PSC Briefing on DRC
Amani Africa
Date | 13 March, 2018
Tomorrow 13 March 2018, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Apart from the possible statement from Ambassador Smail Chergui, the African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, the PSC expects to receive a briefing from the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in the DRC, Ambassador Abdou Abarry. Others expected to make statements include the DRC and representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), UN, Africa 3 members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU).
The political situation in the country
There are at least two issues that PSC members expect to deliberate on with respect to the political situation in the country. The first concerns the rising political instability resulting from the tension between the government and opposition groups and protesters. The other relates to existing concerns regarding preparations for the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016.
With opposition groups and civil society organizations mobilizing pressure against President Laurent Kabila and the government’s authoritarian drift increasingly resorting to repression and heavy-handed security responses, the country continues to witness recurring political instability. What triggered the most recent tensions and protests in various parts of the country was the failure to respect the previously agreed upon deadline of December 2017 for the holding of the presidential election.
Nine people died and ninety eight others were injured as security forces responded with violence to the protest that the Catholic Church called on 31 December 2017. In another wave of demonstration on 21 January 2018, six people were reportedly killed, sixty-eight injured and one hundred twenty one others were arrested, triggering strong condemnation including from the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. Most recently, government crackdown on protests that the Catholic Church called after Sunday service on 25 February led to the death of two people in Kinshasa and Mbandaka. According to the UN Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), thirty seven others were injured and more than one hundred arrested.
Apart from the loss of legitimacy of the government and protesters’ determination of putting pressure on the government for implementing the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016 on political transition, uncertainty over President Kabila’s plan to honour the constitutional term limit underline the political tension. Lambert Mende, DRC Information Minister clarified the position of the government on 5 February, saying that President Kabila will not run for re-election. Despite lingering suspicions that the President could extend his term should he find an opportunity for effecting constitutional term limit, such clear statement from the government affirms commitment to the Saint Sylvester’s agreement that bars the President from standing for another election.
The question of the non-extension of President Kabila’s term is not simply an issue of constitutionalism and rule of law. The other aspect of the question is the availability of workable exit strategy for the president. As such, the resolution of this crisis depends not only on the constitutional dimension of this issue which ensures compliance with the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement but also on crafting such a strategy.
As part of the process for creating conditions for the holding of the elections in December 2018, the implementation of confidence building measures, as has been urged by the AU and the UN, would be important. In this regard the PSC session would discuss steps taken in releasing or suspending trial of members of the political opposition arrested for their political actions in the past few months and during the course of 2017. There are also expectations on the widening of the political space, respecting opposition activity and allowing the media and civil society to operate without repression.
With respect to the steps being taken to implement the new electoral calendar issued in early December 2017, until recently the government did not give firm guarantee that the general elections would be held as planned in December 2018. During the 26 January 2018 press conference he held after five years, President Kabila raised his concern that the cost of the elections would be ‘exorbitant’. In an interview that he gave to Reuters on 8 March 2018, Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala stated that ‘I confirm that in December this year the Congolse people will be brought to the ballot boxes’. While this statement is welcome, it is of interest to PSC members that the electoral commission (CENI) clarifies the details of the budget required for holding the elections and the source of funding. This is important for any discussion for external financial and logistical support to the electoral process.
It is to be recalled that DRC also blamed the delay in the elections on the challenges faced in finalizing the voter registration process. This exercise has been completed in all the 26 provinces of the country, including those that experienced major insecurity such as the Kasai region. In this regard, the PSC expects to receive updates particularly in relation to its earlier call on the government to submit, upon completion of voter registration, the bills on the convening of elections to the two houses of parliament for their timely adoption.
In terms of the operational details for convening the national elections, another area of interest relates to the impact of the electronic voting system on the timeline and conduct of the election. Apart from urging the full implementation of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016, the Catholic Bishops congress of 15-16 February called for the international certification of the new electoral voting machines. Despite the assurance that the Prime Minster gave that the digital voting system could help the election to run smoothly and in record time, the problems recently experienced when testing the system underscore the need for putting in place mechanisms able to address technical problems of the digital voting system that may derail or put in doubt the credibility of the planned elections.
Given the request of the PSC for the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a coordination mechanism bringing together regional and international actors that will facilitate policy coordination and mobilization of coherent support, tomorrow’s PSC session offers an opportunity to consider steps taken in this respect and the prospect of establishment of an international contact group. In this regard, the plan of a joint visit that the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary General are anticipated to undertake offers unique opportunity to ensure the government’s commitment for holding the elections without further postponement and within the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016. If it is undertaken following consultation with regional and international actors, this could also be the basis for exploring discussion on exploring workable exist strategy with President Kabila.
The security situation
In the context of the political uncertainties that emerged in the country following delays in holding national elections, DRC has also witnessed resurgence of rebel or militia groups and armed confrontations during the course of the past year. Both the number of armed groups and incidents of fighting have spiked. In terms of major violence the region that witnessed major violence has been the Kasai region. On 26 February, security forces repelled attack by alleged Kamuina Nsapu militants in this region, with the ensuing clash reportedly leaving one soldier and fourteen others dead. Conflict between Hema and Lendu communities escalated in Dungu area, Ituri province leaving sixty to one hundred people dead in 2018 and forcing in mid-February some 27,000 people to flee to Uganda.
While the spike in number of armed groups and armed fighting affect various parts of the country spreading at least across 10 provinces, more than 120 groups are reported to operate in the east and south east of the country. Armed groups such as Mayi Mayi Yakutumba have become increasingly active. On 15 February, the army reported killing forty eight members of armed group Mai Mai Yakutumba in South Kivu province, forcing some combatants to flee to Burundi and recapturing large areas.
In recent months, most significant incidents of fighting involved the armed group known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). This is the group that is believed to be the perpetrator of the attack on Semuliki in North Kivu that killed fifteen MONUSCO soldiers on the 8 December 2017. Despite a 12 February seizure by DRC army of the ‘grand bastion’ of ADF in Mwalika, fighting continues between DRC army and the ADF in the Mbanu-Kamango-Eringiti axis.
Inter-ethnic clashes also create further sources of insecurity in the country. In February, interethnic violence between the Lendu and Hema groups led to sixty fatalities in less than one week, causing unrest among the local population and leading to humanitarian concerns. Clashes between ethnic Hutu on one side and Nande and Hundu groups on other on 25-28 February left sixteen civilians and seven militiamen dead in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu.
The deterioration in the security situation that the above developments have caused has generated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the country. The UN has declared the country a Level three emergency, characterised as worst of the worst crisis. With an average of 5,500 people fleeing their home daily, DRC is reported to be the country most affected by conflict displacement for a second year in raw. The number of displaced people has exceeded 4.1 million people, more than in Syria. The UNHCR reported significant surge in the number of people from DRC seeking refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania.
Given that the deteriorating security situation carries regional consequences, it is of direct concern to DRC’s neighbors in the PSC particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. One of the factors that shape the dynamics in the PSC is the divergence in the nature of the relationship between DRC and its neighbors and the interest of its different neighbors. While Rwanda requested investigation into incursion on 13 February by Congolese army into its territory (during which three Congolese soldiers were killed), Uganda and DRC launched joint military operation against armed groups along their common borders. In terms of sub-regional organizations, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is most active. It has appointed former Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba as a special envoy to the DRC and dispatched various missions in 2017. Most recently on 3 February, SADC announced that it would open a liaison office in DRC. While it is clearly active, SADC is also seen as being sympathetic to President Kabila.
In the absence of a clear strategy shared by neighboring countries, SADC, UN and the AU both on the preparation of credible elections within the electoral calendar and on workable exit for President Kabila, it is unlikely that this PSC session would go beyond reiterating existing AU positions on the resolution of the political crisis. The PSC would welcome the idea of the joint mission of the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.
PSC Program of Work for the Month of March 2018
Amani Africa
Date | March 2018
Following consultation between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretariat and the incoming chair of the PSC, the draft provisional program of work of the month for March 2018 was considered and adopted at the 13th February 2018 session of the PSC. The provisional program is relatively light with only six sessions of which only four focusing on specific peace and security situations. As the 10 members of the PSC serving for the past two years conclude their tenure by the end of the month, time has also been assigned in this month’s program of work for the induction of the newly elected and returning members of the PSC. Niger, whose two-year term comes to an end at the end of the month, assumed the Chairpersonship of the PSC today. For Niger, the G5 Sahel joint force featuring in this month’s program of work is the main item of most direct interest.
When the Council started its program of the month this morning, it had two items on its agenda. One of these is the draft provisional program of work of the PSC for April 2018. It is the first time that the program of work for the next month is tabled for consideration on the very first day of the preceding month. The other is review of the preparation for the AU-PSC and EU-Political and Security Committee (PSC) joint mission to the Central African Republic. For ten years, the main mechanism in the partnership between the AUPSC and EU-PSC has been the annual joint consultative meeting that rotates between Addis Ababa and Brussels.
The two sides held their most recent consultative meeting in November 2017. With the joint mission, the two entities have established an additional mechanism that opens avenues for shared understanding and coherent and complementary policy approaches. The joint filed mission is scheduled to take place from 6 to 9 March 2018. The Council will meet just over a week later the 15th of March to discuss and adopt the report of the joint mission.
On 13 March, the council will examine the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). With the authoritarian drift of the government amid mounting opposition against the president over the delay in holding general elections, the political and security situation has become worrisome. This situation is marked by sporadic clashes between protesters and security forces in the capital Kinshasa and recurring fighting between proliferating armed militias and government forces in several other areas of the country. For the region and the AU, there are two major concerns. First, there is ever mounting fear over the impending relapse of the country back to major national scale conflicts. Second, the uncertainty over the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016. The proliferation of armed fighting and rising tension between opposition groups and the government has made the situation dire.
In its last meeting on DRC on 7 November 2017, the PSC discussed the report of its field mission by its members to the DRC from 22 to 26 October 2017. The meeting emphasized on the importance of the agreements signed by political stakeholders on a free, fair, peaceful, credible and transparent elections in the DRC, as a vehicle to a democratic transition, which failed to materialize as the electoral calendar was postponed for yet another one year.
One of the standing annual thematic agenda of the PSC relate to women and children in armed conflict. Following its annual schedule, the PSC will convene an open session on 13 March on the plight of women and children in Conflict situations. Apart from the expected role of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women and Peace and Security, the open session will involve, among others, the participation of representatives of RECs, embassies accredited to the AU and civil society organizations.
On 23 March, the council is scheduled to consider the situation in Mali and the Sahel and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The Council will receive the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Mali and the Sahel. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), former President Pierre Buyoya will brief the Council on the political and security situation in Mali. As part of the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Council will also consider the status of operationalization of the Force. The last time the council discussed the Sahel on 21 November 2017 it expressed its frustration on the slow progress in the implementation of the elements of the Algiers Process. It also expressed its concern on the worsening security situation in parts of Mali and the Sahel.
The three days between 26 to 28th March are dedicated to the induction of the new members of the council elected at the AU summit that took place at the end of January 2018. The induction moved to be held in Djibouti covers briefings on the PSC Protocol, the mandate of the PSC, the working methods of the PSC and the roles, among others, of its member states, the monthly rotating chairperson of the Council and the PSC Secretariat. Of the ten members of the PSC whose two-year term will start on 1 April 2018, only three countries namely Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo are current members re-elected for another two-year term. The induction will in particular be useful for the new members (Liberia and Morocco) that have no previous representation in the PSC. Guinea Bissau will be the last item on the agenda of the PSC for the month of March. On 29 March the council will receive a briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau. The country, which has been passing through a security and political crisis, last featured on the agenda of the PSC on 13 February 2018. The meeting noted the continued political standoff and the ‘paralysis affecting the government institutions and the People’s National Assembly’ as the biggest concern for stability. It called on civilian oversight of the security and armed forces and refrain from political intervention. The planned meeting on 29 March will review the political and security situation in the country and the status of the ECOWAS mission present in the country.
PSC Briefing on Somalia
Amani Africa
Date | 18 February, 2018
Tomorrow (15 February 2018) the Peace and Security Council is scheduled to hold a session on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM. The two part agenda of the session would involve briefing on the political stabilization process in Somalia and update on AMISOM activities and exit strategy. It is expected that the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, would provide the Council a briefing on the issues on this agenda. Others expected to participate and make statements include the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, Somalia, IGAD Chair and IGAD Special Envoy, the UN and the EU.
In terms of the political stabilization process in Somalia, the briefing is expected to highlight the state of the security situation, political and financial reforms and issues around the stabilization efforts. The security situation in Somalia remains fluid. In this regard, a major focus of interest is the continuing Al Shabaab suicide and car bombings and attacks including those directed at government and AMISOM targets. In the report of the PSC to the AU Assembly during the January 2018 summit described the capacity of al shabaab as ‘unprecedented’. Indeed, on 14 October 2017 Al Shabaab orchestrated in Mogadishu the most deadly attack that claimed the lives of more than 500 people. During the deliberations at the summit, the FGS representatives expressed reservations on parts of the PSC report. This is partly important due to its implications on the continuing push for AMISOM exit and transfer of responsibility to FGS.
On political reforms, issues of interest include progress in the federal state formation process, the constitutional review process and intra FGS cohesion and stability as well as relationship between the FGS and FMS. In some areas, positive developments have been reported. A case in point is the power-sharing agreement signed on Wednesday, between Galmudug state and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (AWSJ) in December 2018. Despite continuing challenges, the FGS continues to have dialogue with the FMS. Yet, problems continue to persist in other areas. These include infighting in the FGS, disagreements between the FGS and the FMS over some of the details of the national security architecture adopted in April 2017 and the political crisis in some parts of the country. The relationship between the FGS and the FMS experienced further strains as a result of the support that some of the FMS expressed to one of the parties in the Gulf crisis contrary to the neutral position that the FGS sought to pursue. There are fears in the AU that these various differences could re-ignite clan-based conflicts and reverse the political gains so far made.
Another area of interest on which the FGS would also give particular attention to is ongoing financial reforms.
In particular, issue of concern include steps being taken in establishing budgeting and auditing systems within the FGS and capacity for effective management and utilization of funds. Despite efforts in establishing sound financial system including with support from IMF and World Bank, corruption remains a major challenge with Somalia ranked as the most corrupt country in the world. Financial reforms and issues relating thereto have direct impact on the going conversation on transfer of responsibility to Somalia security forces. There have been instances in which non-payment of salaries created security vacuum which Al Shabaab took advantage of.
In terms of transition planning, a Core Group of Transition Planning has been established. Chaired by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the CGTP has the membership of the AU, EU, UN, FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS). This is a group tasked with the responsibility of developing a transition plan for transferring security responsibility to Somalia security forces.
On the security situation, efforts of AMISOM in gaining territory from Al Shabaab and fending off Al Shabaab attacks would be highlighted. Member states would be interested to know the gravity of the threat that Al Shabaab continues to pose and the security and political strategy particularly on the part of the FGS for scaling down the threat. In security terms, the nature and scale of the continued presence of AMISOM
depends on two major factors: the capacity of Al Shabaab to orchestrate serious attacks and the capacity of FGS for assuming increasing role in security.
Since 2011 Al Shabaab suffered major losses in the hands of AMISOM. It lost control of much of the territory that was under its command. Its commanders and leadership have also fallen victim to some of the drone strikes. While it has as a result lost much of its capacity to engage in direct fighting, it has not completely lost the capacity to orchestrate attacks and cause major damage. Despite AMISOM’s gain of 80 percept of the territory of the country, Al Shabaab remains in control of pockets of territory in rural south central Somalia and supply routs between towns. It also continues to show presence in various towns and to infiltrate the capital Mogadishu in pursuit of its suicide and car bombings and other attacks.
In terms of AMISOM activities, issues expected to be addressed include progress being made around AMISOM revised core tasks notably, joint operations with Somalia forces to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab and to secure main supply routes, building the capacity of Somalia security forces and supporting the early recovery and support extension of state authority. In this respect, the major areas of interest include the
training of Somalia security forces and the operations undertaken against Al Shabaab. It has been recently
reported that a joint operation of AMISOM and Somalia troops have pushed Al Shabaab out of various locations in Lower Shebelle Region.
Of major interest for PSC members including Egypt, Kenya and Uganda is issues relating to exit plan of AMISOM. Under the AMISOM exit strategy and UN Security Council resolution 2372, AMISOM would focus on building ‘a capable, accountable, acceptable, and affordable Somalia-led security sector’. Under Resolution 2372, AMISOM should withdraw 1,000 troops by Dec. 31, 2017, but increase its police component by 500, with more troop reduction anticipated during 2018. The AU reported in January 2018 that between ‘October and December 2017, a total of 1,000 AMISOM soldiers returned to their countries.’
Despite the exit strategy and the push for incremental withdrawal of AMISOM troops, implementation of the strategy faces major challenges. As noted above, Al Shabaab continues to pose serious threat. Significantly, the operationalization of the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) remains poor, with the operational readiness assessment revealing major weaknesses and lack of capacity of the SNSF. In this context, issues of interest would include verification of the capacity of the Somalia National Security Forces not only at the national level but also at states level and the establishment of a unified framework.
From the perspective of TCCs including Kenya, the chair of the PSC for the month of February 2018, this
session avails opportunity to highlight on-going activities of AMISOM with a focus on the challenges. Apart
from the continuing need for AMISOM to be equipped with the necessary capacity, including force enablers and multipliers, a major area of concern is the need for AMISOM to be provided with a predictable and
sustainable funding. For the FGS and some member states such as Egypt, attention would focus on channeling
support including funds to the Somalia security forces.
It is to be recalled that AMISOM has been underfunded following the European Union (EU) 20 percent cut in its payment of allowances to AMISOM personnel in 2016. This has affected the morale of AMISOM troops.
While efforts have been underway to make up for this shortfall, the EU, a major source of AMISOM funding, has indicated that it could not guarantee continuing funding of AMISOM from October 2018. In the light of the foregoing, member states would be interested to have information on the on going consultations that the AU and UN Special Envoys on AMISOM Funding have been undertaking. The PSC may in this regard underscore the imperative of finding realistic option for funding of AMISOM.
The expected outcome of this session is a communiqué.