Peacekeeping in Africa: Emerging Challenges and Critical Lessons for Sustainable Peacekeeping Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 18 March, 2021
Tomorrow (18 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 988th session on ‘Peacekeeping in Africa: Emerging Challenges and Critical Lessons for Sustainable Peacekeeping Operations’. This session will be held at the Ministerial level, which is the first since the last ministerial session in December 2019.
Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kenya, Raychelle Omamo, is set to make the opening remark as PSC chairperson for the month of March. Kenya, apart from being a major Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is a member of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is also expected to deliver a statement. The main presentation for the session is expected from the Cabinet Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Kenya, Monica Juma. Also expected to make statements during the partially open segment of the session are representatives of the UN and the European Union (EU). The representatives of ongoing peace support operations including AMISOM and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin will also participate.
Coming against the background of ongoing discussions about AMISOM, tomorrow’s session will address not only the issues affecting AMISOM, by far AU’s largest peace support operation, but also emerging trends and dynamics affecting peace operations on the continent including ad hoc missions like MNJTF. This is not the first time for the PSC to discuss issues affecting peace support operations in Africa. It is to be recalled that the 851st session of the PSC held on 22 May 2019 was to consider the AU Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
The AU has mandated about a dozen PSOs since coming into operation in 2002. Until its end on 31 December 2020, the AU was running jointly with the UN the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). AU further authorized and provided political and technical support for three ad hoc regional security coalitions including the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. AU’s nearly two decades of experience has shown that peace support operations face various issues resulting from the changes in both the peace and security landscape of the continent and international relations.
One of the major challenges likely to gain PSC’s attention is funding. Despite the willingness that the AU has shown over the years for deploying missions in conflict situations where there is no peace to keep and thereby contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security, its missions suffer from lack of predictable and sustainable funding. In recent years, efforts have been underway to address this challenge by trying to identify various funding arrangements including via AU’s major step for mobilizing funds from within the continent. Yet, financial arrangements for African peace support operations remain neither sustainable nor predictable, thereby significantly affecting their effectiveness. In deliberating on this perennial issue, it would be of interest for the PSC to reflect on the status of operationalization of the Peace Fund, the implications of the new financial tool of the EU that came in to operation early this year replacing the Africa Peace Facility and on the preparatory work and next steps that should be undertaken on the part of the AU for reactivating the draft UNSC resolution on AU peace support operations through UN assessed contributions.
Also of interest to PSC members is emerging security threats and their implication to peacekeeping in Africa. Africa witnessed some 1,878 terrorist attacks and over 8,200 death toll in 2020, with incidents of such attacks showing worrying persistence and rise in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia and Northern Mozambique. Other features of the security landscape that present further challenge to peace operations include porous borders, transnational criminal networks, human and drug trafficking, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, climate change, and most recently by public health emergencies such as COVID-19. Characterized by asymmetric warfare and proliferation in particular of local identity militias, non-traditional security threats have increased in scale, intensity and complexity, a development that makes PSOs extremely challenging, with peacekeepers suffering increasing fatalities as witnessed in Mali and CAR in 2020.
There is a growing call for a robust mandate to peace support missions for them to deal with changing security dynamics. As the various experiences including AMISOM and the plethora of security operations in the Sahel show, relative success of peace support operations with robust mandate depends not only on gains made in the security sphere through degrading the capacity of groups such as Al Shabaab but also and importantly in the progress achieved in the political process on which the political end state of such operations has to be anchored. This underscores the ‘primacy of politics’, in that the use of political process is the primary means for the resolution of conflicts, with robust peace operations playing supporting role. This principle of the ‘primacy of politics’ is recognized as one of the nine core principles of the AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations, adopted by the 3rd extraordinary meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security in January 2021, described as referring to ‘the principle and commitment by the AU to ensure that all AU PSOs are deployed with the primary objective to facilitate a political end state as set out in its mandate’.
Gaps in the cooperation and coordination among various stakeholders notably AU, UN, RECs, TCCs, and host government is the other issue affecting PSOs that also deserves attention during tomorrow’s session. Countries that contribute uniformed personnel; those that provide financial, technical and logistical support; and those that authorize the mission are often different. Not each of these actors exert equal influence in making some strategic decisions, which from time to time negatively affects the role of PSOs on the continent. The recent experience of AMISOM highlights some of these challenges. It is to be recalled that in its 978th session on Somalia and AMISOM, the PSC expressed its regret over UN Security Council for conducting an independent review of AMISOM despite PSC’s call for an AU-UN joint leadership in undertaking the independent assessment. Subsequently, further tensions emerged in relation to the negotiation over Resolution 2568(2021). The representative of Niger speaking on behalf of the ‘A3+1’ expressed his disappointment over the manner in which the proposal of the A3+1 to include a reference to the UN assessed contributions as a possibility to be examined with the view to enhance the predictability and sustainability of AMISOM’s financing was rejected without ‘any convincing explanation’.
Experiences in Africa also show the multiplicity of peace operations actors in the continent, with some of the operations taking the form of ad hoc coalitions. This also underscores the imperative not only for harmonization of decision-making between AU and RECs/RMS but also for strategic coordination to avoid reversal of the gains made including in ensuring compliance with AU standards and norms.
Challenges related to troop drawdown, transition and eventual exit of peacekeeping missions may also feature in tomorrow’s session as another issue affecting peace support operations in Africa. Although it did not show the pitfalls of previous transitions such as in Mali and CAR, this remains an issue particularly in light of recent developments in relation to the exist of UNAMID. The imperative for consensus and coordination between national, regional, continental and international actors including affected population on troop drawdown, transition and exit has been highlighted by protests held in Darfur against UNAMID’s withdrawal and the sharp uptick of violence in Darfur just weeks after UNAMID’s closure of operation in December 2020. All these developments underscore the painstaking venture of winding up missions which requires striking the right balance between undertaking transfer of responsibility for national governments and maintaining security gains.
The other critical lesson likely to interest the PSC is the importance of ensuring full and meaningful involvement of women and the youth in Africa’s peace support missions as well as mainstreaming the women and youth in the peace and security agenda. Given the gender and age specific consequences of conflict, there is an urgent need for the inclusion of women and the youth in the planning, deployment and running of peace support operations. In this regard, there is a need for translating into strategic and operational plans the pronouncements of the PSC on the importance of mainstreaming and increasing the involvement of women and youth in all stages of peace process ranging from conflict prevention to peacebuilding as exemplified by the AU PSOs Doctrine.
The expected outcome is a communique. As part of the effort to ensure predictable and sustainable funding for AU’s peace initiatives, the PSC is likely to urge member states to redouble their support and commitment to the scale of assessment for contribution to the Peace Fund pursuant to the consensus reached by the Executive Council through Decision EX.CL DEC./1100(XXXVII) on 14 October 2020. The PSC is also likely to follow up on the Assembly’s request, at its 14th extra ordinary session on Silencing the Guns held on 6 December 2020, for the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing PSOs in Africa with the view to guide the A3 members in the UN Security Council ‘for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the continent’. PSC may also stress the importance of strategic coordination among plethora of stakeholders in peace keeping operations in Africa, particularly among the AU, UN, RECs, and other international partners as well as national actors. It may further emphasize the importance of consultation with the AU before the UNSC makes strategic decisions on peacekeeping missions in the continent. PSC may also make reference to the recently adopted AU Doctrine on PSOs and may underscore that all AU PSOs shall be guided by the fundamental values and standards incorporated in the doctrine.
Briefing on the situation in the Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 16 March, 2021
Tomorrow (16 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 985th session on the transitional situation in Sudan. The session is also expected to serve as a preparation for Council’s upcoming field visit to Sudan scheduled to take place from 30 March to 1 April. Apart from the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC, Bankole Adeoye, the new Commissioner for Political Affairs and Peace and Security will deliver his maiden remarks. It is also expected that the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson and Head of the AU Liaison Office in Sudan, Mohamed Belaichi will give a briefing to the PSC. The representative of Sudan is also expected to make statements both as representative of Sudan and as Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The new Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), Volker Perthes, is also scheduled to make statement.
It is to be recalled that the PSC requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to regularly brief the Council on the situation in the Sudan, in particular, on the implementation of the Political Agreement and the Constitutional Document. Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to provide an update on the overall political situation, the evolution of the transition including the implementation of the Juba peace agreement since PSC’s last session on Sudan held during its 952nd meeting.
The country marked the second anniversary of the revolution in December 2020. Since the PSC’s last session, significant progress has been observed, although the transition continues to face serious challenges, thus remaining fragile. On 14 December 2020, Sudan has been removed from the US List of State Sponsors of Terrorism. This has paved the way for the transitional government to receive much- needed financial and economic assistance to revive the country’s ailing economy and for the country to engage in negotiations to secure debt relief. It also boosts the position of the civilian component of the transitional government.
An important milestone has also been achieved in the implementation of the Juba peace agreement. The Announcement on 8 February by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok of the formation of the expanded new Cabinet resulted in the inclusion in the transitional government of the representatives of the various opposition group formations in the structures of the transitional government. The new cabinet includes, among others, the Darfuri rebel leader Gibril Ibrahim as Finance Minister and, Mariam Sadiq al-Mahdi, a leader of the Umma Party, as Foreign Minister. Some are also represented in the Sovereign Council, the other major component of the transitional government.
Following these changes in the composition of the transitional government, the expanded transitional government adopted a new political agenda committing to addressing the serious economic challenges affecting the public, security sector reform, transitional justice, gender and youth empowerment.
Despite such progress, the transitional process continues to face major challenges. In terms of the implementation of the transitional timelines including in the Constitutional Document, the call of the PSC for the establishment of the transitional legislative council, an important milestone envisaged in the Constitutional Document and the Juba Peace Agreement, remains unmet as various deadlines, including that of 25 February have been missed. The delay is said to be because of ongoing consultations on the distribution of seats among Sudanese political forces, including the signatories of the Agreement. The appointment of substantive state governments expected to take place on 15 February was not met. Despite the provision in the transitional agreement for the Military to handover the chairship of the Sovereign Council, there remain uncertainties.
In the political front, one of the major priorities for the transitional government is to advance the peace process by bringing on board non-signatory armed opposition movements, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North-Abdel Aziz al-Hilu faction and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid al-Nur faction. The recent meeting between the Sovereign Council Chairman, Lieutenant General Abdelfattah Burhan, with Mr. Al-Hilu, and the latter’s declaration to unilaterally extend the cessation of hostilities for five months is encouraging in this regard. There is also the issue of addressing challenges affecting the relationship of the civilian and military arms of the transitional government.
The dire economic challenges facing the country is another major area of concern for the transitional process. the Transitional Government of Sudan rolled out its economic recovery plan, ‘Sudan Economic Revival Plan 2019-2030’ to address the economic challenges facing the country. With the withdrawal of subsidies leading to spike in cost of living, thousands of Sudanese took to the streets to protest in Khartoum and other major cities to express their frustration over the deteriorating socioeconomic condition and criticized the performance of the transitional Government. Following the formation of the new cabinet, the transitional government took the most difficult decision to float the currency exchange rate in line with a reform programme agreed last year with the International Monetary Fund. Despite the adoption of mitigating economic measures including safety net programs, the economic situation remains an area that requires major effort, including via international support.
In terms of the security situation, intercommunal violence in Darfur continues to threaten the lives of civilians, while UNAMID continues its drawdown and exit. Recent incidents resulted in the death, injury, and displacement of civilians. These incidents have raised questions over the withdrawal of UNAMID. Displaced people who protested against these incidents have in fact called for the mission to stay. UNAMID is expected to complete its withdrawal by the end of June this year and UNITAMS that took over from UNAMID with a mandate to assist Sudan in its transition and peacebuilding process is already operational. Highlighting the precarious security situation and fragility of the transitional process, on 9 March Prime Minister Hamdok survived an assassination attempt, second time in a year.
The other major challenge with not-insignificant implications for the transitional process is the broader regional geo-political dynamics. Tensions between the Sudan and Ethiopia along their common border has been a matter of serious concern. There has been calls for the two countries to ensure a peaceful resolution of their differences regarding the demarcation of their common border. Countries in the neighborhood and beyond have also offered to mediate. On his part, Chairperson Moussa Faki had sent his Principal Advisor Professor Mohamed el Hacen Ould Lebatt to Khartoum to undertake consultation with the transition authorities. But there has been calls for the AU to be engaged in assisting Ethiopia and Sudan, including through its border programme. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in his recent report to the UNSC on the Sudan, also urged the leaders of Ethiopia and the Sudan to de- escalate the situation, ensure the safety of those living in the area and work towards a common solution. Other regional dynamics include the negotiations over the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The expected outcome of the meeting is a communique. The PSC is expected to welcome the progress made in the implementation of the transitional process including, the formation of the new transitional cabinet and the expanded Sovereign Council in implementing the Juba agreement. It would also welcome the removal of Sudan from the US List of State Sponsors of Terrorism and call on the international community to extend the much needed financial and economic support to Sudan to ensure the success of the transition. The PSC may also urge the various components of the transitional government to overcome their differences and enhance working together in the implementation of the transitional process. It may also reiterate its earlier call for the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council in line with the Constitutional Document.
In terms of the peace process, the PSC is expected to urge those armed movements that remain outside the peace process to commit to negotiations that will lead to a fully inclusive and sustainable peace in the Sudan. The PSC may express concern over spike in violence in Drafur with dire consequences to civilians. The PSC may also urge express concern about the escalation in border tensions between the Sudan and Ethiopia and call on the leaders of Ethiopia and the Sudan to de-escalate the situation and work towards finding an amicable solution to the border issue through dialogue and negotiation. In order to enhance AU’s support for the transitional process, the PSC may call on the deployment of needs assessment process for identifying areas of post-conflict reconstruction and development support by the AU and the need for close working arrangement between the AU and UNITAMS.
PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 984TH MEETING AT THE LEVEL OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT
https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/984th-meeting-on-western-sahara.pdf
Sustainable Peace in Africa and Implementation of Paragraph 15 of Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XIV)
Amani Africa
Date | 09 March, 2021
Tomorrow (09 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 984th session. In this first Heads of State and Government session of the PSC since February 2020, there are two agenda items that the session is envisaged to address. The first one will be on sustainable peace in Africa, which will have a particular focus on climate change and its impacts on peace and security on the continent. The second agenda item will be a follow up on the implementation of paragraph 15 of the decision on Silencing the Guns of the 14th Extraordinary summit, held at the level of Heads of State and Government (Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XIV)). According to PSC’s agenda for the 984th session, Council will also be addressing any other issues under ‘AOB’.
Opening remarks are expected to be delivered by H.E Uhuru Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya and PSC Chairperson for March 2021; H.E Félix Tshisekedi, President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Chairperson of the AU; and H.E Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission. The Representative of the UN Secretary General, as well as H.E Smail Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security, will also be making presentations with regards to both agenda items. In addition, a statement will be delivered by H.E Josefa Correia Sacko, Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture regarding the first agenda item with specific reference to climate change. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the PSC, on the second agenda item, the Heads of State of the two states concerned, namely His Majesty Mohammed VI, King of the Kingdom of Morocco and H.E Brahim Ghali, President of Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, are expected to make statements. The AU Troika – DRC, Senegal and South Africa – are also expected to take active part in the discussions of both agenda items, along with all PSC Member States.
Since its first session on the issue of climate change and peace and security in Africa at its 585th session in 2016, the PSC has held a further four sessions focusing on this theme, namely the 660th, 708th, 774th and 828th sessions. The most recent previous PSC session of the 828th session had a focus on funding for climate change to contribute towards the maintenance of peace and security, in line with the African Adaptation Initiative (AAI) – an initiative launched with the aim of ensuring that Africa urgently adapts to the adverse effects of climate change. It is to be recalled that Council noted the inextricable linkage between climate change and peace and security.
Tomorrow’s discussion on climate change is expected to emphasise the serious implications of climate change on peacebuilding efforts in the continent, as well as its effects on socio-economic developments and emerging threats to security in Africa, such as terrorism. Despite contributing only 4 % of global carbon dioxide emissions, African countries carry nearly 60 percent of the double burden of climate change induced severe weather events and political fragility risks in the world. In this context, Sacko is expected to highlight how climate change induced environmental degradation and depletion of scarce resources affect food security, social cohesion and stability and how extreme weather events such as severe droughts, floods and cyclones increasingly threaten the security of people on the continent. The PSC, at its 901st session, stressing that natural disasters and climate change contribute to exacerbating existing tensions, called on states ‘to reinforce measures to address effects of climate change, environmental degradation and natural disasters, particularly in conflict-affected areas within the context of the AU Solemn Declaration to Silence the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020.’ Indeed, inter-communal clashes, exacerbated by the impacts of climate change, has become a major source of violence in Nigeria and in much of the Sahel in recent years. Having regard to the unavoidable interlinkage between climate change and peace and security, Council may call on Member States to contextualise climate change impacts in their national peacebuilding efforts and implementation of all relevant resolutions and instruments within the African peacebuilding architecture.
In addition to its climate change focused discussion, Council is also expected to reflect more broadly on steps required to ensure sustainability of peace on the continent. To that end, it may evaluate policy measures adopted at the international, regional and national levels in order to assess their effectivity in addressing the root causes of violence in Africa. The role the youth for maintaining peace and security on the continent, particularly in ensuring sustainability of efforts is also of considerable value and may be an area of reflection. The PSC may also reflect on finding ways to increase predictable financing of peacebuilding efforts in Africa, specifically, of those set under AU’s Silencing the Guns (STG) initiative and Agenda 2063.
The second agenda item is a follow up on the implementation of paragraph 15 of Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XIV). ‘Expressing deep concern over the escalating military tensions between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Sahrawi Republic that have developed in Al- Guerguerat, the narrow Buffer Strip in Western Sahara, leading to the violation of the 1991 Ceasefire Agreement’, the AU Assembly in that paragraph calls on the PSC to engage the Kingdom of Morocco and Sahrawi Republic to address the escalating military tension. According to the Assembly, this is critical ‘in order to prepare conditions for a new cease-fire and to reach a just and durable solution to the conflict, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in line with the relevant AU-UN decisions and resolutions and the objectives and principles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.’ As observed in the information note for the session, the latest escalation of tension came about ‘when, on 13 November 2020, Moroccan forces entered the buffer strip of Al-Guerguerat to dismiss Polisario protesters,’ promoting the POLISARIO Front representing the SADR to announce that the incident involved violation of the ceasefire and marked an end to the ceasefire including Military Agreement 1.
In addition to these recent political and security concerns, the information note for the session identifies three issues relating to the situation. One of these is the humanitarian situation in the region, which has become a cause for heightened concern, especially in light of outbreak of covid-19 pandemic and humanitarian aid reduction. PSC is expected to express concern in that regard and appeal to the international community to mobilise support to address the humanitarian situation, particularly the plight of refugees in the region.
According to the information note for the session, the other issue is Illegal exploitation of natural resources by people who are not of Saharawi origin. In this respect, the information note states that, ‘Western Sahara, as non-self- governing territory ought to have its natural resources protected for the benefit of its own people, and the international community ought therefore to ensure this protection.’ The third area of concern is the human rights situation in the territory. On this as well, the information note states that ‘the situation of human rights need an independent, impartial and transparent monitoring’, while noting that ‘efforts to introduce a human rights component in the mandate of MINURSO have so far failed.’
Although it is a matter that falls within the mandate of the PSC, this is one of the most politically contentious issues. It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly at its July 2018 summit in Nouakchott decided to entrust the follow up of this issue to ‘an African mechanism comprising the AU Troika, namely the outgoing, the current and the incoming Chairpersons, as well as the Chairperson of the Commission, to extend effective support to the UN efforts’. As noted in the information note for this session, several efforts for convening of the inaugural AU Meeting of the Troika Mechanism on Western Sahara on the sidelines of the AU Summits in 2019 and 2020 ‘were never successful because of pressing commitments of the members and the attempt to have the meeting in February 2021 on the margins of the 34th ordinary session ‘was cancelled, again due to the non-availability of the other Troika members.’
Tomorrow’s session accordingly comes against the background of not only the emergence of new escalation of tension threatening the 1991 ceasefire but also such lack of progress to launch the Troika Mechanism of the July 2018 decision of the AU Assembly. Despite the fact that positions of revenant actors seem to remain entrenched, this session could thus serve as an opportunity for both salvaging the 1991 ceasefire and to create conditions for finding lasting solution for the situation. It remains to be seen whether this session will craft a process for a more active engagement on this issue and the modality for following up on this issue within the framework of the AU.
Within the broad theme of sustainable peace in Africa, the PSC may also discuss some of the most pressing conflict situations and threats to peace and security. This may include country specific conflict situations. It is to be recalled that at its 929th meeting, which had a focus on cessation of hostilities within the context of COVID-19, the PSC addressed itself to the conflict in northern Mozambique.
The outcome document of the session could be adopted in the form of a communiqué. In addition, the outcome of the first agenda item is expected to summarise key policy recommendations on opportunities, mechanisms and partnerships for sustaining peace. With respect to climate change and peace and security, the PSC may decide to have this as a standing agenda item and request the AU Commission to present report on how climate change affects peace and security in Africa and the ways in which climate issues can be taken into account across the peace and security cycle of the AU including conflict prevention, management, resolution and post conflict reconstruction and development. It could also reiterate previous PSC decisions including those relating to preparedness and funding for climate adaptation. Council is expected to adopt a report highlighting the ways towards operationalising peacebuilding approaches, which would direct current and future initiatives aimed at implementing approaches for sustaining peace. On implementation of paragraph 15 of the Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1(XIV), the PSC may express concern about the recent flareup of conflict and call for the need to address ‘the causes of the violation of the cease fire and military agreement number one in Guergueret which prompted the resumption of the war’. The PSC may also underscore the need for the protection of the resources of the non-self-governing territory for the benefit of its own people, for the parties to uphold their obligations for protecting human rights and for the international community to address the humanitarian situation. Reference may also be made to the need for the reinvigoration of the engagement of the AU High Representative, to holding consultations for the return of the AU Observer Mission to Laayoune, in order to facilitate operational coordination with the UN and to previous decisions calling on the parties to engage in direct and serious talks without preconditions under the auspices of the AU and the UN.
