Briefing on APRM Reports
Amani Africa
Date | 18 December, 2018
Tomorrow (19 December) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) is scheduled to hold a briefing on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Reports. This session is organized on the request of the APRM secretariat and it is anticipated that a representative of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons will present the country review reports.
Initiated as a self-monitoring mechanism to which AU member states accede voluntarily, the APRM is a unique mechanism that produces reports of volunteering states based on agreed standards and processes involving self-appraisal and peer review. The reports present assessment of the performance of the state under review in four thematic areas: political and democratic governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic governance.
The number of member states that have subscribed to the APRM has now reached 38. The background note indicates that as at January 2018 twenty-three (23) of the 38 volunteering states have completed the first peer review process, while two (2) countries, namely Kenya and Uganda, have completed their first and second reviews.
The session is organized in accordance with a provision stipulated in the APRM Base Document of 2003 that mandates the APRM to present country review reports to the PSC. Most notably, Paragraph 25 of the APRM Base Document states that ‘six months after a report has been considered by the Heads of State and Government of the participating member countries, it should be formally and publicly tabled in key regional and sub-regional structures such as … the Peace and Security Council…’
Additionally, the presentation is also informed by the findings of the Progress Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Institutional Reform of the AU. The Report, among others, noted the lack of utilization of the potential of the APRM to enable relevant AU organs to react in a timely manner in the area of conflict prevention, notably through APRM briefings to the AU PSC and the need for improving complementarity between the APRM and peace and security.
The experience of the APRM in implementing paragraph 25 of the Base Document indicates that the APRM has thus far established a practice of presenting country review reports before the Pan- African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
While there have been various occasions in which the PSC held sessions on governance issues, this is the first time for the APRM to come to the PSC for presenting reports of member states. From the perspective of the APRM the presentation of the reports can serve as mechanism for encouraging implementation of the recommendations of the reports.
This session is an initiative that stands to further deepen the synergy between the governance structures of the AU and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly at its 30th Ordinary Session held in January 2018 acknowledged in Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.686(XXX) the role that the APRM stands to play as an early warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent furthering the synergy between the APRM, the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Admittedly, given the multiplicity of governance processes within the AU, this initiative also gives rise to questions of duplication as well.
As indicated in the background note, the presentation of the review reports is expected to contribute to the realization of the role of the PSC, under Article 3(b) of the Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC, in the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. Although the link between internal governance and regional peace and security is acknowledged in the PSC Protocol, the background note underscores the importance of AU member states ‘critically acknowled(ging) the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on the promotion of peace, security and stability as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development’.
Research reports indicate that some of the APRM reports have indeed highlighted risks of crisis in countries under review and these risks subsequently materialized. A case in point that the researches highlight is the Kenya APRM Report, which warned against ethnic violence in 2006. However, the potential of the early warning role of the reports depends on the quality of the reports.
While the presentation of the APRM reports can innovatively be used for effectively operationalizing the early warning and response responsibility of the PSC under Article 3(b) of the PSC Protocol, whether or not such early warning can be acted upon for taking preventive action is incumbent on the PSC. The role that the APRM presentation of country review reports plays in effectively activating this responsibility of the PSC depends on whether as part of the presentation of the report the APRM offers the PSC practical options on how best the PSC can follow up the PSC relevant issues highlighted in the reports. From the perspective of the work of the PSC, instead of presenting the whole APRM report what would be useful is to draw the attention of the PSC to those issues pertaining to its mandate.
Tomorrow’s session being the first meeting of the PSC on APRM reports, which reports and how they are presented and the methodology for how the PSC deliberates on and follows up on the country review reports has as yet to be clarified. It is not clear, for example, whether the PSC will adopt a statement or communiqué highlighting the specific issues raised in the APRM reports presented and requesting each of the countries concerned to take necessary measures for addressing the issues. Perhaps, this would be one of the issues that can also be elaborated as part of the revision of the working methods of the PSC.
The expected result of the briefing is a communiqué. It is anticipated that the communiqué will establish the modus operandi between the APRM and the PSC, hence establishing the presentation of APRM reports a standing agenda of the PSC. This will clarify how the APRM reports will be presented and used by the PSC as part of the continental early warning system for the PSC to timeously take action for preventing conflicts. In terms of synergy and coordination, the communiqué could also envisage the importance of institutionally feeding the reports to the Panel of the Wise (PoW) for the PoW to use the reports in implementing its mandate.
Open Session: Celebration of Amnesty Month
Amani Africa
Date | 4 September, 2019
Tomorrow (5 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold an open session to commemorate the celebration of amnesty month. The discussion is expected to focus on the progress made on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap on silencing the guns by 2020 mainly the challenges and perspectives, with a focus on the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Africa.
The Department of Peace and Security (PSD), particularly the representative of the Director of PSD and Acting Head of the Division on Defence and Security are expected to deliver briefing to the PSC. Also expected to make a statement is the Head of the UN Office to the AU. The Institute for Security Studies is expected to present as well.
Tomorrow’s session is taking place in line with the 2017 Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 645(XXIX), which after deliberating on the Inaugural Report of the PSC on the Implementation of the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020, declared the month of September each year, up to 2020, as “Africa Amnesty Month” for the surrender and collection of illegally owned weapons/arms.
It is expected that tomorrow’s session will address three inter-related thematic issues. The first relates to Security Sector Reform/Governance (SSR/G). The tailored approach, account should be had to the second is the commemoration of the Amnesty Month. The last is the implementation of the AU Roadmap on Silencing the Guns by 2020.
In the presentation from the Head of the Defence and Security Division. particular attention is expected to be given to SSR including the AU SSR program and the AU SSR Policy framework. Tomorrows’ session follows the inauguration meeting of the AU steering committee on security sector reform, held from 3 September 2019 in Addis Ababa.
The Silencing the Guns Roadmap recognizes the challenges around SSR policies. The Roadmap calls on the need to promote ownership of national SSR Programs in member states and the need to stipulate clear obligations and timelines on SSR in peace agreement including putting in place adequate follow up mechanisms.
For PSC members it would be of interest to identify the challenges relating to SSR in Africa. One set of issues expected to be highlighted is the sensitivities of member states and wrong perceptions that SSR concerns only post-conflict situations. Studies also show that another challenge in SSR relate to civilian possession and use of small arms and weapons. The recent report by the AUC and Small Arms Survey ‘Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa’ has noted that civilian actors including individuals, private businesses and non- state armed groups hold almost 80% of small arms on the continent. Among the civilian held firearms only around 10% has been registered.
This is also an indication that security regimes in various African countries have been characterised by a range of non-state actors, including private security companies, local militias, guerrilla armies, community self-policing groups and others. With the lack or weakening monopoly use of force by the state particularly in countries affected by violence leads to the emergence of reliance by individuals and communities on self-organized security provision.
While a locally driven SSR is key in designing a tailored approach, account should be had to the transnational nature of insecurities. This also requires enhanced coordination among the security institutions of neighbouring countries including through the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and the AU SSR processes.
Tomorrow’s session may also highlight that SSR is not solely a security matter and may call on for a comprehensive approach to reform encompassing state-society relationship. Therefore, its effective implementation may require the concerted efforts and cooperation among wide range of institutions in the government structure and the public at large.
There is also the challenge of effective formulation and proper implementation of SSR provisions in peace agreements. As the experiences of South Sudan and the Central African Republic show, this is one of the major sources of disruption of peace processes. In the light of the return of countries to conflict after signing of peace agreements, there is also interest in post-conflict reconstruction and development. Hence the PSC and participants may reflect on how to sustain peace including through enhanced consideration of the SSR dimension of peace and post-conflict processes.
In terms of the amnesty month, the recent report on small arms and light weapons referred to above highlighted the need for focusing on private possession and use of small arms and light weapons. In this regard the 860th meeting of the PSC stressed ‘the need for improved measures to regulate non-state actor possession of a small arms and light weapons, in order to prevent the diversion or misuse of weapons and encourages Member States to implement initiatives that are in line with the Africa Amnesty Month’.
However, there is a need for national level measures including the boosting of state-based provision of security services for encouraging the surrender of weapons in the hands of non-state actors and reporting on how and whether member states are observing the Amnesty month. Central to this is the need for finding ways of establishing or restoring the capacity particularly of states lacking effective provision of security to all their populations. This is directly linked to security sector governance as a measure of conflict prevention.
With respect to the AU Roadmap on Silencing the Guns, tomorrow’s session affords an opportunity for taking stock of where implementation of the Roadmap stands and the progress made towards achieving its ambitious objectives. Also important is the lessons to be learned from the process of elaboration and implementation of the Roadmap, including in terms of identification of areas of intervention and effective implementation of relevant measures. With 2020 only months away, it would be of particular interest to PSC members to discuss what will happen post-2020.
The expected outcome of the session is a press statement. The Council may highlight that the prospects for sustainable peace and stability are ensured by the extent to which SSR is anchored on the state of security broadly defined, instead of a narrow focus on certain security institutions. The PSC may reiterate its previous decisions for Member States and RECs/Regional Mechanisms to submit reports to Council, through the AUC, on the actions taken in implementing the Africa Amnesty Month, to feed in its report to the upcoming Assembly. With respect to the Roadmap on Silencing the Guns by 2020, the PSC could request the AU Commission to provide it with a comprehensive report reviewing implementation of the Roadmap and proposing on how the agenda on silencing the guns by 2020 will be followed up post-2020
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of November 2020
Amani Africa
Date | November 2020
In November 2020, Ethiopia will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). The provisional programme of work as prepared under the leadership of Ethiopia’s Permanent Representative to the AU Ambassador Tesfaye Yilma, envisages a total of seven sessions, including three focusing on country/region specific agendas.
The first session of the month scheduled to take place virtually on 3 November will be focusing on the situation in Libya. The session is expected to look at the developments in the situation since the last time the PSC met on Libya on 27 September at its 833rd session. Most recent developments including the signing of a UN initiated Permanent Ceasefire Agreement on 23 October 2020 are also expected to feature.
The second session of the month is expected to be a briefing by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) scheduled to take place on November 5. It is to be recalled that at its last session on the APRM, which took place on 5 March 2020 at Council’s 914th meeting, the PSC decided to convene twice a year to receive briefings from the APRM. Therefore, November’s session will be the second APRM briefing of 2020, in line with PSC’s decision. The upcoming session is expected to follow up on items identified in the previous session. The session will be taking place through VTC.
On 9 November, the PSC will consider and adopt its programme of work for the month of December, which will be circulated via email to all PSC Member States, for their comments and feedback.
On 12 November, PSC’s session dedicated to the theme “Youth, Peace and Security” is expected to take place. The session is expected to be an open session, to be conducted through VTC. In line with AU’s theme for the year 2020, the specific focus of the session will be on “advancing youth roles and capacities for silencing the guns in Africa”. This is expected to take stock of the activities undertaken within the framework of the Youth, Peace and Security including in respect to advocacy and mobilization of the youth on the theme of the year.
The following week, the PSC is expected to convene a session on 17 November, to discuss the status of implementation of the “AU Master Roadmap for Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020” and the “AU Theme of the Year 2020: Silencing the Guns in Africa – Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development”. The session may provide an overview of the theme of the year and it may also reflect on the revision of the Master Roadmap, as 2020 is coming to an end. It is also to be recalled that preparations are underway for the convening of an extraordinary summit dedicated to the theme of the year in December. The session will take place through VTC.
On 19 November, PSC is expected to have a VTC session on the protection of children in conflict situations in Africa. The session is expected to address the vulnerability of children in conflict affected African States also in relation to the COVID-19 related exacerbating factors.
The PSC is also expected to receive a virtual briefing session on the situation in Abyei on 24 November. This session is expected to explore the impact of the political changes in Sudan and South Sudan on Abyei area and on the critical role of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).
The last PSC session of the month is expected to take place on 26 November. The session will be dedicated to a discussion on the situation in the Horn of Africa, with a specific focus on how to best support the transitions in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. The session is expected to shed light on the positive developments in the countries and on mechanisms to further strengthen ongoing efforts to consolidate stability and development. This session too will be conducted through VTC.
In addition to these agenda items, the provisional program of work indicates in footnotes possible meeting to consider the Special Report of the Chairperson of the Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the UNAMID and follow-on presence.
PSC Heads of State and Government session on Libya and the Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 8 February, 2020
Tomorrow (8 February) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene a meeting at the Heads of State and Government level on the situations in Libya and the Sahel.
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat and the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Cergui, are expected to brief the Council. President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, is expected to deliver a statement on behalf of the A3. Also expected to deliver a statement is President of Congo, Denis Sassou Nguesso, the Chair of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya.
The fighting in Libya that intensified following the launch of an offensive by the opposition militia Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar against the internationally recognized Tripoli based Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj has worsened an already dire security situation in the country. Fragmentation of the country among warring factions has increased. Flow of weapons has spiked despite a UN Security Council arms embargo.
Various reports show that over 218 civilians have been killed and over 289 civilians have been injured due to the ongoing conflict from attacks that use indiscriminate weaponry, being directly targeted, or being casualties to Explosive Remnants of War in conflict-affected areas including Tripoli and Murzuq. As a result of the renewed fighting, 2019 represented the highest level of displacement since 2014-2015, with a 305 per cent increase in new displacement from 2018.
Further compounding the situation and even making the resolution of the conflict in Libya nearly impossible is the intensification of regional and global rivalry and proxy war on Libya. Over the years, the Libyan conflict has increasingly transformed into a proxy war where a number of countries in the region and global powers have made the country a theatre for advancing their competing political, ideological and economic interests in the country by sending financial, political and military support for the warring parties in Libya.
On the one hand Al-Sarraj’s administration is recognized and backed by the UN and other actors including the US, Turkey, Italy and Qatar. While Egypt and UAE are aiming at curbing the spread of GNA’s faction affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey are supporters. On the hand Russia, France, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan have provided support to Haftar. Mercenaries, which are considered to be affiliated with Russia, are involved in the fighting in support of the LNA.
The rivalry over the control for the country’s oil reserves among warring parties has also exacerbated the dire security situation. On 8 January, the two major actors in the conflict Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan initiated a truce in Libya commencing on 12 January. Although an attempt was made to bring both Haftar and al-Sarraj together to sign the ceasefire, this was not successful given that Haftar left Moscow without signing the agreement.
On 19 January, a high-level conference was convened in Berlin in an attempt to contain the heavy external interference in Libya. The Berlin Conference, in which the AU Commission Chairperson and the Foreign Minister of Congo participated, ended with the conference conclusions articulating the six baskets including: ceasefire, arms embargo, political process, security, economic and financial, international humanitarian law and human rights law matters. As part of the follow up process Serraj and Haftar have each nominated five representatives to be part of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, which was proposed by UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) towards the operationalization of the conclusions.
In the midst of this highly complex external actors’ involvement, the AU continues to urge for restraint of foreign powers and for a stronger African led political process. The AU PSC during its ministerial meeting held on 27 September 2019, has stressed the need ‘for an effective and urgent involvement of the AU in the search for a lasting political solution to the crisis in Libya’. The Council also supported and reiterated the decision of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, taken at its meeting of 8 July 2019, on the appointment of a joint African Union/United Nations Envoy for Libya towards ensuring a more robust, coordinated and AU led peace process.
Tomorrow’s session may further reiterate the importance of AU’s role in resolving the crisis. The session also follows the recently concluded 8th meeting of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya, held in Brazzaville, on 30 January. Three African Heads of State including the Chair of the Committee and the host of the meeting President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, Chairperson of the PSC for February, and Mohamed Ould Ghazouani of Mauritania were in attendance. The committee decided to convene an inter-Libyan Reconciliation Conference in consultation with Libyan parties, neighbouring countries and the United Nations. The committee condemned the continued external interference in Libya, although commitments were made during the Berlin conference, which was held ten days earlier.
Despite the effort by Germany in bringing the various stakeholders, there are still sharp divisions. Although Germany urged for a UNSC resolution supporting the outcome of the Berlin conference, the divergent position within UNSC, particularly between the US and Russia prevented the adoption of a binding document. Moreover, the UNSMIL in a statement released on 25 January indicated the continuation of ‘transfer of foreign fighters, weapons, ammunition and advanced systems to the parties by member states, including several who participated in the Berlin Conference’.
The situation in the Sahel
The second agenda item that is expected to be discussed is the situation in the Sahel. Perhaps more than any other part of the continent, where the sound of the guns has become loudest is the violence region of the Sahel. The number of violent incidents in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has increased sharply. In geographic scope as well, the violence in the Sahel has during 2019 spread across the region. As the UN Chief Representative for West Africa said in a briefing to the UN Security Council on 8 January 2020, this geographic expansion of terrorist attacks ‘is increasingly threatening West African coastal States’.
The other layer of violence that has also become recurrent and increasingly lethal in the region is inter-communal clashes. One of the key aspects to this security threat is the adverse effect of climate change and the failure of governments to put in place mitigating measures, thereby creating a situation for rivalry over increasingly depleting scarce resources to erupt into violent conflicts.
Over the course of 2019, fighting and terrorist attacks in Mali forced more than 80,000 people flee their homes. Burkina Faso witnessed the most surge in violence in 2019, the number of people displaced increased by tenfold to over 560,000, with the figure predicted to skyrocket to 900,000 people by April 2020. Across the three affected countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, since the start of 2019, more than 670,000 children have been forced to flee their homes. According to UNICEF, between April 2017 and December 2019, the three countries witnessed a six-fold increase in school closures due to violence.
The instability in Libya has contributed to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and the Lake Chad region. The ECOWAS extra-ordinary Summit held on 14 September 2019 has also underlined the effect of the crisis in Libya in the region by labelling it as the ‘hotbed for terrorism in West Africa’. Towards preventing and combatting terrorism the Summit adopted a priority action plan for 2020-2024 on selected priority areas.
In addition to the activities of terrorist groups in the region, the PSC may also discuss on the kind of peace and security tools required to effectively address the crisis in the Sahel beyond and above the use of conventional military response and peacekeeping response, which has faltered to deliver contain the situation. President Macron and the G5 Sahel Heads of the State held a meeting in Pau on 13 January. While they agreed on “new political, strategic and operational framework” that is anchored in four pillars: the fight against terrorism, capacity building for states forces in the region, restoring state authority and development assistance, much of the focus remains on reinforcing military responses with France announcing to increase its military presence in the Sahel by adding 600 troops to its existing 4500 in Mali and the four other countries in the region.
Such security heavy approaches that have been dominant delivered little result. If anything, such approaches have worsened the situation. There is a need for national actors of affected countries and regional bodies to assume leading responsibility and foregrounding political and
governance efforts including by addressing the lacklustre implementation of the 2015 peace agreement in Mali.
The PSC may recall its previous 863rd session on the Sahel, which decided to undertake a joint field mission with the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC), to assess the situation and to provide support. In order to provide political and diplomatic support to countries in the region particularly in light of the grave security situation endured by the countries and to assess the presence of various actors the PSC may consider undertaking a mission to the Sahel region. This may also be timely if it takes place ahead of the expiry of the G5 mandate in April 2020.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may reiterate its concern over the deteriorating security situation in Libya and its conviction that political process, rather than armed fighting, is the only solution to the conflict. It may propose based on its longstanding plan the establishment of truce and ceasefire and an AU led ceasefire monitoring mechanism based on the African Standby Force. The PSC may welcome the outcome of the Brazzaville meeting of the High-Level Committee on Libya and the planned inter-Libyan reconciliation forum. In order to address the external rivalry aggravating the crisis, it may call on the UNSC to assume its responsibilities by enforcing the arms embargo as called for in the outcome of the Berlin Conference. Apart from reiterating the appointment of an AU-UN Envoy on Libya for elevating the role of the AU and pursuing these policy objectives, the PSC may call for the AU to be a co- convener of the international follow up committee on Libya.
On the Sahel the PSC may note that response to the crisis in the Sahel should not be limited to military operations and may call on members states in the region to foster political dialogue and negotiation as means to reach a lasting peace in the region. It may also welcome the action plan adopted during the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS on combating and eradicating terrorism. Given the dire humanitarian crisis unfolding in the region, the PSC may call for the convening by the AU of a high-level conference on the humanitarian situation.
VTC BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN THE SUDAN
Amani Africa
Date | 17 June, 2020
Tomorrow (17 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to consider the situation in the Sudan. The meeting is scheduled to take place through video teleconference. The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, is expected to make a statement. The PSC is also expected to receive a presentation from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC) to Sudan, Mohammed Belaich. Representatives of Sudan, as concerned country, and Niger, as the coordinator of the Africa three (A3) non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), are also expected to make statement.
In order to support the transition in Sudan, it is to be recalled that the PSC requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to regularly brief the Council on the situation, in particular, on the implementation of the Political Agreement and the Constitutional Document. It has been a year since former President Omar Al-Bashir was ousted from power and barely a month is also left for the first anniversary of the political agreement reached between Sudanese political stakeholders on the establishment of a transitional government, which will last for 39 months.
Tomorrow’s meeting will afford members the opportunity to review the progress and challenges in implementing the agreement over the past one year and exchange views on ways and means of assisting Sudan in this arduous transition process. This discussion will, of course, take place against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has so far infected more than five thousand Sudanese and killed more than 300 of them, according to data compiled by the Africa CDC. Sudan is one of the most affected countries in the Eastern Africa region and the pandemic is impacting the country by further compounding its multiple and complex socio-economic and political challenges.
Despite some positive steps taken including the launching of a peace process and the adoption of economic recovery plan, however, Sudan remains mired in deep seated problems.
The first of these challenges relate to the economy. The transitional government has inherited a very weak economy suffering from the nearly $60 billion debt burden, widespread unemployment and rising inflation and cost of living. With very little tools at its disposal for addressing the plethora of economic woes facing the country, Sudan needs major external economic support. Prime Minister Abdela Hamdok says the country requires up to $10 billion to stabilize the currency and help the administration tackle key challenges over the next two years. Without getting the much-needed relief, things could likely get worse, thus further weakening an already precarious state of the transitional government. The country also faces a pressure of lifting subsidies, which can further compound the economic woes facing the general public. Lifting subsidies at this point in time could trigger social unrest and instability.
Related to the economy is the issue of the removal by the US of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This has been considered as one of the major stumbling blocks for the country in rehabilitating its economy and attracting much needed international financial intervention.
As pointed out in our analysis on the agenda of the session the PSC held in January on this subject, some of the conditions US officials advanced for removing Sudan from the list include: more cooperation on counterterrorism; improved human rights protections, including freedom of religion and the press; increased humanitarian access; ending fighting and conflicts with rebels within Sudan; showing that Sudan has ceased supporting terrorism, ensuring that no Sudanese weapons in terrorist hands; and compensating those affected by the terrorist incidents for which responsibility is attributed to Sudan.
Since then, while progress has been made on various files including the agreement of Sudan to pay financial compensations to family members of people killed or injured in terrorist attacks in the 1990s, there remain no clear timeline and arrangement for the removal of Sudan from the list.
It is to be recalled that the PSC had called for the lifting of all economic and financial sanctions on Sudan, including removing Sudan from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. There is renewed call for the removal of Sudan from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism to allow the country to address its socio-economic difficulties and mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Apart from the update on the transitional process, during tomorrow’s session the representative of Sudan is expected to provide further details on the challenges facing Sudan and what the transitional government is doing to address these. Also, of importance for the PSC is update by the
Sudanese representative on whether there is any progress in the discussions between Sudan and the US regarding the removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsor of terrorism.
Another challenge facing the transition relates to the implementation of the transitional activities. In terms of the assembly have as yet to be implemented. This in part has to do with the lack of progress in the peace talks.
The transitional government, which was formed through civilian-military coalition is already fragile and tensions have been simmering underneath the surface. It is against this backdrop that an assassination attempt was made on the life of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock. In his recent encounter with the media, Prime Minister Hamdock is said to have acknowledged the challenges in the relationship between the civilian and military components of the power-sharing government. With the military continuing to exert enormous influence and the civilian government lacking enough tools at its disposal, the challenge now is how to keep the transition on track.
During tomorrow’s meeting, the SRCC Belaich is expected to provide the PSC update on the progress and challenges in the Sudanese transitional process including the peace talks. Indeed, the peace process is another area of interest for the PSC in the transitional process.
Peace talks with various armed groups have been under way since 14 October 2019 hosted by South Sudan. Despite some progress the parties reported, there remain some important challenges. The first challenge is that the talks are not proceeding as initially planned. Although this process was initially scheduled to be concluded in February, it has since been postponed to June 2020. Second, the parties participating in the talks in Juba have as yet to reach agreement on security arrangements. Third, two armed groups with military presence on the ground, namely Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/AW) Abdul Wahid and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North, Al-Hilu (SPLM-N-Al Hilu) for the Darfur track and the Two Areas tracks respectively remain outside the peace talks. Additionally, it is feared that the break-up of the Sudan revolutionary Front, a coalition of armed groups, would further complicate the peace talks.
Tomorrow’s session is also expected to review the situation relating to the gradual withdrawal of UNAMID and a transition to a peacebuilding mission. This is an issue in respect of which the representative of Niger is expected to provide update to the PSC. The PSC had called for ‘extreme caution on the withdrawal of UNAMID, in order to sustain the gains made and to avoid relapse and security vacuum’.
Accordingly, the UNSC adopted resolution 2525 (2020) extending the mandate of UNAMID until 31 December 2020, taking into account the views expressed by the AUPSC. The UNSC also endorsed the creation of the UN Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission to Sudan (UNITAMS). It also requested the UN Secretary- General to continue transition planning and management to ensure a phased, sequenced, and efficient transition from UNAMID to UNITAMS.
Even though this new mission will be a fully-fledged UN special political and peacebuilding mission, it is acknowledged that the role of the AU remains critical. Resolution 2524 also encouraged UNITAMS, UNAMID and the AU to ensure coherence, coordination, and complementarity of their support to Sudan. It also underlined the critical importance of the continued strategic and political partnership between the UN and the AU in Sudan.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC would affirm its support for the transitional government headed by Prime Minister Hamdok and welcome the positive steps taken by the transitional government over the past one year. The PSC may reiterate its call to bilateral and international partners to mobilize assistance in support of the Sudan. In this regard, it may take note of the donor’s conference to be jointly hosted by Sudan, Germany and the UN on 25 June to help Sudan raise funds for its economic recovery and development. It may reiterate its call for the lifting of all economic and financial sanctions on Sudan and may in particular urge the US to act with speed for removing Sudan from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, with a view to enhancing the economic activities of the country and encouraging foreign investments. The PSC may also encourage the Government of Sudan to continue its effort to ameliorate the economic challenges facing Sudanese and avoid adopting economic measures that may trigger social unrest and instability. The PSC may take note of resolutions 2524 and 2525 adopted by the UNSC on the deployment of UNITAMS and the extension of the mandate of UNAMID, respectively. It may reaffirm the need for the AU to continue playing an active role in the transition process and enhance its visibility in this regard. The PSC may express concern over the slow progress in negotiation between the transitional government and armed opposition groups and call for renewed efforts with participation of the two armed groups not taking part in the peace talks to facilitate the signing of a comprehensive agreement with all the armed opposition groups to silence the guns in the Sudan and achieve lasting and durable peace in the country.
VTC briefing on the Situation in Darfur and the activities of UNAMID
Amani Africa
Date | 21 May, 2020
Tomorrow (21 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to receive a briefing on the situation in Darfur and the activities of UNAMID. Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and Jeremiah Nyamane Kingsley Mamabolo, the Joint Special Representative and Head of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) are expected to brief the Council. Representative of Sudan is also expected to make a statement.
The briefing is expected to take place via video teleconference (VTC).
It is to be recalled that in October 2019 the UN Security Council (UNSC) had decided to extend UNAMID’s mandate for one year through resolution 2495 (2019). In the same resolution the UNSC also decided that the mission would maintain its current troop and police levels until 31 March 2020. However, on 30 March 2020 due to the current spread of COVID19 pandemic and the ensuing restrictions on movement, the UNSC decided to extend the date to 31 May 2020 and for UNAMID to maintain all team sites for mandate implementation.
Stressing that UNAMID remains a joint deployment of the AU and the UN, the PSC, during its last meeting on UNAMID on 3 March 2020, has particularly underlined the need for UNAMID drawdown and its follow up mechanism to maintain this hybrid nature and the importance of the joint engagement until the end of the mandate. Accordingly, during tomorrow’s session the PSC is expected to deliberate on the various developments including the political and security situation in Darfur and broadly in Sudan, the spread of the pandemic and their impact on the operations and the drawdown of UNAMID. The session is also taking place ahead of the UNSC meeting that is expected to take place around the end of the month to adopt a resolution establishing a follow-on presence that takes the place of UNAMID after 31 May. Hence it will be a critical session to inform the decisions at the upcoming meeting.
The political situation in Sudan remains tense. The 9 March attack on the convoy of Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was a clear indication of the continuous internal power struggle between the various factions of the transitional government. The peace talks between the transitional government of Sudan and opposition armed groups have also experienced some challenges. Agreement is yet to be reached with the SPLM-N faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. The Darfur track has also experienced some delays and resistance from the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) to join the process. As noted by the head of UN Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix in a briefing to UNSC on 24 April, inter-communal clashes have persisted, underscoring the importance of peacebuilding interventions that go beyond peace processes.
It is expected that PSC will receive update from Chergui on how the AU can enhance support to the transitional process in Sudan and the follow up from the AU on the PSC’s 913th session on UNAMID. During a discussion that the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security held with Prime Minister Hamdok earlier in the month, he stated that the AU and the UN will jointly play an integral role post-UNAMID. Another issue to be addressed is how the AU enhance its role rallying African and international support for the economic recovery of the country, which is crucial for the stability of the power sharing government and the transitional process.
It will be important for tomorrow’s session to deliberate on AU’s role in the follow-on mechanism post- UNAMID. In the joint report prepared by the AU Chairperson and UN Secretary General in March measures were identified by taking in consideration the request made by Prime Minister Hamdok through two letters submitted to the Secretary General. The letter submitted on 27 January calls for the reconfiguration of the UN presence and for the establishment of a Chapter VI peace support operation in the form of a special political mission. The second letter sent a month letter requested the UN’s support in peace negotiations among the Sudanese parties as well as assistance with mobilising economic and development and humanitarian aid.
Based on the request the report identified four core objectives for a post-UNAMID presence in the Sudan: (a) To support achievement of the political benchmarks in the Constitutional Declaration, including the preparations towards the Constitution and elections; (b) To support implementation of peace agreements in the conflict- affected areas, including security arrangements, such as ceasefire monitoring and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, if required, and accountability and transitional justice; (c) To support national-led peacebuilding and the strengthening of human rights and rule of law institutions, and the scaling-up of support for recovery and development to build resilience and mitigate protection risks; (d) To facilitate international support for economic reform that would set the country on a path to sustainable development.
For the realization of these objectives the report articulates a number of principles. The one on the continued partnership between the AU and UN will be of particular interest to the PSC. The report recognizes the role the PSC has played through landmark decisions in 2019 to deter military seizure of power. And also noted the interest demonstrated by some Sudanese stakeholders on the potential role of the AU as a guarantor of a peace agreement.
In this context, an issue of particular importance for the PSC is how to provide political guidance on how to elevate AU’s strategic engagement and presence in post- UNAMID period.
Tomorrow’s briefing is also the first the PSC will be considering the situation in Darfur and UNAMID in the context of COVID19. Sudan has the highest case of confirmed cases with close to 3000. Due to the existing vulnerabilities in regions such as Darfur, it is feared that the impact of the pandemic will be devastating. The PSC may particularly focus on the effects of the pandemic on the safety and livelihood of vulnerable communities that will be disproportionately affected by the pandemic. A large community that continues to be displaced by conflicts does not have access to regular and timely life saving information and the necessary tools to fight the pandemic. Ongoing clashes and fighting as well as the restriction on movement also deter the provision of humanitarian assistance. In this context the PSC is expected to pronounce itself on the need to pay particular attention to vulnerable groups in Darfur and it may urge all political actors to make efforts in combatting the pandemic.
COVID-19 has brought a lot of uncertainty worldwide. In the Sudan case, it has brought about more socio-economic stress to an already economically challenged transitional process under way in the country. It is a difficult task to prepare timeline and actions in this current context. Nonetheless, it will be important for the Council to assess the implication of the pandemic on the security situation and political process of the country to ensure that emerging challenges are addressed amicably.
The expected outcome is communiqué. The PSC may particularly express concern over the current pandemic and its impact on the most vulnerable section of the people. During this critical time it may reiterate the need for cessation of hostilities and may in particular urge the Government and opposition armed groups to redouble their efforts in the negotiation process. It may in particular call on Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and the SPLM-N faction led by Abdelaziz al- Hilu to join the respective peace processes pertaining to Darfur and the two areas. With regards to the follow-on mechanism, it is expected that the PSC will reiterate the communique of its 913th session on the need for maintaining the hybrid character of both the process of the drawdown and the make-up of the post-UNAMID as a means of both securing the gains made through the joint mission and leveraging effectively the comparative advantage of the AU in supporting the transitional process in Sudan. In the light of inter-ethnic clashes and concerns around COVID19 including its impact on UNAMID, the PSC may urge closer collaboration between UNAMID and the Sudan Government to support local peacebuilding efforts. Regarding the transitional process, the PSC will urge the members of the power sharing agreement that established the transitional government to sustain the spirit of cooperation and consultation in the implementation of the transitional agenda and in addressing emerging issues.
PSC session on the establishment of a special unit for counter-terrorism as part of the ASF
Amani Africa
Date | 28 October, 2020
Tomorrow (28 October) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will hold a discussion on the establishment of the Special Unit for Counter-Terrorism within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF). The session is envisaged to take place through VTC.
Following the opening statement of the Chairperson of the PSC, the Department of Peace and Security is expected to brief the PSC. Additionally, representatives of the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and of the five African Standby Force (ASF) regional brigades are also expected to address the PSC. Others that may provide further input may include the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).
The theme of this session, put on the agenda of the PSC on the initiative of Egypt, is a follow up to the decision of the 33rd ordinary session of the AU Assembly held in February 2020. Within the framework of the focus of the AU theme of the year for silencing the guns and as part of the response for the rising threat of terrorist attacks and operations on the continent, the AU Assembly through Assembly/AU/Dec.753(XXXIII) requested the PSC to consider the proposed establishment of a special unit for counter terrorism within the ASF and report back to the Assembly with its recommendations during the ordinary session of the Assembly in February 2021.
In the context of the proliferation of groups engaged in acts of terrorism, the expansion in the geographic spread of terrorist operations and the rise in the incidence and scale of terrorist attacks, African states have responded through various mechanisms. It was in this context that, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) changed its defensive approach and assumed a more combative posture in the effort to degrade and weaken Al Shabaab in Somalia. Subsequently, building on the experience of the Regional Task Force against the Lord Resistance Army, ad hoc regional military operations bringing together the coalition of the willing of affected member states have been established in the Lake Chad Basin against Boko Haram and in the Sahel region against various terrorist groups.
Accordingly, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram comprising Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin and the G5 Sahel Joint Force made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania have come into operation. These ad hoc security arrangements are developed both in response to the pressing needs of the affected regions and to fill the gaps in the existing instruments for countering the kind of asymmetric warfare being undertaken by terrorist groups in various parts of the continent.
The proposal for the establishment of the special unit for counter terrorism is also a manifestation of this trend in putting up more agile and flexible arrangements to respond to urgent and pressing threats from the expansion of terrorist groups on the continent.
The need for reinforcing the effectiveness of responses and for a comprehensive approach to addressing the menace of terrorism in Africa is pressing. This can be gathered from the rise in incidents of terrorist attacks in various parts of the continent. Northern Mozambique has become the latest hot spot terrorist operations, leading to major displacement and destruction in the region. The number of violent incidents in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has increased sharply. According to the UN, it has increased fivefold since 2016 and doubled in 2019 compared to 2018. In geographic scope as well, the violence in the Sahel has during 2019 spread across the region. The human toll of this dramatic spike in violent incidents involving militant armed groups in the Sahel has also skyrocketed, making 2019, according to a major global conflict database, the deadliest in over 20 years.
Tomorrow’s session is not the first time for the idea of the establishment of a special unit for countering terrorism arose in the PSC. The first time this idea was discussed was during the first summit level PSC session held in Nairobi Kenya in September 2014. In tasking the AU Commission to pursue and intensify its efforts, the communique of the 455th session of the PSC, among others, tasked the Commission to support and facilitate ‘regional cooperation initiatives and mechanisms, to address specific transnational threats, building on the RCI-LRA…, including making specific recommendations on the possible establishment of specialized joint counter-terrorism units at the sub-regional and regional levels and within the framework of the African Standby Force.’ Such a unit may be an option for addressing some of the challenges surrounding the operation of the ad hoc coalitions and indeed for ensuring the coherence of the African Peace and Security Architecture as it relates to the role of the ASF.
It is clear that the prevailing security environment does indeed demand the availability of agile, flexible and speedy response tools as part of the range of mechanisms for addressing the threat of terrorism in Africa. At a practical level, there are a number of technical and policy issues that need to be clarified for purposes of the establishment of such unit within the framework of the ASF. The first relates to what the impact of the assignment of a counter terrorism operation for the ASF would be in terms of its role as peace support operations instrument of the AU and the care that should be taken. This also relates directly to the first issue highlighted in the concept note for this session, namely ‘What are the predefined determinants of what qualify for a terrorist threat that may require a country to request the PSC to mandate the ASF to perform counter- terrorism operation’. Indeed, there is a need for clarity on the scenarios for which such unit would be deployed.
Second, there is the question of the relationship of this unit with the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) of the ASF. Under the ASF concept the RDC is the instrument that is envisaged for deployment in response to urgent emergencies. Third, the legal basis for the establishment of such a specialized instrument. In this respect, the concept note for the session indicates that the ASF ‘can be given additional functions as part of the mandates issued by the PSC in the deployment of peace support operations and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.’ It seems that this special unit is tied specifically to Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act, which envisages the possibility of a state party seeking intervention by the AU for restoring peace and stability. Fourth, in terms of its mandate and duration of operation, there is the issue of what kind of tasks would it accomplish, for how long and with what exist strategy. The fifth area relates to command and control, accountability and coordination with regional bodies and national authorities. While the concept note identifies the mandating authority and the ASF command and control structure, an issue for further consideration is how this would work in practice from the conception of the operation to force generation, its mandating, deployment and the management of the operation.
The sixth area concerns the technical and logistical as well as the training requirements for the establishment of such a unit and the openness of such unit for participation by all states at the level of the regional brigades which house the unit. The concept note makes reference to ‘the skill sets’ that may be required for a particular counter terrorism operation and ‘the necessary capabilities and equipment, including for example, a battalion, battle group, special forces, intelligence capabilities that must be availed by Member States as part of their pledges to their regional standby force …etc; and while emphasizing the necessity to ensure that such capabilities could be rapidly deployed, and so light weaponry and limited sized of companies would be important elements for such counter terrorism capability.’ Finally, there is the issue of the financing of the establishment and deployment of such unit, including the mechanism for its initial sustenance. IN this respect as well, the concept note states that ‘Taking into consideration that an ASF counter terrorism operations is an integral part of the ASF, the Resources and funding for that special unit will be reflected within the budget of the ASF as stipulated in article 13 of the ASF protocol.’
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may express its concern about the serious threat that terrorism poses in various parts of the continent. It may also underscore the need for a comprehensive approach reiterating the outcome of its 749th session on comprehensive approach to combating the transnational threat of terrorism in Africa. It may also state the need for strengthening the response mechanisms in combating terrorism within the ASF. It is expected that the communique would outline the next steps for the establishment of the specialized unit. Among others, this may entail the PSC tasks the AU Commission to develop proposal in consultation with RECs/RMs and the five regional brigades clarifying both the conceptual and operational details for the establishment of the unit as part of the ASF and submit the same for consideration and adoption within specified timeline.
12th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting Between the AUPSC and EUPSC
Amani Africa
Date | 25 October, 2020
Tomorrow (26 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 12th annual joint consultative meeting with the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (PSC). The session is expected to take place through VTC.
The respective chairpersons of the two bodies, namely the Chairperson of the PSC Ambassador Osama Abdelkhalek and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC Ambassador Sofie From-Emmesberger, are set to deliver the opening remarks. The Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui and EU representative are scheduled to address the joint consultative meeting.
The PSC and EU PSC joint consultative meeting is convened on a yearly basis, aimed at facilitating dialogue between the organs on topical thematic and conflict specific agendas of common interest. The AUPSC and EUPSC have held annual joint consultative meetings in the context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, since their inaugural meeting in 2008. Starting from 2015, the joint consultative meetings are preceded by joint informal retreats aimed at creating the opportunity for an informal engagement to facilitate more constructive dialogue and convergence of approaches.
Given that the two bodies were unable to hold the annual joint consultative meeting in 2019, the convening of this year’s meeting carries its own significance. It signifies continuing interest on both sides to maintain the regularity of the consultative meeting.
Throughout their meetings over the years, the AU PSC and EU PSC have addressed various thematic and country specific peace and security concerns in Africa. Some of the thematic topics that featured on the agenda of previous consultative meetings include unconstitutional change of governments, election management, migration, and the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. Conflict specific agendas of previous meetings addressed conflicts in countries such as Libya, Sudan, South Sudan, CAR, Somalia and the Sahel region. In addition, key collaborative issues are also discussed at these meetings such as the importance of sustainable financing of AU-led peace operations and the need for enhanced AU–EU partnership in maintaining peace and security and boosting development in Africa, particularly by supporting conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
Over the 12 years of their joint collaborations, the AUPSC and EUPSC have also introduced the conduct of joint field missions to particular conflict settings. In 2015, the AUPSC and EUPSC also undertook a joint field mission to Mali. The mission focused on consultations and discussion on finding lasting solutions to the political and socio-economic crisis in Mali. Subsequently, in March 2018, they undertook a joint filed visit to CAR, in the context of the AU-EU common agenda for sustainable stabilisation of the situation in CAR.
The 11th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting took place in October 2018, in Brussels, Belgium. At their last meeting in 2018, the AU PSC and EU PSC were able to address multiple issues with a particular focus on the situations in Mali/Sahel, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, CAR and DRC.
This year the agenda is expected to focus only on three country/region specific issues: Mali/Sahel, Somalia and Sudan. In preparation for this year’s meeting, three preparatory meetings and consultations have been held in the course of this month, two at the ambassadorial level and one at the level of the PSC Committee of Experts. These preparatory meetings reflected on the issues of interest on the agenda items to be considered during the consultative meeting and identified the speakers from members of the AUPSC designated to speak on the three agenda items.
On the situation in Mali/Sahel Ambassador of Ghana Amma Twum-Amoah and Ambassador of Algeria Salah Francis Elhamdi will make presentations on behalf of the PSC. With regards to Mali and the Sahel, some of the key points raised in the 2018 AU PSC- EU PSC consultative meeting were the continued spread of terrorist attack in the Sahel region with a concerning spill-over effect from northern Mali to the central parts of the country as well as neighbouring States, mainly Burkina Faso. They also discussed the importance of supporting G5 Sahel Joint Force and ECOWAS led efforts, through mobilising political support from regional and international actors to follow up on the pledges and through ensuring greater ownership of initiatives by countries of the region.
As the following years demonstrated, the terrorism situation in Mali and the Sahel region in general have deteriorated further. The heightened increase in terrorist attacks in the region in 2019 has rendered the border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger into major crisis hotspot. A discussion on the situation in Mali at the 12th consultative meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC is expected to highlight the efforts deployed towards the establishment of a civilian led transitional government in Mali after the 18 August military coup that ousted Ibrahim Keita and the state of the transition since the establishment of the transitional government. Apart from supporting the transition, the meeting is also sure to reflect on the need for adhering to the Malian Transitional Charter, the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of and the key ECOWAS decisions and the terms of the last AUPSC communique on Mali.
On Somalia three presentations are expected from the PSC side: Ambassador of Djibouti, Ambassador Mohamed Idriss Farah, Ambassador of Lesotho Mafa Mosothoane Sejanamane and Ambassador of Ethiopia Tesfaye Yilma.
In relation to Somalia, the main points noted during the 11th consultative meeting were the continued Al-Shabaab threats to the security situation; the adoption of the Somali Transitional Plan (STP); the need for a reconfigured AMISOM to move towards the gradual handover of security responsibility to the country’s security institutions as well as the need for enhanced support to the Somalia National Army as to prepare it to take over security responsibilities from AMISOM; and the importance of collaboration between FGS and FMS for the success of Somalia’s security sector reform.
While Al-Shabaab continues to pose serious threat as its various attacks have shown, new threats in the form of desert locust invasion and flooding (threats impacting most of the horn region currently) have compounded the security crisis in Somalia and the horn of Africa during 2020. Together with the COVID-19 pandemic, these conditions have worsened the humanitarian situation. On the other hand, despite some progress registered in terms of the process of AMISOM’s handover of responsibilities and in the political situation in Somalia, the level of preparedness of Somali Security Forces and the relationship between FGS and FMS remain at best work in progress. A major recent positive development was the agreement among Somali political actors on the modalities for the election.
A country situation which was not a topic of discussion at the 2018 AUPSC-EUPSC joint consultative meeting but that will feature in tomorrow’s meeting is Sudan. Three PSC members are expected to deliver presentations: Ambassador of Kenya Catherine Mwangi, Charge D’Affair of Nigeria Richards Adejola and Ambassador of Egypt Osama Abdelkhalek.
The situation in Sudan has been among the most dominating topics in the agenda of the AUPSC throughout 2019 and to some extent in 2020. Major points of discussion expected to feature during the consultative session include the peace process notably, the peace agreement signed between the transitional government and major rebel groups, the socio-economic reconstruction of Sudan and the humanitarian situation resulting from heavy flooding. Of major concern for the Sudan transition has been the country’s continued designation by the US as a state sponsor of terrorism. In this respect, the announcement by the US Government for delisting Sudan from the list of states sponsors of terrorism offers the unique opportunity for supporting the transitional process more robustly.
The expected outcome is a joint communiqué. On Mali/Sahel the two organs may commend the work of ECOWAS in mediating and facilitating political dialogue. It may welcome the recent developments in the formation of a transitional government in Mali and the importance of maintaining the civilian nature of the transition and respect the provisions of the Malian Transitional Charter. They may underline that the fight against terrorism should be accompanied with addressing the root causes of conflict and instability and improving governance in Mali and the Sahel region. On Somalia the communiqué may welcome the progress made towards the preparation of the upcoming election and the dialogue between the FGS and FMS. It may express concern over the continued security challenges in the country and underline the importance that the drawdown of AMISOM should be based on the security realities of the country. On Sudan AUPSC and EUPSC may welcome the positive developments in the signing of the peace agreement and they may call on the remaining non-signatories to join the peace process. Welcoming the decision of the US to delist Sudan from the list of sponsors of terrorism, they may also urge for enhanced economic support to address the severe economic challenges facing Sudan.
