Status report on the full operationalization of ASF and CLB
Amani Africa
Date | 08 July, 2021
Tomorrow (08 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene a session to consider report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the full operationalisation of the Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the AU Continental Logistics Base (CLB). The convening of this session under Nigeria’s chairship of the PSC is indicative of the importance that Nigeria attaches to and draws on its earlier engagements for achieving the utilization of the ASF in deploying PSOs.
Following the opening remarks of the Chairperson of the PSC for July, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs and Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The PSOD and the Chief of Staff of the ASF may also provide update to the Council. Council may also receive briefing from representatives of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) on the status of their respective Regional Standby Forces.
It is to be recalled that the ASF was declared to be fully operational by the AU Assembly at its 14th Extra Ordinary Session convened in December 2020. The Assembly in this decision directed the PSC to utilise the framework in mandating and authorizing AU peace support operations (PSOs). At the strategic and political levels, an issue worth addressing for the deployment of PSOs using the ASF is agreement between Member States, the REC/RMs and the AU on the processes from mandating deployment to the identification and preparation of the capabilities by RECs/RMs and the release by Member States of the capabilities they pledged as part of the regional standby force and the actual deployment of the forces to the theatre of operation.
At the institutional levels, there is also the issue of clarity on the role of strategic level ASF planning element at the level of the AU and staffing capacity of the AU ASF planning element. In this regard, the PSC may wish to discuss how its decision authorizing or mandating the deployment of a PSO is followed up by the AU ASF planning element for implementation in coordination with RECs/RMs.
One of the challenges in the utilisation of the ASF framework for mandating and authorising AU PSOs is the lack of clarity between the AU and RECs/RMs regarding the command and control of regional forces. Since the first ASF exercise in 2010, one of the outstanding questions is the respective roles of the AU and the RECs/RMs in the decision-making process for the deployment of the ASF. At Council’s first joint- consultative meeting with RECs/RMs which was convened on 24 May 2019, it was agreed that RECs/RMs shall forward to the PSC, proposals for a practical way forward in relation with the deployment of ASF.
Although the drafting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the AU and RECs/RMs on the ASF replacing the 2008 MoU has been finalized, the MoU has as yet to be signed by the AU Commission and RECs/RMs. This MoU is expected to clarify the respective roles of the AU and RECs/RMs in mandating and deploying ASF. In tomorrow’s session, this is one of the issues in respect of which Member States of the PSC may seek clarity on what needs to be done for the signing of the MoU by the AU and the RECs/RMs.
The session also presents the opportunity for Council to be updated on the status of readiness of Regional Standby Forces. As noted by Council at its 767th session, the different RECs/RMs have shown progress in operationalising their respective standby forces. While the East African Standby Force (EASF), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) seem to continue taking advances, the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) still lags behind.
Accordingly, one of the issues necessary to address is the standardization of the state of readiness of the various Standby Forces which is also critical for interoperability. While efforts have been made in developing standard for verifying the pledged capabilities of the various regional standby forces, the verification of pledged capabilities has as yet to get the buy in of the RECs/RMs.
It may also interest Council to reflect on the importance of updating the ASF to effectively respond to new and emerging threats in the continent. This principally includes the increasing proliferation of terrorism and extremist violence, outbreak and spread of health pandemics including Ebola and Covid-19, as well as natural disasters and humanitarian crises, such as climate change induced insecurity and the growing rate of forced displacement. With respect to responding to the threat of terrorism and violent extremism within the framework of ASF, it is to be recalled that Council convened a session on the establishment of a special unit on counter- terrorism within the framework of ASF at its 960th meeting. At the session, the AU Commission was requested to provide technical guidance and submit concreate proposals on the technical aspects regarding establishment of this special unit and to seek inputs from the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) in this regard.
Tomorrow’s session will also discuss the status of the CLB. The CLB which is based in Douala, Cameroon and forms part of the setup of the ASF serves the main purpose of ensuring the presence of policies and procedures for procuring, delivering and accounting for necessary support to all military, police and civilian components of AU PSOs. It is to be recalled that the CLB was inaugurated on 05 January 2018, by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and the Prime Minister of Cameroon. The update on the CLB is expected to cover staffing, use of the resources stored at the CLB, relationship of the CLB with regional logistic bases and infrastructure development including addressing the challenge of safe storage materials that partners donated and currently housed at the CLB.
As highlighted in the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted at the 13th Ordinary Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Safety and Security and the 12th Ordinary Meeting of the STCDSS, there is need to ensure storage and security of the CLB. Moreover, the need for Member States to support the CLB through the secondment of personnel at their own cost was emphasised at the 13th Ordinary Meeting of the STCDSS. During tomorrow’s session, it is expected that the PSC will receive update on the measures taken for the safe keeping and storage of equipment that partners including Turkey and China donated. With respect to staffing, the Chairperson’s report for the session highlights that as of 9 April 2021 nine (9) military officers are deployed at the CLB seconded at own cost by AU Member States namely; Cameroon (7), Niger (1) and Morocco (1) and Nigeria (1). It also indicates that one (1) training officer from Zambia is expected to deploy soon.
The other issue expected to be discussed in relation to the CLB is the distribution from the current stock of supplies to the regional logistics bases and the use of the supplies for purposes of supporting ongoing missions. As highlighted in the Chairperson’s report, the 13th meeting of the STCDSS meeting held in November 2020 urged RECs/RMs and /or identified Member States to commit to receive and preposition ASF equipment in their Regional Logistics Depots (RLD) to facilitate future rapid deployment. It is indicated that the various RECs/RMs are at various stages in the identification and establishment of RLD with NARC, ECOWAS and EASF having RLD at various stages of operationalization and ECCAS and SADC being at stage of identification of sites for establishing respective RLD.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to outline concrete steps in the process of fully operationalising and deploying the ASF and properly utilising the framework for planning and rapid deployment of PSOs to conflicts and crises in Africa. It may follow up on the proposals it requested to be submitted by RECs/RMs for a practical way forward in relation with the deployment of ASF, at its first annual joint consultative meeting with RECs/RMs. It may also call for enhancing the capacity of the ASF Planning Element at the AU. With respect to the status of signature of the 2018 MoU between AU and RECs/RMs on ASF, the PSC may call for immediate steps being taken for finalization of the signing of the MoU. In terms of the CLB, the PSC may call on RECs/RMs to work closely with the AU to speed up the establishment and operationalization of respective RLD and start receiving equipment from the CLB as part of the effort to prevent equipment from deterioration due to storage issues and lack of use. Council may commend Member States’ efforts made towards supporting the capacity of the CLB by seconding staff at their own cost and call for permanent solution for the staffing of the CLB through approved structure and budget.
Consideration of the renewal of the mandate of G5 Sahel Joint Force
Amani Africa
Date | 6 July, 2021
Tomorrow (06 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene the first session of the month, which will be the 1006th session, to consider the renewal of G5 Sahel Joint Force mandate. The PSC will do so on the basis of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission.
Following the opening remarks of the Chairperson of the PSC for July, Victor Adekunle Adeleke, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs and Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye, is expected to introduce the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Maman Sidikou, and the representatives of the G5 Sahel Secretariat and member states of the regional mechanism are expected to make statements.
It is to be recalled that the Council, at its 939th meeting held in July last year, renewed the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force for a period of one year until 12 July 2021.
The security situation in the Sahel continues to worsen with spate of terrorist violence in the region, especially in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the AL Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) remain major source of violence though they are not the only actors (vigilant self- defense groups are on the rise stirring intercommunal conflicts). Notwithstanding some gains made in the counter-terrorism operations in the region, the threat posed by the armed terrorist groups seems to be extending beyond the Sahel into the West African coast.
In sign of increasing insecurity, Niger, particularly its Western region of Tillabéri, experienced one of the deadliest attacks in March in which at least 140 people were reportedly killed. In Burkina Faso, the 5 June deadliest attack on the village of Solhan— informal gold mining site close to the border with Niger—left more than 160 people dead. This deadly attack reportedly brought the death toll in that country to about 500 since January. Terrorist groups in Mali also continued targeting both civilians and Malian armies as well as UN forces. In the latest attack, six Malian soldiers were killed while 13 UN peacekeeping forces were injured in separate assault staged in central and northern part of the country.
The latest spike of violence—coupled with rising food insecurity, climate change, and COVID-19 pandemic and its attendant economic shock—has exacerbated the already dire humanitarian situation in the Sahel. According to the June report of UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 14.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance: Mali (7.1 million), Niger (3.8 million), and Burkina Faso (3.5 million). This has prompted UN agencies to raise the alarm over rising food insecurity, more so in the case of Burkina Faso.
It is also worth noting the impact of the pressing security and humanitarian situation in destabilizing governments of the region. For example, in Burkina Faso where the government has been forced to reshuffle the cabinet as discontent brewing over government’s perceived failure to contain the string of civilian attacks. It is to be recalled that Mali, Niger and Chad experienced coup or attempted coup between March and May illustrating the fragility.
A positive development in relation to the operationalization of the Joint Force is the deployment of 1,200 Chadian forces in the tri-border area in early March pursuant to the G5 Sahel Summit held in N’Djamena in February 2021. This brings the total number of the joint Force troops to 5,534.
The other issue the Council is likely to discuss is the operational and logistical challenges facing the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Though the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the European Union (EU) continue to provide logistical and financial support to the Force, the supports have not been adequate nor predictable. In the latest report on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S), dated 10 May, the UN Secretary-General stated that ‘while the Force is becoming increasingly operational, it still lacks the necessary financial and logistical means to become autonomous’. It is in this context that the idea of establishing a dedicated UN Office to support the Joint Force gets traction with the view to ensuring predictable and sustainable support to the Force.
The creation of UN Office—similar to the UN Support Office to AU Mission in Somalia—was suggested by the UN Secretary-General June 2020 report on Mali. The G5 Sahel and the AU support and advocate for the UN to make such support package. It is worth recalling that the PSC, during its 939th session, called for the UN Security Council to ‘take necessary steps that will guarantee sustainable and predictable funding for the G5 Sahel Force from the UN assessed contribution’. However, dynamics in the UN Security Council suggest that members are divided on whether the idea of a dedicated and separate UN Office to support the G5 Joint Force should be pursued. Some members (particularly the three African members in the UN Security Council (A3) as well as France) are in support of the establishment of the Office while other members (notably US and UK) clearly object to the use of UN funds to establish the Support Office, preferring bilateral support as the right approach.
A positive development on the UN part is Security Council’s unanimous decision (through the adoption of resolution 2584) to renew MINUSMA’s mandate until 30 June 2022. While the mission maintains its current strength, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on the force levels and ceilings of the mission by mid- July, indicating the possibility of increasing the mission’s troop ceiling. A strengthened MINUSMA in a context where the situation in Mali and the wider Sahel is deteriorating would indeed be a positive step in turning the tide against terrorist groups in the region.
In tomorrow’s session, the PSC is also likely to discuss the status of 3,000 troops that the AU Assembly requested for the deployment to the Sahel. Despite some progress in developing the technical documents for deployment of the troops, critical issues of force generation, the command-and-control architecture, and the funding for the additional deployment have as yet to be clarified.
The other issue the Council may find worth reflecting on is the need to complement the military response with comprehensive approach that addresses the structural causes of instability notably underdevelopment, governance and climate change. A welcome development in this respect is the announcement of what is dubbed as ‘civil surge’ by the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel during the N’Djamena Summit last February. The expansion of state administrations and services to the populations, consolidation of rule of law and inclusive governance, and the fight against corruption and impunity are at the heart of the ideal of ‘civil surge’.
The expected outcome is a communique. While commending the efforts of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and its Member States in degrading capability of armed terrorist and other armed groups in Sahel, the PSC may reiterate its grave concern over the deterioration of security and humanitarian situation in the region. The Council is likely to note the progress made in the operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, particularly the deployment of the Chadian battalion of 1,200 forces as reinforcement to the Joint Force.
On the challenges facing the joint Force, the Council is likely to note the operational, logistical and financial limitations of the Force having detrimental effect to the effectiveness of the force in the fight against terrorism. Commending the efforts of the UN (through MINUSMA) and the EU for providing logistical and financial support, the Council may further call on these partners to continue their support. The Council may particularly reiterate the imperative of providing predictable and adequate resource for G5 Sahel Joint Force and welcome the proposal made by the Secretary-General for the creation of a dedicated UN Support Office. The Council is expected to welcome UN Security Council resolution 2584 of 29 June 2021, extending the mandate of MINUSMA for one year period until 30 June 2022.
The Council is also expected to stress on the need to follow a holistic approach and the need for enhancing non-military efforts that aimed at addressing root causes of the conflict in the region. In this connection, the Council may welcome the initiative of the ‘civil surge’ by Heads of State of the G5 Sahel during the N’Djamena Summit, and further call on partners to rally behind this initiative in addition to the military support. Finally, as growing security threats of the armed terrorist groups highlight the continued military engagement in the Sahel, the PSC is expected to renew the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force for additional one year period.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - July 2021
Amani Africa
Date | July 2021
During July, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Nigeria. Throughout the month, eight sessions were convened, out of which five addressed thematic issues while the remaining three focused on country/region specific situations.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - July 2021
Amani Africa
Date | July 2021
During July, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Nigeria. Throughout the month, eight sessions were convened, out of which five addressed thematic issues while the remaining three focused on country/region specific situations.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - July 2021
Amani Africa
Date | July 2021
During July, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Nigeria. Throughout the month, eight sessions were convened, out of which five addressed thematic issues while the remaining three focused on country/region specific situations.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of July 2021
Amani Africa
Date | July 2021
In July, Nigeria will be the Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC’s provisional programme of work for the month envisages eight substantive sessions. As has been the case since April 2020, all the sessions are scheduled to take place virtually. Five of these sessions will be focusing on thematic issues. From the remaining sessions, two relate to peace operations and one relate to region specific situation.
The first session of the month, on 6 July, is scheduled to focus on the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. It is to be recalled that the PSC renewed the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force at its 939th session for one year period starting from 13 July 2020. It is expected that the Council will also review the current situation in Mali and the Sahel. In this session, the Council may also receive update on the status of the 3000 troops deployment, which was decided by the AU Assembly during its 33rd Ordinary Session held in February 2020 in order to degrade the terrorist groups in the Sahel.
On 8 July, the PSC will hold its session on a status report on the full operationalisation of the Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the AU Continental Logistics Base (CLB). It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly, during its 14th Extra Ordinary Session held in December 2020, declared that the ASF is ‘fully operational’ and directed the Council to ‘utilize its framework in mandating and authorizing AU peace support operations’. In addition to following up on the implementation of these decisions, the PSC may reflect on the key challenges and the steps that should be taken towards the full operationalization of the ASF that serves as the ‘framework for the planning and rapid deployment of PSOs to conflicts and crises in Africa’. The Council is further expected to discuss on means of supporting the operational capacity of the AU Continental Logistics Base in Douala, Cameroon, and regional bases.
On 13 July, the PSC is scheduled to have a briefing session on the implementation of the ‘Regional Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region.’ It is to be recalled that this was adopted in August 2018, at a Ministerial conference of the member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) with support of the AU, including the PSC. On the same date, Council will consider and adopt the provisional programme of work for August 2021. Apart from reviewing the progress and challenges in the implementation of the strategy, the Council may also emphasise the heightened importance of addressing emerging humanitarian and stabilisation needs in the region and mobilizing the requisite AU support for the implementation of the strategy.
During its session on 15 July, the PSC is set to consider the report on the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) independent assessment on the future of the mission. As indicated at its 994th session, AU’s engagement in and with Somalia post-2021 is to be guided by the report of the independent assessment team. Although relative stability has been restored in the country following agreement on the resolution of the recent political stalemate over the elections, the intensity of the insecurity exacerbated by the impasses and the immediate clan- based division observed within the Somalia army are reasons to consider an appropriately calibrated AU engagement post-2021.
On 19 July, the PSC is expected to address the state of maritime security in Africa. When the PSC met last time on this theme at its 858th meeting, the session had a central focus on the finalisation, signature and ratification of the draft Annexes to the African Charter on Maritime Security, Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé Charter). In the session on 19 July, the Council is likely to pay attention to the continued rise of maritime security incidents in Gulf of Guinea (accounting for 43% of all reported piracy incidents in the first three months of 2021) and the looming threats in the Mozambique Channel due to Cabo Delgado crisis.
On 22 July, Council’s sixth session is envisaged to focus on the common African position on financing AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions. At its 986th session, Council emphasised the importance of burden sharing between the AU and UN including by ensuring UN’s predictable, sustainable and flexible financing of AU-led or authorised PSOs through the UN assessed contributions, and requested the Commission to develop a paper presenting common African position for funding of the AU PSOs and accessing UN assessed contributions. It is also to be recalled that at the celebration of its 1000th session, Council reiterated its request for the Commission to finalise development of the common African position on access and use of UN assessed contributions to AU PSOs, and submit for Council’s consideration. As emphasised by the AU Assembly at is 14th Extraordinary session, the articulation of a common position by the PSC will be important to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in promoting support within the UNSC for resuscitating the consideration of a resolution which would endorse AU’s access to UN assessed contribution for AU peace support operations authorized by the UNSC.
On 27 July, Council is set to receive a briefing on “early warning and security outlook”. One of the steps identified by the PSC (during its 360th meeting held in March 2013) to enhance the objectives of conflict prevention on the continent is a periodic review at least biannually of the state of peace and security using horizon-scanning approaches. This session, therefore, offers the Council the opportunity to practically apply the horizon scanning approach as part of the effort to enhance its capacity for operationalizing its conflict prevention role. In addition, the PSC is likely to deliberate on ways of reinvigorating the early warning system and strengthening its linkage with early response.
The last session of the PSC on 29th session will be a briefing on AU support to member States in transition and post-conflict situations. At its 958th session dedicated to PCRD in Africa, Council emphasised the need to consistently identify, initiate and promote PCRD initiatives in order to allow rebuilding of resilience and to consolidate peace in countries emerging from conflict situations. This session will present an opportunity, among others, to follow up on this.
The provisional program for July also mentions in footnote the possibility of a briefing on elections in Africa, which is to take place at a date and time to be determined.
