Discussion on the Impact of Foreign Terrorist Fighters on Peace and Security in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 20 October, 2020
Tomorrow (20 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 957th session to discuss the impact of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) on Peace and Security in Africa.
After the opening remarks by the Chair of the month, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Cergui is expected to deliver a statement. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) are scheduled to brief the Council. Moreover, Emmanuel Mouya from the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and Tarik Sharif from the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) are also expected to brief the Council.
Initiated under the Chair of the PSC for October, Egypt, the agenda of this session focuses on the implications of FTFs on peace and security in Africa and more particularly on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. The session among other issues envisions discussing mechanisms of identifying and locating FTFs as well as measures to improve the collection and sharing of information and evidence. The session is also expected to address issues related to measures aimed at strengthening relevant prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies and to deliberate on the gender aspect and child rights issues in relation to FTFs.
The AU PSC has addressed the issue of FTFs in Africa at its 749th session held under the theme ‘Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Combatting the Transitional Threat of Terrorism in Africa’, which was held at the Heads of State and Government level under Egypt’s Chairpersonship in January 2018. The PSC has expressed its concern on the return of FTFs back to the continent. The communiqué issued following the meeting stated the possibilities of FTFs seeking ‘refuge with other terrorist groups on the ground’. Thus, it requested ‘the AU Commission and partners to continue to assist Member States in building and further strengthening their national capacities’. Moreover, the Council called on its subsidiary body, the Sub-Committee on Countering Terrorism, once operationalized, to prepare in close collaboration with the AUC ‘an African watch-list composed of a database of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including FTFs, for use by law enforcement, border security, customs, military, and intelligence agencies in addition to AFRIPOL’.
Moreover, the PSC’s 812th meeting, held on 23 November 2018, recognized the role of ACSRT, CISSA and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), in compiling ‘the list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including FTFs’. The Council has also urged the international community ‘to share with AU Member States, the lists of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including their nationals identified as FTFs’.
Various AUC Chairperson’s reports have addressed the issue of FTFs within the broader context of terrorism and violent extremism in the continent. While not addressing the phenomenon of FTFs in detail, the AUC Chairperson’s Report on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa – presented at the 455th meeting of the PSC convened on 2 September 2014 – made reference to the phenomenon. The report identifies the instability in North Africa as one of the factors contributing to the spread of terrorism in Africa. In this regard, it is stressed that North African youths that have been recruited and radicalised constitute a large group of foreign fighters in terrorist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq and anticipates their return as a security threat not only to the North African region, but also to the whole of Africa.
In a more recent report by the AUC Chairperson on AMISOM and Somalia presented at the 865th session of the PSC in August 2019, references have also been made to FTFs. The report indicates that Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat to security and stability across Somalia given its capacity to continue its recruitment, training and deployment of fighters, both local and foreign.
At the international level, the scale of the phenomenon became apparent and concerning following the international community’s observation that terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida and ISIL/Da’esh (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), were attracting an estimated amount of 40,000 individuals from 110 countries who travelled to join them at various territories under their control. FTFs generally impose a threat to peace and security in the State of destination, transit and neighbouring States, and upon their return, they become security threat to their State of origin. Some FTFs also relocate to third States instead of returning to their State of origin, thereby being a risk to peace and security in such States.
African countries including Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and recently, Mozambique have been particularly affected by the operation of terrorist elements which include FTFs. In the African context, certain factors are closely inter-linked with the phenomenon and require serious attention. Among these, the lack of strict maritime regulatory rules at the continental and sub-regional level is worth mentioning. Weak maritime regulations have highly contributed to terrorism in general and opened the way for free movement of FTFs as well as their criminal activities such as smuggling of goods and people, drug and arms trafficking. I n this regard terrorism has been intimately linked with organized crime particularly when there are natural resources and strategic points such as ports, which can be easily controlled due to government’s limited capacity.
Coastal African States with weak maritime governance including Somalia and Mozambique have been particularly vulnerable to these activities. For instance, in Somalia, IS-Somalia continues to import weapons and fighters from IS-Yemen through the northern port town of Qandala. In Mozambique, Ansar al-Sunna coordinated its attacks against government forces by first controlling the north-eastern cost of the country, Cabo Delgado. These trends clearly indicate the need for African States, particularly costal States, and the AU in general, to strengthen maritime safety and security.
At the level of the UN, the UNSC has adopted various resolutions directly addressing the threats and risks of FTFs. UNSC Resolution 2178(2014) and 2396(2017) focused on halting the flow of FTFs attempting to travel to conflict zones by requesting Member States to strengthen screening procedures including collection and analysis of travel data. It has also made a decision for States to ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize their nationals that are directly involved or financially support FTFs.
In addition, the 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles on FTFs and its 2018 Addendum were adopted by UNSC following the UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee’s deliberation and identification of principles imperative for guiding States in their efforts to stem the movement of FTFs.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may underline that the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in the continent requires addressing root causes of conflict and crisis. It may reiterate its previous calls and urge Member States to strengthen the data collection and analysis capacity in terms of compiling the lists of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including their nationals identified as FTFs. It may urge Member States to increase their capacity in border control and security and to work closely and in coordination with neighbouring countries through information and intelligence sharing. It may also request institutions such as AFRIPOL, CISSA and ACSRT to enhance and support efforts around the development of a database of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts. The conclusions of the meeting are expected to be presented to the Assembly in February 2021 as part of the PSC report.
10 Years Review of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda of the AU Peace and Security Council
Amani Africa
16 | October, 2020
The year 2020 is a milestone for the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. In addition to the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, this year also marks the 10th anniversary of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) decision making women, peace and security a standing thematic agenda of the PSC. 1 Moreover, the year also marks the 10th anniversary of the Decade for African Women (2010-2020), which was launched on 15 October 2010 in Nairobi and subsequently endorsed by the 16th Ordinary Session of the Union in 2011.
Consideration and adoption of the Cairo Roadmap on Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations: From Mandate to Exit
Amani Africa
Date | 14 October, 2020
Tomorrow (15 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council is scheduled to convene its 955th meeting to consider and adopt the Cairo Roadmap on Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations: From Mandate to Exit through email exchange. The report and statements for the meeting will be circulated to all PSC Members through emails and the expected outcome will be circulated through silence procedure.
The 12th ordinary meeting of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security held in Cairo on 19 December 2019 has decided to ‘adopt, in principle, the “Cairo Roadmap on enhancing peacekeeping Operations: from mandate to exit”. Moreover, it requested Member States to share their inputs in the subsequent two-month period to the AUC, in order to be presented to the AU Policy Organs.
Subsequently, the 33rd Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in February 2020 adopted the decision of the STC.
The Cairo Roadmap was developed to support the reforms articulated in UN Secretary General Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative that was launched in March 2018. The A4P principally aims at establishing a collective understanding of challenges faced by peacekeeping and to renew political commitment towards peacekeeping operations. The A4P initiative’s major tenets were consolidated through the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations endorsed by UN member states in September 2018. The declaration particularly identified critical areas including the promotion of political solutions to conflict, protection of civilians, safety and security of peacekeepers, performance and accountability of all peacekeeping components, the impact of peacekeeping on sustaining peace, partnership as well as conduct.
The Cairo Roadmap was subsequently developed after a high-level meeting was held in Cairo, Egypt on ‘Enhancing the Performance of Peacekeeping operations’. Building on the A4P and the Declaration of Shared Commitments as well as insights from reviews on UN peace operations and peacebuilding and the inputs from the STC meeting and further subsequent submissions from AU member states, it presented recommended actions that the various role players of UN peacekeeping can take.
The Roadmap is organized along five priority areas. The first priority, which is in line with the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, is around the need to enhance political solution and the importance of political objectives to guide the mandate of peacekeeping missions. In this regard the Cairo Roadmap proposes a ‘quadrilateral consultations’ among the host nations, the UN Security Council, troop/police-contributing countries (TCCs) and the UN Secretariat as well as relevant regional bodies. This process is essential in also enchaining ownership of the political process by the host countries themselves. PSO’s mandate design and implementation have to be anchored on a clear political strategy, informed by the needs of conflict-affected countries.
While the primacy of political strategy is rightly emphasized, complementarity and harmonization of efforts as well as strong support for and consensus on the strategy among various peace and security actors at different levels including UN, AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are critical factors for the effective implementation of the political strategy and collective and coordinated action. Another issue which is of particular significance for members of the PSC is the degree to which the views of the AU and RECs are given serious hearing and substantive weight in designing and implementing peacekeeping operations.
The second priority aims at increasing the performance of peacekeeping operation through set parameters including clear and focused mandate and objectives of operation as well as adequate resources. In this regard, the Roadmap also indicates issues related to accountability and the need for a framework that systematically tracks performance.
The clear definition of objectives of operation and ensuring an effective performance of peacekeeping mission is intimately related to the quadrilateral consultation that forms part of the first priority area. The coordination of the actors and the development of a common strategic position will have a direct effect on the effectiveness of the mission.
The other key element of this second pillar relates to resources. Ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for PSOs has been a major difficulty especially in the context of protracted conflicts. It would also be of interest for PSC members to share their input on the need to globally scale up efforts to enhance resource mobilization for peacekeeping missions, including for those AU led or mandated operations authorized by the UNSC. In this respect, it is worth recalling the importance of sustaining the agenda of financing AU operations that the African 3 non-permanent members of the UNSC (A3) have championed during the past five years.
The third pillar highlights the need for well-trained and well-equipped uniformed personnel. This includes boosting PSO trainings to increase preparedness and ensuring personnel’s technical and operational requirements set by the UN are fulfilled. Moreover the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping including by reaching the target of the UN to ensure for women’s participation at 15% in military positions and 20% among police deployments are indicated in the Roadmap. These efforts are expected to be accompanied by the implementation of the UN zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.
Given that the Roadmap covers the full cycle of the peacekeeping from mandate to exit, the fourth pillar focuses on the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Currently, this is an issue that is very much alive in the context of Sudan with respect to the joint UN-AU mission in Darfur. Proper planning for and creating conditions for smooth transition is critical both to sustain the gains registered and avoid the emergence of security gaps. Rather than a sequential approach to transition, this may entail a phased approach that facilitates increase in peacebuilding interventions parallel to the drawdown or reconfiguration of the make-up and areas of focus of peacekeeping operations as part of the exit strategy.
Finally, the Roadmap gives recognition to the role of peacekeeping missions in responding to emerging challenges including natural disasters, health and environmental crisis. This is important in expanding the understanding of security by integrating non-traditional security matters including disaster induced humanitarian crisis and health, which have increasingly become major emerging security issues.
In fact the AU through its policy guideline on the role of the African Standby Force in Humanitarian Action and Natural Disaster Support has developed a framework to ensure peacekeeping troops play a broader mandate beyond the standard operational matters. In the context of a pandemic such as COVID19, peace operations can play the critical role of supporting the implementation of public health measures and mitigating the adverse impact of such health or other natural events on peace efforts. In the current realities of a global economy severely battered by the pandemic, there is also the issue of resource constraints which can adversely affect peacekeeping.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to adopt the Cairo Roadmap. It may reiterate the key issues raised in the Roadmap including the importance of sustainable political solutions to conflict, the need to enhance ownership of host countries in political processes, in the design and implementation of peacekeeping missions as well the need to strengthen the capacity of peacekeeping components. The PSC may underline the importance of collective action and global commitment in strengthening the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions through the provision of adequate capacity and financing. The Council may also further reiterate the importance for the UN and various global actors to work closely and in coordination with the regional organizations including the AU as well as RECs/RMs in designing and implementing the mandate of peacekeeping missions. The PSC may further reiterate its previous pronouncements on the need for predictable and sustainable financing of peace support operations including through UN assessed contributions support to AU led or mandated peace support operations authorized by the UNSC, as a collective global public good.
Briefing on the situation in Mali
Amani Africa
Date | 9 October, 2020
Tomorrow (9 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing session on the situation in Mali. The meeting is expected to take place through VTC.
The AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, is expected to brief the PSC. Additionally, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, is also set to address the Council. It is also anticipated that the PSC will hear from Ghana, the current Chairperson of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The session is convened in the context of the recent developments in Mali that culminated in the establishment of a transitional government and the decision of ECOWAS to lift the sanctions it imposed following the unconstitutional changes of government in Mali on 18 August. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 941st session of 19 August adopted a decision suspending Mali.
It is to be recalled that ECOWAS, which assumed leadership on the effort to restore constitutional order in Mali, considered the situation in Mali at a summit level meeting on 7 September and decided that the Malian forces has to appoint a transitional civilian president and prime Minister.
Subsequently, at a meeting that ECOWAS convened on 15 September with the the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), the formation of the military junta that seized power through the 18 August coup, ECOWAS reaffirmed the position on the need for civilians to be appointed to the position of President and Prime Minister of the transitional government and the limitation of the transitional period for 18 months as well as the dissolution of the CNSP upon the formation of the transitional government.
In the communique of its 946th session of 17 September in which it endorsed the ECOWAS decision, the PSC also categorically rejected ‘any attempt by the military to lead or influence the Malian Transition’, reiterated the ‘call for the immediate formation of a civilian-led transitional government’ and expressed ‘full support to the ECOWAS decision that both, the President and the Prime Minister of the Transition should be civilians’.
In the light of the foregoing, for purposes of tomorrow’s meeting the central issue is the lifting of the suspension of Mali. In this regard, one key technical issue that is sure to attract attention during the session is whether the formation of the transitional government complied with the requirements for civilian leadership and the PSC’s rejection of the influence of the military in the Malian transition.
After both the PSC and ECOWAS insisted on the requirement for civilian leadership for the position of President and Prime Minister, the selection committee that the CNSP established announced on 21 September the appointment of Bah N’daw, who is a former colonel and served as minister of defense in 2014, as transitional president. It also named CNSP head Colonel Assimi Goïta as transitional vice-president. On Friday 25 September,Ndaw and Goïta were sworn in as interim president and vice-president respectively for the transitional period that is set for a maximum of 18 months starting from 15 September.
ECOWAS’s Special Envoy, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, after meeting with Ndaw, has also stated of the possibilities for ECOWAS’s sanctions to be lifted with appointment of a civilian prime minister. On Sunday 27 September the transitional government appointed former minister of foreign affairs, Moctar Ouane, as Mali’s prime minister.
The Transition Charter published of 1 October in the Official Gazette has sought to meet the conditions put forward by ECOWAS towards the restoration of the constitutional order in Mali. The provision that allows the vice-president of the transition to replace the president has been removed with his responsibilities limited to security and defense. It also excluded the possibility of the transitional vice president replacing the transitional president. The 18-month cutoff timeline setting the duration of the transition has also been affirmed in the Charter. Taking these developments into account on 5 October ECOWAS decided to lift the sanctions imposed on Mali.
Indeed, despite his previous role, the president of the transitional government has since his retirement been a civilian with no notable influence on the military in Mali. Similarly, the appointment of Ouane as Prime Minister fulfils the demand for a civilian to be appointed to this leadership position. In terms of the reference, in the PSC communique of its 946th session of 17 September, to rejection of the influence of the military in the transition, the dissolution of the CNSP is an important step. At the same time, this reference to the influence of the military touches on the overall composition of the transitional government. Of particular interest in this respect is that four ministries including defense, internal security, territorial administration and national reconciliation are assigned to members of the CNSP.
The President has established a government consisting of 25 ministries. Even though the number of ministries led by army members is not significant as compared to the 25 membership of the cabinet, the portfolios of those ministries are however central for the country’s political transition and security. With the current composition, overall the transitional government can be characterized as a civilian led government with representation of members of the military in key portfolios. The effectiveness of Mali’s transition, similar to that of Sudan, will also depend on the kind of agency that they will be able to exercise.
For tomorrow’s session, the technical considerations, despite their political weight, are not the only or even most important considerations. In its application of AU norms, PSC also takes account of the needs of the context. In this respect, there are at least three important considerations. The first is the necessity for having an authority whose role as government is free from uncertainty. This is critical for both avoiding the political anxiety that results from uncertainty and for effective engagement to support the transitional process. This would be one of the issues that those briefing the Council may underscore. The second, related to the first, is the need for effective engagement of the Malian authorities in the effort to restore peace and security in the country. Indeed, the session may highlight that the fragile transition is taking place within the context of continued operation of terrorist groups in the country and in the region. The third consideration relates to the implementation of reforms including those within the framework of the 2015 peace agreement. On this latter point, it is envisaged that former armed groups parties to the Mali peace agreement of 2015 will also be represented in the transitional government.
There are also clear indications from the dynamics in the PSC that there will be strong support for the lifting of the suspension of Mali. Members of the PSC from the ECOWAS region would in pursuit of the ECOWAS decision lifting the sanctions on Mali would make a case for the PSC to follow ECOWAS. There are also other PSC members who support this position. Mali’s Ambassador, Fafre Kamara, engaged various PSC members and met with Chergui to brief them on progress made in Mali. It is not expected that there will be opposition to the lifting of Mali’s suspension.
At the same time, as part of ensuring support for the transitional process including for implementation of reform measures to address the governance and security issues that led to the political crisis, various members of the PSC may also indicate that the lifting of the suspension is done within the parameters of applicable AU rule constitutional governance. In this respect, apart from the need for adhering to the 18 month period of the transition, such members may highlight, the importance of using the transitional period for strengthening political stability including through mobilizing consensus around the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement, the rolling out of local governance structures and the creation of conditions for the convening of credible parliamentary and presidential elections. The issue of non-participation of the members of the CNSP and the transitional government in the formation of a new government that will be established on the basis of elections as required by AU norms may also arise.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to lift the suspension of Mali and express its support for the transitional process as a means for the restoration of constitutional order in Mali. In light of this the PSC may also welcome the decision of ECOWAS. Deciding to continue being seized with the situation, the PSC may underline the importance for the transitional government to adhere to the decisions made during the Accra Summit on 15 September including the need to maintain the civilian nature of the transition, the need to work within the agreed upon timeframe of 18 month and the dissolution of the CNSP. The Council may also reiterate the need for the consolidation of the political and security situation in the country. In this respect, the PSC may welcome the release of government and military officials that were detained in the context of the 18 August coup and commend the transitional government for securing the release of Malian politician Soumaïla Cissé, who was kidnapped in March, and French aid worker, as part of a prisoner exchange involving up to 200 extremist fighters that have been in government custody.
