PSC Program of Work for the Month of March 2018
Amani Africa
Date | March 2018
Following consultation between the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretariat and the incoming chair of the PSC, the draft provisional program of work of the month for March 2018 was considered and adopted at the 13th February 2018 session of the PSC. The provisional program is relatively light with only six sessions of which only four focusing on specific peace and security situations. As the 10 members of the PSC serving for the past two years conclude their tenure by the end of the month, time has also been assigned in this month’s program of work for the induction of the newly elected and returning members of the PSC. Niger, whose two-year term comes to an end at the end of the month, assumed the Chairpersonship of the PSC today. For Niger, the G5 Sahel joint force featuring in this month’s program of work is the main item of most direct interest.
When the Council started its program of the month this morning, it had two items on its agenda. One of these is the draft provisional program of work of the PSC for April 2018. It is the first time that the program of work for the next month is tabled for consideration on the very first day of the preceding month. The other is review of the preparation for the AU-PSC and EU-Political and Security Committee (PSC) joint mission to the Central African Republic. For ten years, the main mechanism in the partnership between the AUPSC and EU-PSC has been the annual joint consultative meeting that rotates between Addis Ababa and Brussels.
The two sides held their most recent consultative meeting in November 2017. With the joint mission, the two entities have established an additional mechanism that opens avenues for shared understanding and coherent and complementary policy approaches. The joint filed mission is scheduled to take place from 6 to 9 March 2018. The Council will meet just over a week later the 15th of March to discuss and adopt the report of the joint mission.
On 13 March, the council will examine the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). With the authoritarian drift of the government amid mounting opposition against the president over the delay in holding general elections, the political and security situation has become worrisome. This situation is marked by sporadic clashes between protesters and security forces in the capital Kinshasa and recurring fighting between proliferating armed militias and government forces in several other areas of the country. For the region and the AU, there are two major concerns. First, there is ever mounting fear over the impending relapse of the country back to major national scale conflicts. Second, the uncertainty over the holding of the general elections scheduled for December 2018, already postponed two times since 2016. The proliferation of armed fighting and rising tension between opposition groups and the government has made the situation dire.
In its last meeting on DRC on 7 November 2017, the PSC discussed the report of its field mission by its members to the DRC from 22 to 26 October 2017. The meeting emphasized on the importance of the agreements signed by political stakeholders on a free, fair, peaceful, credible and transparent elections in the DRC, as a vehicle to a democratic transition, which failed to materialize as the electoral calendar was postponed for yet another one year.
One of the standing annual thematic agenda of the PSC relate to women and children in armed conflict. Following its annual schedule, the PSC will convene an open session on 13 March on the plight of women and children in Conflict situations. Apart from the expected role of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Women and Peace and Security, the open session will involve, among others, the participation of representatives of RECs, embassies accredited to the AU and civil society organizations.
On 23 March, the council is scheduled to consider the situation in Mali and the Sahel and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The Council will receive the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Mali and the Sahel. The AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), former President Pierre Buyoya will brief the Council on the political and security situation in Mali. As part of the renewal of the mandate of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Council will also consider the status of operationalization of the Force. The last time the council discussed the Sahel on 21 November 2017 it expressed its frustration on the slow progress in the implementation of the elements of the Algiers Process. It also expressed its concern on the worsening security situation in parts of Mali and the Sahel.
The three days between 26 to 28th March are dedicated to the induction of the new members of the council elected at the AU summit that took place at the end of January 2018. The induction moved to be held in Djibouti covers briefings on the PSC Protocol, the mandate of the PSC, the working methods of the PSC and the roles, among others, of its member states, the monthly rotating chairperson of the Council and the PSC Secretariat. Of the ten members of the PSC whose two-year term will start on 1 April 2018, only three countries namely Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo are current members re-elected for another two-year term. The induction will in particular be useful for the new members (Liberia and Morocco) that have no previous representation in the PSC. Guinea Bissau will be the last item on the agenda of the PSC for the month of March. On 29 March the council will receive a briefing on the situation in Guinea Bissau. The country, which has been passing through a security and political crisis, last featured on the agenda of the PSC on 13 February 2018. The meeting noted the continued political standoff and the ‘paralysis affecting the government institutions and the People’s National Assembly’ as the biggest concern for stability. It called on civilian oversight of the security and armed forces and refrain from political intervention. The planned meeting on 29 March will review the political and security situation in the country and the status of the ECOWAS mission present in the country.
PSC Briefing on Somalia
Amani Africa
Date | 18 February, 2018
Tomorrow (15 February 2018) the Peace and Security Council is scheduled to hold a session on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM. The two part agenda of the session would involve briefing on the political stabilization process in Somalia and update on AMISOM activities and exit strategy. It is expected that the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Smail Chergui, would provide the Council a briefing on the issues on this agenda. Others expected to participate and make statements include the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, Somalia, IGAD Chair and IGAD Special Envoy, the UN and the EU.
In terms of the political stabilization process in Somalia, the briefing is expected to highlight the state of the security situation, political and financial reforms and issues around the stabilization efforts. The security situation in Somalia remains fluid. In this regard, a major focus of interest is the continuing Al Shabaab suicide and car bombings and attacks including those directed at government and AMISOM targets. In the report of the PSC to the AU Assembly during the January 2018 summit described the capacity of al shabaab as ‘unprecedented’. Indeed, on 14 October 2017 Al Shabaab orchestrated in Mogadishu the most deadly attack that claimed the lives of more than 500 people. During the deliberations at the summit, the FGS representatives expressed reservations on parts of the PSC report. This is partly important due to its implications on the continuing push for AMISOM exit and transfer of responsibility to FGS.
On political reforms, issues of interest include progress in the federal state formation process, the constitutional review process and intra FGS cohesion and stability as well as relationship between the FGS and FMS. In some areas, positive developments have been reported. A case in point is the power-sharing agreement signed on Wednesday, between Galmudug state and the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (AWSJ) in December 2018. Despite continuing challenges, the FGS continues to have dialogue with the FMS. Yet, problems continue to persist in other areas. These include infighting in the FGS, disagreements between the FGS and the FMS over some of the details of the national security architecture adopted in April 2017 and the political crisis in some parts of the country. The relationship between the FGS and the FMS experienced further strains as a result of the support that some of the FMS expressed to one of the parties in the Gulf crisis contrary to the neutral position that the FGS sought to pursue. There are fears in the AU that these various differences could re-ignite clan-based conflicts and reverse the political gains so far made.
Another area of interest on which the FGS would also give particular attention to is ongoing financial reforms.
In particular, issue of concern include steps being taken in establishing budgeting and auditing systems within the FGS and capacity for effective management and utilization of funds. Despite efforts in establishing sound financial system including with support from IMF and World Bank, corruption remains a major challenge with Somalia ranked as the most corrupt country in the world. Financial reforms and issues relating thereto have direct impact on the going conversation on transfer of responsibility to Somalia security forces. There have been instances in which non-payment of salaries created security vacuum which Al Shabaab took advantage of.
In terms of transition planning, a Core Group of Transition Planning has been established. Chaired by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the CGTP has the membership of the AU, EU, UN, FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS). This is a group tasked with the responsibility of developing a transition plan for transferring security responsibility to Somalia security forces.
On the security situation, efforts of AMISOM in gaining territory from Al Shabaab and fending off Al Shabaab attacks would be highlighted. Member states would be interested to know the gravity of the threat that Al Shabaab continues to pose and the security and political strategy particularly on the part of the FGS for scaling down the threat. In security terms, the nature and scale of the continued presence of AMISOM
depends on two major factors: the capacity of Al Shabaab to orchestrate serious attacks and the capacity of FGS for assuming increasing role in security.
Since 2011 Al Shabaab suffered major losses in the hands of AMISOM. It lost control of much of the territory that was under its command. Its commanders and leadership have also fallen victim to some of the drone strikes. While it has as a result lost much of its capacity to engage in direct fighting, it has not completely lost the capacity to orchestrate attacks and cause major damage. Despite AMISOM’s gain of 80 percept of the territory of the country, Al Shabaab remains in control of pockets of territory in rural south central Somalia and supply routs between towns. It also continues to show presence in various towns and to infiltrate the capital Mogadishu in pursuit of its suicide and car bombings and other attacks.
In terms of AMISOM activities, issues expected to be addressed include progress being made around AMISOM revised core tasks notably, joint operations with Somalia forces to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab and to secure main supply routes, building the capacity of Somalia security forces and supporting the early recovery and support extension of state authority. In this respect, the major areas of interest include the
training of Somalia security forces and the operations undertaken against Al Shabaab. It has been recently
reported that a joint operation of AMISOM and Somalia troops have pushed Al Shabaab out of various locations in Lower Shebelle Region.
Of major interest for PSC members including Egypt, Kenya and Uganda is issues relating to exit plan of AMISOM. Under the AMISOM exit strategy and UN Security Council resolution 2372, AMISOM would focus on building ‘a capable, accountable, acceptable, and affordable Somalia-led security sector’. Under Resolution 2372, AMISOM should withdraw 1,000 troops by Dec. 31, 2017, but increase its police component by 500, with more troop reduction anticipated during 2018. The AU reported in January 2018 that between ‘October and December 2017, a total of 1,000 AMISOM soldiers returned to their countries.’
Despite the exit strategy and the push for incremental withdrawal of AMISOM troops, implementation of the strategy faces major challenges. As noted above, Al Shabaab continues to pose serious threat. Significantly, the operationalization of the Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) remains poor, with the operational readiness assessment revealing major weaknesses and lack of capacity of the SNSF. In this context, issues of interest would include verification of the capacity of the Somalia National Security Forces not only at the national level but also at states level and the establishment of a unified framework.
From the perspective of TCCs including Kenya, the chair of the PSC for the month of February 2018, this
session avails opportunity to highlight on-going activities of AMISOM with a focus on the challenges. Apart
from the continuing need for AMISOM to be equipped with the necessary capacity, including force enablers and multipliers, a major area of concern is the need for AMISOM to be provided with a predictable and
sustainable funding. For the FGS and some member states such as Egypt, attention would focus on channeling
support including funds to the Somalia security forces.
It is to be recalled that AMISOM has been underfunded following the European Union (EU) 20 percent cut in its payment of allowances to AMISOM personnel in 2016. This has affected the morale of AMISOM troops.
While efforts have been underway to make up for this shortfall, the EU, a major source of AMISOM funding, has indicated that it could not guarantee continuing funding of AMISOM from October 2018. In the light of the foregoing, member states would be interested to have information on the on going consultations that the AU and UN Special Envoys on AMISOM Funding have been undertaking. The PSC may in this regard underscore the imperative of finding realistic option for funding of AMISOM.
The expected outcome of this session is a communiqué.
