PSC provisional program of work for June 2019
Amani Africa
Date | June 2019
For the month of June 2019, Sierra Leone will assume the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). Prepared under the leadership of Sierra Leone’s Permanente Representative to the AU Brima Patrick Kapuwa, the provisional program of work of the PSC for the month adopted on 7 May envisages some nine sessions. These includeeight closed sessions and one open session.Two of the closed sessions will focus on two country situations. During the month there is also a planned PSC retreat.
On 4 June, the monthly PSC program of work starts with a session deliberating on two agenda items. The first is the preparation for the African Amnesty month within the context of the AU Master Roadmap to Silence the Guns by the Year 2020 and building momentum for the effective implementation of the Agenda 2063 goals. Among others, this is expected to review the state of continental and regional efforts for effectively addressing illicit movement of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), one of the major drivers of conflict in Africa.
The following day on 5 June the committee of experts will meet to engage in preparatory works for two planned PSC activities. The first preparatory meeting is on PSC retreat that is planned to take place in Rabat, Morocco in the last week of June and is expected to work on the agenda and working documents of the retreat. The other is the preparation for the 13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UN
Security Council.
On 6 June, the PSC is scheduled to have two agenda items. It will have the first country specific session on the situation in Guinea Bissau. As a major country of concern for West Africa it was initially on the agenda when Nigeria was chairing the PSC, however the session could not be held. Guinea Bissau is brought back on the agenda for June under Sierra Leone. The PSC is expected to receive update on the political stalemate in the country following the March 2019 parliamentary election that prevented the formation of a new government, exacerbating the existing precarious political and socio-economic situation.
The second agenda of the day is a briefing on elections in Africa. This is the periodic briefing that the AU Department of Political Affairs regularly presents to the PSC. It is expected to give update on elections held since the last briefing and on the upcoming elections. On 11 June, the PSC will have its second session on a country situation, focusing on South Sudan. This will focus on the steps being taken and challenges faced in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement, including where the process for the formation of the national unity government stands.
On 13 June, the PSC will deliberate on three agenda items. First, it will consider the renewal of UNAMID mandate which will end on 30 June. The session is expected to provide clarity on the kind of conditions under which the mandate will be renewed in the context of the contested transition under way following the military coup in Sudan. Subsequently, building on the preparatory work of the committee of
experts undertaken earlier in the month, the PSC willconsider two preparatory activities, namely the preparations for the 13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the UNSC and for the PSC retreat expected to take place in Rabat at the end of the Month.
On 14 June, the PSC is expected to receive and consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the implementation of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy, including the institutional and operational developments.
The one open session of the month is planned to take place on 20 June to commemorate the African Refugee Day. It is expected to be held under the theme ‘Advancing Refugee Protection in Africa in the Context of Human Rights’. The operationalization of the African Humanitarian deliberations.
On 21 June, the PSC will receive an update on the AU peace support operations doctrine and the monthly briefing on the harmonization of the ACIRIC within ASF.
After the retreat from 24-26 June, the last activity of the month will take place on 28 June on the briefing by the Chairperson of the PSC to the PRC on the activities of the PSC during the
month of June. In addition to these agenda items, the provisional program of the month also envisions in footnotes additional items that may be added in the course of the month. These include the three-week update by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Sudan. Additionally, meeting of the Military Staff
Committee may also take place.
Inaugural Consultative Meeting of the Peace and Security Council and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
Inaugural Consultative Meeting of the Peace and Security Council and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (24 May) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security council (PSC) will convene its 852 session on the inaugural consultative meeting of the PSC and the peace and security decision-making organs of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
The session convened in line with Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the conclusions of the various retreats of the PSC convened over many years on its working methods. As the first consultative meeting being convened 15 years after the coming into effect of the PSC, this session is also a reflection of the institutional reform of the AU, which puts emphasis on enhancing close working relationship and coordination with the policy organs of the RECs/RMs.
The AU Commission is expected to present by way of a report a background document on the Inaugural Meeting of the AU PSC and the Policy Organs of the RECs/RMs for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution on Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. Accordingly, the focus is not on the interface between the AU Commission and the secretariats of the RECs/RMs but on the PSC and the policy decision-making organs of the RECs/RMs.
The chairpersons of nine RECs/RMs peace and security policy decision-making organs are expected to participate. These are Chad as Chair of CEN-SAD, Ethiopia as Chair of IGAD, Gabon as Chair of ECCAS and the Peace and Security Council of ECCAS, Madagascar as Chair of COMESA, Namibia as Chair of SADC and SADC Political and Defense Organ, Nigeria as Chair of ECOWAS and the Mediation and Security Community of ECOWAS, Rwanda as Chair of EAC and Tunisia as Chair of UMA. Additionally, invitation has also been extended for all Executive Secretaries of the RECs/RMs to participate in this inaugural consultative meeting.
In terms of defining the outline for coordination between the two levels, there is no lack of adequate legal rules. Article 7(1) (e) of the Protocol enjoins the PSC ‘promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa’. Most importantly, Article 16 of the Protocol articulates the place of RECs/RMs in the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and outlines at some length the details of how the PSC together with the Chairperson of the AU Commission shall go about developing policy coordination and close working relationship with RECs/RMs. With nine sub-articles, Article 16 is the longest and most detail of the PSC Protocol articles that define relationships between the PSC and other actors.
While acknowledging the primary role of the PSC, Article 16 affirms that RECs/RMs ‘are part of the overall Security Architecture of the Union’. Its sub-article 1 emphasizes the need for aligning the role of RECs/RMs with the objectives and principles of the AU. It further underscores the need for enduring ‘effective partnership between them and the PSC in the maintenance of peace and security’. Eschewing a one size fits all approach, it envisions that such effective partnership is to be pursued on the basis of ‘the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances’. Other than requiring alignment of normative objectives and principles, this approach does not consider a rigid and hierarchical relationship between the two levels. Instead it opts for a flexible approach leveraging the comparative advantage of both the PSC and RECs/RMs. Thus, sub-article 2 of Article 16 envisions a consultative decision- making process.
In terms of how the close working relationship and the coordination of policy is to be operationalized, sub-article 6 of Article 16 provides that RECs/RMs ‘shall be invited to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that question is being addressed by a regional mechanism is of special interest to that organization.’ In undertaking conflict prevention, peacemaking and peace building functions, the PSC and RECs/RMs are required under sub-article 3 of Article 16 to fully and continuously inform each other of their activities.
As highlighted in the background document for the meeting, these detailed provisions have been complemented with further provisions elaborated in the conclusions of the various retreats of the PSC on its working methods. Most notable in this regard are the May 2015 Swakopmund and the September 2015 Abuja retreats of the PSC.
There have been two major gaps that have led to the lack of effective coordination between the PSC and RECs/RMs. The first of this was the non-implementation of both the provisions of Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the relevant conclusions of the PSC Retreats on its Working Methods. This was despite the fact that for at least the past few years the indicative annual program of work of the PSC envisaged the convening of the annual consultative meeting envisaged in Article 16 of the Protocol. The other was the lack of initiative for developing the kind of arrangements and mechanisms established for the PSC – UN Security Council relationship for the operationalization of the provisions Article 16 on policy coordination and close working relationship.
Experience from various conflict situations show that the resultant lack of effective and institutionalized policy coordination between the two levels has produced increasing disaffection on both sides. While tomorrow’s consultative meeting is long overdue, it is key for addressing the growing challenges of policy coherence and coordinated action in responding to conflicts. As the PSC’s role in conflict prevention, management and resolution has become institutionalized and the role of RECs/RMs in this area shows expansion, the instances for policy divergence and dissonance has also increased over the years. Such differences and uncoordinated interventions have been observed in a number of conflict situations. In the past this has been the case with respect to the situations in Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Guinea Bissau, Mali and Central African Republic (CAR). In recent years, this has been evident in the situations in Burundi and South Sudan. In some of these cases, there has been normative disconnect between the two levels. This is particularly notable with respect to situations involving electoral disputes and unconstitutional changes of government.
Apart from the impact of such divergent policy approaches and uncoordinated interventions in fragmenting peace and security decision- making on the continent, they have importantly undermined the effort for the resolution of conflicts, thereby allowing the conflicts to rage on perpetuating the suffering of the affected populations.
It is expected that apart from the foregoing, the background document for the meeting will outline other gaps observed in PSC – RECs/RMs peace and security decision-making processes. These notably include lack of clear criteria for determining the application of the principle of subsidiarity, lack of clarity on the format and mechanics of organization of the consultative meetings, lack of clarity on horizontal coordination among RECs and the role of the PSC in facilitating such horizontal coordination, the challenges arising from trans-regional security threats that don’t fall within the jurisdiction of no one REC/RM, and lack of clarity on decision-making role between the PSC and RECs/RMs on the mandating and deployment of the African Standby Forces.
Another area worth looking into in this context is the need for reviewing whether and how the legal instruments or decisions of policy-making organs of RECs/RMs established provisions recognizing the role of the PSC similar to those found in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol. Such provisions will prove critical not only to give legal basis in RECs/RMs instruments but also to institutionalize mutual recognition and close working relationship between the two levels. Such provisions are also key for institutionalized operationalization of one of the conclusions of the September 2015 Abuja PSC Retreat, which stipulates that ‘RECs/RMs shall extend invitations to the AUC Chairperson and the Chairperson of the PSC in their statutory and other decision-making meetings on peace and security.’
In terms of the operationalization of the principles of subsidiary, complementarity and comparative advantage, the annual consultative meeting may take lessons and best practices from AU-UN partnership on peace and security. This entails that instead of rigid application of principles, they should recognize that both levels have a role to play and engage in joint analysis of the situation and joint formulation of policy options which ensure policy coherence and joint collective action that leverages the role and contribution of each. Other best practice include the joint field visits to conflict situations, thus the PSC and the concerned REC/RM can plan and undertake joint field visits as a means of enhancing collective action and policy coherence.
Taking stock of the forgoing and the experience in PSC and RECs/RMs relationship, the annual consultative meeting can identify the best practices thus far and the remaining challenges. In this regard, one measure that the annual consultative meeting can establish is to consolidate into one coherent and authoritative document the various modalities and frameworks for cooperation articulated in diverse documents. On the basis of such single document that consolidates best practices and articulated additional options for coordination, the PSC and the policy organs of RECs/RMs on peace and security can develop and sign a memorandum of understanding or framework agreement.
It is expected that the outcome of the consultative meeting would take the form of Proposals/Recommendations on Harmonisation and Coordination of Decision Making Processes/Division of Labour between the AU and RECs in the area of peace and security. This is expected to be part of the working documents that will be considered during the inaugural AU-RECs/RMs summit to be held in Niamey, Niger on 4-5 July 2019. The Proposals/Recommendations are to outline agreed interpretation of the principles that govern relationships between the PSC and RECs/RMs peace and security policy organs and the modalities, format and timelines for coherent policy making and operational coordination of interventions.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.
Report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2019
Tomorrow (May 23) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the African Union Commission’s report on the challenges faced by AU led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) and on mechanisms to address them. The military staff committee and the Peace Support Operations Division are expected to brief the Council.
The session is expected to identify challenges faced by mandated, authorized, endorsed and hybrid peace operations in Africa. A wide range of challenges are expected to be addressed including those that are recurring in all forms of operations as well as the ones that are distinct to a specific type of operation. Issues related to leadership, funding, coordination and division of labor, with a particular focus on the relationship between host nations and troop contributing countries are expected to feature in the briefing. The impact of such factors on the sustainability of mandates and their effective operationalization are also expected to be addressed.
The AU has mandated and managed and/or authorized some ten PSOs since its first mission to Burundi. The largest, most deadly and expensive mission of the AU to date is AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007. AU has also authorized and provided political and technical support for the establishment and operationalization of three ad hoc security forces against terrorist groups including the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) which are all deployed based on the cooperation of affected countries in the respective regions. Moreover, the AU jointly with the United Nations (UN) has managed the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur for more than a decade (UNAMID).
PSOs in Africa are increasingly tasked with broad and complex mandates including protection of civilians, stabilization, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and long term post conflict reconstruction operations. The international security system is gradually relying more on the response of the AU and its sub-regional institutions, particularly in the context of high security threats and counter terrorism operations in the continent. This has been largely the case for AMISOM and is central to the mandate of the MNJTF and the G5 Sahel. However, the delivery of these mandates highly depends on the financial and technical partnership of the UN and other multilateral and individual partners. Apart from dependency on such external sources, a major challenge has been the delivery of the logistics and equipment that matches the nature of the activities of the operations and in a timely manner. The protracted nature of the deployment timeline of PSOs is the other factor that is posing challenge in securing sustainable funding. The human and capital cost of such counterterrorism operations is also very high.
Challenges related to resource and funding have mainly contributed to the decision of drawdown and the eventual exit of peacekeeping operations such as UNAMID and AMISOM. Both missions have been in place for more than ten years however the situation on the ground remains volatile and highly insecure. PSC may also address the challenges associated with the exit process particularly in relation to such long standing operations and the kind of vacuum their withdrawal might create. In line with agreed upon timeline UNAMID’s military component will be reduced to 4,050 by 30 June 2019 and AMISOM’s uniformed personnel has already been reduced to 20,626. The unpredictable political and security recent developments in Sudan are likely to have impact on the troop withdrawal. In this regard, a major concern is the serious threat that the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of PSOs without the presence of a trained and prepared national force that is able to take effective control. In order to prevent the risks of the reversal of the security gains, there is a need for strengthening national security mechanisms.
In these and other operations, perhaps the most crucial challenge has been the lack of political strategy for addressing the conflict issues. The absence of such strategy means that PSOs are deployed for a prolonged period of time caught up in the protracted task of trying to manage the conflict situation and hence making the planning of their exit difficult.
The other related challenge in various PSOs is the coordination among the various stakeholders involved in the implementation of the missions. There have been disagreements between nations that send troops and those that fund missions. Countries that either contribute troops or whose citizens are directly affected by peacekeeping missions often have limited say in how missions are designed and mandated given that funding and technical support is provided by other countries or partners. The interest and relationship with the host country adds an additional layer of complexity. The same is true of the relationship between the mission leadership and the sector contingents.
The mismatch between the mandate of PSOs and what their capacity and resources also remains a major challenge facing AU mandated and/or authorized missions. The challenge faced particularly by hybrid peacekeeping missions such as UNAMID is related to the asymmetrical relationship between the AU and UN. Although the AU has the political leverage in mobilizing African states for troop contribution and in managing the engagement with the government of Sudan, it however depends entirely on UN budget and resources. Although hybrid missions have deepened UN and regional organization cooperation in peacekeeping operations, in reality however the relationship between the two organizations in managing the mission has not necessarily been even.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing session is expected to focus on providing solutions to the multifaceted challenges faced by the various forms of AU led PSOs. Based on these categorizations and recommendations that will be provided by the MSC and PSOD, the PSC is expected to agree on ways to address challenges faced by the various PSOs. One of the recommendations or area of intervention is expected to address the issues related to prolonged PSOs and on ways to prevent open ended mandates by strategizing on definite exit timeline.
With regards to responding to the financial challenges the launch of the AU Peace Fund in November 2018 which aims at mobilizing 400 million USD by 2021 including for the financing of PSOs is another option that may be explored. So far, around 105 million USD has been mobilized towards the Peace Fund.
The progress that is being made in strengthening Africa’s ownership in PSOs through the reinvigorated Peace Fund may also facilitate the political engagement with UNSC. Particularly in relation to the pending UNSC resolution which establishes that the AU mandated or authorized PSOs should in principle be financed on a case by case basis through UN assessed contributions. In its recent resolution 2457 (2019) the UNSC stated its ‘intention to consider steps that can be taken to enhance practical cooperation with the African Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter’. During the briefing Ramtane Lamamra High representative of the AU for Silencing the Guns by 2020 reiterated the importance of UN’s favorable response to the critical and the long-standing calls for the funding of UN assessed contributions to be accessed by AU-led PSOs.
The expected outcome of the session was not known at the time of the production of this Insight. The PSC may however consider to adopt a communiqué that identifies tasks and responsibilities for addressing the challenges that AU PSOs face and assigns the AU Commission to develop action plan for a coordinated and sustained effort for addressing the challenges. In the communiqué, the PSC may request for AU Commission reports on current missions to include analysis of the steps taken both at the strategic and operational levels to address the forgoing challenges as they relate to the specific missions. It is also expected that the outcome of the session will provide key recommendations based on the experiences and lessons learnt from past and ongoing PSOs.
