Consideration of the Fact Finding Mission on Chad
Amani Africa
Date | 10 May, 2021
Tomorrow (10 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 994th session to consider the findings of the Fact- finding Mission on Chad.
This first session of the month is set to begin with the opening remark of the PSC Chairperson for May, Algeria’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Salah Francis Elhamdi. The AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, who co-led the delegation of the Fact-finding Mission, is expected to present on the findings of the Mission. Similarly, Djibouti’s Permanent Representative to the AU, Mohammed Idriss Farah, Chairperson of the PSC for April who co-led the mission is also scheduled to present on the mission. It is also envisaged that the representative of Chad, as the country concerned, will make a statement.
Tomorrow’s session is a follow up to the emergency session on Chad the PSC had at its 993rd meeting held on 22 April 2021. In that meeting, the Council requested the AU Commission to send a ‘high- powered Fact-Finding Mission to Chad’. It is to be recalled that the emergency session was convened after the military announced seizure of power after the death of the late President Idriss Deby Itno on 20 April, reportedly from the wounds sustained while battling rebel groups. A Transitional Military Council, established under the leadership of Deby’s son, Mahamat Idriss Deby, suspended the Constitution and dissolved the national Assembly. The military takeover took place in clear contravention to the terms of Chad’s Constitution which provides that in the event of vacation of power, the president of the National Assembly should be appointed as interim president and lead the country to elections within 90 days.
As highlighted in our previous ‘Insight on the PSC’ for the emergency session on Chad at its 993rd session, practice of the PSC takes two approaches during unconstitutional change of government. The first is the automatic application of the Lomé Declaration and article 7(1) (g) of the PSC Protocol, resulting in the immediate suspension of the country from AU activities. Since coming into operation in March 2004 and until its 993rd session on Chad, the PSC invoked its Article 7(1)(g) power in fifteen (15) instances.1 In all the 15 instances except that of Cote d’Ivoire in December 2010, the PSC designated each instance as constituting ‘coup d’état’ or ‘unconstitutional change of government’. The PSC also condemned or rejected the ‘coup d’état’ or ‘unconstitutional change ofgovernment’ in each instance. Additionally, with the exception of three cases,2 in all other twelve (12) cases the PSC applied the Lomé Declaration’s stipulation for automatic suspension of the country concerned, with the PSC, in some cases, such as its 384th session, stating that AU instruments ‘provide for automatic implementation of specific measures whenever unconstitutional change of government occurs.’
The forcible seizure of power by the military in Chad is the first case in which the PSC failed to name the act as a coup d’état and condemn or reject it. This is in stark departure from both the clear terms of AU normative instruments including the Lomé Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007) and the practice it has set over the years, at least in two major ways. On one hand, the Council stopped short of characterizing the military takeover in Chad as ‘unconstitutional change of government’ or a ‘coup d’état’. On the other hand, the Council neither suspended Chad from AU activities pursuant to its Protocol and the Lomé Declaration nor did it follow the Burkina Faso and Sudan approach that gave 15 days ultimatum for the military to transfer power to a civilian authority.
The PSC decided to task the AU Commission to dispatch ‘a high-powered Fact-Finding Mission’, with the participation of the PSC, to engage with the Chadian authorities on all issues relating to the situation there, particularly to support the investigation into the killing of the late President and ascertain the efforts to restore constitutionalism, and report back to the Council within two weeks. In pursuit of this, the Fact-finding Mission, led by the AU Commissioner for PAPS, along with the PSC Chairperson for the month of April (Permanent Representative of Djibouti), was deployed to Chad from 29 April to 06 May 2021. The delegation involved the participation of the representatives of five PSC member states from the five regions of the continent (Cameroon from Central, Djibouti from East, Egypt from the North, Ghana from West and Lesotho from Southern). The DRC in its capacity as Chairperson of the Union, and an officer of the AU Legal Counsel were also part of the delegation.
According to a statement released by AU Commission on 29 April, the Fact-Finding Mission would engage with Chadian authorities and stakeholders mainly to ‘get first-hand information’ on the unfolding political and security situation as well as explore ways to facilitate ‘a swift return to constitutional order’, while at the same time preserving security and territorial integrity of that country. The mission held meetings with a wide range of actors including the President of the Military Council, Head of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, religious leaders of Chad, President of the Supreme Court of Chad and President of the Assembly of Chad. The delegation of the mission also received a briefing from the AU Commission Chairperson in N’Djamena.
One consideration that seems to carry tremendous weight within the PSC as reflected in its communique of the 993rd session is the security context in Chad and its neighbourhood. Some of the developments that merit attention during tomorrow’s session include the intense political climate after a deadly protest broke out in the two largest cities (N’Djamena and Moundou), demanding a return to constitutional order. According to media reports, military crackdown left six people dead and some 700 people arrested. Also of concern is the fight with rebel group, the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, otherwise known by its French acronym as FACT, in northern part of the country, some 300Kms north of the capital. This is despite the rebel’s overtures for a ceasefire and dialogue. The military council ruled out any possibility to sit down with the rebels for negotiation nor mediation, but vowed to bring them to justice. Another consideration for PSC members is the fact that Chad is a key player as a major military actor in the efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism in both the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions.
Of course, these concerns about security and stability are not completely unique to Chad. These are threats that Chad shares with its two neighboring countries, Sudan and Mali, that also experienced military seizure of power in similar context. Indeed, experience shows that overemphasizing the security dimension leads to risk of the military considering it as a license to justify seizure of power in complete disregard of the constitutional process of the country concerned. While security represents a significant consideration, the experience of Mali and Sudan also shows that it cannot dispense with the need for upholding constitutional order and the application of the AU norm on unconstitutional changes of government.
In terms of the task of the Fact-finding Mission for ‘ascertaining’ and ‘facilitating’ swift return to constitutional order, the shape that the transitional process has taken shows no indication of a handing over of power to civilian authority. Instead, indications are that the Military Council is going to stay around. The Military Council, without any meaningful engagement with other stakeholders, adopted a Transitional Charter, indicating the continuation of the suspension of the Constitution of the country. This Charter invests supreme authority in the Military Council, with the Chairman of the Military Council holding enormous power including the appointment of both the Transitional Government headed by the Prime Minister and the members of National Transitional Council. It is to be recalled that the PSC has already expressed its ‘grave concern’ over the military takeover and urged the handing over of political power to civilian authorities in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Constitution of Chad, at its 993rd session.
The Military Council named a government comprising 40 ministers and deputy ministers where oppositions are given some portfolios. For instance, the former Prime Minister turned an opposition and a presidential runner-up in the latest election, Albert Pahimi Padacke, has been appointed to head the transitional government as an interim Prime Minister. The newly created Ministry of Reconciliation and Dialogue as well as the Justice Ministry are also portfolios handed to the opposition. While some of this move received positive response from some oppositions including the longtime opposition figure Saleh Kebzabo, the fact remains that under the Transitional Charter, ultimate power is held by the Military Council. Thus, these measures that the Military Council took represent no progress towards return to civilian rule within the framework of Chadian Constitution as stipulated in the communiqué of PSC’s 993rd meeting.
The other issue on which the Fact-finding Mission is expected to update the PSC is the investigations around the circumstances of the death of the late President Deby.
The expected outcome is a communique. On the issue of the transfer of power to civilian authorities as per the terms of PSC’s 993rd meeting, the PSC may follow one of the two options. The first is to endorse the Military Council’s plan for the transition. This would be a direct violation of the AU instruments including the PSC’s Protocol and bring to an end AU’s policy of zero tolerance to military coups. The other option is to apply, as it did for Mali in August 2020, the AU instruments, declare the military council’s action a military coup, suspend Chad from participation in the AU activities and set out clear terms for Military Council’s handover of power to civilian transitional authority with the participation of various Chadian stakeholders for lifting suspension. The Council is expected to reiterate its deep concern about the increasing spate of violence and rebellion and the attendant heightened insecurity and the increasing operational tempo of rebels, foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries, as well as the proliferation of illicit weapons, as consequences of, among others, the conflict in Libya. The PSC is also expected to express concern about the challenges facing Chad’s security and stability and the necessity of forestalling the transitional process from leading to the destabilization of the country, and the weakening of its role in the fight against terrorism in the region. In this respect, the PSC, as it did in previous instances relating to Chad, may also express its rejection of the attempt of the rebel groups for taking power by force and call for peaceful means for resolving the fighting with rebel groups. The Council is also likely to express its regrets over the incidents of violence on protesters and call on all parties to show utmost restraint and the de facto authorities to respect human rights as enshrined in different regional and international human rights instruments.
1Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005), Mauritania (2008), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Niger (2010), Cote d’Ivoire (2010), Mali (2012), Guinea Bissau (2012), Central African Republic (2013), Egypt (2013), Burkina Faso (2014), Burkina Faso (2015), Sudan (2019) and Mali (2020).
2The first instance in which the PSC did not activate automatic suspension after declaring the occurrence of a coup d’état or unconstitutional change of government was at its 164th session held on 24 December 2008 relating to Guinea. But this lasted only for five days. Thus, at its 165th session held on 29 December 2008, after the visit of the AU Commission Chairperson to the country on 26 December, the PSC suspended Guinea from participation in AU activities. The other instances are the cases of Burkina Faso in November 2014 and Sudan in April 2019 where the PSC set a 15-day deadline for transfer of power after declaring the seizure of power by the military a coup d’état and condemning it.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - May 2021
Amani Africa
Date | May 2021
In May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Algeria. Out of the nine sessions that were convened throughout the month, three were held at ministerial level while the remaining took place at ambassadorial level.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - May 2021
Amani Africa
Date | May 2021
In May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Algeria. Out of the nine sessions that were convened throughout the month, three were held at ministerial level while the remaining took place at ambassadorial level.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - May 2021
Amani Africa
Date | May 2021
In May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Algeria. Out of the nine sessions that were convened throughout the month, three were held at ministerial level while the remaining took place at ambassadorial level.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - May 2021
Amani Africa
Date | May 2021
In May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Algeria. Out of the nine sessions that were convened throughout the month, three were held at ministerial level while the remaining took place at ambassadorial level.
Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - May 2021
Amani Africa
Date | May 2021
In May, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) was chaired by Algeria. Out of the nine sessions that were convened throughout the month, three were held at ministerial level while the remaining took place at ambassadorial level.
Provisional Programme of Work of the PSC for the Month of May 2021
Amani Africa
Date | May 2021
The Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council for May will be Algeria. The program of work of the PSC for the month shows that the PSC is scheduled to have five substantive sessions. Out of three country/region specific sessions planned for the month, two will be convened at the ministerial level. There is one session covering two agenda items, namely mandate renewal and the annual thematic session on protection of children in conflict situations. The fifth session will be at a ministerial level with a focus on access to COVID19 vaccine in Africa. Although no specific date is assigned, PSC may also convene a session on the situation on Chad as a follow up to the decision of its 993rd session.
PSC is also scheduled to have an anniversary session on the occasion of reaching the convening of its 1000th session. The PSC retreat initially proposed for February is now scheduled to take place at the end of the month as the last activity of the PSC for May.
On 6 May, the main agenda item focuses on AU’s role on the fight against terrorism in Mozambique. The recurrence, scale and geographic spread of terrorist attacks have alarmingly expanded in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado. The most dramatic deadly incident took place in late March when armed terrorists attacked the town of Palma, which led to displacement of more than 40,000 people. Civilians bear much of the brunt of the atrocious attacks, with displacement nearing the 1 million mark. In a statement issued on 31 March, the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, expressing utmost concern about the situation, called for urgent and coordinated regional and international action. PSC’s session serves as an initiative for enabling the AU to play a more active part. The second agenda item focuses on preparation for the retreat of the PSC planned to take place at the end of the month.
The next session, scheduled to take place on 11 May, has two substantive agenda items. The first one will be on the protection of children in conflict situations in Africa, which is one of the annual standing thematic agenda items of the PSC that is usually convened in May. Among the increasingly concerning trends in the continent, one is the illicit trafficking of children, particularly in post- conflict settings and in countries with fragile and weak security apparatus. Another major concern that may be addressed by the PSC is the continued abduction of children and their use either for fighting or for sexual slavery by extremist groups such as Boko Haram. As repeatedly emphasised by various humanitarian agencies, targeting of schools in armed conflicts in contravention of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also remains to be a worrying trend in Africa. Another issue expected to receive PSC’s attention during this session is the situation of refugee children and the protection needs of such children.
The second agenda item of the session will be PSC’s consideration of AMISOM’s mandate renewal. During this session, the PSC is expected to discuss the future of AMISOM, including its financing having regard to the political crisis in Somalia and the ensuing heightened threat for Al Shabaab’s expansion. The PSC will also receive update on the revised Concept of Operations and AU’s independent assessment. It is to be recalled that on 12 March 2021, the UNSC reauthorized AMISOM until 31 December 2021, through the unanimous adoption of Resolution 2568 (2021), maintaining AMISOM’s overall 19,626 uniformed personnel level, which is in accord with the PSC’s request at its 978th session for the UNSC not to change the current troop ceiling of the mission. This has become even more important following the current political instability and ensuing insecurity in the country, as well as the continued threat posed by Al- Shabaab.
On 13 May, the PSC will consider and adopt programme of work for June via email exchange.
Although no session is planned to discuss the theme, the PSC is also expected to issue a Press Statement on the commemoration of the “Day of Living Together in Peace”, which is celebrated on 16 May of each year.
On 18 May, Council will convene its second country specific session focusing on Libya, which is envisaged to be the first ministerial level session of the month. While a Permanent Ceasefire Agreement signed on 23 October 2020 between the conflicting parties brought some hope for the resolution of the Libyan conflict, foreign military backing, illicit export of petroleum and the presence of foreign terrorist fighters are still challenging the successful implementation of the agreement and hindering an effective resolution to the conflict. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has also recently expressed concern over the halt in oil production at the National Oil Corporation’s (NOC) eastern facility, which could further destabilise the country. The PSC may reflect on these major outstanding issues and how the AU could play a more substantive role in supporting the implementation of the peace agreement and the preparation for elections.
On 22 May, the PSC is scheduled to convene a ministerial session on Africa’s access to vaccines against the COVID19 pandemic as a human security issue. Thus far, Africa only accessed 2% of COVID19 vaccine and remains to be the continent least vaccinated. The current approach to the production and distribution of the COVID19 vaccine is one in which a handful of pharmaceutical companies decide the amount of vaccines produced, the countries for which those vaccines are sold and the price at which the vaccines are sold for different countries, leading to what President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa called vaccine apartheid, which entails grave consequences to human security in Africa in particular. It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly adopted a decision during its 34th ordinary session held in February 2021 calling for the temporary waiver of patents relating to COVID19 vaccines to enable the generic production of the vaccine for equitable access by all. PSC’s ministerial session serves as an opportunity for following up on this decision and on other avenues for the manufacturing of COVID19 vaccines on the continent.
PSC’s third ministerial level session of the month is expected to take place on 24 May, focusing on the situation in Mali. Since the formation of the Malian Transitional Government which was welcomed at PSC’s 954th session, some progresses have been noted such as the establishment of the National Transitional Council (which serves as the interim parliament) and the holding of a meeting on 11 February 2021, by the Monitoring Committee of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which brought together Malian ministers, leaders of armed groups signatory to the 2015 Agreement and international mediators. The Transitional Government’s announcement that it will honour its promise to hold the presidential and legislative elections by determining a specific timeline (27 February 2022) has also been a commendable step. Regardless of such progress in the political situation, Mali’s security and stability is still seriously impeded as a result of the continued terrorist attacks, including the recent attack on MINUSMA’s base that killed four peacekeepers.
On 25 May, which marks the 17-year anniversary of the official launch of the PSC, the Council is scheduled to mark the convening of its 1000th meeting. Expected to take place partially in person, the session will discuss the activities of the PSC since its establishment with high- level speakers including from heads of state and government expected to deliver statements. It is an occasion for taking stock of the 17 years journey of the PSC and reflect on progress achieved and challenges facing the PSC.
The retreat planned to take place from 27 to 29 May will be the last activity that Council will undertake during the month. This presents an opportunity for the PSC to, among others, review working methods issues that have emerged during the past year. These include rotation of the monthly chairperson of the PSC as it relates, among others, to implementation of Article 5 of the PSC protocol and the convening of virtual sessions of the PSC.
Discussion on the AU Human Rights Observers and Military Experts to the Republic of Burundi
Amani Africa
Date | 27 April, 2021
Tomorrow (27 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 994th session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Human Rights Observers (HROs) and Military Experts (MEs) mission deployed to the Republic of Burundi and decide on the future of AU’s HROs and MEs in Burundi.
The PSC Chairperson of the month, Djibouti’s Permanent Representative, Mohammed Idriss Farah, is expected to make opening remark. The report of the Chairperson is expected to be introduced by AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye or his representative. The representative of Burundi will also make statement as the country concerned, pursuant to the PSC practice.
Since 2018, the PSC noted ‘the relative peace and stability in Burundi’. The communiqué of the 794th session of the PSC signaled the drawdown of AU’s operation involving Human Rights Observers and Military Experts when deciding to reduce the number of HROs and MEs and extend their mandate ‘bearing in mind the relative peace and stability prevailing in the country’. It is also worth recalling that the AU Assembly, at its 31st Ordinary session held from 1 to 2 July 2018 in Nouakchott, Mauritania, requested the Commission to ‘accompany Burundi during this phase’ as the country nears its 2020 national elections and contribute its part in strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the country.
Last time the Council discussed the situation in Burundi was during its 808th session convened on 19 November 2018. In that session, while recognizing the ‘relative stability’ that reigned in the country, the Council also requested the AU Commission to continue its engagement with the government with the view to support AU initiatives, notably its mission involving HROs and MEs.
Since then, one of the major milestones for Burundi, the 2020 elections, was concluded. The country held its elections in a context in which the incumbent, President Nkurinziza, honored the commitment not to run during the 2020 presidential elections. It is against this backdrop that tomorrow’s session of the PSC will consider the AUC Chairperson’s report on the HROs and MEs deployed in Burundi and decide on their future.
The HROs and MEs were deployed in July 2015 in line with PSC decision, at its 515th session held on 13 June 2015 at the level of Heads of State and Government. This was the first time that the PSC used the deployment of such kind of instruments as part of its efforts to prevent escalation of violence and facilitate the resolution of unfolding crisis in the country. As set out in the PSC decision, the HROs were mandated to monitor the human rights situation on the ground and report on the possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, whereas the mandate of the MEs was to support and verify the disarmament of militias and other armed groups.
The first deployment of the mission took place in July 2015 with the dispatch of an advance team consisting of only two HROs. Several HROs and MEs were then deployed in different batch, reaching its maximum strength in July 2016 with the dispatch of the final batch that brought the total number of the HROs to 45 and the MEs to 26. This was despite the initial plan to deploy 100 HROs and 100 MEs, with police component, by March 2017. A combination of lack of funds and recognition of the relative improvement of the situation in the country meant that the number of the HROs and MEs has continued to decrease staring in 2017, with only ten HROs left by the end of 2018. Currently, the number of HROs and MEs stands at eight and two, respectively.
As highlighted in the Report, the deployment was managed in two phases. In the first Phase (July 2015- August 2018), the activities of the mission focused on Human Rights monitoring, awareness creation and sensitization and advocacy. During this phase, 867 violations and infringements on the right to life; 882 violations and infringements on the right to physical integrity; 294 cases of torture and mistreatment; 230 rapes; 888 arbitrary arrests; 1243 illegal detentions; 169 violations of the right to freedom of expression and association; and 209 violations of the right to freedom of movement were reported. Beyond its contribution in limiting the escalation of the situation in Burundi, the engagement of the HROs registered some gains such as the release of 258 arbitrarily detained persons and supporting efforts at monitoring and reporting human rights violations as part of improving the human rights situation.
The second phase of the mission is characterized by the draw-down of the mission, accompanied by a shift of engagement focusing largely on capacity building, though its mandate remains unchanged. In this phase, several training programs were convened for key judicial and non-judicial actors, law enforcement agents and civil society organizations, with the primary aim of strengthening the technical capacity of those working in the human rights sector.
In respect of the Military Experts, the report of the Chairperson indicates that their activities have been much limited as they have not been given ‘free access to exchange with local military personnel’. As highlighted in the report, the government has been less receptive of the military component of the mission, which constrained the MEs from discharging their mandate fully. Despite these challenges, the Experts managed to conduct several visits of provinces over the course of 2019 and 2020. The Experts reported range of security related incidents in this period including armed invasion from neighboring border countries; homicide by unidentified gunmen targeting members of political parties and business individuals; grenade attacks; armed robberies; kidnappings; and violence between party militants.
According to the report of the Chairperson, 53 fact- finding missions were conducted; some 300 field trips were undertaken; and 623 advocacy activities were carried out resulting in the release of 623 detainees. The PSC is expected to take note of the achievements the mission registered under very difficult operating environment.
A major challenge for the operation of the HROs and MEs was the lack of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Burundi. Despite repeated calls and expectations from the AU, Burundi did not sign the MoU. In the absence of this key instrument that outlines rights and duties of respective parties, the mission was forced to operate under a shaky legal ground. Indeed, this is identified as one of the issues from which lessons should be learned for purposes of similar future missions.
Despite the severe limitations that the lack of MoU has put on the operation of the HROs and MEs, the Burundi government did not actively impede their presence and activities. To the contrary, it facilitated their operation including the issuance of visas, diplomatic plate numbers, as well as approval of their work plan and field missions, etc. This has enabled them to carry out various activities. Building relationships with local authorities and collaboration from international organisations such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have also been found valuable in helping the HROs and MEs navigate their constrained context.
Currently, the most pressing challenge remains the way forward, as captured in the report of the Chairperson. It is to be recalled that the PSC extended the mandate of the mission ‘until further notice’, at its 797th session held at ministerial level on 24 September 2018. The report does not see room for the continued presence of the mission with its current mandates as the conditions that led to the deployment of the mission ‘are no longer prevailing.’ Indeed, Burundi no longer experiences the level of insecurity and violence that was prevalent for during the first phase of the deployment of the HROs and MEs. While there remain important human rights issues, it is not at the scale that necessitated the deployment of the HROs. It is to be recalled that United Nations (UN) Security Council removed Burundi from its agenda in December 2020.
For tomorrow’s session, the main issue in deciding the next steps rightly highlighted in the Chairperson’s report is the role that the AU could play in supporting post conflict reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Burundi, including implementation of transitional justice processes. This includes additionally, as noted in the report, the need for supporting the establishment, through the National Human Rights Institutions and the Ministry of Justice, of centers for supporting victims of human rights violations.
The expected outcome is communique. The PSC may take note with appreciation the significant improvements that Burundi is able to achieve in consolidating peace and stability. The Council is also likely to commend the Human Rights Observers and Military Experts for their dedication and meaningful contribution. The Council is further expected to heed to the key recommendations made by the Chairperson of the Commission in its report. In this regard, the PSC is likely to end the mandate of the Human Rights Observers and Military Experts by 31 May 2021, taking a cue from the Report of the Chairperson and in light of the positive developments witnessed in the country. As part of a transitional justice process to strengthen post-conflict stability, the PSC may also express support for the establishment of Human Rights Victims centers to redress some of the human rights violations and respond to the needs of victims. The PSC may also express its appreciation to the AU Commission for the initiative to incorporate in the planning similar future missions the lessons from the difficulties faced in the signing of the MoU and develop a manual for the management of its field missions with the view to properly plan, organize, coordinate and lead similar future AU Missions.
