PSC Meeting on Mali/Sahel
Amani Africa
Date | 23 March, 2018
Tomorrow 23 March 2018, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the situation in Mali and the Sahel. The Council will receive the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Mali and the Sahel. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), former Burundian President Pierre Buyoya will brief the Council on the political and security situation in Mali and the Sahel region. Representatives of the G5 Sahel member states, the United Nations, the European Union and the Africa 3 members of the Security Council will also make statements.
The session will consider the security situation in Mali and implementation of the Algiers peace Accord and recent security developments in the Sahel region. As part of the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Council will also consider developments made towards the operationalization of the Joint Force.
On the situation in Mali
Despite progress being made with the 2015 Algiers Accord For peace and Reconciliation in Mali, the delay in the implementation of some key aspects of the Accord remains to be a significant concern for the AU. In the report to the AU Assembly in January 2018, the PSC identified differences of opinion among the stakeholders as the main factor for delays in implementing the agreement. As part of the implementation effort, the Mediation and the Follow-up Committee of the Agreement (CSA), the main follow-up mechanism to the 2015Algiers Peace Accord, designated the Carter Center as the independent observer responsible for overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement. Following the meeting of the CSA in December 2017, an agreement has been reached in the determination of the criteria and quotas for the integration of ex-combatants into the new Malian army subject to validation by the National Council for Security Sector Reform (CNRSS). Only limited progress has been made in terms of the other critical areas of the agreement, namely establishment of transitional regional authorities in Northern Mali, decentralization, the operationalization of the Operational Coordinating Mechanism (MOC) and the process for the integration of ex-combatants into Malian army and the demobilization and reintegration of others into society. The PSC session will examine progress made and efforts required to remove the obstacles.
The regional, local and communal elections scheduled for April 2018 is expected to be another matter of immediate importance during tomorrow’s PSC meeting. It is to be recalled that the elections were postponed from the initial schedule of December 2017 due to concerns over the weak security situation in northern Mali, the delay in the operationalization of the interim authorities, the status of refugees and the non-finalization of review of the Code of local Communities and the Law on the Free Administration of Territorial authorities. Despite expression of agreement by the parties to finalize discussions on conditions for the organization of peaceful and credible elections scheduled for next month including specifically in relation to the issues that caused the delay, the progress from these discussions remains unclear. In this regard, PSC members would be interested to know whether the necessary preparations for holding the April elections would be finalized timely and how the AU could help in this regard. Another separate but related issue that may feature in tomorrow’s meeting is how the elections in April will affect the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for July 2018.
The security situation in the wider Sahel region
Mali and the region remain unstable and suffer from the sporadic attacks by the numerous armed groups active in the region, which take advantage of porous borders and ungoverned territories. The notorious Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and others including smaller groups like al- Murabitoun and Ansar ed-Dine, continue to stage asymmetric attacks across the region.
There is no sign of improvement to the gravity of the security threat that the presence of these various armed terrorist groups and organized criminal networks pose to the region. Apart from criminal activities including trafficking in weapons and migrants, the groups are involved in targeting of civilians and humanitarian organizations, bombings of hotels and restaurants in capital cities of the countries of the region, ambushes on military bases and personnel including those of the French Operation Barkhane and UN’s MINUSMA. According to the UN, with close to 150 deaths since 2013, its peacekeeping mission in Mali, MINUSMA has become the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission in its history.
It would be recalled that the ambush that took place on 4 October 2017, in Tongo Tongo, in Niger, resulted in the loss of dozen of Nigerien and American soldiers. The latest such attack took place in Burkina Faso and Niger. On 2 March the al-Qaeda affiliated Group to Support Islam and Muslims (GSIM) orchestrated an unprecedented attack in Burkina Faso’s capital Ouagadougou daringly targeting the army headquarters and the French Embassy. In this attack that directly challenged the center of power 30 people lost their lives and 85 others were wounded. The same group also took responsibility for the February 21 attack near the border with Niger, which killed 2 French soldiers and left a third injured. A clash on 19 March 2018 between the Fulani and Dogon communities in central Mali further highlights the insecurity adding an inter-communal dimension.
The G5 Sahel Joint Force
In 2017, the countries of the region making up the G5 Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mauritania) established a Joint Force with the aim of neutralizing the rising security threat that these groups pose. While condemning the recent attack in Ouagadougou, the AU Commission Chairperson Mussa Faki Mahamat underscored ‘the urgency of a more sustained international action in support of the efforts of the countries of the region, particularly through the G5 Sahel Joint Force’. The G5 Joint Force is envisaged to work alongside the 4,000 French troops deployed in the region since 2013, and the MINUSMA mission which commands 12,000 peacekeepers.
The PSC mandated the deployment of the Joint Force for an initial period of one year in the communiqué of its 679th meeting of April 2017. In authorizing the deployment of the Force, the PSC envisaged that the 5000 strong Force would comprise not only military but also police and civilian components. Apart from the Force headquarters, the Joint Force is organized in three sectors: Western (Mauritania and Mali), Central (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) and Eastern (Chad and Niger).
In terms of the operationalization of the Force, the Force headquarters was set up in Sévaré, Mali at the end of 2017. On 31 October 2017, the Force undertook its first cross border operation, ‘Hawbi’, in the central sector involving Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It has since undertaken its second operation in the same sector. Given the plan for the Force to achieve its full operationalization during this month, this session would review the progress made to this end. Two areas would in particular be of interest to the PSC, namely the establishment of the command and organizational structures of the Force and the provision of support including funding of the Joint Mission.
With respect to the command and organizational set up of the Joint Force, progress was reported in the establishment of Central Command Post of the Force. In this session, PSC is expected to hear about the full operationalization of the Central Command Post and its coordination with and setting up of sectors’ command. Another area of interest is the mechanism required for ensuring coordination between the Joint Force and the various other regional and international operations in the Sahel, and with other Sahel countries outside of the G5, notably Algeria.
The PSC communiqué authorizing the Force stipulated the need for the participation of civilian capacity particularly with focus on ensuring compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL). Similarly, the UN Security Council Resolution 2391 (2017) requires the G5 countries and the Joint Force not only to take steps for avoiding civilian harm and follow due process in handling terrorist suspects including non-nationals but also to put in place a robust human rights and IHL compliance framework. As the experience of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has attested, the presence of civilian capacity with focus on protection of civilians is critical particularly in terms of avoiding the pitfalls that the planning and conducting military operations face with respect to civilian protection. Given the lessons from its various missions including AMISOM, it would be fitting for the AU to take active role in the establishment of the necessary civilian structures and tools for the proper integration of human rights and IHL in the processes and operations of G5 Sahel Joint Force.
In terms of the support required for the Joint Force, it is estimated that the annual cost of the Force is close to $500 million. While each of the members of the G5 pledged $10 million, the EU has increased its contribution from the initial $61 million to 143 million during the 23 February 2018 pledging conference that the AU, G5 Sahel and the EU jointly convened in Brussels with the participation of 30 leaders. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pledged $ 100 million and $30 million respectively, with an additional $60 million coming from the United States. About $500 million have been pledged during the conference. In this regard, issues of interest for the PSC include the operationalization of the mechanism for the disbursement of international financial support and, as AU Commission Chairperson observed, how speedily these pledges will be felt on the ground. In terms of transparent management and relatively efficient utilization of the funds as well.
In reviewing the steps taken in the implementation of PSC’s communiqué of 13 April 2017, another interesting development has been the resolution that the UNSC adopted on 8 December 2017 (2391). Consistent with the PSC communiqué, resolution 2391 adopted the provision of operational and logistical support to G5 Sahel Joint Force through MINUSMA, including medical and casualty evacuation capabilities, access to life support consumables, and engineering support. For Niger, it expects the PSC to call on partners to provide logistical support and speed up the delivery of the pledged funds.
While welcoming the contributions from partners, the council members are expected to discuss the leadership role that the members of the G5 in collaboration with the AU play for the initiative and the operations. Earlier meetings highlighted that the intervention by foreign partners should be ‘a support based on requirements expressed by members of the G5 Sahel’. A major area of interest for the PSC is the level of involvement of the AU in the implementation of the G5 Sahel Task Force including in putting in place mechanisms for facilitating support for the Force and its reporting on the elements of PSC decisions mandating the Force. Some of the members of the PSC like Algeria could emphasize the importance of a political strategy on which security measures should be anchored. The primacy of the political could not be emphasized enough. Experience in Africa and elsewhere in the world has shown that a military approach on its own could not be a recipe for success.
Algeria, which will attend the meeting both as PSC member and in its capacity as chair of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali would be interested to know where things stand in terms of follow up on the 13 April 2017 communiqué of the PSC. This include cooperation with Sahel countries that are not members of the G5 Sahel within the framework of the implementation plan of the concept of operations of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. In this respect, during the visit of the AU Commission Chairperson to Algeria from 10 to 12 March, discussions with Algeria underscored the need for reviving the Nouakchott Process on Enhancing Security Cooperation in the Sahelo-Saharan Region and ensure an effective coordination between the various initiatives underway in the Sahel region. Chairperson Faki told Algerian authorities AU’s plan for convening, in Nouakchott, a meeting, at the end of the month, on the Sahel for promoting synergy between the various initiatives on the Sahel.
The PSC is expected to adopt a communiqué renewing the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force for another 12 month period and identifying various areas for AU follow up and action including in relation to the elections in Mali and the full operationalization of the G5 Sahel Force.
PSC Briefing on DRC
Amani Africa
Date | 13 March, 2018
Tomorrow 13 March 2018, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing on the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Apart from the possible statement from Ambassador Smail Chergui, the African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, the PSC expects to receive a briefing from the Chairperson of the AU Commission and Head of the AU Liaison Office in the DRC, Ambassador Abdou Abarry. Others expected to make statements include the DRC and representatives of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), UN, Africa 3 members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union (EU).
The political situation in the country
There are at least two issues that PSC members expect to deliberate on with respect to the political situation in the country. The first concerns the rising political instability resulting from the tension between the government and opposition groups and protesters. The other relates to existing concerns regarding preparations for the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016.
With opposition groups and civil society organizations mobilizing pressure against President Laurent Kabila and the government’s authoritarian drift increasingly resorting to repression and heavy-handed security responses, the country continues to witness recurring political instability. What triggered the most recent tensions and protests in various parts of the country was the failure to respect the previously agreed upon deadline of December 2017 for the holding of the presidential election.
Nine people died and ninety eight others were injured as security forces responded with violence to the protest that the Catholic Church called on 31 December 2017. In another wave of demonstration on 21 January 2018, six people were reportedly killed, sixty-eight injured and one hundred twenty one others were arrested, triggering strong condemnation including from the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat. Most recently, government crackdown on protests that the Catholic Church called after Sunday service on 25 February led to the death of two people in Kinshasa and Mbandaka. According to the UN Mission in DRC (MONUSCO), thirty seven others were injured and more than one hundred arrested.
Apart from the loss of legitimacy of the government and protesters’ determination of putting pressure on the government for implementing the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016 on political transition, uncertainty over President Kabila’s plan to honour the constitutional term limit underline the political tension. Lambert Mende, DRC Information Minister clarified the position of the government on 5 February, saying that President Kabila will not run for re-election. Despite lingering suspicions that the President could extend his term should he find an opportunity for effecting constitutional term limit, such clear statement from the government affirms commitment to the Saint Sylvester’s agreement that bars the President from standing for another election.
The question of the non-extension of President Kabila’s term is not simply an issue of constitutionalism and rule of law. The other aspect of the question is the availability of workable exit strategy for the president. As such, the resolution of this crisis depends not only on the constitutional dimension of this issue which ensures compliance with the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement but also on crafting such a strategy.
As part of the process for creating conditions for the holding of the elections in December 2018, the implementation of confidence building measures, as has been urged by the AU and the UN, would be important. In this regard the PSC session would discuss steps taken in releasing or suspending trial of members of the political opposition arrested for their political actions in the past few months and during the course of 2017. There are also expectations on the widening of the political space, respecting opposition activity and allowing the media and civil society to operate without repression.
With respect to the steps being taken to implement the new electoral calendar issued in early December 2017, until recently the government did not give firm guarantee that the general elections would be held as planned in December 2018. During the 26 January 2018 press conference he held after five years, President Kabila raised his concern that the cost of the elections would be ‘exorbitant’. In an interview that he gave to Reuters on 8 March 2018, Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala stated that ‘I confirm that in December this year the Congolse people will be brought to the ballot boxes’. While this statement is welcome, it is of interest to PSC members that the electoral commission (CENI) clarifies the details of the budget required for holding the elections and the source of funding. This is important for any discussion for external financial and logistical support to the electoral process.
It is to be recalled that DRC also blamed the delay in the elections on the challenges faced in finalizing the voter registration process. This exercise has been completed in all the 26 provinces of the country, including those that experienced major insecurity such as the Kasai region. In this regard, the PSC expects to receive updates particularly in relation to its earlier call on the government to submit, upon completion of voter registration, the bills on the convening of elections to the two houses of parliament for their timely adoption.
In terms of the operational details for convening the national elections, another area of interest relates to the impact of the electronic voting system on the timeline and conduct of the election. Apart from urging the full implementation of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016, the Catholic Bishops congress of 15-16 February called for the international certification of the new electoral voting machines. Despite the assurance that the Prime Minster gave that the digital voting system could help the election to run smoothly and in record time, the problems recently experienced when testing the system underscore the need for putting in place mechanisms able to address technical problems of the digital voting system that may derail or put in doubt the credibility of the planned elections.
Given the request of the PSC for the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a coordination mechanism bringing together regional and international actors that will facilitate policy coordination and mobilization of coherent support, tomorrow’s PSC session offers an opportunity to consider steps taken in this respect and the prospect of establishment of an international contact group. In this regard, the plan of a joint visit that the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary General are anticipated to undertake offers unique opportunity to ensure the government’s commitment for holding the elections without further postponement and within the terms of the Saint Sylvester’s agreement of 2016. If it is undertaken following consultation with regional and international actors, this could also be the basis for exploring discussion on exploring workable exist strategy with President Kabila.
The security situation
In the context of the political uncertainties that emerged in the country following delays in holding national elections, DRC has also witnessed resurgence of rebel or militia groups and armed confrontations during the course of the past year. Both the number of armed groups and incidents of fighting have spiked. In terms of major violence the region that witnessed major violence has been the Kasai region. On 26 February, security forces repelled attack by alleged Kamuina Nsapu militants in this region, with the ensuing clash reportedly leaving one soldier and fourteen others dead. Conflict between Hema and Lendu communities escalated in Dungu area, Ituri province leaving sixty to one hundred people dead in 2018 and forcing in mid-February some 27,000 people to flee to Uganda.
While the spike in number of armed groups and armed fighting affect various parts of the country spreading at least across 10 provinces, more than 120 groups are reported to operate in the east and south east of the country. Armed groups such as Mayi Mayi Yakutumba have become increasingly active. On 15 February, the army reported killing forty eight members of armed group Mai Mai Yakutumba in South Kivu province, forcing some combatants to flee to Burundi and recapturing large areas.
In recent months, most significant incidents of fighting involved the armed group known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). This is the group that is believed to be the perpetrator of the attack on Semuliki in North Kivu that killed fifteen MONUSCO soldiers on the 8 December 2017. Despite a 12 February seizure by DRC army of the ‘grand bastion’ of ADF in Mwalika, fighting continues between DRC army and the ADF in the Mbanu-Kamango-Eringiti axis.
Inter-ethnic clashes also create further sources of insecurity in the country. In February, interethnic violence between the Lendu and Hema groups led to sixty fatalities in less than one week, causing unrest among the local population and leading to humanitarian concerns. Clashes between ethnic Hutu on one side and Nande and Hundu groups on other on 25-28 February left sixteen civilians and seven militiamen dead in Rutshuru territory, North Kivu.
The deterioration in the security situation that the above developments have caused has generated one of the worst humanitarian crises in the country. The UN has declared the country a Level three emergency, characterised as worst of the worst crisis. With an average of 5,500 people fleeing their home daily, DRC is reported to be the country most affected by conflict displacement for a second year in raw. The number of displaced people has exceeded 4.1 million people, more than in Syria. The UNHCR reported significant surge in the number of people from DRC seeking refuge in neighboring Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania.
Given that the deteriorating security situation carries regional consequences, it is of direct concern to DRC’s neighbors in the PSC particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. One of the factors that shape the dynamics in the PSC is the divergence in the nature of the relationship between DRC and its neighbors and the interest of its different neighbors. While Rwanda requested investigation into incursion on 13 February by Congolese army into its territory (during which three Congolese soldiers were killed), Uganda and DRC launched joint military operation against armed groups along their common borders. In terms of sub-regional organizations, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is most active. It has appointed former Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba as a special envoy to the DRC and dispatched various missions in 2017. Most recently on 3 February, SADC announced that it would open a liaison office in DRC. While it is clearly active, SADC is also seen as being sympathetic to President Kabila.
In the absence of a clear strategy shared by neighboring countries, SADC, UN and the AU both on the preparation of credible elections within the electoral calendar and on workable exit for President Kabila, it is unlikely that this PSC session would go beyond reiterating existing AU positions on the resolution of the political crisis. The PSC would welcome the idea of the joint mission of the AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat and the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.
