Open Session on Children in situations of Armed Conflicts in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 15 April, 2019
Tomorrow (16 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have an open session on children affected by armed conflict in Africa.
During this session, it is expected that Amira Elfadil Mohammed Elfadil, AUC Commissioner of Social Affairs, Benyam Dawit Mezumr member of the African Committee of Experts on the Right and Welfare of the Child and Special Rapporteur on Children and Armed Conflict, will brief the PSC. Assefa Bequele founder of the African Child Policy Forum, UNICEF and Save the Children representatives are also expected to make a statement. The PSC Chair of the month, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, of Nigeria, who is the Chair of the PSC for April, will make opening remarks.
The 21st Ordinary Executive Council Session held in Addis Ababa in June 2012, adopted Decision EX.CL/Dec.712 (XXI) in which it requested the PSC to take into consideration the rights of the child in its agenda and cooperate actively with the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC). Following this decision, the first PSC open session exclusively focusing on children affected by armed conflicts was held in May 2014 at the 434th meeting. Since then, efforts were made by the PSC and ACERWC in institutionalizing the session on the topic by convening regular PSC open sessions.
According to the 2016 ACERWC ‘Continental Study on the Impact of Conflict and Crises on Children in Africa’ states that conflict in the continent accounts for a 50 per cent increase in infant deaths and a 15 per cent increase in under nutrition. Children are twenty-four times more exposed to death in armed conflict due to illness and injury than in peacetime.
Tomorrow’s session is taking place within the context of the AU theme for 2019, ‘the Year of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees: Towards Durable Solutions to Forced Displacement in Africa’ and it also makes linkages to the Silencing the Guns by 2020. The session is expected to take stock of previous PSC decisions and AU’s response to protecting children affected by armed conflicts. There have been quite a significant number of PSC outcome documents since 2010 on the impact of armed conflict on children. However there has not been systematic follow up mechanism on items that require implementation and regular review. The session may address the lack or limited implementation of standards and policies and the absence of a robust oversight and coordination capacity through this stock taking exercise on the protection of children in situations of armed conflicts.
One of the major PSC decisions that is yet to be implemented is the appointment of a special envoy on children to draw more attention and action on issues of child rights, education and protection, particularly in the context of conflict. This decision has been a standing item in the PSC outcome documents since 2014 and in the subsequent PSC sessions dedicated to children.
The lack of implementation of this decision and others is not completely surprising. It in part has to do with the lack of clear strategy that guides and informs decisions such as the appointment of a special envoy on children. Additionally, this lack of implementation also reflects the lack of due consideration at the time of making decision to the institutional, legal and resource implications of decisions particularly those involving the establishment of new mechanisms. There is thus a need for the PSC to have a study that addresses these issues including vis-a-vis the mandate of the AU Special Envoy on Women and Peace and Security and the role of the Children’s Committee, which itself has a dedicated rapporteur on the theme of children in armed conflicts.
Indeed, the issue of the impact of conflict on children is also addressed within the framework of the one of the standing themes of the PSC on women peace and security in Africa. The 757th session especially urged for an extraordinary AU summit dedicated to the plight of women and children to mobilize political support and recourses to respond to the needs of women and children. Although this decision did not fully materialize, the 2019 AU theme on humanitarian focus offers an opportunity to highlight the vulnerability of children in conflict and humanitarian situations.
Some of the recent PSC sessions on children have increasingly focused on the impact of conflict on children’s access to education. In this context the 706th and 597th PSC sessions held in May 2016 and July 2017 respectively shed light primarily on attacks on schools and on out-of-school children due to protracted conflicts and violence. The military use of schools and presence of troops and weapons inside schools have been highlighted. The 2016 session has particularly indicated that more than 12 million children are denied of education due to attacks on school and violence. Hence the PSC called on member states to endorse the Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use During Armed Conflicts, also commonly known as the “Safe Schools Guidelines”. Moreover at its 706th session the PSC has called for the establishment of a comprehensive child protection architecture within the AUC to monitor and track the effective implementation of various instruments adopted at continental and international level.
Beyond its aim to take the issues affecting education of children in situations of armed conflict, this session is expected to reflect broadly on the impact of conflicts on children including killing and maiming, abductions, sexual abuse, recruitment of children as armed combatants, attacks on education and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access. The launch of the recent ACERWC report on children on the move can further generate momentum in underlining the particular needs of children in armed conflicts. Elfadil in her briefing is expected to highlight key issues raised in the report. The report elaborates on the drivers of forced displacement and states that ‘no other continent has witnessed armed conflicts that have adverse effects on children like the African continent’. The report further asserts that children constitute 53% of the total 5.4 million refugees in the continent.
The PSC is expected to make reference and follow up on commitments made during the previous sessions. Particularly the PSC may reiterate the primary responsibility of governments to ensure that children are protected and that their rights and welfare are respected by particularly ratifying and implementing all the relevant legal instruments. Significant children specific PSC decisions are related to ratification, domestication and enhancing implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other international child protection, rights and welfare instruments.
The expected outcome is a press statement.
Briefing session on the situation in Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 14 April, 2019
Tomorrow (15 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene on an emergency meeting on the situation unfolding in Sudan.
It is expected that the AU Peace and Security Department, will brief the PSC. Sudan’s Ambassador and representative of IGAD are also expected to make statements. It is anticipated that the session will focus on the conditions of the ouster of long time President of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir the precious day on 11 April and the nature of the transition that the army leadership announced after removing Bashir.
The move of the Sudanese army ousting Bashir came after months of peaceful popular protests that covered many parts of Sudan. The protests began on 19 December in the northern town of Atbara after a major spike in the price of bread. As the protests spread to many other parts of Sudan including notably the capital Khartoum, the demand of the protesters shifted into broader political change with a particular focus on the departure of Bashir from power.
The army ousted Bashir after the protesters mobilized major demonstrations running for a number of days since April 6 outside of the military headquarters in Khartoum. When announcing the removal of Bashir, the First Vice President and Minister of Defence Awad Ibn Auf declared the suspension of the Constitution, the dissolution of the National Assembly, the formation of a military-led transitional government which will rule for two years, and the arrest of President Omar al Bashir, as well as the imposition of a state of emergency for three months. Since then the military Awad IbnAuf himself resigned and Lt-General Abdel Fattah Burhan assumed the region of power. Despite reconciliatory tone of the new head of the Military Council, protesters continue to demand the establishment of a civilian administration.
These turn of events, particularly the abrogation of transitional government power by the military and the suspension of the Constitution, raised the question of the application of the AU norm on unconstitutional changes of government. Unsurprisingly, the AU Commission Chairperson issued a press statement on the situation. In the statement the Chairperson expressed ‘the African Union conviction that the military take-over is not the appropriate response to the challenges facing Sudan and the aspirations of its people.’ While appealing to all stakeholders to engage in an inclusive dialogue to create the conditions that will make it possible to meet the aspirations of the Sudanese people to democracy, good governance and well-being and restore constitutional order as soon as possible, the Chairperson reiterated the strong condemnation, under the Lome Declaration of 2000 and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (African Democracy Charter), ‘of any unconstitutional change of Government and commit member states to the respect of the rule of law, democratic principles and human rights.’
Tomorrow’s session was also anticipated in the Chairperson’s statement. It is expected that the PSC will make a determination on whether the transition in Sudan constitutes a military coup warranting the application of the measures envisaged under the Lome Declaration and the African Democracy Charter. The military takeover of transitional authority under a Military Council, the suspension of the constitution and the declaration of state of emergency are all the constituent elements of a military coup. As such, it is expected that the PSC will designate the situation in Sudan as an unconstitutional change of government.
What is not clear is whether the PSC will proceed to institute the consequences that flow from the occurrence in a member state of an unconstitutional change of government. While the reading of the Lome Declaration and other relevant instruments of the AU including the AU Constitutive Act and the dominant practice of the AU suggests that the application of suspension of the country in which unconstitutional change happened to be automatic, there have been instances in which the PSC opted for holding back the automatic application of the legal consequences. This is done to use the threat of sanction as leverage for pushing democratic change and deploy an incremental application of sanctions.
It may be recalled that in a similar situation in Burkina Faso in 2014 the PSC opted for the suspension of the automatic application of the consequences of the occurrence of a military seizure of power. After widespread protests against the change of constitutional term limit he was pushing through Parliament for seeking a third term, Burkina Faso’s then President Blaise Compaore fled out of the country at the end of October 2014. On his departure, the army took over the reign of power. The AU through the statement of the Chairperson of the AU commission announced its rejection of unconstitutional changes. At its meeting on 3 November 2014, the PSC informed the army that the seizure by the army of power was contrary to the AU norm on unconstitutional changes. But as opposed to the usual practice of suspending Burkina Faso immediately, the PSC, on the advise of the then Chairperson of the AU Commission Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, used the threat of suspension as a leverage for quick transfer of power by the military to a transitional civilian authority. Accordingly, the PSC gave Burkina Faso’s army a period of two weeks for handing over power to such civilian authority.
From the perspective of applying the AU norm banning unconstitutional change of government to support peaceful transition in Sudan, this approach used in Burkina Faso could as well be the option that the PSC could opt for. The result of this could be the rejection and condemnation of the seizure of power by the army as unconstitutional and the provision of a timeline for the army to negotiate with various stakeholders on the streets protesting for handing over power to an inclusive civilian transitional authority.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. In accordance with Lome Declaration of 2000 and the Addis Ababa Democracy Charter, it is expected to condemn the military seizure of power and urge the transfer of power to a civilian transitional administration, failing which the PSC would take the relevant measures including suspension of Sudan from the AU and targeted sanctions as applicable. As in Burkina Faso, the PSC could request the AU High Level Panel to support the Sudanese actors in handing over power to an inclusive civilian authority and elaborate a road map for addressing outstanding issues of the various peace processes in Sudan and for instituting reforms for achieving democratic change.
Briefing session on international and regional initiatives in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel Regions
Amani Africa
Date | 9 April, 2019
Tomorrow (9 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to a briefing session on security in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. This session is set to have two segments. The first segment focuses on counter terrorism and violent extremism in the Lake Chad and the Sahel regions, with particular attention on strengthening AU support to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) and G5 Sahel Joint Force. The second segment is on the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. It is expected that the Chairperson of the AU Commission will present his report on Mali and the Sahel.
It is anticipated that Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, will introduce the Chairperson’s report. Representatives of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the G5 Sahel Secretariat, member states of the two regional arrangements and Nigeria as the Chair of the PSC are also expected to make statements.
In terms of the focus of tomorrow’s session, the Chairperson’s report is expected to provide update on the security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad. Notwithstanding the plethora of security actors in the region, which was the subject of the 818th session of the PSC, in the Sahel the security situation continues to exhibit deterioration. According to the UN, 125 security incidents were registered from 1 July to 15 September, approximately double the number of incidents registered throughout the whole of 2017. Attacks against civilians, Government officials and security and defense forces, particularly in northeastern Burkina Faso and the Niger, show that the terrorist threat in the Sahel is spreading.
In Burkina Faso, attacks by armed groups against security and civilian targets, previously concentrated in the north, have spread to the east and southwest. The attack in Mali on 23 March
2019, the deadliest in the region since 2013 since 2013, by a Dozo hunting militia killing at least 160 Fulani in central Mali near the border with Burkina Faso, indicates the multidimensional character of the sources and manifestations of insecurity, with inter-communal tensions erupting into major acts of violence. With respect to the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin, the operational tactics of Boko Haram appeared to be changing from attacking mostly civilian targets to direct attacks on military targets. Despite increased military operations, Boko Haram continues to orchestrate increasing, occasionally, large-scale attacks. There were more than 17 attempts by the group to overrun army bases since July 2018, and on 29 November 2018, the Nigerian army announced recent attacks by the Boko Haram killed 39 soldiers in northeast Nigeria. According to the statement of the Nigerian army ‘in the last two to three months, we have noticed daring moves by the terrorists, (involving) increased use of drones against our defensive positions and infusion of foreign fighters in their ranks.’
On the MNJTF and AU’s support to the Joint Force, it is to be recalled that the 816th session of the PSC requested the AU Commission to collaborate with the LCBC plus Benin to address
the threat posed by the increasing use by Boko Haram of the drones. The PSC also tasked the Commission to mobilize additional support to fill in the shortfall in MNJTF capabilities ‘in terms of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) equipment, Amphibious equipment, communication equipment, and for the Task-Force to have, at its disposal, the necessary resources for effectively implementing Quick Impact and Peace ConsolidatingProjects, as well as to provide humanitarian support to the affected population in need.’ Tomorrow’s meeting will provide update on the efforts of the AUC to support the MNJTF in filling some of the gaps in its capabilities and address the new challenges facing it from the changes in tactics of Boko Haram.
The operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force is another subject expected to receive attention in both the Chairperson’s report and the interventions from the G5 Sahel. It is to be recalled that the attack on the headquarters of the G5 Joint Force in June 2018 destroyed critical infrastructure and communications equipment, resulting in the temporary suspension of Joint Force operations. The G-5 Sahel Defense and Security Committee in its meeting of 25 October in Niamey decided to relocate the Joint Force headquarters to Bamako. Progress has been observed in terms of the deployment of the pledged forces making up the G5 Joint Force.
The G-5 Sahel member states have deployed more than 80 per cent of their troops, manned all sector headquarters and completed the transfer of authority for all command posts. There remain major challenges for the full and effective operationalization of the G5 Joint Force. Major equipment shortfalls, capability gaps, insufficient infrastructure and a lack of secured operational bases continue to delay its full operationalization. In terms of funding, a briefing to the UNSC at the end of 2018, observed that almost 50 per cent of pledges made have not been earmarked, let alone disbursed. Despite the UNSC authorization under Resolution 2391 (2017) for the UN Mission in Mali (MUNISMA) to provide logistics support to the Joint Force, MINUSMA continues to face a funding gap of almost $30 million for providing the expected support. In the light of the request of the UN Security Council for options to overhaul the mission in Mali, the implication of this in terms of support for the G5 Joint Force is a major issue of interest for tomorrow’s session.
In an attempt to address the challenges of predictability and sustainability of funding, the G5 countries and the AU have been seeking to secure a UN Chapter VII mandate and a support package akin to that offered to the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) based on UN assessed contributions. This has faced major objection particularly from the US. In the meantime, the AU can continue to assist in the mobilization of partner support to the MNJTF, particularly in terms of the release of the pledged funds. From the perspective of enhancing the AU support to the G5 Sahel and the MNJTF, a point of departure is the full implementation of the MoU signed between the AU Commission and the G5 Sahel Secretariat.
Possible additional options that could be explored in tomorrow’s session for funding the G5 Joint Force and the MNJTF include the possibility of mobilizing further funding from the European Union’s African Peace Facility and accessing funds mobilized from AU member states during 2017-2018 for the Peace Fund.
The second segment of the session will focus on the renewal of the mandate of the MNJTF. It is to be recalled that the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF at its 759th session held on 23 March 2018 for additional twelve months effective from 12 April. The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC would reiterate its call on all countries and organisations that made pledges to honour to ensure the effective operationalization of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. It is also expected that the PSC would also call for greater complementarity and enhanced synergy among the various processes, initiatives and mechanisms addressing peace and security in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin regions. The PSC could also request to receive regular updates on the implementation of its previous decisions on the mobilization of support to the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel Joint Force.
Sensitisation Session on International Disarmament
Amani Africa
Date | 04 April, 2019
Tomorrow (4 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a sensitization session on International Disarmament with a focus on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The concept note of this 837th meeting envisages that tomorrow’s session will be an open one.
Executive Secretary of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) and the Executive Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) Beatrice Fihn are expected to brief the Council. The Commissioner of Peace and Security and the Defense and Security Division (DSD) will also deliver a statement. Additionally, statements are also expected from invited participants including Norway as the President of the Mine Ban Treaty for 2019 and host of the fourth review conference of the treaty. A statement will also be delivered by the Chair of the month, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye of Nigeria.
The session aims at generating awareness and reinvigorating commitment for the implementation of the two instruments. The Ottawa Treaty came into force in March 1999 with the central objective of eliminating anti-personnel land mines (AP-mines) globally. Currently 51 African member states have ratified the treaty. The review of the Treaty has taken place every five years, the last one was held in 2014 in Maputo, which also marked the 15th anniversary of the entry into force of the treaty. Consequently the Maputo Action Plan (2014-2019) was adopted with clear commitments on the implementation of time-bound obligation of the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines by the year 2025. The fourth review conference is scheduled for November 2019 in Oslo, which will mark the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Convention.
The concept note of the session indicates that despite the commitments of African member states both at the global and regional levels and the progress that has been made over the years, 13 AU Member States remain affected by mines, while 4 have not completed the destruction of their stockpiles. The anti-personnel land mines continue to kill and injure people even after cessation of hostilities by warring parties. Member states are continuously facing challenges due to armed groups increased use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) compounded with Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) threat particularly in Peace Support Operations context.
Although there has not been regular PSC briefing on AP-mines, at the AUC level the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action has been observed in past on 4 April. Moreover, previously the AU developed and launched the Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework project document for the period 2014-2017. The session may serve as a reminder of existing initiatives, which require renewed commitments and to commemorate the International Day.
The other instrument that will be discussed extensively is the TPNW and its implementation in line with the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba). The TPNW was adopted in July 2017 by 122 UN Member States, including 42 African countries, as a global instrument banning nuclear weapons. Despite such efforts, currently a total of 50 ratifications are needed to bring the treaty into force and only 22 countries have ratified including two African countries. Thus far, there are 70 signatories and 22 ratifications of the TPNW.
From Africa, while 20 AU member states are signatories, only South Africa and The Gambia have ratified this treaty. Botswana, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Sudan and Tanzania have expressed their intention to ratify the treaty. Given the leadership that African states demonstrated through the Pelindaba Treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons with ratification from 41 AU member states, tomorrow’s session may serve as an opportunity for AU member states to take Africa’s commitment to the international level by mobilizing the ratification of the TPNW as a means of strengthening the international legal regime aiming at outlawing nuclear weapons.
This session that can help in the effort for strengthening multilateral regulation of nuclear weapons is very timely, taking place as the tension at the global level is heightened. With the withdrawal of the US and Russia from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, the lack of talks between the two countries for extending the 2010 treaty that reduced nuclear warheads, there are increasing fears of nuclear arms race, which threatens the TPNW. There are also risks in other fronts including around upholding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal due to the withdrawal of the US, the collapse of the talks between the US and North Korea and the recent escalation of tension between India and Pakistan are all concerns that the PSC members may raise as existential threats of global stability.
In the midst of these challenges Africa remains committed in maintaining a nuclear weapon free zone. The AU Chairperson and head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have signed a four-year agreement (2018-2022), an agreement on a safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear technologies for development in Africa. At the 763rd PSC session held in April 2018, the Council ‘reaffirmed its commitment to disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy, as enshrined in the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC’. In the same decision the Council ‘requested the AU Commission and the AFCONE to provide annual briefing to the PSC on the status of the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and the activities of AFCONE’. The latter was established by the Pelindaba Treaty to monitor compliance of member states in the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes and development.
As indicated in the concept note the session may also shed light on the fact although the continent is a nuclear weapon free zone, the global threats and use of nuclear weapons will have severe humanitarian impact on Africa and may reverse the development gains made. It may also make the case for the massive global expenditure on nuclear weapons amounting to close to US$105 billion annually to be channeled for global development and cooperation. The discussions may also highlight the efforts of countries including Nigeria and South Africa, who facilitated the initial resolution that led to the establishment of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and continue to engage in the implementation of the treaty.
The expected outcome is a press statement. Tomorrow’s PSC meeting will hold a comprehensive discussion and deliberation given that it will be covering two interlinked instruments and processes that have immense impact globally and for the continent. The PSC may reiterate its commitment to nuclear weapons disarmament non-proliferation and cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear science and technology. The Council may highlight the existential risks and humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonation would have on the continent. Hence, it may call on member states to ratify the TPNW to ensure that it enters into force. The PSC may also urge for the full implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the realization of the Maputo 2025 Commitment and for international partners to support the complete clearance of AP mines in Africa. The PSC may also call on the AU Commission to convene a meeting of AU member states for an African common position for the fourth review conference of the Ottawa Treaty.
