Session on the 17 years journey of the PSC on the occasion of its 1000th session
Amani Africa
Date | 25 May, 2021
Tomorrow (25 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will convene its 1000th session dedicated to an appraisal of the 17 years journey of the Council. While the Council came into operation in March 2004, it was during its 10th session held for first time at the level of Heads of State and Government that the PSC was officially launched on the occasion of the celebration of Africa Day on 25 May 2004.
In marking the 17th years anniversary of the launch of the PSC and its 1000th session during tomorrow’s session, the PSC will conduct the session in a hybrid form combining a physical meeting with participation virtually. For the occasion, the PSC has invited all the former AU Commissioners for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, Ramtane Lamamra & Smail Chergui and Directors of the Peace and Security Department, El-Ghassim wane and Kambudzi Ademore Mupoki.
Highlighting the level of institutionalization of the PSC and its working methods, the number of PSC meetings between 2004 and 2021 shows a fourfold increase from the 21 meetings that the PSC held during its first year of operation. Since 2015, the PSC meets on a monthly basis for an average not less than six times. While its Rules of Procedure came into operation when the PSC became operational and served, together with the PSC Protocol, as the framework for guiding the work of the PSC, the PSC elaborated the specifics of its working methods through the Conclusions of the Dakar Retreat of the PSC held in August 2007. In 2019, the PSC consolidated the Conclusions of the Dakar Retreat and the conclusions of the subsequent 11 retreats on its working methods into the Manual on the Working Methods of the PSC. The PSC Secretariat has become not only the technical arm for the standardized conduct of the business of the PSC but also the custodian of its institutional memory. The two main subsidiary bodies of the PSC, the Committee of Experts and the Military Staff Committee, have achieved full operationalization, availing the PSC useful support despite capacity limitations.
As at the end of December 2020, 52 of the 55 member States of the AU are parties to the PSC Protocol. The three countries that are not yet parties to the Protocol are Cabo Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan. Following the elections held in February 2020, out of the 52 States Parties to the PSC Protocol, the number of States that served as members of the PSC reached 40. The States Parties to the PSC Protocol that never served on the PSC include the Central African Republic, Comoros, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Madagascar, Mauritius, Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Somalia.
Disaggregating the 1000 sessions of the PSC offers useful insights about how the PSC deployed its very finite time and resources over the years. Of the total number of PSC sessions, about 70% have been on country/region specific situations. The PSC used the remaining 30% of its sessions for thematic issues, consultative meetings with other AU organs and institutions, the UN Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the EU, LAS and the ICRC.
Although situations from all parts of the continent featured on the agenda of the PSC, the regional distribution of the sessions of the PSC shows notable variations in terms of PSC engagements across the five regions of the continent. 46% or nearly half of the sessions of the PSC dedicated to county/regional situations dealt with situations in the East Africa region. Much of the focus of these sessions focusing on this region have been on Somalia and the two Sudans. Both Somalia and Sudan have been on the agenda of the PSC since its establishment in 2004. And regardless of progress achieved over the years in relation to the situations in both countries, they continue to face major political and security challenges and are therefore still in the agenda of the Council. South Sudan, which has been on Council’s agenda since 2012 has also been considered at a relatively high frequency, although Mali and Sahel and Guinea Bissua featured more on the agenda of the PSC than other situations in this region.
After East Africa, West Africa featured most regularly on the agenda of the PSC, accounting for more than 25% of the sessions of the PSC. Compared to East Africa, where Somalia and the Sudans account for more than 2/3 of the activities of the PSC in the region, more countries in West Africa were on the agenda of the PSC more regularly. The political instability and ever-increasing terrorist threat in Mali and the Sahel region continue to be one of the major security concerns for the PSC. Central Africa, with 19% of sessions, comes next in place. Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have all been on Council’s agenda since the early days of its establishment. CAR and DRC, which make the highest number of PSC’s sessions in the region respectively, are still part of Council’s agenda.
In comparison to the three regions, there are fewer number of PSC sessions on the situations in Northern and Southern Africa. Of the two, northern Africa takes the lead with 9% of the total sessions. From the northern region, the situation that dominates the agenda of the PSC is that of Libya. Other situations that featured on the agenda of the PSC include those of Western Sahara, Egypt and Tunisia. Sothern Africa is the region with the least number of situations on the agenda of the PSC making up only about 1 % of the total country/region specific sessions. Mozambique, Lesotho and Zimbabwe have all at some point been considered by Council although none have continuously featured on its agenda. South Africa has also been addressed by the PSC in the context of the 2019 xenophobic attacks in the country.
Though the peace and security framework of the AU anchored on the PSC is still relatively young, the foregoing shows that it has come a long way both in terms of its institutionalization and in initiating efforts for maintaining peace and security on the continent. Its 17 years of journey make the PSC well positioned to become the leading platform for peace and security decision- making on the continent. As its engagement witnessed huge expansion and acquired increasing, though sometimes challenged, authority, the PSC has come to significantly affect the politics of AU member States, the relations between them and ultimately Africa’s relations with the wider international community and the latter’s engagement on peace and security issues on the continent.
Perhaps more than the successes registered, tomorrow’s session is of particular importance for reflecting on the challenges facing the PSC and the gap between the ambitions of the PSC protocol and the practice of the PSC. Indeed, as the PSC marks its 1000th session, increasing number of questions are emerging on the effectiveness of the work of the PSC and the way it conducts its business and the adequacy of some of its tools. The relapse of countries in transition back to conflict, the persistence of existing conflicts and the eruption of new conflicts and crises as well as the violence and insecurity from the spread of terrorism have put a spotlight on the effectiveness of the PSC conflict prevention, peacebuilding and conflict management and resolution activities.
Despite the decline witnessed in the number and scale of conflicts during 2000s, there has been notable increase in the number and nature of conflicts in the conflict from around 2011. The changes in the nature of conflicts and the challenges arising from emerging security threats call for response mechanisms that are prompt, agile and robust. These raise major questions on a) the security instruments that best fit for responding to changing security challenges, b) the adequacy of the political and institutional frameworks of the AU and c) the provision of the required level of leadership and resources by member States.
Addressing both the persistence of violent conflicts & crises and the enormous gap between the ambitions of the PSC Protocol and the actual practice of the PSC requires that the PSC addresses the various issues undermining its effectiveness.
The first set of challenges relate to the uneven implementation of the mandate of the PSC. This has two dimensions. The first relates to the fact that the level of implementation of the conflict prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding functions of the PSC. The PSC has predominantly operated like a ‘fire-brigade’. Hence, fire-fighting – dealing with conflicts after they have erupted – has become the dominant feature of the work of the PSC. As a result, other dimensions of the mandate of the PSC, notably conflict prevention, have been poorly implemented. Second, the PSC has not been consistent in its approach of putting conflict situations on its agenda. The PSC faces a charge of applying a double standard by intervening in some conflicts and failing to do so in other conflicts of similar, or even more serious, gravity.
The second set of challenges relate to capacity issues. In terms of diplomatic resources and technical expertise, despite the requirements of the PSC Protocol for member States to be in good standing and to have the capacity to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, a number of states still lack the required staff complement and technical expertise at the AU headquarters and the material capacity to effectively support the implementation of the decisions of the PSC. A number of member States also lack the required technical expertise that provide dedicated analysis for and follow up on the activities of the PSC. Similarly, the size and technical capacity of the AU Commission (AUC) is inadequate to support the PSC in all aspects of its mandate. Additionally, there are several subsidiary bodies of the PSC that are not operationalized. There is also the perennial issue of the mismatch between the diplomatic, logistic, technical and financial resources that the AU and its member States are willing to commit and what the implementation of the decisions of the PSC requires.
The PSC also faces political challenges. Despite the fact that member States of the AU made commitments under various AU instruments including the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the PSC, on various occasions the pursuit of national policy interests in member States engagement on peace and security issues without due regard to AU policy and normative requirements undermined PSC’s efforts and frustrated the emergence of timely and robust response. Recently, this has led to major retrogression when the PSC failed to uphold its zero tolerance policy for military seizure of power, severely denting its credibility as far as the application of AU’s norm banning unconstitutional changes of government is concerned. Additionally, there is a trend of States invoking sovereignty for blocking or resisting the role of the PSC as witnessed during the previous few years and in the course of this year.
The other set of challenges lie in the realm of policy and operational coordination between the PSC and regional economic communities and/or mechanisms (RECs/RMs). The AU and RECs/RMs have experienced increasing interaction punctuated by tension over the leadership of, and division of responsibility in, the management of various crises.
As it did during the 10th anniversary of the PSC, it is anticipated that the PSC will issue a communique. The communique is expected to acknowledge the progress registered in the execution of the mandate of the PSC. It is also expected to set out proposals for addressing the challenges that the PSC faces in dealing with the peace and security challenges of the continent, including those outlined above.
Ministerial session on the situation in Mali
Amani Africa
Date | 24 May, 2021
Tomorrow (24 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 999th session at the Ministerial level to consider the situation in Mali.
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, chairperson of the ministerial PSC session, is scheduled to make the opening remark. Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Mali, Zeyni Moulaye, representing Mali as the country concerned, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration of Ghana, as Chair of ECOWAS, will deliver statements. Others scheduled to address the PSC include Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, the new Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) for Mali and Head of the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Maman Sidikou and the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Mali and Head of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), El Ghassim Wane.
The last time the PSC considered the situation in Mali was during its 954th session convened on 9 October 2020, following the issuance of a Transitional Charter and the establishment of a transitional governmentinvolving civilian leadership in October last year, as prescribed by ECOWAS and the PSC. The Prime Minister announced his 25-member cabinet in October. High-ranking military officials including those who took part in the August coup, members of the Movement of June 5-Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP) who led the protest against Keita’s regime, representatives of civil society, as well as four representatives of the signatory movements to the 2015 peace agreement formed the interim government. Against the background of these developments, during that session the PSC lifted the suspension of Mali from participation in AU activities.
For purposes of tomorrow’s session, it would be of interest for PSC members to follow up on the Council’s call for the interim government to expedite the implementation of the outstanding provisions of the Transitional Charter including the establishment of the National Transitional Council and to work towards the conclusion of the transitional process for holding national elections at the end of the 18-month transitional period. The PSC also recognized the importance of the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement in order to comprehensively address political, security and socio-economic challenges facing the Republic of Mali. In this context, tomorrow’s session presents the Council with the opportunity to receive updates on the progress made in respect of all these various areas.
Those providing update to the PSC, including the representative of Mali, are expected to highlight a number of developments. The first of this is the establishment of the Transitional National Council (TNC), as requested in the communique of the 954th session of the PSC. Established on the basis of a decree that the interim President, Bah N’Daw, issued last November, the 121 seats of the TNC were allocated to Defense and Security Forces, representatives of M5-RFP, signatory movements of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, political parties and other groups. Major political actors including the M5-RFP strongly criticized the arrangement over the perceived unfair representation of the military in the Council who were able to secure 22 seats. The inaugural session of the transitional council elected one of the leaders of the Coup, Malick Diaw, as the President of the Council with overwhelming majority early in December. Second, in February, the Transitional Council considered and approved the action plan of the interim government, setting out six priority areas and 275 specific actions. Of particular interest for the PSC is ensuring the implementation of the action plan within the transitional period focusing on the major milestones for convening national elections.
Despite these positive developments, the recent resignation of interim Prime Minister Moctar Ouane on 14 May and his immediate reinstatement to pave the way for ‘new broad-based’ government illustrates not only the fragility of the transition but also thesimmering tension between the military and civilian elements of the transitional government, due to the dominant role taken by the military leadership in the transition. The report of the ECOWAS mediator and special envoy to Mali, former President of Nigeria Goodluck Jonathan, also flagged the concerns of stakeholders stating that ‘the mission encourages the government to ensure greater inclusivity of the main socio-political actors…’ This was further echoed by the authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS during its fifty-eighth ordinary session held on 23 January 2021, which underscored the ‘need for the timely implementation of the various decisions relating to the Transition, in a more consultative and inclusive approach with all stakeholders’.
With respect to the preparations for national elections, on 15 April 2021, the Minister of Territorial Administration announced an electoral calendar. Accordingly, a constitutional referendum is slated for October 2021. The parliamentary election and the first round of presidential voting will take place on 27 February 2022, with the runoff presidential election envisaged to take place in March 2022. Local and regional elections are also set to take place in December this year. As UN Secretary- General noted in his last quarterly report, the government is taking positive steps in engaging political parties, civil society organizations and signatories of the 2015 peace agreement to map out agreeable legal and institutional framework for the upcoming elections.
On the implementation of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement resulting from the Algiers process, one notable development was the holding of the fifth ministerial session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee on 11 February in Kidal, for the first time since 2015. Six Malian ministers and the leadership of the signatory armed groups and international mediators took part in that session, with Algeria’s Foreign Minister, the Chairperson of tomorrow’s PSC session, as Chair of the Monitoring Committee. Apart from allocation of seats for signatory armed groups in the transitional institutions, progress is also being made with respect to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, which forms key part of the peace agreement. A worrying development worth highlighting is the killing of the President of one of the signatory armed groups (Coordination of Azawad Movements), Ould Sidati, in Bamako last month.
Despite the positive political atmosphere from the transitional process and the 2015 agreement, the security situation remains dire. A terrorist attacks in Kidal on 2 April 2020 led to the death of 10 peacekeepers and one UN contractor. In a deadliest attack since August 2020 on a security post in the norther region of Gao in March 2020, 33 Malian soldiers were killed and 14 were injured.
On the humanitarian and socioeconomic front, the situation remains dire causing frustrations on thepart of the population. A nationwide strike was called by the prominent National Workers’ Union of Mali (UNTM), starting on 17 May to demand a better living and working conditions to their members. It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its last session on Mali, requested the Chairperson of the Commission, through the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre, to ‘engage the Transitional Government of Mali with the view to identifying priority areas that should contribute towards the restoration of national socio-economic development to more effectively prevent relapse to conflict’. In this respect, the Council is likely to follow up on this decision during tomorrow’s session.
In tomorrow’s session, the PSC may also follow up on the tools it agreed to put in place with the view to support the transition in Mali. One of such mechanisms is the ‘follow-up and support committee’, which the PSC requested the Chairperson of the Commission to ‘urgently activate’ at its 954th session to ensure the appropriate participation and contribution of AU to the transitional government. Accordingly, the inaugural meeting of the committee- co-chaired by the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN- was held on 30 November 2020 in Bamako, followed by its second meeting convened on 8 March 2021 in Lome, Togo.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to welcome the progress made in the implementation of the Transitional Charter since its last session on Mali held on 9October 2020. The Council is however expected to share the concerns of different stakeholders in the lack of proper consultation and inclusivity in the transition process, and in this respect, it may echo the fifty-eighth ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS in stressing ‘the need for the timely implementation of the various decisions relating to the Transition, in a more consultative and inclusive approach with stakeholders’. On the election, the Council is expected to welcome the announcement of the electoral calendar by the Government and urge Malian authorities to work on the outstanding legal and institutional frameworks in consultation with all stakeholders and create a conducive environment that would enable the conduct of the constitutional referendum and a free, fair and credible elections. In this regard, the Council may request the Chairperson of the Commission to initiate electoral support to Malian authorities. The Council may welcome the adoption of the Interim Government’s action plan by the National Council that outlined six priority areas, and may, in this respect, request the Chairperson of the Commission to continue its engagement with Malian authorities with the view to support them in translating this action plan into a reality.
In relation to the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the PSC is likely to welcome the progress registered and call on the parties to expedite the redeployment of reconstituted forces to the regions that continue to experience armed violence. In relation to the security situation, the Council is expected to condemn the continued terrorist attacks and intercommunal violence pervasive in central and northern part of the country, including the attacks on MINUSMA. On the socioeconomic condition, the Council is also likely to express its concern over the continued disagreement between Malian authorities and labor unions in light of the recent nation-wide strike called by UNTM. In this respect, it may call on all parties to resolve their differences through dialogue to avoid a further damage to the struggling economy. In relation to the ‘follow-up and support committee’, the Council is expected to welcome theactivation of the Committee and the meetings it held, and the plan for the convening of its third meeting next month in Bamako. The Council is also expected to pay tribute to the late former President of Burundi, Paul Buyoya for his service and to welcome the appointment of Sidikou as SRCC and Head MISAHL.
Ministerial session on access to Covid-19 vaccines
Amani Africa
Date | 22 May, 2021
Tomorrow (22 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 998th session, at the ministerial level, under the theme ‘Access to vaccines against COVID19 pandemic in Africa: Challenge to human security’.
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, chairperson of the ministerial PSC session, is scheduled to make the opening remark. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chritophe Lutundula, representing the Chairperson of the AU for 2021, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, Naledi Pandor, representing the AU Champion on COVID-19 response, and the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat will deliver remarks. Commissioner for Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development is expected to brief the Council. Others expected to make statements during the session include Michel Sidibé, the AU Special Envoy for the African Medicines Agency, John N Nkengasong, Director of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO).
This session focuses on the most pressing issue of this moment with respect to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, namely the threat that Africa’s lack of access to the COVID-19 vaccines presents to human security on the continent.
Since its outbreak in Africa early last year, the virus has so far claimed the lives of over 126,000 people, while the number of cases is currently over 4.6 million, according to the data from Africa-CDC. And of the five regions, southern and northern Africa have respectively recorded the highest number of cases by far. While the death toll and number of cases related to COVID-19 have been far worse in most western countries as compared to Africa, the spread of the virus and the rate of infection remains to be a serious concern. There continue to be AU member states recording increasing incidents of COVID-19 cases. 21 AU member states have reported fatality ratios higher than the global fatality ratio of 2.1 %. Significant number of African countries have also reported the presence of new variants of the COVID-19 pandemic.
For Africa, President Cyril Ramaphosa cautioned in his opening address during the 34th AU Assembly in February 2020 that COVID-19 ‘is not only a severe health emergency, it is also a grave economic and social crisis’. Indeed, in the African context the devastating socio- economic impacts of the pandemic is feared to outweigh its impacts on health and safety of people. In one of its first sessions on the virus, the PSC, in its communique of the 918th session, noted ‘with deep concern the profound socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 within Africa.’ According to United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the far-reaching economic impacts of the pandemic include “falling demand for Africa’s commodities; capital flight from Africa; a virtual collapse of tourism and air transport associated with lockdowns and border closures; and depreciation of local currencies as a result of a deterioration in the current account balance”. In terms of the socio-economic wellbeing of the peoples of the continent, this would entail disruption of access to basic necessities, loss of jobs and livelihoods, rising food insecurity and falling of millions of people into extreme poverty.
The health and the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic is not without consequences for the stability and peace and security of the countries of the continent. Arresting the spread of the virus and instituting measures for the social and economic recovery of the countries of the continent is not only an African but also a global imperative. Unless the pandemic is contained, there is a risk of its continuing spread and even more worryingly its mutation into more contagious and more deadly variants.
The AU report on COVID-19 pandemic in Africa presented to the AU summit in February 2021 pointed out that ‘the only way in which we can prevent COVID-19 transmission and deaths while at the same time protecting African economies and societies is to successfully immunise a critical mass of the African population with safe and efficacious COVID-19 vaccines.’ Africa will need 1.5 billion doses of vaccine in order to vaccinate 60% of its population—the estimated minimum requirement for achieving ‘herd’ immunity. Yet, Africa’s path to access COVID-19 vaccines is very narrow. There are four challenges militating against Africa’s access to vaccines against the COVID-19 pandemic.
The first of this is the phenomenon of vaccine nationalism. Predictably, rich countries have been purchasing and hoarding supplies of the vaccine for the prior utilisation of their own communities. As South Africa’s Foreign Affairs Minister Naledi Pandor pointed out in her opening address to the Minister’s meeting during the AU summit, the economically well-off countries of the north ‘has purchased the largest stock, while we in Africa are struggling to get our fair share.’ Thus, these countries with only 16 percent of the world population have bought up 60 percent of the world’s vaccine supply. Restrictions of exports, pre-production commitment of COVID-19 vaccine supplies by the few manufacturers and the hoarding by wealthy countries of excess supplies have left countries in the global south, including those in Africa, with very limited access. Not surprisingly, only less than 2% of the world COVID-19 vaccines have been administered in Africa.
The COVAX facility is a major avenue for access to the COVID-19 vaccines for many countries in Africa, although it can only supply 20 % of the required doses for achieving ‘herd immunity’. With much of the existing supply enlisted to meet the request of wealthy countries and the eruption of a new variant of the COVID-19 pandemic leading India into suspending export of vaccines for meeting pressing domestic needs, there is now a risk of the COVAX facility not being able to deliver the second round of shipment of the vaccine. This situation has led the WHO to warn that ‘trickle down vaccination is not an effective strategy for fighting a deadly respiratory virus.’
The second challenge is, what is the market-based approach to the production and procurement of the COVID-19 vaccines? While the world is facing an extraordinary pandemic, the production and procurement of vaccines is based on the ordinary mechanisms of the market. The monopolistic protection that the few pharmaceutical companies enjoy means that they control not only the scale of production of the vaccine but also who accesses such limited supply, when and with what price, thereby accentuating existing inequalities between various regions of the world. This has resulted in what the WHO Chief called ‘artificial scarcity’. As the WHO Regional Director for Africa aptly put it, the resultant limited stocks and supply bottlenecks are putting COVID-19 vaccines out of the reach of many people in Africa.
The third challenge for access to the vaccine is the absence of the requisite strategic infrastructure on the continent for producing and manufacturing COVID-19 vaccines. It is this structural condition that has exposed Africa to be completely dependent on outside sources for strategic medical supplies, hence for it to be left behind in access to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the two-day access to vaccine virtual summit that Africa CDC and the AU convened on 12-13 April 2021 that attracted the participation of some 44,000 people, it was reported that Africa, a continent of 55 AU member states and 1.2 billion people, produces only 1% of the vaccines it administers. The remaining 99% is imported, highlighting the hitherto policy failure of governments and the extreme vulnerability of the continent.
The fourth challenge is that of logistical capacity for rolling out the vaccines. So far, about 37.8 million vaccines have been supplied to multiple member States, through the Africa-CDC. Of these, over 24 million have been administered, indicating that there are member States who, having been supplied with the vaccine, fail to administer them in time. This is also indicative of the lack of preparations on the side of some member States to effectively and efficiently administer the vaccine as soon as they receive it.
There have been efforts, as part of Africa’s response to the pandemic, to address some of these challenges. The AU had established the COVID-19 African Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) to accelerate access to funds for the procurement and delivery of the vaccine doses and promote access to vaccines. AVATT has been engaged in mobilizing sources of funding and presented financing options in order to meet the $6.1 billion funding gap for the procurement and administration of the required number of doses in Africa.
In an important development, in its decision (Doc. Assembly/AU/5(XXXIV)) on the 2020 AU Chairperson’s report on the response to COVID-19, the AU Assembly acknowledged ‘the need for equitable and timely, access to the COVID-19 vaccine to all AU Member States which will require additional mechanisms to ensure at least 60% of the Continent’s population is vaccinated.’ This is a clear acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the pre-existing strategy that was premised on a market-based approach focusing on procurement of vaccines manufactured by the existing limited number of monopolistic pharmaceutical companies. Accordingly, the AU Assembly, noting that ‘exceptional circumstances exist justifying a waiver from the obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) specifically for the prevention, containment and treatment of COVID-19, decided to support the proposed WTO Waiver from certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19 as contained in WTO document IP/C/W/669.’ Underscoring the strategic importance of this, Pandor told her counterparts during the AU summit, the temporary waiver by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of specific IP obligations related to prevention and treatment of COVID-19 ‘would enable countries in Africa and elsewhere to access active pharmaceutical ingredients and benefit from technology transfer, including the know- how to manufacture vaccines in Africa at a cheaper cost.’
In terms of expanding sources of supply, apart from the limited number of major manufacturers that currently dominate the supply chain, it would be of interest for tomorrow’s session to explore how African countries may establish, within the AU COVID-19 pandemic response framework, partnerships for securing access from the various types of COVID-19 vaccine producers. Doing so within the AU COVID-19 pandemic response framework would ensure standardized contracting and safe supply of vaccines produced in China, Russia and India.
Given the centrality of addressing the structural vulnerability of the continent for human security by building capacities for manufacturing strategic medical supplies within the continent, the issue of addressing the structural lacunae in Africa’s capacity would be of major significance for tomorrow’s session. As highlighted during the April 12-13 AU summit on vaccine, there is a need for Africa to prioritize the mobilization of the required financial resources, expand medical research capacities, secure policy commitment of states for domestic purchasing of vaccines and the establishment of the requisite regulatory mechanisms that meet international standards. In this regard, the session may serve as an opportunity for calling on member States to ratify the treaty on the African Medicine Agency. Similarly, African countries need to deliver on the commitments that they have made under the 2001 Abuja Declaration, particularly as it relates to allocation of 15% of their annual budget to the health sector.
Finally, in addition to efforts aimed at ensuring access, more work needs to be done by member States in terms of putting in place plans for the rolling out of the vaccines and capacitating their public health institutions to administer the vaccine timely to avoid non-use and expiry of the vaccines.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its previous pronouncements relating to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Africa. It may also reiterate the AU summit’s decision that access to COVID-19 vaccines is the most effective avenue for not only containing the spread of the virus but also preventing further mutation of the virus and limiting the devasting costs to the socio-economic wellbeing of people in Africa and the world. In this regard, the PSC may call for the WHO to declare the COVID-19 vaccine as global public goods. The PSC may call on members of the international community to heed the appeal of the WHO for sharing their excess stock to African countries through the COVAX and AVATT. Council may also encourage African scientific research institutes to persevere in their efforts to produce COVID- 19 vaccines and urge member States as well as the private sector to support the efforts of such institutions. The PSC may reiterate the support of the AU Assembly to the call for the temporary waiver by the WTO of specific IP obligations related to prevention and treatment of COVID- 19 as the most critical avenue for overcoming the current limitations for generic and more accessible production of the vaccines. The PSC may also call for international cooperation and solidarity particularly through openly sharing vaccine manufacturing technology, intellectual property, and know-how through the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool. The PSC may also call on Africa CDC to expand its engagement on access to vaccine with a view to establish partnership with all vaccine producers both for procuring speedy access and for purposes of technology transfer and sharing of know-how. The PSC may also welcome the conclusions of the summit on access to vaccines and the proposed plan for Africa to build and expand its vaccine manufacturing capacity from the current 1% to 60%. The PSC may also call on AU member states to ratify the treaty establishing the African Medicine Agency and urge member states to meet the Abuja Declaration target of allocating at least 15% of their budget for improving the health sector.
Ministerial session on the situation in Libya
Amani Africa
Date | 18 May, 2021
Tomorrow (18 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) convenes its 997th session on the situation in Libya. The session is set to be held at the level of ministers.
Algeria’s Foreign Minister, Sabri BouKadoum, who will preside over the session, will make the opening remark. The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat will deliver a remark, while the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present a briefing to the Council. The representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo, as Chairperson of the AU for 2020, and the Republic of Congo, as Chair of the AU High Level Committee, are also expected to make statement during the partially open segment of the session. As the country concerned, Libya’s Foreign Minister, Najla Mangouch, is also expected to provide update on the peace process and the transitional government. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Wahida Ayari, the Head of United Nation (UN) Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), M. Jan Kubis, and a representative of the League of Arab States are also expected to deliver a statement.
PSC’s last session on Libya was held on 3 November 2020 following the breakthrough in the Libya peace process which resulted in the signing by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (5+5 JMC)—consisting of five representatives each from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the self- styled Libyan National Army (LNA) – of a permanent ceasefire on 23 October 2020. The agreement envisaged the immediate identification and categorization of armed groups to carry out a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as for urgent opening of three main roads joining the East to the West and the North to the South of the Country. It also provided for the withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries operating in Libya.
The communique of the 961st session of the PSC endorsed the permanent ceasefire agreement of 23 October 2020, and emphasised the importance of supporting the full implementation of the agreement including through the participation of AU in the applicable monitoring mechanisms. It also demanded the ‘immediate and unconditional’ departure of foreign fighters within the timeframe envisaged in the ceasefire agreement; called for the ‘unconditional and urgent closure of all illegal detention centres housing African migrants connected to the trafficking of migrants’.
Since then, Libya has registered additional major milestones towards the restoration of peace and stability in the country. In the political front, UNSMIL successfully convened the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)- composed of 75 participants representing all regions and main political and social constituencies in Libya- from 9 to 15 November 2020 in Tunisia. The LPDF adopted a political roadmap that provided for the convening of parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 December 2021. They also agreed on the formation of a transitional government with a reformed executive authority having a three-member Presidency Council and a separate Prime Minister with two deputies.
On 6 February 2021, delegates of the LPDF elected members of the new executive authority, resulting in the election of Mohammad Younes Menfi to head the three- member Presidency Council and Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah as a Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity. A new cabinet composed of 35 members submitted by the Prime Minister was approved by the House of Representatives convened in Sirte on 10 March. The Parliament reconvened a session on 15 March in Tobruk for the swearing-in ceremony of the new government, followed by power handover ceremony in Tripoli.
Despite these major developments, the political process is not firmly secure. One illustration of remaining challenges is the postponement of a planned cabinet meeting scheduled to take place in Benghazi following prevention by civilians and armed men affiliated with LNA of an advance team for Prime Minister Dbeibah from leaving the airport following their arrival. As the Permanent Representative of Libya to the UN rightly asserted during his statement to the UN Security Council in February this year, all the tracks that Libya has been following for years are ‘essentially fragile’ in the absence of a dialogue of national reconciliation, which would ensure the sustainability of any outcome.
The legal frameworks for the convening of parliamentary and presidential elections are not yet in place. In its recent resolution on Libya (2570), UN Security Council made its expectation clear that the parliament and relevant authorities need to ‘clarify the constitutional basis for elections and the enactment of legislations’ by 1 July 2021 to allow an orderly preparation by the High National Elections Commission. Given that the time left before the 24 December date for the election is only seven months, there is a need for finalizing the outstanding legal and constitutional issues and equip the High National Elections Commission with the requisite institutional and financial resources to make the necessary preparations.
As far as the implementation of the permanent ceasefire agreement is concerned, it is worth noting that the ceasefire is holding. It is also to be recalled that initially the 5+5 JMC unanimously decided to establish a ‘Libyan- led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism’ in November 2020. Subsequently, the JMC requested that the ceasefire monitoring is undertaken through the deployment of international monitors under the auspices of UNSMIL. Against this background, last month on 16 April the UN Security Council unanimously adopted 2570 on UN support for the Libyan Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism. As highlighted in resolution 2570, one possible avenue for AU to support the monitoring mechanism is through the provision of individual monitors under the auspices of UNSMIL.
In respect of the ceasefire agreement as well, challenges abound. First, despite the fact that the three-month deadline for the withdrawal of foreign fighters ended on 23 January, foreign fighters and mercenaries continue to be present in the country. It is to be recalled that the PSC, during its 957th and 961st sessions, requested ‘immediate and unconditional’ withdrawal of all foreign fighters and further warned to ‘name and shame’ all those that are sponsoring foreign fighters. Second, illicit flow of arms in breach of the UNSC arms embargo remains a major problem. As a recent report of the UN Panel of Experts on violations of the UN arms embargo observed, the continuing flouting the embargo has rendered it ‘totally ineffective’. PSC members are expected to deliberate on this issue from the perspective of the serious ramifications of the continuing presence of foreign fighters and the illicit flow of arms to the peace and stability of the region against the backdrop of recent developments in Chad.
Third, the different armed groups and militias that the conflict generated still keep a tight grip over the areas they control; and it remains unclear how far the new government could assert control over them. The recent brief seizure by militias in Tripoli of a hotel that serves as headquarter for the interim government, allegedly because of their unhappiness with the choice of a new chief of intelligence agency, is illustrative of the threat that militia groups continue to pose for the transitional government and the peace process in Libya. Finally, the reopening of the coastal roads is not yet fully realized.
The economic front also showed a steady progress as well, benefiting from successes registered in the security and political sector. Libya’s oil production continues to surge. The output has significantly risen to 1.3 million barrels per day from the low of 228,000 prior to September 2020. It is expected that production capacity would increase to reach a target of 1.45 million b/d at the end of this year. This is critical in reviving Libya’s shattered economy given the importance of the sector to the economy which accounts for 60 percent of aggregate economic output. Further economic reforms including the unification of the Board of Directors of the Libyan Central Bank, the unification of exchange rate, devaluation of the Libyan dinar, the presentation of a unified 2021 budget for the interim government have been also undertaken.
The PSC is also expected to deliberate on the human rights and humanitarian conditions in Libya, particularly in the context of African migrants and refugees. The death of African migrants while crossing the Mediterranean continued unabated. In the latest tragedy, more than 130 migrants lost their lives after a shipwreck off the Libyan coast. According to the UN migration agency (IOM), 557 deaths were recorded on the Central Mediterranean Sea route this year, which nearly tripled compared to the same period last year. Alarmed by the spike of deaths in this route, the two UN agencies (IOM and UNHCR) recently called on the international community to take urgent steps including the ‘reactivation of search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, enhanced coordination with all rescue actors, ending returns to unsafe ports, and establishing a safe and predictable disembarkation mechanism’ to avoid further loss of life.
In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also expected to follow up on its request at its 961st session for the ‘unconditional and urgent closure of all illegal detention centres’. Migrants and refugees are held in captives both at official and unofficial detention centres in harsh and life- threatening conditions, subjecting them to serious human right violations including torture, rape, sexual exploitation, and forced labour. They are also targeted by trafficking organizations, armed groups and militias operating in Libya as part of their criminal networks to generate income through engaging in human trafficking. In the light of these persisting challenges, the PSC is expected to receive update from the AU Commission on the outcome of the conclusion of a two-day working visit to Libya by the AU Commission Chairperson along with the Commissioner of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the Commissioner of Health, Humanitarian Affairs and Social Development in April last month.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to congratulate Mohammad Menfi and Abdul Hamid Dbeiba for their appointment as President and Prime Minister, respectively, and hail the smooth transfer of power to the new interim government as set out in the political roadmap adopted by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. As far as the political process is concerned, the PSC is likely to avail the support of the AU for facilitating and supporting a national reconciliation process in Libya. On the preparation for elections slated for 24 December, the PSC may urge relevant authorities to take action regarding outstanding legal and constitutional issues and the provision of institutional and financial resources to the Elections Commission necessary for the convening of the elections on time and to this end may request the AU Commission to initiate electoral support to enable the Libyan authorities finalize relevant legal and institutional preparations for the convening of the elections. On illegal detention centres and the treatment of migrants, apart from reiterating its call for the closure of these illegal centres that expose migrants to grave violations, the PSC may welcome the agreement the AU delegation of the recent visit to Libya reached with the interim government to reactivate the process of dignified and voluntary repatriation and resettlement of African migrants. On the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the PSC may welcome the adoption of resolution 2570 by the UN Security Council on the Ceasefire monitoring arrangements in Libya, and express its readiness to support the Ceasefire monitoring mechanism including through the provision of individual monitors under the auspice of UNSMIL. With respect to the continuing presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries, the PSC may express its deep concern about the lack of progress for their withdrawal and reiterate its demand for their immediate and unconditional withdrawal. In this respect, the PSC may call on the AU Commission to initiate the establishment of a joint mechanism that oversees and verifies the speedy withdrawal of all foreign fighters and mercenaries from Libya. The PSC may also call on the UNSC to ensure the enforcement of the arms embargo and institute sanctions against those flouting the embargo. The PSC may also endorse the call, in the joint statement of the recent meeting of the Libyan Quartet, for the ‘sustained implementation of measures to fully identify and dismantle’ armed groups and militias, and ‘ensure the subsequent reintegration of those individuals meeting the requirements into national institutions’.
