake a joint field mission with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), to assess the situation and to provide support. In order to provide political and diplomatic support to countries in the region particularly in light of the grave security situation endured by the countries and to assess the presence of various actors the PSC may consider undertaking a mission to the Sahel region. This may also be timely if it takes place ahead of the expiry of the G5 mandate in April 2020. The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its concern over the deteriorating security situation in Libya and its conviction that political process, rather than armed fighting, is the only solution to the conflict. It may propose based on its longstanding plan the establishment of truce and ceasefire and an AU led ceasefire monitoring mechanism based on the African Standby Force. The PSC may welcome the outcome of
the Brazzaville meeting of the High-Level Committee on Libya and the planned inter-Libyan reconciliation forum.
In order to address the external rivalry aggravating the crisis, it may call on the UNSC to assume its responsibilities by enforcing the arms embargo as called for in the outcome of the Berlin Conference. Apart from reiterating the appointment of an AU-UN Envoy on Libya for elevating the role of the AU and pursuing these policy objectives, the PSC may call for the AU to be a coconvener of the international follow up committee on Libya.
On the Sahel the PSC may note that response to the crisis in the Sahel should not be limited to military operations and may call on members states in the region to foster political dialogue and negotiation as means to reach a lasting peace in the region. It may also welcome the action plan adopted during the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS on combating and eradicating terrorism. Given the dire humanitarian crisis unfolding in the region, the PSC may call for the convening by the AU of a high-level conference on the humanitarian situation.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of February 2020
Amani Africa
Date | February 2020
Djibouti assumes the role of the monthly chairpersonship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of February. The provisional program of work, prepared under Mohamed Idriss Farah, Permanent Representative of Djibouti to the AU, involves some three substantive sessions. These include a meeting at the Heads of State and Government level and another one at ministerial level. Additionally, the PSC will also undertake a field mission.
On 8 February, the PSC is scheduled to hold its first meeting at a summit level focusing on two situations: the situation in Libya and the one in the Sahel. Despite the flurry of non-African peace efforts including the declaration signed during the Berlin Conference, the deterioration of the situation in Libya continues unabated. The focus on Libya follows the meeting of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, held in Brazzaville, the Republic of Congo on 30 January. The dire consequences of the spike in the frequency and geographic spread of terrorist attacks and intercommunal violence in the Sahel has similarly become gravely concerning, requiring summit level engagement.
On 9-10 February the 33rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly will take place. The PSC is expected to submit to the Assembly its report on its activities and the state of peace and security pursuant to Article 7 of the PSC Protocol.
On 13 February the PSC is expected to consider three agenda items. First, the Council is expected to receive a briefing on the future of AMISOM and upcoming elections in Somalia. This PSC session is also taking ahead of the withdrawal of additional troops planned during the month as part of the drawdown of AMISOM.
In the second part of the session the PSC will discuss the preparation of its field mission to South Sudan and Sudan. Lastly, the PSC is expected to consider and adopt the PSC provisional programme of work for the month of March 2020.
From 16-20, the PSC will undertake a field mission to Sudan and South Sudan. In October, at its 889th session the PSC decided to undertake a field mission to Sudan and Darfur in early 2020 as part of the overall efforts aimed at contributing towards the promotion of peace in the country. The field mission to Sudan follows the meeting that the PSC held on Sudan on 30 January focusing on addressing the challenges facing the transition in Sudan, including its continued listing in the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism.
The visit to South Sudan comes as a follow up to its 894th session decision in November to undertake a field visit to South Sudan in February 2020 before the expiration of the 100 days extension of the pre- transitional period.
On 24 February the PSC will undertake a preparatory meeting for the ministerial meeting in Djibouti.
On 26 February, the PSC ministerial meeting is expected to address two agenda items. The first is on the challenges relating to the Horn of Africa and Red Sea. It is to be recalled that the PSC held a meeting on the situation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea in November 2018 at ambassadorial level. The ministerial session will build on the previous meeting.
The second agenda item will be a briefing on maritime security in Africa. This will take place in relation to the Lomé Charter adopted in October 2016 at the Extraordinary Summit on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa in Togo and based on previous PSC sessions on the topic.
In addition to these agenda items, the provisional program of work indicates in footnotes possible meetings of the Military Staff Committee and Committee of Experts for which the dates are yet to be set.
The Candidates for the 2020 elections of the PSC
Amani Africa
Date | 2 February, 2020
The tenure of ten members of the PSC (Table 1 below) serving for a two-year term is set to end at the end of March 2020. Accordingly, one of the agenda items during the summit scheduled to take place this week is the election of the ten new or returning members of the PSC. Pursuant to Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.106 (VI) of the
Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly delegating the power of the Assembly to elect members of PSC, under Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol, to the Executive Council, the elections for the two-year term seats of the PSC will be held during the 36th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council scheduled to take place on 6 & 7 February 2020.
Table 1 PSC members whose two-year term ends in March 2020
| Region | States whose term ends in 2019 |
|---|---|
| Central Africa | Equatorial Guinea and Gabon |
| East Africa | Djibouti and Rwanda |
| North Africa | Morocco |
| Southern Africa | Angola and Zimbabwe |
| West Africa | Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo |
The procedures for the election of members of the PSC are set out in the Protocol establishing the Peace and
Security Council of the AU (PSC Protocol) and the Modalities for Election of PSC Members adopted in 2004. Most notably, Article 5 (1) of the PSC Protocol states that the Council’s membership is to be decided according to the principle of ‘equitable regional representation and rotation’. In terms of regional representation, for the two-year term, while East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa are allocated two seats each, West Africa and North Africa are allocated three seats and one seat respectively.
In July 2019, the AU Commission sent out a Note Verbale to States Parties to the PSC Protocol indicating
the elections of ten (10) members of the PSC scheduled to take place during the February Summit and inviting them to submit candidates for the election by the dead line of 30 November 2019. After the deadline was extended to 17 December to the Eastern and Southern Africa regions, the final list of candidates received by the Office of the
Legal Counsel are the ones shown in the map below. In terms of previous record of election to the PSC, the table below offers the statistics relating to the candidates from the five regions of the AU.
Table 2 Previous membership of candidates for the 2020 PSC election
| Region | Available Seats in the 2020 Election | States Running | Years Previously Served on the Council/th> |
|---|---|---|---|
| Central Africa | 2 | Cameroon and Chad | Cameroon was elected three times to the PSC (2004, 2006, 2012) each time for two-year term and Chad was elected four times (2008, 2010, 2014 & 2016) |
| Eastern Africa | 2 | Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan | Djibouti was elected three times previously in 2010, 2012 and 2018; Ethiopia was elected three times in 2004, and 2007 for three-year term and 2014 for twoyear term; Somalia was never elected to the PSC & Sudan was elected once in 2004 for a twoyear term. |
| Northern Africa | 1 | Egypt | Egypt was elected three times, in 2006 and 2012 for two-year terms and in 2016 for three-year term |
| Southern Africa | 2 | Malawi and Mozambique | Malawi was elected once in 2006 for two-year term and Mozambique was elected twice in 2004 for two-year term and in 2013 for three-year term. |
| Western Africa | 3 | Benin, Ghana, Liberia, and Senegal | Benin was elected twice in 2008 & 2010 for tow year term; Ghana was elected ones in 2004, although it was a candidate in 2012 before withdrawing in favor of The Gambia; Liberia was elected ones in 2018 for twoyear term; Senegal was elected twice in 2004 and 2006 on both occasions for two-year term. |
Of the current list of candidates for membership of the new PSC whose term of office starts in April 2020,
Somalia is the only State Party to the PSC Protocol that never previously served on the Council. Djibouti and Liberia are standing for re-election, while the remaining candidates are running again after a period of absence from the PSC.
In terms of previous membership (rotation of membership), Ghana, Malawi and Sudan are the only candidates that served in the PSC only once. While Chad was elected four times serving a total of eight years, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Mozambique have previously served in the PSC three times serving six, seven, eight and seven years respectively. The remaining candidates were previously elected to the PSC twice.
Southern Africa remains the region that generally follows the requirement of rotation of membership. As in the past, the number of candidates fielded from the region is equal to the number of seats available for the region as per Articles 9 and 10 of the Modalities for the Election of Members of the PSC. The Central Africa and North
Africa regions also fielded the same number of candidates as seats available for the two regions.
East Africa and West Africa have higher number of candidates than the seats allocated to the two regions. In East Africa, a region known for fielding higher number of candidates than available seats, four countries are running for two seats. of the four countries, Ethiopia was a candidate for the 2019 election and lost for Kenya for the three-year term seat. West Africa, which is usually known for fielding candidates on a consensual basis, has one candidate more than the three seats available to the region.
Apart from regional representation and rotation, the PSC Protocol under Article 5(2)) and the Modalities for the
Election of Members of the PSC (Article 6) lay down additional election criteria. These include a commitment
to uphold the principles of the African Union; contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; provision of capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in
membership; respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights; and the availability of a sufficiently staffed and equipped Permanent Mission at
the AU and the UN. Looking at the list of candidates, it clearly emerges that in practice the requirements under Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol don’t usually complied with and have thus become secondary to the requirements of regional representation and rotation. While the focus on regional representation and rotation makes membership in the PSC egalitarian, the failure to enforce requirements of Article 5(2) was not without its consequences for the effectiveness of the PSC.
Briefing on the Situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 30 January, 2020
Tomorrow (30 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to receive a briefing on the situation in the Sudan. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) and Head of the AU Liaison Office to Sudan Mohamed Belaiche is expected to brief the Council. Also invited for addressing the Council are Sudan, expected to be represented at the level of State Minister for Foreign Affairs and the US Special Envoy to Sudan, Donald Booth.
The main focus of the session is on how to address the economic challenges facing Sudan and guarantee the success of the transitional process in Sudan. Since 1993, the United States has kept Sudan and its former leader, Omar al-Bashir on its state sponsors of terrorism list. This has serious consequences for the transition in Sudan. Most notably, it directly affects the economy that is in desperate need of revitalization based principally on international support and economic cooperation.
The transitional government has inherited a very weak economy suffering from the nearly $60 billion debt burden, widespread unemployment and rising inflation and cost of living. With very little tools at its disposal for addressing the plethora of economic woes facing the country, Sudan needs major external economic support. Prime Minister Abdela Hamdok says the country requires up to $10 billion to stabilise the currency and help the administration tackle key challenges over the next two years.
Sudan however cannot mobilize international economic support while it is still on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. In December, Hamdok was on an official visit to the US aiming at engaging US authorities on the normalization of relations between the two countries and the removal of Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list. In a speech that he delivered during his stay in the US, he stated that Sudan’s removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism ‘has a lot of bearing on so many processes, not to mention debt and investment but also opening the country at large,’ and ‘unless it is addressed, all these other processes will not take place’. Many agree that removing Sudan from the list will open the door for access to essential financial support and address the economic stress facing Sudan.
During tomorrow’s session the representative of Sudan is expected to provide further details on the challenges facing Sudan and how keeping Sudan in the US state sponsors of terrorism affects the transitional process in Sudan. Also, of importance for the PSC is update by the Sudanese representative about the outcome of Hambdok’s visit to the US that took place last December and measures Sudan is taking for getting its removal from the list.
The two countries have agreed to exchange Ambassadors for the first time in 23 years. Hamdok said some progress has been made during his visit to the U.S., but he admitted that the process of removing Sudan from the U.S. terrorism list could take time. During a visit to Sudan, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy who visited Sudan recently was asked about this issue and he said, “we see a very positive partner with whom we can do business. We have active negotiations going on in a number of areas. We are optimistic”.
During tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to hear from Booth on US’s assessment of the support required for forestalling the collapse of the transitional process in Sudan and the role of the removal of Sudan from US state sponsors of terrorism list. Most specifically, PSC member states would be keen to know the conditions that are required for getting the removal of Sudan from the list and the plan of the US for helping Sudan meet those conditions. Some of the conditions that senior officials of the US State Department indicated for removing Sudan from the list include: more cooperation on counterterrorism; improved human rights protections, including freedom of religion and the press; increased humanitarian access; ending fighting and conflicts with rebels within Sudan; showing that Sudan has ceased supporting terrorism, ensuring that no Sudanese weapons in terrorist hands; and compensating those affected by the terrorist incidents for which responsibility is attributed to Sudan. Hamdok is reported to have said that the two points still under discussion are the cooperation of Sudan regarding the war on terrorism and compensations to U.S. victims of the terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies.
The last time the PSC met was in September when it decided to lift the suspension of the participation of Sudan in the AU’s activities following the establishment of the transitional government and the appointment of the new prime minister. The PSC had called for the lifting of all economic and financial sanctions on Sudan, including removing Sudan from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, with a view to enhancing the economic activities of the country and encouraging foreign
investments. In the same meeting, the PSC agreed to continue to closely monitor the development of the situation in Sudan and requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to regularly brief the Council on the situation in Sudan, in particular, on the implementation of the Political Agreement and the Constitutional Document. During tomorrow’s meeting, the SRCC Belaiche is expected to provide the PSC update on the progress and challenges in the Sudanese transitional process. It has been more than five months since the Sudanese transitional government was formed, and under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, it has taken series of measures aimed at addressing the country’s multiple and complex challenges. The transitional government has recently adopted a general framework that guides its work and sets out its key priorities. In this regard, it has been working to put an end to war as a matter of priority with a view to building a comprehensive and sustainable peace in the country.
Some encouraging progress is registered. Prime Minister Hamdock has visited rebel held areas in a gesture of peace, which was widely welcomed. Most recently, the transitional government signed a peace deal with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) for bringing an end to the conflict affecting the two areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan.
It is expected that SRCC Belaiche will also address the issue of how the economic situation affects the transitional process. Sudan continues to face enormous socio-economic difficulties; addressing the grievances of the people and giving the Sudanese youth a sense of hope and future is a herculean task for the transitional government. In this regard, it has been taking series of steps to revive the moribund economy by undertaking reform measures to address macro-economic and structural imbalances.
Prime Minister Hamdock has been visiting countries of the region and beyond in a renewed diplomatic engagement. At the 13th Ordinary Summit of IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa in November last year, Sudan was elected to the Chairmanship of IGAD replacing Ethiopia. At this important juncture, Sudan certainly needs all the support from the international community to surmount its current political, security and socio-economic challenges and meet the needs and aspirations of its people. Kuwait is said to be planning to host an international donors Conference in support of Sudan in April/May. The Conference is expected to mobilize financial contributions to assist the country’s economic reform efforts.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to review the progress in the implementation of the political agreement in the Sudan and welcome the positive steps taken by the transitional government over the past several months. Given the key role that the AU together with Ethiopia played in facilitating the signing of this agreement, the PSC is expected to urge the US to play its key role of preventing the derailment of the transitional process in Sudan and the peace and security risks that it entails by removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The PSC may in particular call for a plan with specific timeline and agreed parameters underpinned by firm commitments to be jointly drawn up by the US and Sudan towards achieving this objective of removal from the list and facilitating access by Sudan to economic support including for addressing its debt burden. On its part, the PSC may express its commitment to support Sudan towards realizing the assurances that it gives for meeting the conditions for its removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The PSC may also welcome the peace process including the signing in Juba, South Sudan of the peace agreement with the SPLM-N. The PSC may recognize the enormous challenges that the country
continues to face and reiterate its call to bilateral and international partners to mobilize assistance in support of the Sudan. In this context, it may welcome the plan by Kuwait to hold an international donors conference.
Briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Amani Africa
Date | 27 January, 2020
Tomorrow (27 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold a briefing session on Guinea Bissau. The AU Peace and Security Department and Department of Political Affairs may brief the Council. Also expected to make statement is the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The briefing is expected to focus on the recent presidential election conducted in the country. On 24 November, Guinea-Bissau held the first round of its presidential elections. From the twelve candidates, no candidate garnered the 50 percent vote required to win the election. Two candidates, namely, Domingos Simões Pereira (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde – PAIGC) and Umaro Sissoco Embaló (Movimento para Alternância Democrática (MADEM) G- 15), qualified for the run off election, which was held on 29 December.
Both the AU and ECOWAS have mobilized efforts to support the electoral process in Guinea Bissau. The AU has deployed African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM), led by Joaquim Rafael Branco, former Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe to monitor and report on the conduct of the election. The Mission comprises 13 Long Term Observers (LTO) and 40 Short Term Observers (STO). The LTO were deployed since 19 November 2019 up to 5 January 2020 while the STO were deployed in Bissau on
22 December until 3 January 2020. Similarly, ECOWAS has supported the election process with 1.5 million USD, deployment of ECOMIB and the deployment of pre- electoral, long and short-term observers and technical team.
According to the preliminary statement of the AU Election Observation Mission, while the runoff election was held in a peaceful political atmosphere, it observed that ‘social tension within the ranks of the public administration owing to delays in salaries [and] strikes by teachers.’ From final results released by the National Electoral Commission (CNE), opposition candidate Embaló won the December run-off ballot with 54% of the vote while Pereira garnered 46%.
Despite the commission’s confirmation of former Prime Minister Umaro Cissoko Embalo as winner of the December presidential run-off vote, Domingos Simoes Pereira contested the result at the Supreme Court with allegations fraud. This has cast a cloud of uncertainty about the post-electoral situation in the country including the political transition.
Embaló’s victory has already received recognition from various stakeholders in the region and the international community. ECOWAS welcomed the peaceful conduct of presidential elections and took note of the final results of the run-off presidential election announced on 17 January 2020 by the CNE and reconfirmed by the same authority on 21 January 2020. The ECOWAS in the communiqué released on 22 January further confirmed Embaló victory vis a vis his opponent Pereira. The ECOWAS Commission urged the various national institutions to finalize their activities and to prepare for the inauguration of the new president elect.
PAIGC and its candidate Pereira rejected ECOWAS’s statement arguing that it came while the institutions involved in the electoral process are still trying to agree on the election result and the legal process envisaged in the constitution has as yet to be finalized. The Supreme Court of Justice (STJ) ordered the CNE to carry out the national counting of the results. CNE says that it has already taken this step before publishing the results and announcing Embaló’s victory. The Parliament, on the other hand has stated that without the steps required by the STJ having been carried out by the CNE, it will not be able to swear in Embaló on the proposed date of 19 February. PAIGC has also urged the international community to respect the national sovereignty and the country’s electoral legal process.
On the other hand, Embaló reiterated that the entity to declare the winner of the elections is the CNE and not the Supreme Court of Justice.He further added that the recount of the votes is unconstitutional.
The National People’s Assembly (ANP) has also presented clarifications on the process by stating that the inauguration of the elected President of the Republic takes place in a special session convened by the President of the Assembly, within a maximum period of 45 days after the announcement of the definitive results. To this end, the President of the ANP will need to receive the minutes of the national counting before conferring power to the President. This also includes the clarification by the Supreme Court of Justice on the electoral dispute brought by Pereira.
The Supreme Court of Justice on its part stated that its ruling was not about recounting the votes for the second round of the presidential elections rather it’s about national counting operations, particularly ensuring that its uninterrupted and immediately after its completion the minute is shared with all the relevant institutions.
Agreement is yet to be reached between the various national bodies mainly CNE, the Supreme Court and the Assembly. The two candidates as well have divergent positions on the outcome of the election as well as on the process of determining the winning party.
It should also be noted that the election is only one of the many steps in the democratic transition of Guinea Bissau. The PSC at its 896th session underlined ‘the imperative for the people of Guinea Bissau to expedite the much- needed institutional reforms, including constitutional reform immediately after the election’. Once the new president takes office, there are a number of political and legal transformations expected to be underway to ensure a meaningful and sustainable democratic transition in the country.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC may back ECOWAS’s statement and may urge national institutions to complete their activities in a way that ensures legality and institutional harmony. It may call on the various political actors to exercise restraint from any form of violence and may call on them to resolve their dispute through a peaceful process, while ensuring that gains made during the electoral process are not lost. The PSC may reiterate its 896th session underscoring the need for implementing the institutional reforms, including the constitutional review process and security sector reform. It may also commend ECOWAS for the efforts and the activities it has undertaken during the presidential election.