Consideration of the renewal of UNAMID mandate
Amani Africa
Date | 13 June, 2019
Tomorrow (13 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session to consider the renewal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
mandate. Jeremiah Nyamane Kingsley Mamabolo the Joint Special Representative and Head of the UNAMID is expected to brief the Council. The session anticipates the participation of the representatives of the African members of the UNSC (A3). On account of its suspension, Sudan will not have its representative making a statement.
The drawdown of the uniformed personnel, in line with the timetable to reduce the military component from 5,470 to 4,050 personnel and the deployment of a maximum 2500 police force, by 30 June 2019 has been underway as indicated in the latest Secretary General report. However the political turmoil in Sudan has started renewed violence in Central Darfur. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have occupied most of the sites that have been evacuated by the UNAMID troops. The closed UNAMID bases were supposed to be handed over to
the government to use for civilian purposes. In May Sudan’s current governing body – the Transitional Military Council (TMC) – has released a decree demanding that the remaining UNAMID bases be handed over directly to the RSF.
Since the decree, the UN has halted plans to evacuate additional personnel given that the basic agreement of using sites for civilian purposes has not been respected by the current Sudanese authority. The seizure of the sites by the RSF has a great risk of exposing civilians currently protected by UNAMID in Jebel Marra area. This is the same force that has been implicated in the killings committed since 3 June in Khartoum.
As per the planned gradual drawdown, the PSC and UNSC were expected to deliberate on the eventual closure of the peacekeeping troop by June 2020 and its liquidation to be completed by 2020. This process however depends on the security situation on the ground. It is to be recalled that the PSC during its 778 session in June 2018 when renewing the mandate of UNAMID, it has qualified the basis in which the drawdown should take place. The communiqué clearly underlined that the Council should consider key factors mainly ‘[e]nsuring a
gradual drawdown that would allow the Mission’s exit to be guided by the political and security situation on the ground so as not to create a security vacuum and expose civilian populations’.
The volatile political and security situation in Darfur and broadly in Sudan has dramatically changed in the past few weeks, which has posed a number of challenges for the continuation of the current plan for the drawdown of the peacekeeping mission. The Jebel Marra area was already susceptible to violence where the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) faction has increased over the past few months.
The protests and the ensuing instability have also disrupted the Darfur peace process, as armed groups namely the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and the Gibril Ibrahim faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Gibril) withdrew their December 2018 agreement to resume talks with the Government. The protest that has started due to the rising cost of fuel and other commodities has expanded to also include demands for sweeping political reforms. The economic crisis, the rising prices of food and medicines have also particularly affected vulnerable communities in Darfur.
The Joint Special Representative when briefing the UNSC in April 2019 stated that the political situation in Sudan has changed significantly and has the potential to affect the implementation of its mandate going forward. However Sudan’s representative emphasized the domestic nature of events unfolding in the country since December, hence there is no justification for the Council to discuss the matter. During the briefing the US highlighted the need for upcoming strategic review of UNAMID to take into account the impact of recent events on Darfur, including the Government’s ability to protect and provide for the region’s people. Moreover, the representative stated that in a situation where the Government is unable to provide protection, the US is in favour of the Council considering all options.
After this last briefing to the UNSC, the political and security situation has deteriorated. The excessive use of force that was used to disband the sit-in camps near the headquarters of the army. Following these developments Sudan has also been suspended from the AU. Following the diplomatic efforts of
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on 7 June, the TMC arrested leading opposition leaders after
their meeting with Ahmed. In June the UNSC will also hold a session on the UNAMID mandate renewal. This PSC session is expected to be informed by its previous decisions on Sudan given that the on going instability will continue to have direct impact on the situation in Darfur and the troop drawdown. Hence, the session will be key to set the tone ahead of the UNSC session in late June on the question of the kind of adjustment, if any, that needs to be made in the implementation of the drawdown.
The outcome of the session will be a communiqué. This will present the PSC to reconsider the ongoing implementation of drawdown and reconfiguration of UNAMID in light of the recent developments. The PSC is expected to renew the mandate of UNAMID for another twelve month. Another issue for PSC decision is the adjustment of the process of withdrawal until the situation not only in Darfur but also in the country improves. In this respect, the PSC may, among others, consider slowing down of the drawdown while tasking a joint AU and UN review of the situation in Sudan and its implications on UNAMID. The PSC may also pronounce itself on the issue of the handing over of UNAMID facilities to the RSF, which will be contrary to the plan for using the facilities for civilian purposes.
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 11 June, 2019
Tomorrow (11 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the situation in South Sudan. The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui
is expected to brief the PSC. Ethiopia as the chair of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is expected to make a statement. South Africa as an A3 and chair of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee of five countries from the five regions of the AU (C5) on South Sudan may also deliver a statement.
The signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS) on 12 September 2018 has resulted in the reduction of political violence. However, ethnic and inter-communal violence, as well as clashes between government and opposition armed groups continue to be prevalent particularly in the Greater Upper Nile and the Greater Equatoria regions.
Since the last PSC field mission to South Sudan in March 2019 which aimed at following up on the implementation status of the R-ARCSS major developments have taken
place in the country as well as in the region. This PSC session is taking place at a time where key political developments in the region are evolving and taking shape.
The R-ARCSS stipulated that 12 May marks the end of the eight-month pre-transitional period and the start of the thirty six-month transitional period, with elections to be held 60 days before the end of the transitional period. In April, opposition leader Riek Machar, who is yet to return
to Juba from Sudan, called for this deadline to be extended, due to the pending key tasks and unmet political and security benchmarks of the pre-transition period set out in the R-ARCSS.
The IGAD Council of Ministers at its 67th Extra-Ordinary Session on 7 May 2019 in Juba, South Sudan, under the chairmanship of Ethiopia endorsed the extension of request and called for ‘all steps necessary be taken to expedite the implementation of the pending tasks, within this extended non-renewable timeline’. During the ministerial meeting the interim Chairperson of Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC) stated that assessment report on the status of the implementation of the Pre-Transitional tasks has identified that ‘out of 59 key tasks, only 27 had been completed, 17 were still on going while 15 are pending’.
The critical tasks including cantonment, training, unification and deployment of forces, the reconstitution of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Commission, as well as determination of the number and boundaries of States and the restructuring and composition of the Council of States are still pending according to the R-JMEC report. A joint UN, AU and IGAD mission led by UN Under- Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the AUC, Smail Chergui, and IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Ismail Wais, visited Juba, from 10 to 12 May. The aim of the visit was to provide support to the peace process in South Sudan, complementing the 3 May 2019 agreement facilitated by IGAD that extended the pretransitional period by six months. The delegation strongly urged that the extension has to be the last one.
The most crucial issue for the success of the newly extended pre-transitional period is the implementation of the security arrangements. One challenge is the lack of funding for the implementation of the security benchmarks of the pre-transitional period. Without funding and in the absence of the implementation of the security arrangements, there is risk of the additional sixmonth pre-transitional period coming and going without the formation of the transitional national unity government. This is one of the issues that South Africa as Chair of the C5 is expected to highlight. There are already signs that implementation of the RARCSS will continue to face major challenges. Despite the six-month extension until November 2019, President Salva Kiir has stated that the formation of a unity government should be postponed by at least a year. This suggestion was made following government’s claim of its inability to disarm, house, train and integrate the country’s various force since the deal has been signed.
More particularly the upcoming rainy season was seen as a critical factor that will inhibit the completion of integration within six months. Parallel to this political process the UN Security Council has decided to renew until 31 May 2020 the arms embargo it imposed on South Sudan the previous year, as well as the sanctions imposed in 2015 on those spoiling the peace process. The resolution passed with 10 votes in favour and 5 abstentions including by the A3 block namely Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa. The A3 group collectively argued that sanctions will not be useful for the on-going IGAD and AU led political process and further urged for a more supportive and encouraging approach towards the progress made in the country. The penholder of the resolution, the US, although discontented by the A3 position, expressed readiness to consider adjustments depending on the progress made towards peace in South Sudan. In June, the UNSC is planned to receive a briefing and deliberate on the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on South Sudan.
The last briefing that the PSC received on South Sudan was in January by the C5. The C5 has signed the RARCSS as guarantor, which helped its integration in the peace process. C5 is expected to contribute to providing guidance in carrying out their role as guarantors of the RARCSS, including in the mobilization and provision of support for the implementation of the pre-transitional benchmarks, particularly those relating to the security sector. The steps that the C5 are taking and the plan of the C5 in this respect are issues expected to receive attention in South Africa’s intervention and the deliberations by PSC members. The role of C5 is expected to further increase at this particular moment in supporting IGAD’s political effort given the leadership gap that may be created due to the absence of one of the key R-ARCSS guarantors, Sudan, both on account of the internal crisis facing Sudan and its suspension from the AU following the 3 June deadly attacks against protestors and civilians by the Transitional Military Council. The embroilment of Sudan in major political crisis is also feared to affect the South Sudan peace process in other ways given Sudan’s role in the past as a place from which the SPLM-IO and its leader Riek Machar seek support. In this context, another issue of interest for the PSC is the need for enhanced coordination and synergy between the C5, R-JMEC and IGAD. The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underline the need to prevent any further delay of the implementation of the R-ARCSS and to avoid the extension of the pre-transitional period. It may reiterate the recommendations made by R-JMEC and call on the reconstitution of the DDR Commission, for the Transitional Government of National Unity to disburse the funds pledged to the National Pre-Transitional Committee and the Independent Boundaries Commission to expedite its work and submit its report immediately. It may further call on AU member states and partners to support addressing the financial constraints and provide technical assistance in the various security mechanisms.
Briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Amani Africa
Date | 11 June, 2019
Tomorrow (11 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing session on the situation in Guinea Bissau. The PSC is expected to receive update from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the political stalemate in the country following the March 2019 parliamentary. Apart from the representative of Guinea-Bissau, the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and representatives of the UN and the EU, who form part of the group of five international partners of Guinea-Bissau, are expected to make statements.
Guinea Bissau has been in political crisis for a number of years. Apart from the instability the country has faced from the military’s intervention in politics, in the aftermath of the 2014 elections, the major source of the crisis has been the power struggle between the various centers of power, notably the President, the Prime Minister and Parliament. In Guinea- Bissau’s semi-presidential system, the president is the head of state, with the power to appoint the prime minister. The prime minister, while accountable to the president, is the head of government from the party with the most seats in parliament and is vested with most of the executive power. The dismissal by President Jose Mario Vas in 2015 of Prime Minister Domingos Pereira plunged the country into political paralysis. According to the preliminary report of the AU Election Observer Mission, it led to a ‘de facto shut down’ of the National People’s Assembly. It was only after a protracted mediation effort of ECOWAS that the NPA has resumed parliamentary work and the date for election was set.
After delays from the initial timeline of November 2018, the parliamentary elections were held on 10 March. The votes were held in a stable and free atmosphere. The peaceful legislative elections were considered free and fair by AU and other international observers. In the elections, the ruling the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won the highest number of seats in the NPA, giving it the power to form government. However, since PAIGC won only 47 of the 102 seats of the NPA, other parliamentary parties, notably the PAIGC breakaway party Movement for Democratic Change (MADEM), currently led by the president also play a role for appointment in parliament.
While many hoped that the elections would resolve the political instability, the various parties that secured seats in parliament, particularly the victories PAIGC and its rival MADEM have been unable to agree on appointments. Another stalemate emerged when the majority in parliament led by PAIGC rejected the candidacy of Braima Camará, who is the coordinator of the MADEM, as the second vice-president of the NPA. With the MADEM insisting on the candidacy of Camara for position of second vice-president, the resultant stalemate has hindered the full establishment of the office of the National People’s Assembly (NPA), the appointment of the prime minister and the formation of a new government. The president has made the appointment of a new prime minister conditional on resolving the NPA impasse. This raises suspicions that he’s trying to block Pereira – as head of the majority PAIGC alliance – from again becoming prime minister.
This new round of political deadlock now threatens the Stability Pact that was signed in February 2019 and the progress achieved under the Pact reflected in the convening of the peaceful and credible parliamentary elections held in March 2019. Instead of the commitment for the consolidation of the politics and institutions of the country based on the popular vote from the elections envisaged in the Pact, the political parties and their disagreement have returned the country back to the paralysis that ensued after the dismissal of the then prime minister.
The situation also presents further threats to the already precarious socio-economic and security situation in the country. The threat from drug trafficking in particular has increased. On 9 March, while the country was in the middle of the electoral campaign, police made a record seizure of 789 kg of cocaine. On 30 April, 72 kg of cocaine from Guinea- Bissau were seized by Senegalese customs in the Tambacounda region in eastern Senegal.
The current post-election stalemate also feared to affect the electoral calendar for the election of the president. The end of the constitutional term of the current President is on 23 June. If this timeline comes and passes without the formation of the new government, it is feared that this will result in a power vacuum.
On 24 May, the group of five international partners of Guinea-Bissau – the AU, CPLP, ECOWAS, European Union, and the United Nations – issued a statement expressing concern for the new political impasse and call for the “urgent” appointment of a new prime minister and government respecting the “sovereign will of the people of Guinea-Bissau” expressed in the 10 March legislative elections. They also encouraged the “urgent appointment of a new prime minister and the subsequent formation of a new government. Furthermore, the date of the presidential election must also be set to take place in 2019.”
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will urge the Guinea Bissau political actors to prioritize the national interest and proceed with the formation of a new government reflecting the sovereign will of the people expressed in the parliamentary election before the end of the constitutional term of the president.