Briefing on review of the structure and mandate of the RPF of UNMISS
Amani Africa
Date | 20 December, 2018
Today 20 December, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) will have a briefing session on the Regional Protection Force (RPF) for South Sudan. Convened on the request of Ethiopia as Chair of the Inter‐Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the briefing is expected to provide update on the proposed review of the structure and the mandate of the (RPF). This is initiated as part of the effort to support the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R‐ARCSS) signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 12 September 2018.
This session also builds on the 800th session of the PSC held on 10 October 2018. In the communiqué it adopted on that session, the PSC requested ‘the Parties, together with IGAD and the UN, to finalise the matter relating to the deployment of the Regional Protection Force (RPF), as soon as possible, in order to ensure that the protection of civilians mandate is not compromised’.
The PSC is expected to receive the briefing from Woinshet Tadesse of Ethiopia, representing the Chairperson of IGAD. It is to be recalled that on 16 November, the IGAD Council of Ministers held an extraordinary session on South Sudan. The communiqué of that session envisaged submission of a report to ‘the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the UN Security Council on concrete proposals to revise the mandate and structure of the RPF to allow the participation of all IGAD Member States’.
The IGAD minister’s decision was a follow up to the IGAD Assembly decision. Earlier in September, the extraordinary summit of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government took a decision to seek from the Security Council review of the mandate of the RPF ‘to allow Sudan, Uganda, Djibouti and Somalia as guarantors, to contribute forces to enhance the protection and security throughout the implementation of the R‐ARCSS.’ Acting on the request of the IGAD Assembly and the subsequent IGAD Ministers meeting, The IGAD
Chiefs of Defence Staff/Forces established a joint technical assessment team, which visited South
Sudan from 3 to 10 November to assess the security situation, with a view to reviewing the regional protection force mandate. On 22 November, the assessment team presented its report to the IGAD Chiefs of Defence Staff/Forces, who decided to formalize its recommendation to integrate forces from Djibouti, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda into the UNMISS regional protection force.
The deployment of the RPF first received the endorsement of the AU Assembly during the July 2016 summit. In its decision on South Sudan, the Assembly
endorsed ‘the communique of the Summit meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the IGAD‐Plus, in particular with respect to the reinforcement of UNMISS as proposed by the UN Secretary‐General and the call to the UN Security Council to extend the Mission of UNMISS with a revised mandate, including the deployment of a regional protection force to separate the warring parties, protect major installations and civilian population and demilitarize Juba’.
This was followed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2304, which extended the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) authorizing the expansion of the mission with deployment of a 4,000‐strong RPF. The mandate of the RPF under Resolution 2304 was to ‘facilitate the conditions for safe and free movement into, out of, and around Juba’; ‘protect the airport to ensure the airport remains operational, and protect key facilities in Juba;’ and ‘Promptly and effectively engage any actor that is credibly found to be preparing attacks, or engages in attacks, against United Nations protection of civilians sites, other United Nations premises, United Nations personnel, international and national humanitarian actors, or civilians.’ Over two years since the adoption of Resolution 2304, only a total of 2,226 troops making up the RPF have thus far been deployed, according to a report of the Secretary General of the UN submitted to the UNSC early this month.
Resistance from the government of South Sudan was one of the major factors that slowed down the deployment of the RPF. At the time of the adoption of Resolution 2304 the representative of South Sudan to the UN stated the Government’s rejection of the resolution. One of the major points of contention
between the Government and UN was over the deployment of the RPF to protect Juba airport. At present, South Sudan’s government is more receptive of the planned deployment of the troops from new contributors as part of RPF. After the visit from the Cheifs of Defense Staff/Forces of IGAD countries last month, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs informed reporters that the government has cleared the regional protection force for deployment in Juba. The meeting is also expected to reflect on the implementation of the R‐ARCSS, that the South Sudanese conflict parties and other political forces signed on 12 September and since then. Of particular current importance for the session is the report on the attacks against the members of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) by South Sudanese troops. A press release of the CTSAMVM that came out on 19 December condemned in the strongest terms what it called ‘appalling attack on its Monitoring and Verification Team in the Luri Area’ involving assault and illegal detention of senior ranking male and female officers by South Sudanese security forces.
It is not clear in what ways such major breach would inform the mandate of the RPF but ensuring the protection of the CTSAMVM is key for the effective implementation of the Revitalized Agreement. The outcome of today’s session of the PSC offers IGAD the foundation for requesting the consideration and adoption of the review of the mandate and composition of the RPF within the framework of UNMISS.
In terms of the review of the mandate the newly restructured RPF will be tasked with the protection of the opposition leaders once they return to the country to take part in the transitional government. It is also expected that the review of the mandate of the RPF to allow Djibouti, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda to serve as guarantors of the Revitalized Agreement to contribute forces and will enable the full deployment of the force into UNMISS.
Briefing on APRM Reports
Amani Africa
Date | 19 December, 2018
Tomorrow (19 December) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) is scheduled to hold a briefing on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Reports. This session is organized on the request of the APRM secretariat and it is anticipated that a representative of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons will present the country review reports.
Initiated as a self-monitoring mechanism to which AU member states accede voluntarily, the APRM is a unique mechanism that produces reports of volunteering states based on agreed standards and processes involving self-appraisal and peer review. The reports present assessment of the performance of the state under review in four thematic areas: political and democratic governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic governance.
The number of member states that have subscribed to the APRM has now reached 38. The background note indicates that as at January 2018 twenty-three (23) of the 38 volunteering states have completed the first peer review process, while two (2) countries, namely Kenya and Uganda, have completed their first and second reviews.
The session is organized in accordance with a provision stipulated in the APRM Base Document of 2003 that mandates the APRM to present country review reports to the PSC. Most notably, Paragraph 25 of the APRM Base Document states that ‘six months after a report has been considered by the Heads of State and Government of the participating member countries, it should be formally and publicly tabled in key regional and sub-regional structures such as … the Peace and Security Council…’
Additionally, the presentation is also informed by the findings of the Progress Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Institutional Reform of the AU. The Report, among others, noted the lack of utilization of the potential of the APRM to enable relevant AU organs to react in a timely manner in the area of conflict prevention, notably through APRM briefings to the AU PSC and the need for improving complementarity between the APRM and peace and security.
The experience of the APRM in implementing paragraph 25 of the Base Document indicates that the APRM has thus far established a practice of presenting country review reports before the Pan-African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
While there have been various occasions in which the PSC held sessions on governance issues, this is the first time for the APRM to come to the PSC for presenting reports of member states. From the perspective of the APRM the presentation of the reports can serve as mechanism for encouraging implementation of the recommendations of the reports.
This session is an initiative that stands to further deepen the synergy between the governance structures of the AU and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly at its 30th Ordinary Session held in January 2018 acknowledged in Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.686(XXX) the role that the APRM stands to play as an early warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent furthering the synergy between the APRM, the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Admittedly, given the multiplicity of governance processes within the AU, this initiative also gives rise to questions of duplication as well.
As indicated in the background note, the presentation of the review reports is expected to contribute to the realization of the role of the PSC, under Article 3(b) of the Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC, in the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. Although the link between internal governance and regional peace and security is acknowledged in the PSC Protocol, the background note underscores the importance of AU member states ‘critically acknowled(ging) the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on the promotion of peace, security and stability as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development’.
Research reports indicate that some of the APRM reports have indeed highlighted risks of crisis in countries under review and these risks subsequently materialized. A case in point that the researches highlight is the Kenya APRM Report, which warned against ethnic violence in 2006. However, the potential of the early warning role of the reports depends on the quality of the reports.
While the presentation of the APRM reports can innovatively be used for effectively operationalizing the early warning and response responsibility of the PSC under Article 3(b) of the PSC Protocol, whether or not such early warning can be acted upon for taking preventive action is incumbent on the PSC. The role that the APRM presentation of country review reports plays in effectively activating this responsibility of the PSC depends on whether as part of the presentation of the report the APRM offers the PSC practical options on how best the PSC can follow up the PSC relevant issues highlighted in the reports. From the perspective of the work of the PSC, instead of presenting the whole APRM report what would be useful is to draw the attention of the PSC to those issues pertaining to its mandate.
Tomorrow’s session being the first meeting of the PSC on APRM reports, which reports and how they are presented and the methodology for how the PSC deliberates on and follows up on the country review reports has as yet to be clarified. It is not clear, for example, whether the PSC will adopt a statement or communiqué highlighting the specific issues raised in the APRM reports presented and requesting each of the countries concerned to take necessary measures for addressing the issues. Perhaps, this would be one of the issues that can also be elaborated as part of the revision of the working methods of the PSC.
The expected result of the briefing is a communiqué. It is anticipated that the communiqué will establish the modus operandi between the APRM and the PSC, hence establishing the presentation of APRM reports a standing agenda of the PSC. This will clarify how the APRM reports will be presented and used by the PSC as part of the continental early warning system for the PSC to timeously take action for preventing conflicts. In terms of synergy and coordination, the communiqué could also envisage the importance of institutionally feeding the reports to the Panel of the Wise (PoW) for the PoW to use the reports in implementing its mandate.
Consideration of outcome of the MSC meeting on the harmonization of ACIRC and ASF
Amani Africa
Date | 18 December, 2018
Tomorrow (19 November) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have a session for considering the summary records of the meeting of its Military Staff Committee (MSC) on the harmonization of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) within the African Standby Force (ASF).
It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 795th session decided that the MSC of the PSC convenes a meeting to ‘identify and propose ways and means of fully implementing Assembly Decisions 679 and 695 and to make appropriate recommendations, including timelines and roadmap, to guide the PSC on how to overcome the challenges facing the harmonization of the ACIRC within the ASF’. Acting on this decision, the MSC held on 5 October 2018the meeting for working on the task the PSC entrusted to it.
Although it has been introduced in 2013 as a gap filling measure for availing the AU a rapid response capability pending the full operationalization of the ASF, in the years that follow divisions emerged over the role of ACIRC and its relationship with and implications on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in general and the ASF in particular. While countries participating in ACIRC viewed it as availing the AU pragmatic capability for rapid response based on the concept of coalition of the willing organized around a lead nation, others came to view ACIRC as diverting attention from the operationalization of the ASF and carrying the risk of fragmenting or undermining the APSA framework. Some RECs/RMs, such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and EASFCOM, have in particular been critical of ACIRC both for lack of their participation in its establishment and for their exclusion in its operationalization and potential utilization. The Specialized Technical Committee on Defense, Safety and Security (STCDSS), during its seventh meeting held on 14 January 2014 in Addis Ababa, recommended that both the ACIRC and the ASF RDC concepts should be harmonized to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that the ACIRC assists in expediting the operationalization process of the RDC. In 2015, the Report of the Independent Panel of Experts’ Assessment of the African Standby Force recommended that the AU Commission ‘takes steps to harmonise and integrate the ACIRC into the ASF model, as an additional tool for further enhancing the AU’s capacity to respond rapidly to Scenario Six-type mass atrocity crimes, and that it be synchronised with the ASF’s national or stand-alone RDC (Rapid Deployment Capacity) model.’
Subsequently, the AU Assembly adopted decision 679 which called on all stakeholders to support the realization of the full operationalization of the ASF, and harmonization of the activities of ACIRC with the Framework of the ASF and enhance cooperation with all ad-hoc coalitions namely, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram terrorist group, Group of Five Sahel Joint Force and the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), and requested the Commission to submit a plan on the harmonization of ACIRC into ASF, including steps to be taken by the AU and the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention (RECs/RMs) to coordinate ad-hoc the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.’
Despite the policy decisions, the actual implementation of the harmonization of ACIRC within the ASF has faced challenging questions of political, legal and resource preconditions. Various institutional, technical, human and financial inputs have been put in place for putting ACIRC in place. An ACIRC PLANELM within the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa has been established. Politically, it remains unclear that all ACIRC participating countries are convinced that ACIRC merges into the ASF RDC. The legal issue pertains to the memorandum of understanding that the AU may need to sign with ACIRC members on the integration and use of their pledged capabilities within the ASF. It is also imperative that the harmonization addresses the question of what happens to the various technical, logistical and institutional resources, including the personnel making up the ACIRC PLANELM, currently servicing the ACIRC.
These were the issues that the 5 October meeting MSC considered with the Defense Attaché of the Congo chairing by virtue of the fact that Congo was the PSC chair of the month. Premised on the understanding that harmonization means integration of the ACIRC into the ASF, the meeting of the MSC proposed the steps to be taken and the accompanying timeline for implementing the harmonization. The steps to be taken consist broadly of a) communication by the AUC to ACIRC countries (for their contributions), AU member states (urging them to comply with Assembly decisions 679 and 695) and partners (notifying them of the merger of ACIRC and ASF), b) the legal process to be followed (in terms of review of existing legal frameworks between AU and ACIRC countries and reporting to the PSC in May 2019), the approach to the re-deployment of the assets and resources of ACIRC into the ASF, and the measures to be taken at the level of the PSOD, RECs/RMs and finally the AU Assembly.
These various steps are envisaged to run from November 2018 to February 2020 when the AU Assembly is expected to make final pronouncement. The integration of ACIRC into the ASF seems to fit the ongoing AU reform process that seeks to avoid duplication and ensure mainstreaming of efforts. Yet, some of these issues such as the proposal on integrating the human resources of the ACIRC PLANLEM into PSOD are likely to trigger discussion from the perspective of the human resource regulations of the AU.
The Defense Attaché of Congo is expected to present the summary record of the MSC meeting. The AU Peace and Security Department is also expected to make a statement. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may endorse the proposed steps with amendments with a request for the AUC to develop and implement a roadmap based on the steps and timelines set and to report periodically on progress.
Open session on international and regional initiatives in the Sahel Region
Amani Africa
Date | 17 December, 2018
Tomorrow (17 December) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to convene the only open session of the month. The session is to be held under the theme ‘International and Regional Initiatives in the Sahel Region: Promotion of Coordination and African Ownership for Peace, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development.’
The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), Pierre Buyoya is expected to brief the Council. The UN Special Advisor for the Sahel, Ibrahim Thiaw, is also expected to brief the session. Representatives of the G5 Sahel including member countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), other regional organizations notably Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African states and the European Union (EU) and individual countries with Sahel strategy are also expected to participate in the session.
As pointed out in the background note for the session, the complex crises in the Sahel have engaged the attention and interest of large number of actors. The regional and international engagement is thus characterized by the multiplicity of actors involved and proliferation of initiatives and strategies.
In the security realm, the initiatives include the UN Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the G5 Sahel Force, the AU’s political mission MISAHEL, three missions of the EU and the French regional operation Barkhane. The questions raised in the background note in respect of these initiatives include: ‘To what extent do international security initiatives, which include MINUSMA, the French Barkhane Force, as well as the different forms of support from the EU and its individual Member States, take into account the ongoing regional initiatives in the area of security? Do the coordination and consultation mechanisms put in place produce the expected results? What is the level of articulation between the efforts in the field of security in the Sahel, in general and those made for the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed in 2015, knowing that the Mali is the epicentre of the current crisis and the implementation of the Agreement is the best way to isolate armed terrorist groups?’
These questions clearly manifest concerns about duplication and tendencies of competing approaches in terms of focus and target groups and importantly about how priorities are set and by whom. There are also questions about how these various initiatives affect not only local and regional processes, notably the 2015 peace agreement of Mali and G5 Sahel, but also the operationalization of the APSA in the Sahel region. It is also to be recalled that concerns over the militarization of the Sahel region have been raised in various PSC session in the course of 2018. The briefings from Buyoya and statements from representatives of the G5 Sahel are expected to highlight these issues from the experiences in the implementation of these various security initiatives and the lessons from existing arrangements for coordination including the Ministerial Coordination Platform (MCP) for the Sahel Strategies of the countries of the region.
In the context of the discussion about the impact of diverse initiatives, an issue that deserves attention during tomorrow’s session is the state of operationalization of the G5 Sahel joint Task Force. Despite the initial plan to be fully operational in March 2018, and the second deadline of May 2018, the force still faces serious logistical, staffing, training, financial and constraints. The first two of the three military operations undertaken by the regional task force so were conducted with the support of the 4,000 French counterterrorism forces. The 29 June 2018 attack on the headquarters of the force triggering exchange of gunfire that lasted for hours raised serious questions on its autonomy, operational capacity and effectiveness.
The issues afflicting the G5 Task Force are associated with the funding of the Force. The Task Force is dependent on pledges and donations from individual countries. There are uncertainties on the long-term funding for the force, and it only received less than one fourth of the 420 million euros pledged by the international community at the fundraising event held at the start of 2018. In an attempt to address these challenges of predictability and sustainability of funding, the G5 countries and the AU have been seeking to secure a UN Chapter VII mandate and a support package akin to that offered to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) based on UN assessed contributions.
The chairman of the G5 Sahel Group of Countries, President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, previously announced that the group would pursue direct funding from the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. This is another issue expected to feature in tomorrow’s session. It is thus noted in the background note that the AU ‘continues to plead for the G5 Sahel Joint Force to operate under Chapter VII of the Charter and to receive funding from the assessed contributions of the United Nations budget.’
In the meantime, it is anticipated that, apart from updating the Council on the current political and security issues in the region and how MUNISMA’s efforts to address this issues, Thiaw would inform the PSC how MUNISMA is coordinating with and supporting the G5 Sahel Force.
The challenges facing the Sahel region are multiple and go beyond the realm of security. They cover state weakness involving poor capacity and level of control of its territory, ecological degradation, underdevelopment, and bad governance. In an attempt to address these plethora of political, climatic, developmental and security challenges, the various actors engaged in the Sahel region have adopted their own respective strategies. It is pointed out in the background note that ‘there are no less than fifteen Regional and International strategies and initiatives in support of the Sahel Region.’
One study undertaken in 2015 identified 14 major multilateral strategies and several other regional and individual country strategies and initiatives. Clearly, the Sahelian strategic landscape has become crowded. While the strategies converge in terms of the issues they seek to address and their objectives, they also differ in terms of geographical scope of application, focus areas and financing regimes. Thiaw is expected to update the PSC on the implementation of the UN strategy and how it interfaces with the regional strategies and efforts.
These numerous strategies by various actors with differing expertise and mandate raise questions similar to those relating to the security sphere noted above. One platform tracking strategies in the Sahel region pointed out the large number of strategies raise ‘questions about their relevance, their consideration for each other and their usefulness’. It is also noted in the background note for tomorrow’s session that the ‘concern about coordination also led some development partners such as Germany, France, the World Bank, the European Union, and others to establish the “Sahel Alliance” to support, particularly, the G5 Sahel, with a view to promoting coherence and pooling of resources.’
After several years of implementation, the fundamental question is whether the large number of strategies is making a difference in the conditions in the Sahel. The socio-economic, governance, security and humanitarian conditions of the region remain dire. These conditions are characterized by the presence of armed terrorist groups and allied networks of increasingly militarized transnational organised crime involving traffickers and smugglers, covering the Central part of Mali, Northern and the North East of Burkina Faso and the border between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It is to be recalled that on 2 July 2018 on the sidelines of the AU summit in Nouakchott, Mauritania, the Presidents of the member states of the G5 Sahel and the President of France held a meeting. It was agreed that the G5 Sahel would seek Chapter VII authorization for the G5 Sahel military operation from the UN Security Council. As a follow up to that meeting earlier this month on 6 December, a coordination conference of G5 Sahel partners and funders for the financing of the Priority Investment Program (PIP) of the Sahel region was held in Nouakchott. Developed as part of the G5 Sahel development and security strategy adopted by the leaders of the member states in 2016, the PIP is a three- year (2019-2021) program with a reported portfolio of 40 projects and with a budget of Euro 1.9 billion.
The background note indicates that the session has two objectives. These are a) to identify and evaluate the initiatives taken so far to ensure effective coordination of peace and Post-conflict Reconstruction Strategies in the Sahel Region and b) to explore, on the basis of this assessment, ways and means of improving the articulation of initiatives and strategies for the Sahel, founded on a division of labour, based on the comparative advantages of the actors. The expected outcome is a communiqué.
In the light of the issues highlighted above, various approaches may be taken for meeting the objectives of the open session. In terms of coordination, one approach could be to focus on reinvigorating the Ministerial Coordination Platform (MCP) for the Sahel Strategies with appropriately structured mechanism and measures, and working in concert with the ‘Sahel Alliance’, for ensuring a coordinated delivery on the priorities that the countries of the region, in collaboration with partners, have set.
Given the governance and development focus of the PIP, an approach related to the above could be to align the focus and resources of the various strategies around the PIP, with different actors taking responsibility for the areas on which they have comparative advantages.
In terms of addressing pressing concerns particularly in the security realm, one approach to realize the objectives of the session is to focus on how effectively the various actors and strategies can be mobilized a) for achieving the implementation of the 2015 peace agreement of Mali and b) for addressing the challenges facing the full operationalization of the G5 Sahel Task Force and its alignment with governance and development imperatives.
Another outcome area of the session is to contribute to the decision of the PSC’s 782nd meeting at ministerial level held in Nouakchott. That meeting requested the AU Commission to take the necessary measures to facilitate the review of the AU Sahel Strategy with a view to not only adapting it to the new political, institutional and security context of the Region, but also strengthening the coordination and cooperation between the various actors in the Sahel.
Briefing on the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
Amani Africa
Date | 5 December, 2018
Tomorrow (5 December) the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) will receive the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and on the renewal of the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The PSD is expected to make a statement introducing the report. The representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and representative of the troop contributing countries (TCC) of the MNJTF Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin are expected to participate.
The session will examine the security situation and operational capabilities and future mandates of the task force, which the PSC has described at its 702nd meeting held on 19 July 2017 as ‘a reference model of multinational cooperation that could serve positively other regions in Africa and beyond to address similar security challenges’. The session also presents an opportunity for the PSC to be updated about the regional strategy for the stabilization, recovery and resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin region jointly developed by the AU and the LCBC.
There have been significant developments in the situation in the Boko Haram affected areas since the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF at its 738th meeting held on 7 December 2017. The briefing is happening against the backdrop of rise in Boko Haram attempts at orchestrating attacks.
The past years saw significant reduction in the capabilities and territorial scope of Boko Haram operations following series of coordinated military campaigns by the MNJTF and the security forces of the individual members of the LCBC. The campaigns degraded the military capacity of the group, weakened its economic and recruitment base and pushed it out from its strongholds. Boko Haram was forced to abandon its seizure of territories.
Yet, as the Chairperson’s report notes Boko Haram remains a serious threat. Operating in a decentralized arrangement based on semi- autonomous groups, it has resorted to relying heavily on asymmetric guerilla and suicide attacks on isolated locations, soft civilian targets like markets, religious spaces and public gatherings.
Additionally, over the past months an upward trend in the activity of the terrorist group has been observed. There were more than 17 attempts by the group to overrun army bases since July 2018, and on 29 November 2018, the Nigerian army announced recent attacks by the Boko Haram killed 39 soldiers in northeast Nigeria. According to the statement of the Nigerian army reased use of drones ‘in the last two to three months, we have noticed daring moves by the terrorists, (involving) increased use of drones against our defensive positions and infusion of foreign fighters in their ranks.’
These dangerous developments prompted President Muhammadu Buhari, Chairperson of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), to convene meeting of the LCBC on 29 November at the headquarters of the LCBC in N’djamena, Chad. The meeting examined measures to enhance the capacity of the MNJTF to address the recent setbacks, and permanently neutralize the notorious group.
The report will also examine the progress made in the implementation of the Renewed Support Implementation Agreement (SIA) and the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU Commission and the MNJTF TCCs for streamlining the AU additional support to MNJTF and the renewed Concept of Operations (CONOPs). At it’s meeting on 7 December 2017, the PSC requested the commission to assist the MJNTF to fill its capability gaps. Tomorrow’s meeting will provide update on the efforts of the AUC to support the MNJTF in filling some of the gaps in its capabilities. In this respect, attention would be drawn to the delivery of various materials including level III medical services and financial contribution for implementing quick impact projects. Other challenges include the use and implementation of effective strategy for promoting surrender of Boko Haram fighters and for the handling of surrendered and/or captured Boko Haram fighters.
In the light of the rise in the threat from Boko Haram activities and as a follow up to the LCBC summit, tomorrow’s session will review the challenges facing the MNJTF. In this respect, the persisting gaps in the capability of the MNJTF as highlighted in the Chairperson’s report will receive particular attention. These gaps include lack of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) equipment, lack of effective and robust communication strategy, and lack of more robust maritime capabilities to enhance MNJTF mobile operations in and around the Lake Chad.
Although not the main focus of the report, reference is made to the dire humanitarian situation in Boko Haram affected areas. As noted in the report, over 20 million people in the affected areas are exposed to acute need of humanitarian assistance. Of these 2.4 million people consisting of IDPs, refugees and returnees, all with about 490,000 children, are under threat of severe malnutrition. Continued attacks by the terrorist group have resulted in additional displacements, further exacerbating an already dire situation.
Also of note is the impact of the terrorist group Boko Haram on women and girls. They have been disproportionately affected having been been used as suicide bombers, subjected to forced marriage and sexually exploited among the 2.4 displaced persons. After they freed or escaping from Boko Haram, returnees often face stigmatisation.
The issue of the Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) efforts in the areas affected by and liberated from the Boko Haram will be one of the top issues in tomorrow’s briefing. Restoring the security, livelihood and social fabric of the millions displaced by the activities of Boko Haram and the campaigns against it will need huge resources and political commitment from the countries of the region and the international community. With the AU led Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, which was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the LCBC on 30 August 2018, the session can use the Strategy as a useful framework for disbursing the 672 million dollars pledged by donors for emergency assistance and reconstruction at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region held almost two years ago.
The expected outcome of the briefing is a communiqué. Apart from renewing the mandate of the MNJTF for a period of 12 months effective 31 January 2019, the communiqué may call for the mobilization of all recovery and reconstruction efforts to be mobilized within the framework of the same strategy as has been adopted by the members of the LCBC. It could also address the need for developing workable approach to address the existing gaps in the capability of and in the pursuit of legally sound strategy by the MNJTF including in terms of the handling of surrendered or captured Boko Haram. With respect to the humanitarian situation, the PSC could also consider establishing an expert group that can propose ways and means of effectively operationalizing its mandate in respect to humanitarian action with particular attention to the situation in Boko Haram affected areas.