Briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau
Amani Africa
Date | 11 June, 2019
Tomorrow (11 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing session on the situation in Guinea Bissau. The PSC is expected to receive update from the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the political stalemate in the country following the March 2019 parliamentary. Apart from the representative of Guinea-Bissau, the representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and representatives of the UN and the EU, who form part of the group of five international partners of Guinea-Bissau, are expected to make statements.
Guinea Bissau has been in political crisis for a number of years. Apart from the instability the country has faced from the military’s intervention in politics, in the aftermath of the 2014 elections, the major source of the crisis has been the power struggle between the various centers of power, notably the President, the Prime Minister and Parliament. In Guinea- Bissau’s semi-presidential system, the president is the head of state, with the power to appoint the prime minister. The prime minister, while accountable to the president, is the head of government from the party with the most seats in parliament and is vested with most of the executive power. The dismissal by President Jose Mario Vas in 2015 of Prime Minister Domingos Pereira plunged the country into political paralysis. According to the preliminary report of the AU Election Observer Mission, it led to a ‘de facto shut down’ of the National People’s Assembly. It was only after a protracted mediation effort of ECOWAS that the NPA has resumed parliamentary work and the date for election was set.
After delays from the initial timeline of November 2018, the parliamentary elections were held on 10 March. The votes were held in a stable and free atmosphere. The peaceful legislative elections were considered free and fair by AU and other international observers. In the elections, the ruling the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) won the highest number of seats in the NPA, giving it the power to form government. However, since PAIGC won only 47 of the 102 seats of the NPA, other parliamentary parties, notably the PAIGC breakaway party Movement for Democratic Change (MADEM), currently led by the president also play a role for appointment in parliament.
While many hoped that the elections would resolve the political instability, the various parties that secured seats in parliament, particularly the victories PAIGC and its rival MADEM have been unable to agree on appointments. Another stalemate emerged when the majority in parliament led by PAIGC rejected the candidacy of Braima Camará, who is the coordinator of the MADEM, as the second vice-president of the NPA. With the MADEM insisting on the candidacy of Camara for position of second vice-president, the resultant stalemate has hindered the full establishment of the office of the National People’s Assembly (NPA), the appointment of the prime minister and the formation of a new government. The president has made the appointment of a new prime minister conditional on resolving the NPA impasse. This raises suspicions that he’s trying to block Pereira – as head of the majority PAIGC alliance – from again becoming prime minister.
This new round of political deadlock now threatens the Stability Pact that was signed in February 2019 and the progress achieved under the Pact reflected in the convening of the peaceful and credible parliamentary elections held in March 2019. Instead of the commitment for the consolidation of the politics and institutions of the country based on the popular vote from the elections envisaged in the Pact, the political parties and their disagreement have returned the country back to the paralysis that ensued after the dismissal of the then prime minister.
The situation also presents further threats to the already precarious socio-economic and security situation in the country. The threat from drug trafficking in particular has increased. On 9 March, while the country was in the middle of the electoral campaign, police made a record seizure of 789 kg of cocaine. On 30 April, 72 kg of cocaine from Guinea- Bissau were seized by Senegalese customs in the Tambacounda region in eastern Senegal.
The current post-election stalemate also feared to affect the electoral calendar for the election of the president. The end of the constitutional term of the current President is on 23 June. If this timeline comes and passes without the formation of the new government, it is feared that this will result in a power vacuum.
On 24 May, the group of five international partners of Guinea-Bissau – the AU, CPLP, ECOWAS, European Union, and the United Nations – issued a statement expressing concern for the new political impasse and call for the “urgent” appointment of a new prime minister and government respecting the “sovereign will of the people of Guinea-Bissau” expressed in the 10 March legislative elections. They also encouraged the “urgent appointment of a new prime minister and the subsequent formation of a new government. Furthermore, the date of the presidential election must also be set to take place in 2019.”
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. It is expected that the PSC will urge the Guinea Bissau political actors to prioritize the national interest and proceed with the formation of a new government reflecting the sovereign will of the people expressed in the parliamentary election before the end of the constitutional term of the president.
Emergency session on the Situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 6 June, 2019
Tomorrow (6 June) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold an emergency session on the situation in Sudan. As this was not initially planned in the provisional program of work of the PSC for June, the session was agreed on following an informal consultation that the PSC had on Monday morning 3 June 2019.
It is expected that the Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the Commission, who has been tasked to follow the situation in Sudan and brief the PSC, will brief the PSC on the most recent developments. Sierra Leone’s Permanente Representative to the AU, Ambassador Brima Patrick Kapuwa, the PSC Chairperson of the month, will also make an opening remark. As per established PSC practice, the representatives of Sudan, and Ethiopia, as Chair of the regional body the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are also expected to make statements.
Tomorrow’s session follows the latest developments indicating the deterioration of the situation in Sudan. According to various reports, on 3 June a group from the security forces initiated an operation for dispersing the sit-in camp near the military headquarters that has been the epicentre of the protest movement in the days before and since the removal of the country’s long-time President Omer Hassen al Bashir. The accounts of various reports and media footage show that the security forces used live ammunitions and tear gas. While initial reports put the death toll from the violent crackdown at over 30 people, the most recent
reports indicate that it has reached over 60 people. Hundreds of other people have also reportedly been injured.
There were also reports of hospitals and clinics, where the wounded were receiving emergency treatment, being besieged and attacked. Following this incident, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), coordinating body of the protest movement, announced its suspension of all communication with the TMC and called for sweeping civil disobedience against the military council. The Forces for Declaration of Freedom and Change (FDFC), which represented the protesters and various opposition forces, also called for the end of military rule. The head of the TMC Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan announced plans for holding elections in a period of nine months. He also declared that the agreements reached with the civilian stakeholders have also been scrapped.
There are concerns that these developments affect the negotiations for the formation of a civilian-led transition in at least two ways. First, the events of 3 June and the subsequent
announcement from both sides has brought the negotiation to a halt. Second, these developments have also reversed the progress made in the negotiations. It is to be recalled that the PSC in its communique of the 852nd session noted the progress made including in particular ‘with regard to the agreement reached on duration of the Transition, the Transitional Institutions and the priorities of the transition’. Another issue for the PSC in the light of these difficult set of situations is whether there is a realistic prospect for an agreement to form a
civilian-led transitional authority after the 3 June tragic events and the rescinding of the agreements reached between the TMC and the FDFC. Central to this question is the implication of the language civilian-led transition vis-à-vis the leadership of the sovereign council.
The AUC Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, has released a statement on 3 June. In the statement, he expressed his strong condemnation of the violence and called for ‘an immediate and transparent investigation in order to hold those all responsible accountable’. The statement further stated the demand that
the Sudanese stakeholders return to the negotiations urgently in order to arrive at an inclusive accord, which paves the way for a civilian-led Transitional Authority.
On 4 June, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting called by the United
Kingdom and Germany. While the Council members did not agree on an outcome document, many have expressed concern over the violence against protesters. The UK condemning the violent crackdown killing so many protesters called for agreed transfer of power to civilian-led government. Germany on its part, noting that legitimacy cannot come from the barrel of a gun, stressed ‘the urgent need for a return to the negotiation table to bring about an inclusive, civilian-led transitional government.’ It was reported that Russia during the emergency session of the Council insisted that the Council should await the response of the AU.
For members of the PSC, there are at least two issues that the current situation presents. The first of this is whether under the current circumstances the PSC can continue to wait until the end of the two-month period it set at its 846th session before determining the application of the measures envisaged under the Lome Decalration of 2000 after a military seized power. At the heart of this question is if these are not the kind of situations envisaged in the PSC’s affirmation at its 852nd session that ‘it shall, at any time deemed appropriate in view of the prevailing circumstances in the country, take the necessary measures, including imposition of sanctions, in line with article 7(g) of its Protocol’.
The other issue on which PSC members may wish to get Mahamat’s view is what the
prospects are for the parties to return back to the negotiating table to continue from where the negotiations stopped. While Burhan in his Eid celebrations address expressed regret about the civilian casualties and affirmed readiness for negotiations, it remains uncertain if the SPA and FDFC will accept resumption of talks and if the negotiations will be from scratch or continue from where they stopped.
An IGAD meeting at the level of Ambassadors has been called. It is expected that the meeting will deliberate on how to respond to the latest developments and on a plan to dispatch a delegation to Khartoum. While IGAD has clearly been slow to respond, the outcome of this meeting informs the position that the Chair of IGAD will present during tomorrow’s session. From the deliberations of the meeting IGAD aligns its position with that of the AU. It is noteworthy that IGAD does not have similar rules against military takeover of power and the measures envisaged under the Lome Decalration.
The expected outcome of the session is a communique. Depending on whether the PSC decides to apply the Lome Declaration, there are major implications in terms of AU’s zero tolerance position vis à-vis military takeover of power. Even if the PSC decides to apply the measures envisaged in the Lome Declaration by imposing suspension, it would still require, as envisaged in the Declaration, to institute a process to facilitate negotiations towards transfer of power to a civilian-led authority paving the way for restoration of constitutional order in Sudan. Thus, apart from reiterating the statement of the AUC Chairperson of the Commission condemning the violence against unarmed protesters and demanding independent investigation, the PSC may, in terms of resumption of negotiations, additionally consider to affirm the continued validity of the agreements reached thus far and request the AUC Chair to designate a highrepresentative that will, working with the UN Special Envoy, facilitate the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of a civilianled transitional authority.
PSC provisional program of work for June 2019
Amani Africa
Date | June 2019
For the month of June 2019, Sierra Leone will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Prepared under the leadership of Sierra Leone’s Permanente Representative to the AU Brima Patrick Kapuwa, the provisional program of work of the PSC for the month adopted on 7 May envisages some nine sessions. These includeeight closed sessions and one open session.Two of the closed sessions will focus on two country situations. During the month there is also a planned PSC retreat.
On 4 June, the monthly PSC program of work starts with a session deliberating on two agenda items. The first is the preparation for the African Amnesty month within the context of the AU Master Roadmap to Silence the Guns by the Year 2020 and building momentum for the effective implementation of the Agenda 2063 goals. Among others, this is expected to review the state of continental and regional efforts for effectively addressing illicit movement of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), one of the major drivers of conflict in Africa.
The following day on 5 June the committee of experts will meet to engage in preparatory works for two planned PSC activities. The first preparatory meeting is on PSC retreat that is planned to take place in Rabat, Morocco in the last week of June and is expected to work on the agenda and working documents of the retreat. The other is the preparation for the 13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN
Security Council.
On 6 June, the PSC is scheduled to have two agenda items. It will have the first country specific session on the situation in Guinea Bissau. As a major country of concern for West Africa it was initially on the agenda when Nigeria was chairing the PSC, however the session could not be held. Guinea Bissau is brought back on the agenda for June under Sierra Leone. The PSC is expected to receive update on the political stalemate in the country following the March 2019 parliamentary election that prevented the formation of a new government, exacerbating the existing precarious political and socio-economic situation.
The second agenda of the day is a briefing on elections in Africa. This is the periodic briefing that the AU Department of Political Affairs regularly presents to the PSC. It is expected to give update on elections held since the last briefing and on the upcoming elections. On 11 June, the PSC will have its second session on a country situation, focusing on South Sudan. This will focus on the steps being taken and challenges faced in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement, including where the process for the formation of the national unity government stands.
On 13 June, the PSC will deliberate on three agenda items. First, it will consider the renewal of UNAMID mandate which will end on 30 June. The session is expected to provide clarity on the kind of conditions under which the mandate will be renewed in the context of the contested transition under way following the military coup in Sudan. Subsequently, building on the preparatory work of the committee of
experts undertaken earlier in the month, the PSC willconsider two preparatory activities, namely the preparations for the 13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC and for the PSC retreat expected to take place in Rabat at the end of the Month.
On 14 June, the PSC is expected to receive and consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the implementation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy, including the institutional and operational developments.
The one open session of the month is planned to take place on 20 June to commemorate the African Refugee Day. It is expected to be held under the theme ‘Advancing Refugee Protection in Africa in the Context of Human Rights’. The operationalization of the African Humanitarian deliberations.
On 21 June, the PSC will receive an update on the AU peace support operations doctrine and the monthly briefing on the harmonization of the ACIRIC within ASF.
After the retreat from 24-26 June, the last activity of the month will take place on 28 June on the briefing by the Chairperson of the PSC to the PRC on the activities of the PSC during the
month of June. In addition to these agenda items, the provisional program of the month also envisions in footnotes additional items that may be added in the course of the month. These include the three-week update by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Sudan. Additionally, meeting of the Military Staff
Committee may also take place.
