Consideration of the new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of AMISOM
Amani Africa
Date | 4 February, 2019
Today (4 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider and adopt the new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM) when it meets at 3pm. Although initially planned in the program of work for 15 February, it is brought forward to today as we indicated in our review of the Program of Work for the month late last week.
The AU Department of Peace and Security is expected to present the CONOPS. Following applicable rules and established practice, invitations have also been extended to all AMISOM troop/police contributing countries (Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) to participate in the session.
It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 806th session expressed its expectation to the consideration and adoption of the new revised CONPOPs of AMISOM. It was the ministerial meeting of the PSC held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 30 June at its 782nd session which, on renewing the mandate of AMISOM and within the framework of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2431 called for the development of a new AMISOM CONPOPS.
Developed on the basis of the framework of the AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA), the Somali Security Forces (SSF), the 2018 AU-UN Joint Review, the National Security Architecture (NSA), the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and UNSC Resolution 2431, the CONOPS are designed to guide the operations and organizational reorientation of AMISOM for the transitional period of 2018-2021 during which AMISOM transitions and hands over security responsibilities to Somali Security Forces (SSF).
The CONOPS provide the operational framework for the implementation of the AMISOM exit strategy designed to reduce the threat from al-Shabab, secure the political process and transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces. Based on review of the prevailing political situation and threat analysis in the operational environment in Somalia, the CONOPS provides for a three-phased process of the reconfiguration and progressive handing over of responsibilities to SSF.
Phase I runs until 30 June 2019, during which AMISOM will be reconfigured to enable it to degrade al-Shabaab, secure Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR, hold and secure Leego, protect key population centers identified especially along the MSRs, collapse or consolidate existing FOBs and build ones (where appropriate jointly with SSF) and commence a multi-faceted transition from AMISOM to SNA/SSF. During Phase II, which runs from July 2019 to December 2020, SSF are expected to take increasing lead role to degrade al- Shabaab, build and hold positions along MSRs and continue to strengthen population centers with Somali or AMISOM police gradually taking over security of the main population centres. Phase III, which runs until December 2021 the end time of AMISOM’s operations, AMISOM takes the role of supporting the leadership of SSF and prepare for exit by 2021. In all the three phases, AMISOM will reconfigure its uniformed personnel while strengthen the role and presence of its police and civilian components to key locations. The CONOPS also outline the revised tasks of the military, police and civilian components of AMISOM.
The CONOPS and the effective implementation are premised on a number of assumptions including improvement in the political situation such as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) of Somalia working in partnerships, the generation of the required trained, equipped, and sustained SSF, adequate logistics support and effective strategic communications.
Yet, as the recent experience in the situaiton in Somalia shows, it is unlikely that there will be a linear implementation of the CONOPS and the AMISOM exit strategy. The first challenge comes from Al Shabaab. Despite gains registered in pushing back the terror group, it continues to orchestrate major attacks including those targeting AMISOM, SSF, FGS and UN. On 2 January 2019, in a sign of possible shift in tactics, Al-Shabab launched a series of mortar attacks against AMISOM camp in Mogadishu landing particularly affecting UNSOM compound. Outside Mogadishu as well Al Shabaab’s attacks remain high targeting convoys in Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Gedo, Hiiran and Bay regions. On 2 February, al Shabaab exploded a suicide car bomb outside a military base for Ethiopian soldiers.
That the implementation of the exit strategy and the different phases of the CONOPs depend on security situation came out when the initial plan of the withdrawal of 1000 AMISOM troops was
postponed from the initial period of October 2018 to February 2019.
The other challenge is in the political front. Here the major problem is the lack of cohesion among Somali government actors. There have been major issues between FGS and the FMS affecting the
implementation of the STP. There have been issues within the FMS of Somalia as well.
In terms of the drawadown of the size of AMISOM, a major issue has been whose troops should withdraw. The CONOPS envisage that the 1000 troops that will be withdrawn by end of February 2019 would be from Burundi. There seems to be no agreement on the criteria for troop withdrawal. Burundi appears to insist that the withdrawal has to be on the basis of equitable proportion from each of AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries, while the CONOPS is based on consideration of threat analysis. Indeed, one of the reasons for the factors for early convening of today’s session was to get the endorsement of the PSC in order to meet the planned deadline for the withdrawal of the 1000 troops by end of the month.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué, which is expected to endorse the CONOPS.
The 2019 elections of the PSC: Candidates for the three-year term seats of the PSC
Amani Africa
Date | 2 February, 2019
The tenure of 5 members of the PSC (Table 1 below) serving for a three year term is set to end at the end of March 2019.
| Region | States whose term ends in 2019 |
|---|---|
| Central Africa | Congo |
| East Africa | Kenya |
| North Africa | Egypt |
| Southern Africa | Zambia |
| West Africa | Nigeria |
Elections for these seats will be held during the thirty-fourth (34th) Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in February 2019 summit. The procedures for the election of members of the PSC are set out in the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC Protocol) and the Modalities for Election of PSC Members. Most notably, Article 5 (1) of the PSC Protocol states that the Council’s membership is to be decided according to the principle of ‘equitable regional representation and rotation’. In terms of regional representation, for the three-year term, one seat is assigned to each of the five (5) regions of the AU.
Following the established practice for AU elections, the Office of the Legal Counsel of the AU sent out a note verbal to member states parties to the PSC Protocol indicating the scheduled elections and inviting them to submit candidates from the five AU regions for the 5 seats expected to be vacant at the end of March 2019. Although the submission of candidature through regions is the preferred path, it is not uncommon that states party to the PSC Protocol directly submit their candidacy. It is the countries from West Africa and Southern Africa that regionally coordinate the submission of candidature.
Although it is not unique to it, East Africa is known for lacking regional coordination in submission of
candidatures. At the end of the period for submission of candidacy, the list of candidates the Office of the Legal Counsel received are the ones shown in the graph below.
As the list of candidates shows, the only region that did not come to an agreement on a single candidate
was East Africa. Three countries, including the incumbent, Kenya, are competing for the new threeyear
term seat. Ethiopia was a candidate during the 2018 elections but withdrew from the election, paving the way for the election of Djibouti. Sudan was a member of the Council during 2006-2007.
Of the current list of candidates for membership of the new PSC whose term of office starts in April 2019, Kenya and Nigeria are standing for re-election. The remaining candidates are running again after a period of absence from the PSC. All candidates except Sudan have served on the PSC at least twice. Lesotho served twice for a two year term. Similarly, Burundi also served for a two year term but on three occasions. Ethiopia served
two consecutive terms of three years from 2004 to 2010 and another term for a two-year period. Algeria was absent from the PSC only for the term of the PSC ending at the end of March 2019. Nigeria has been member of the PSC since 2004 and has emerged as a de facto permanent member of the PSC on the three-year term slot for West Africa.
As it can be gathered from graph 2, the number of candidates from the four regions of Central Africa,
Southern Africa, North Africa and West Africa is equal to the number of seat available for these respective regions. In East Africa, a region known for fielding higher number of candidates than available seats, three countries are running for one seat. Of these Kenya is running for election, while Sudan is running for PSC membership for the first time.
Apart from regional representation and rotation, the PSC Protocol (Article 5(2)) and the modalities for the
election of members of the PSC (Article 6) lay down additional election criteria. These include a commitment to uphold the principles of the African Union; contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; provision of capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership; respect for constitutional governance, the rule of law and human rights; and the availability of a sufficiently staffed and equipped Permanent Mission at the AU and the UN.
Looking at the list of candidates, there clearly is divergence in the level of compliance with these requirements. While countries such as Algeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria are known for their contribution to peace operations in Africa, they also have various levels of experiences in taking up responsibilities for regional conflict resolution initiatives. In terms of respect for constitutional governance and respect for human rights, almost all the candidates lack good track record, although the performance of some is worse than others. This is indicative that in practice the requirements under Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol don’t usually count
and have thus become secondary to the requirements of regional representation and rotation.
While the focus on regional representation and rotation makes membership in the PSC egalitarian, the failure to enforce aspects of the requirements of Article 5(2) was not without its consequences for the effectiveness of the PSC. In apparent attempt to rectify this issue of effectiveness, the PSC, in the Conclusions of its Yaoundé retreat (held on 15-16 November 2012), stressed ‘the need for effective membership in the Council, including satisfying obligations elaborated in Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol’ and ‘the need for periodic review by the Assembly of the Union with a view to assessing compliance by members of the PSC’ with those obligations.’ As a March 2017 briefing note of the PSC indicated, this is one of the conclusions of the PSC retreats on its working methods that have not been implemented.
Unless a mechanism with objective standards for operationalizing this conclusion is established, it is unlikely that the requirements under Article 5(2) of the PSC Protocol would be followed in the election of members of the PSC. Clearly, membership of the PSC is one area that needs to be part of the reform of the PSC within the framework of the on-going AU reform.
PSC Program of Work for February 2019
Amani Africa
Date | February 2019
Gabon assumes the role of the monthly chairpersonship of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of February 2019. The provisional program of work envisages six substantive sessions other than the meetings on the consideration of the PSC reports. One open session is scheduled.
The PSC program of work starts on 1 January with a meeting of the PSC for consideration of its reports on a) the implementation of the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps on Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020 and b) its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa. If the consideration of the reports is not finalized, it is expected to continue on 4 February.
On 5 February, the PSC is scheduled to have a session for ‘Exchange of views between the PSC and the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns’. This session is envisaged to be open to all AU member states. Considering the 2020 timeline for silencing the guns, this session offers good opportunity for taking stoke of the progress made, if any, the remaining challenges towards achieving the targets of the AU Master Roadmap of Practical Steps on Silencing the Guns and the changes required.
The next session of the PSC scheduled on 14 February focuses on the consideration and adoption of the draft PSC Program of Work for the month of March 2019.
On 15 February, the PSC plans to consider and adopt the new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of AMISOM, a session carried forward from January. This session may however be brought forward to the early days of the week of 4 February. It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 806th session expressed its expectation to the consideration and adoption of the new revised CONPOPs of AMISOM. This was developed within the framework of the AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) and the process on the reconfiguration of AMISOM including the anticipated reduction of its size by 1000 troops by February 2019.
The only fully open session of the PSC is planned on 19 February. Interestingly, the focus of the session is on climate change funding in line with the Africa Adaptation Initiative (IAA) to contribute to peace and security.
Carried forward from the January program, on 21 February the PSC plans to have a briefing session on the situation in Darfur and the reconfiguration of UNAMID.
The next session on 26 February involves the quarterly briefing by CISSA on terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.
On 27 February, the PSC will have another session carried from its January program. PSC is scheduled to consider the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Status of the A3 Draft Resolution on Financing. Following the last minute withdrawal of the A3 resolution from proceeding to voting on 21 December despite it being co-sponsored by about 90 UN member states, the matter was referred to the PSC for its direction. After discussing it as AOB on 24 December, the PSC requested the AU Commission to submit to it a report, outlining the issues encountered in the negotiation of the resolution. It is expected that the PSC will provide guidance on the parameters for negotiations in the UNSC in taking the resolution forward.
On the same day, the PSC will have a monthly review of the implementation of the harmonization of ACIRC into the ASF as per its decision on the Report and Recommendations of the Military Staff Committee on the Harmonization of ACIRC into the ASF.
In the last anticipated session on 28 February, the PSC is scheduled to have a session to review post- conflict reconstruction and development in Africa.
Briefing of the AU Ad hoc committee (C5) on South Sudan
Amani Africa
Date | 25 January, 2019
Tomorrow (25 January) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a briefing session. The briefing focuses on the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee of five countries from the five regions of the AU (C5) on South Sudan. It is anticipated that the chairperson of the C5, South Africa, will deliver the briefing report to the PSC.
The session is expected to enable the PSC to be updated on the activities of the C5. It is also expected to serve as an opportunity to clarify the terms of reference of the C5 and how its role can best be leveraged for supporting IGAD in the South Sudan peace process. It was during its 474th session that the PSC called for the establishment of an AU High-Level Ad-hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government, comprising one representative from each of the five regions of the Continent (C5). Initiated to enhance and scale up AU’s support to IGAD and its mediation efforts in South Sudan, the role expected of the C5, according to the terms of the communiqué of the 474th session of the PSC, is to ‘strengthen Africa’s support to (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) IGAD and assist the South Sudanese parties and stakeholders to achieve
durable peace in their country’.
Following consultations with the IGAD and the five regions, the AU Commission designated Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa as members of the High-Level Ad Hoc Committee. Welcoming the constitution of the C5, the summit level 484th session of the PSC held on 29 January
2015 encouraged the ‘committee to take all the necessary steps to enhance the IGAD-led mediation’. At its 494th session held on 30 March 2015, the PSC urged the C5 ‘to meet as early as possible to elaborate its terms of reference and determine its work plan in support of IGAD.’ It was only during the AU summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa in June 2015 that the C5 was officially launched.
Since that time, the C5 has for quite sometime had only a passive and episodic engagement in the South Sudan peace process. During the course of 2018, the C5 has come to assume an active and substantive engagement. In the briefing to the PSC, South Africa’s Ambassador Ndumiso Ntshinga is expected
to provide updates on the activities that the C5 has undertaken in pursing its role.
On 30 June 2018, the C5 held a summit level meeting on the margins of the AU summit held in Nouakchott, Mauritania. The meeting that South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa chaired discussed the peace process in South Sudan and the issue of how to leverage and reinforce the role of the Committee vis-à-vis the work of IGAD.
In the communiqué that it adopted following the meeting, the ‘Ad-hoc Committee emphasized the added value of the Ad hoc Committee to the IGAD-led peace process and underscored the need for Africa to fully assume its responsibilities and create all requisite conditions for definitively ending the war in South Sudan’. Importantly, the communiqué called for ‘the elaboration of a roadmap to guide actions, including imposition of punitive measures against those who violate the ceasefire and obstruct the peace efforts.’ Following the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (RACRSS) in September 2018, Ambassadors of members of the C5 held a meeting on 13 November 2018 with the Chairperson of the AU Commission to discuss on the role of the C5 in the implementation process of the R-ARCSS. Elevating the active role of the C5 further, the meeting underscored the importance of a filed visit by the C5 to South Sudan. A meeting that the C5 held with the Special Envoy of IGAD Ismail Wais on 19 November 2018 highlighted the need for Africa to accompany IGAD and the parties to the peace agreement for ensuring successful implementation of R-ACRSS. The meeting also agreed on two important course of action. The first and most important was the proposal for the C5 to sign as guarantors of the RARCSS.
It was also agreed that the C5 would undertake a visit to South Sudan on 2 December 2018. In a ceremony held on 21 November at the AU Commission headquarters, the C5 signed the RARCSS as guarantors. This has helped in writing the C5 into the R-ARCSS and assigning to it a role of guarantors of the peace agreement. As the briefing report would highlight, subsequently the Ambassadors of the C5 visited South Sudan on 1-5 December 2018. During the visit, the expectation of the C5 and indeed the AU to ensure the successful implementation of the peace agreement was underscored. Most importantly, the C5 were able to have first hand assessment of the challenges facing the implementation of R-ARCSS.
It is expected that the briefing will highlight the major issues facing the implementation of the RARCSS. It is to be recalled that the lack of trust between the leaders of the major parties and the problems in the security arrangement precipitated the collapse in July 2016 of the initial August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS). Addressing this issue of the trust deficit in the political leadership remains an issue facing the R-ARCSS, which the C5 can work on to address. Other challenges observed include breaches of the ceasefire agreement, perpetration of violations against civilians and maintain the cohesion of the opposition groups signatory to the peace agreement. In a statement he delivered to the 3rd reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) board meeting held on 23 January, the Interim Chairperson A. Njoroge observed the split within the leadership of South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), an umbrella body constituting the third group, in addition to President Salva Kiir, and SPLA-IO leader Riek Machar, to sign the R-ARCSS. Njoroge stated that ‘it should be made clear to all leaders of SSOA that what we have achieved so far must be well guarded, and we must not let our unity of purpose fragment through absence of dialogue.’ In terms of clarifying the role of the C5, there are several issues that need to be addressed. One and most important is the division of labor and the modalities for coordination and collaboration between the C5 and IGAD. This is particularly crucial for ensuring that no divergence emerges and there is a common approach in dealing with issues that arise in the implementation of the R-ARCSS. In the context of the elaboration of the terms of reference and program of work of the C5, another issue is whether and how the C5 plays a role, beyond providing political support, with respect to the implementation of specific elements of the peace agreement. Given that there is detailed matrix for the implementation of the R-ARCSS with timelines and responsibilities of different actors, the briefing is expected to highlight the areas where the C5 is best placed to make contribution in facilitating or taking a role in the implementation of the agreement. It is expected that one of the role that the C5 can play is in contributing to providing guidance in carrying out the AU’s assigned role with respect to the implementation of specific areas of the agreement, including notably in the establishment of the Transitional Justice institutions such as the Hybrid Court.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. This will help in defining the broad terms of reference of the C5 within the framework of the terms of the 474th session of the PSC and identify the areas from the R-ARCSS implementation matrix where the C5 is expected to have active role in supporting implementation. The PSC may also envisage the establishment of a consultative meeting as a framework for coordination the role and support of the C5 with IGAD.
