Session on Prevention of Genocide
Amani Africa
Date | 05 April, 2018
‘Prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crime’
Tomorrow (5 April), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing session on a comprehensive approach towards ‘the prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crime.’ It is the first session of the Council for April that Ambassador Bankole Adeoye of Nigeria will preside over as the Chair of the PSC for this month. The Council will be briefed by Ambassador Minata Samate Cessouma, African Union (AU) Commissioner for Political Affairs and Adama Dieng the Special Advisor of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of the Genocide. A representative of the Rwandan National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide is also expected to brief the Council, if not the Executive Secretary of that Commission, Jean-Mamascene Bizimana himself.
In its communiqué of the 678th session, the PSC decided to have the theme on ‘hate crime and the fight against genocide ideology’ a standing theme on which it holds an open session annually every April. This theme avails the PSC a unique opportunity to reflect on its work in the context of the annual commemoration of the horrors of the1994 Rwanda genocide against the Tutsi.
The commemoration is more than an act of remembrance and of honoring the victims and survivors of the genocide. On its own the remembrance serves as a vehicle that contributes to the prevention of genocide. It catalyzes dialogue that enhances awareness within the PSC most particularly on the measures that should be taken including, as highlighted in the in communiqué 678, on steps that states should take in addressing discrimination and the root causes of ideologies of genocide.
The remembrance guards against the risks that arise from all tendencies of social amnesia. It is anticipated that the discussion on the theme of the session would highlight particular issues of concern in relation to the remembrance of the Rwanda genocide against the Tutsi. In this regard, the PSC would reiterate its earlier pronouncement on the importance of the ‘use of clear analysis and proper terminology in order to avoid falling into the problem of denials’.!
The Commissioner Cessouma will highlight in her briefing the initiatives in this respect at the level of the AU Commission. It is expected that she will mention by way of example, among others, the use of human rights tools including deploying human rights monitors and the efforts currently underway for operationalizing the AU Human Rights Memorial.
Dieng’s briefing is a significant development. As the first such briefing since this theme became a standing theme for annual session, it is expected that Dieng’s briefing touches on the importance of the theme, including for enhanced coordination between the AU and the UN. Apart from current issues and challenges particularly in Africa, this briefing also avails opportunity for highlighting best practices and lessons learned from the UN in the prevention of genocide, including vis-à-vis the existence of an office dedicated to the prevention of genocide. Specifically in relation to the commemoration of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, Dieng may recall the decision the UN General Assembly took on 26 January 2018 designating the 7 April International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda modifying the Assembly’s 2003 resolution establishing the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.
The briefing expected from the Rwandan National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide is expected to present Rwanda’s national experience. Themes this briefing would cover include highlight of the factors leading to the horrors of 1994 and the basis on which it qualified as genocide; the efforts of Rwanda to come to terms with the legacies of the genocide and the measures for national reconciliation and reconstruction. The issue of denial of or revisionist narratives are issues of concern expected to also be highlighted.
For majority of the membership of the PSC, there would be focus on the remembrance aspects of the session. In this regard, they would renew their commitment to the pledge of ‘never again’ and express solidarity with the people of Rwanda. In terms of addressing specific concerns, various member states may highlight the need to implement relevant AU instruments and decisions as well as dialogue nationally and between member states concerned. Rwanda, which is also a member of the PSC, is a country with specific interests on the theme, including particularly the points contained in paragraph 7 of the communiqué of the 678th meeting of the PSC. While highlighting developments with respect to the points in this communiqué, if any, its intervention would thus reiterate PSC’s call for investigation and prosecution or extradition of suspects, ‘including leaders of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda’ and condemnation of ‘denial and distortion of facts relating to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’.
In more general terms, the focus on this theme allows the PSC to assess its work with respect to the AU’s agenda of prevention of genocide and similar atrocities within the framework of Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act. Last year, in its 678th session communiqué, the PSC underlined ‘the imperative of early and appropriate responses to credible early warning signs of situations that, if not addressed in a timely and effective manner, could lead to potential genocides’. In taking its engagement on this theme forward, the PSC may consider review of existing mechanisms of the AU vis-à-vis prevention of genocide and how best it pursues the objectives of this thematic agenda. Options in this respect include the designation of focal point in the AUC and the production of annual report on this theme. The PSC may also consider the establishment of a coordinating role for adequately taping into the expertise and role of various AU bodies, such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, whose mandates have direct bearing on prevention of genocide.
When the PSC held its first session on this theme at its 678th meeting on 11 April 2017, it clearly stated this session to be open. Despite this, the session is not envisaged to be open. This limits the participation of wider group of stakeholders in the deliberations, although it may allow the PSC to have a focused discussion.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. This would reiterate the themes from the PSC’s communiqué of its 678th meeting and reflect new areas from the briefings of the Commissioner Cessouma and Dieng. The communiqué may also indicate how the PSC may wish to pursue this theme further. It would also welcome the decision of the 26 January 2018 General Assembly designating the 7th of April International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.
PSC Program of work for April 2018
Amani Africa
Date | April 2018
April 2018 PSC Program of Work
The Chair of the month for April started preparations on the program of work as early as February holding a preparatory meeting with the PSC Secretariat. When the PSC commenced its program of work for March 2018 on 1 March, the agenda for April was tabled for its consideration and adoption. The April program is relatively busy with the PSC expected to hold some ten sessions in addition to a filed visit to South Sudan. While the agenda items that the sessions cover are diverse, only one country specific session is planned. A wide range of thematic peace and security issues dominate the program of the month, with two open sessions.
Although the program of the month as adopted by the PSC was scheduled to start on 3 April with an open session that will preview Africa’s peace and security landscape by 2023, this program is now postponed. The program scheduled for 5 April will now be the first session of the month.
Nigeria will assume the chairpersonship of the PSC, under Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, when the program of the month starts on 5 April. Although no date is assigned to it as formal sessions, Ambassador Adeoye is scheduled to host an informal consultation luncheon with a focus on the establishment of the PSC Sub-Committees on Counter Terrorism and Sanctions. As the State leading initiatives on the stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin region, one session of the Council that is also of major interest to Nigeria is the ‘Briefing on Saving the Lake Chad: Enhancing Environmental Sustainability and Human Security in West and Central Africa’.
On 5 April, the PSC will hold a briefing session on a comprehensive approach towards ‘the prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crime.’ Established to mark the annual commemoration of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, this agenda item is a follow up to the decision of the 678th meeting of the PSC to have the theme as standing agenda of an open session annually in April. Despite the clear statement of the PSC decision, in this month’s program the session is not envisaged to be open. Apart from a representative of Rwanda’s National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide, the Special Advisor of the Secretary General on the Prevention of the Genocide Adama Deng is expected to brief the Council. The same session will consider and adopt the draft PSC program for the month of May 2018.
The PSC field mission to South Sudan will take place from 9-12 April 2018. The filed mission could indicate a more visible role of the PSC and the AU in efforts to resolve the South Sudan conflict. During this field mission, the PSC will get to see first hand the political, security and humanitarian situation in South Sudan. Apart from meetings with the government and other South Sudanese stakeholders, the PSC is expected to visit protection of civilian sites in Juba and in Malakal.
After a week-long mission to South Sudan, the PSC will convene on 13 April with a briefing on ‘Saving the lake Chad; Enhancing Environmental Sustainability and Human Security in West and Central Africa.’ It is expected that the Executive Secretary of the Lake Chad Basin Commission would brief the Commission on the environmental threat facing the Lake Chad and its implications to the security of the people of the region. The session aims at discussing and determining the role that the AU is expected to play in supporting the regional initiative for addressing the threat facing the Lake Chad. This meeting is a result of the increasing recognition of a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and resolution responses in Africa, and the acknowledgment to the role environmental degradation and desertification play in instigating insecurity and conflict.
On 16 April, the PSC is scheduled to have a briefing session on the ‘Effective takeoff of the AU Humanitarian Agency’. The African Union Humanitarian Policy Framework, which was developed by the Humanitarian Affairs, Refugees and Displaced Persons Division at the AU Department of Political Affairs in November 2015, recognizes the linkages between peace and security and natural and human-induced disasters. The document and the Common African Position on Humanitarian Effectiveness envision the establishment of the African Union Humanitarian Agency (AUHA) by June 2018. Reviewing the efforts and preparations for the effective launching and operationalization of AUHA will be one of the three agenda items for the 16 April meeting of the PSC.
The 16 April meeting will also look at ameliorating the impact of terrorism and armed conflict on Africa’s social fabric.
The last item of the session on 16 April will be on peace support operations in Africa. The Council will receive a briefing by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Amb Smail Chergui and Jean-Pierre Lacroix UN Under Secretary General for peacekeeping operations.
The next day, 17 April, the PSC will discuss nuclear energy, non-proliferation and disarmament. The session will also discuss the prohibition of nuclear weapons on Africa, and the status of the Palendaba Treaty, an African legal and political regime for non-proliferation. The treaty that was adopted in 1996 entered force in 15 July 2009. To date it is signed by 52 members of the AU and ratified by 41 member states.
On 19 April, the PSC will receive a briefing on the status of the operationalization of the ASF and will assess the progress of the Draft Maputo Strategic Work Plan (2016-2020), a five-year work plan for the ASF. The increasing trend in the use of ad-hoc regional security and deployment arrangements and alliances, and the 2013 introduction of the African Capacity for Rapid Intervention in Crises (ACIRC) have raised questions on whether the ASF as it stands now will remain relevant. In 2016, the PSC declared ASF fully operational following the Amani II exercise in South Africa. However, the structure of the force, and its place in the APSA is a matter of ongoing conversation at the PSC.
On 24 April, the PSC will have an open session on the nexus between corruption and conflict resolution. More than anything else this is a reflection of the theme of the AU for 2018. It also forms part of the effort of Nigeria to implement the role that the AU Assembly entrusted to President Buhari of Nigeria for championing the theme ‘Winning the fight against corruption: A sustainable path to Africa’s transformation’.
On 25 April, the PSC will have a briefing on the status of the AU Peace Fund, one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The PSC is expected to receive update on the progress being made towards the establishment of the various structures required for the operationalization of the Fund.
On 26 April 2018, the Council is scheduled to listen to the report on the field mission. The dynamics between regional and continental efforts to resolve the South Sudan conflict, and role of individual member states in the conflict and negotiation has in the past put the principle of subsidiarity to test. The IGAD Council of Ministers which held its 61st Extra-Ordinary Session on 26 March 2018 in Addis Ababa decided to impose targeted sanctions against individual violators of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA). The meeting also referred the case to the PSC for ‘appropriate punitive measures’. The PSC will receive a report from the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) and will discuss the issue of the targeted sanctions and the status of the High- Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF).
The month finale will be a briefing by the Chair of the PSC for the month of April, Nigeria, to members of the Permanent Representatives Council (PRC) on the activities of the PSC during the month.
PSC Meeting on Mali/Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 23 March, 2018
Tomorrow 23 March 2018, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the situation in Mali and the Sahel. The Council will receive the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Mali and the Sahel. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), former Burundian President Pierre Buyoya will brief the Council on the political and security situation in Mali and the Sahel region. Representatives of the G5 Sahel member states, the United Nations, the European Union and the Africa 3 members of the Security Council will also make statements.
The session will consider the security situation in Mali and implementation of the Algiers peace Accord and recent security developments in the Sahel region. As part of the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Council will also consider developments made towards the operationalization of the Joint Force.
On the situation in Mali
Despite progress being made with the 2015 Algiers Accord For peace and Reconciliation in Mali, the delay in the implementation of some key aspects of the Accord remains to be a significant concern for the AU. In the report to the AU Assembly in January 2018, the PSC identified differences of opinion among the stakeholders as the main factor for delays in implementing the agreement. As part of the implementation effort, the Mediation and the Follow-up Committee of the Agreement (CSA), the main follow-up mechanism to the 2015Algiers Peace Accord, designated the Carter Center as the independent observer responsible for overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement. Following the meeting of the CSA in December 2017, an agreement has been reached in the determination of the criteria and quotas for the integration of ex-combatants into the new Malian army subject to validation by the National Council for Security Sector Reform (CNRSS). Only limited progress has been made in terms of the other critical areas of the agreement, namely establishment of transitional regional authorities in Northern Mali, decentralization, the operationalization of the Operational Coordinating Mechanism (MOC) and the process for the integration of ex-combatants into Malian army and the demobilization and reintegration of others into society. The PSC session will examine progress made and efforts required to remove the obstacles.
The regional, local and communal elections scheduled for April 2018 is expected to be another matter of immediate importance during tomorrow’s PSC meeting. It is to be recalled that the elections were postponed from the initial schedule of December 2017 due to concerns over the weak security situation in northern Mali, the delay in the operationalization of the interim authorities, the status of refugees and the non-finalization of review of the Code of local Communities and the Law on the Free Administration of Territorial authorities. Despite expression of agreement by the parties to finalize discussions on conditions for the organization of peaceful and credible elections scheduled for next month including specifically in relation to the issues that caused the delay, the progress from these discussions remains unclear. In this regard, PSC members would be interested to know whether the necessary preparations for holding the April elections would be finalized timely and how the AU could help in this regard. Another separate but related issue that may feature in tomorrow’s meeting is how the elections in April will affect the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for July 2018.
The security situation in the wider Sahel region
Mali and the region remain unstable and suffer from the sporadic attacks by the numerous armed groups active in the region, which take advantage of porous borders and ungoverned territories. The notorious Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and others including smaller groups like al- Murabitoun and Ansar ed-Dine, continue to stage asymmetric attacks across the region.
There is no sign of improvement to the gravity of the security threat that the presence of these various armed terrorist groups and organized criminal networks pose to the region. Apart from criminal activities including trafficking in weapons and migrants, the groups are involved in targeting of civilians and humanitarian organizations, bombings of hotels and restaurants in capital cities of the countries of the region, ambushes on military bases and personnel including those of the French Operation Barkhane and UN’s MINUSMA. According to the UN, with close to 150 deaths since 2013, its peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA has become the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission in its history.
It would be recalled that the ambush that took place on 4 October 2017, in Tongo Tongo, in Niger, resulted in the loss of dozen of Nigerien and American soldiers. The latest such attack took place in Burkina Faso and Niger. On 2 March the al-Qaeda affiliated Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) orchestrated an unprecedented attack in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou daringly targeting the army headquarters and the French Embassy. In this attack that directly challenged the center of power 30 people lost their lives and 85 others were wounded. The same group also took responsibility for the February 21 attack near the border with Niger, which killed 2 French soldiers and left a third injured. A clash on 19 March 2018 between the Fulani and Dogon communities in central Mali further highlights the insecurity adding an inter-communal dimension.
The G5 Sahel Joint Force
In 2017, the countries of the region making up the G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania) established a Joint Force with the aim of neutralizing the rising security threat that these groups pose. While condemning the recent attack in Ouagadougou, the AU Commission Chairperson Mussa Faki Mahamat underscored ‘the urgency of a more sustained international action in support of the efforts of the countries of the region, particularly through the G5 Sahel Joint Force’. The G5 Joint Force is envisaged to work alongside the 4,000 French troops deployed in the region since 2013, and the MINUSMA mission which commands 12,000 peacekeepers.
The PSC mandated the deployment of the Joint Force for an initial period of one year in the communiqué of its 679th meeting of April 2017. In authorizing the deployment of the Force, the PSC envisaged that the 5000 strong Force would comprise not only military but also police and civilian components. Apart from the Force headquarters, the Joint Force is organized in three sectors: Western (Mauritania and Mali), Central (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) and Eastern (Chad and Niger).
In terms of the operationalization of the Force, the Force headquarters was set up in Sévaré, Mali at the end of 2017. On 31 October 2017, the Force undertook its first cross border operation, ‘Hawbi’, in the central sector involving Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It has since undertaken its second operation in the same sector. Given the plan for the Force to achieve its full operationalization during this month, this session would review the progress made to this end. Two areas would in particular be of interest to the PSC, namely the establishment of the command and organizational structures of the Force and the provision of support including funding of the Joint Mission.
With respect to the command and organizational set up of the Joint Force, progress was reported in the establishment of Central Command Post of the Force. In this session, PSC is expected to hear about the full operationalization of the Central Command Post and its coordination with and setting up of sectors’ command. Another area of interest is the mechanism required for ensuring coordination between the Joint Force and the various other regional and international operations in the Sahel, and with other Sahel countries outside of the G5, notably Algeria.
The PSC communiqué authorizing the Force stipulated the need for the participation of civilian capacity particularly with focus on ensuring compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL). Similarly, the UN Security Council Resolution 2391 (2017) requires the G5 countries and the Joint Force not only to take steps for avoiding civilian harm and follow due process in handling terrorist suspects including non-nationals but also to put in place a robust human rights and IHL compliance framework. As the experience of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has attested, the presence of civilian capacity with focus on protection of civilians is critical particularly in terms of avoiding the pitfalls that the planning and conducting military operations face with respect to civilian protection. Given the lessons from its various missions including AMISOM, it would be fitting for the AU to take active role in the establishment of the necessary civilian structures and tools for the proper integration of human rights and IHL in the processes and operations of G5 Sahel Joint Force.
In terms of the support required for the Joint Force, it is estimated that the annual cost of the Force is close to $500 million. While each of the members of the G5 pledged $10 million, the EU has increased its contribution from the initial $61 million to 143 million during the 23 February 2018 pledging conference that the AU, G5 Sahel and the EU jointly convened in Brussels with the participation of 30 leaders. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pledged $ 100 million and $30 million respectively, with an additional $60 million coming from the United States. About $500 million have been pledged during the conference. In this regard, issues of interest for the PSC include the operationalization of the mechanism for the disbursement of international financial support and, as AU Commission Chairperson observed, how speedily these pledges will be felt on the ground. In terms of transparent management and relatively efficient utilization of the funds as well.
In reviewing the steps taken in the implementation of PSC’s communiqué of 13 April 2017, another interesting development has been the resolution that the UNSC adopted on 8 December 2017 (2391). Consistent with the PSC communiqué, resolution 2391 adopted the provision of operational and logistical support to G5 Sahel Joint Force through MINUSMA, including medical and casualty evacuation capabilities, access to life support consumables, and engineering support. For Niger, it expects the PSC to call on partners to provide logistical support and speed up the delivery of the pledged funds.
While welcoming the contributions from partners, the council members are expected to discuss the leadership role that the members of the G5 in collaboration with the AU play for the initiative and the operations. Earlier meetings highlighted that the intervention by foreign partners should be ‘a support based on requirements expressed by members of the G5 Sahel’. A major area of interest for the PSC is the level of involvement of the AU in the implementation of the G5 Sahel Task Force including in putting in place mechanisms for facilitating support for the Force and its reporting on the elements of PSC decisions mandating the Force. Some of the members of the PSC like Algeria could emphasize the importance of a political strategy on which security measures should be anchored. The primacy of the political could not be emphasized enough. Experience in Africa and elsewhere in the world has shown that a military approach on its own could not be a recipe for success.
Algeria, which will attend the meeting both as PSC member and in its capacity as chair of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali would be interested to know where things stand in terms of follow up on the 13 April 2017 communiqué of the PSC. This include cooperation with Sahel countries that are not members of the G5 Sahel within the framework of the implementation plan of the concept of operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. In this respect, during the visit of the AU Commission Chairperson to Algeria from 10 to 12 March, discussions with Algeria underscored the need for reviving the Nouakchott Process on Enhancing Security Cooperation in the Sahelo-Saharan Region and ensure an effective coordination between the various initiatives underway in the Sahel region. Chairperson Faki told Algerian authorities AU’s plan for convening, in Nouakchott, a meeting, at the end of the month, on the Sahel for promoting synergy between the various initiatives on the Sahel.
The PSC is expected to adopt a communiqué renewing the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force for another 12 month period and identifying various areas for AU follow up and action including in relation to the elections in Mali and the full operationalization of the G5 Sahel Force.