Illicit flow and financing of arms in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 23 May, 2018
Illicit flow and financing of arms in Africa: Sources of conflict and impediment to silencing the guns’
Tomorrow (24 May) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have a briefing session on the theme of ‘Illicit flow and financing of arms in Africa: Sources of conflict and impediment to silencing the guns’. The PSC is expected to receive a briefing from the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) and the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD), particularly its division on Defense and Security. Others who will participate in this session include members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and representatives of Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs).
This session is convened within the framework of the 430th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, held on 24 April 2014 under the theme ‘Silencing the Guns: Pre-requisites for Realising a Conflict-Free Africa by the Year 2020’ which identified the curbing of illicit flow of light and small weapons as one of the measures requested for achieving the AU agenda of silencing the guns by 2020. As reflected in the agenda for this session, this session is designed to support the efforts of the AU to achieve its aim of silencing the guns and adopt decisions identifying measures that help in preventing illicit flow of arms and its financing.
One of the aims of the session is to understand current dynamics in the flow of arms and their financing in Africa. The briefing from RECSA is expected to provide insights on patterns and trends in arms and ammunition inflows, illicit circulation, and gaps in control measures. It is in particular expected to share the experience of the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions in terms of both the challenges these regions face due to illicit flows and financing of arms and the measures being taken to address these challenges.
The briefing from PSD is expected to highlight the role of illicit flow of arms in fueling and sustaining conflicts, in the displacement of peoples, in disrupting development efforts and the scale and nature of casualties inflicted on civilians. In this regard, mention can be made of how the illicit flow of arms from Libya in the aftermath of the collapse of Col Gadhafi’s regime fueled the conflict in Mali and the surge in acts of terrorism and groups engaged in such acts in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin regions of Africa. It is also worth noting that the changing character of conflicts in Africa that witnessed the proliferation of small and poorly organized militias, insurgents, terrorist groups and criminal networks is partly attributed to easy access to illicit flow of weapons.
At the AU level, the policy framework that serves as point of departure is the ‘African Common Position on illicit circulation, proliferation and trafficking of small and light weapons’ (SALW), also known as the Bamako Declaration of 2000. This declaration commits member states to identify, seize and destroy illicit weapons. In January 2017, the AU Assembly adopted the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps to Silence the Guns by 2020. As a follow up to this master roadmap, in September 2017 the PSC declared the month of September an amnesty month for the Surrender and Collection of Illicit Weapons. As noted in our ‘Insight’ on the PSC Field Mission to Sudan, Darfur, one of the stabilization efforts being implemented in Darfur is the collection of weapons.
At sub-regional levels, important normative and institutional developments have taken place, including with the adoption of binding treaties. These include the 2001 SADC Protocol, the 2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States, the 2006 ECOWAS Convention, and the 2010 Central Africa Convention.
Member states of the PSC would expectedly share their experiences with respect to illicit flow and circulation of weapons as well as its consequences and their efforts to address the threat that illicit flow and circulation of SLWPs poses. In terms of the efforts of the AU, it would be of interest to PSC member states to know why illicit flow and circulation of weapons persist despite the various legal and institutional regimes put in place and the various interventions both at AU and regional levels.
For PSC member states and the wider AU system, this session presents an opportunity not only to take stock of the policy and institutional architecture but also the steps that are required for both enhancing the effectiveness of the legal and institutional regime for curbing illicit flow of SALW and implementing practical measures for countering illicit flow and circulation of SALW at national, regional, continental and global levels. With respect to the legal and institutional regimes, one of the major challenges remains to be non-ratification and lack of adherence to the measures stipulated in the various regional conventions. The universal ratification and implementation of these legal instruments is thus necessary. Regional level efforts should include the strengthening of the legaland security measures for cracking down entry pointes and trafficking routs, arms dealers, including the activities of brokers and the sources of financing of the illicit flow, sell and circulation of SALW.
There is a need for regionally targeted approach to the challenge of illicit flows. The nature of the problem and its manifestations are not the same in the different regions of the continent. It is necessary in this regard that targeted interventions are designed and implemented in collaboration with RECs/RMs for parts of the continent most affected by the illicit flow and use of illicit weapons or arms. The measures to be taken in this regard include not only the strengthening of control measures and coordination between member states but also implementation of programs for collection of weapons and for the effectives physical security and management of stockpiles.
At the national level, issues that need attention include corruption and the strengthening of the regulatory measures for effective control, management and protection of SALW. Indeed, weak regulatory framework, including poor protection and management of stockpiles, and corruption often lead to diversion of legally sourced arms through leakages and raids by illegal non-state actors.
Given the global dimension of the movement and circulation of arms, the agenda for this session recognizes the need for the AU to work with international actors. In this respect, the agenda envisages a plan for the PSC, through its Chair with the support of the African members of the UNSC (A3) and the AU Commission, to brief the UNSC on Africa’s efforts for silencing the guns with a view to have a UNSC resolution calling on different arms producing countries to implement arms certification, including end user certification. Another avenue for effective follow up is the expected review of the UN Program of Action on small arms during 2018. The PSC can articulate African common position on this review addressing issues including transparency in small arms production and sell, the obligation of tight regulation and accountability measures by producing countries of the transfer of SALW and weapons registers as well as standardization of certification.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué.
Briefing on the Principles on the Protection of Civilians in conflict situations in Africa
Amani Africa
Date | 22 May, 2018
Briefing on the Principles on Protection of Civilians
Tomorrow (22 May) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the principles on protection of civilians. The meeting is expected to receive a briefing from the AU Peace and Security Department and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU).
As set out in the agenda for tomorrow’s session, one of the objectives of this session is to create more understanding among AU member states of the principles on the protection of civilians, also known as the Kigali Principles. The Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians are a set of eighteen pledges for the effective implementation of the protection of civilians in peace support operations. They emerged from the High-level International Conference on the Protection of Civilians held in Rwanda on 28-29 May 2015 in the run-up to the Leaders’ Summit on UN Peacekeeping. The event at which the principles were presented brought together the top 30 troop and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) and the top 10 financial- contributing states of UN peace operations.
As its major contribution to the effectiveness of peacekeeping, for Rwanda this session presents useful avenue for not only promoting the principles but also secure the buy in of the AU system and AU members states. Some 40 countries have adopted the Kigali principles, of which 13 are AU member states. Framed from the perspective of T/PCCs and major peacekeeping financial contributors, the Kigali Principles aim at both enhancing ownership of the principles by T/PCCs and empowering T/PCCs and peace support operations in terms of their ability to effectively deliver on their protection of civilians responsibilities. In this sense, the principles could lead to better coordination between the filed and the dynamics at AU headquarters including in the PSC.
The AU has made conscious decision of making the protection of civilians a core task of its peace and security agenda, including its peace support operations. In 2010, the AU developed the draft guidelines on the protection of civilians. When the PSC adopted the mandate of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), it tasked the force to ‘ensure the mainstreaming of the civilian protection in all military and security initiatives aimed at resolving the LRA problem’. In June 2012, the AU PSC issued a statement that stressed the importance of ‘mainstreaming’ PoC issues ‘in standard operating procedures of AU peace support operations’, and that ‘PoC must form part of the mandate of future AU missions’. In 2013, the draft guidelines informed the development and adoption of the Aide-memoire for the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians in Africa.
Apart from the points in the foregoing, the briefing from PSD is expected to highlight the various measures being taken for a comprehensive framework on the protection of civilians within the peace and security architecture of the AU. These include the elaboration of relevant guidelines including notably the draft AU policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in AU PSOs and the Draft Conduct and Discipline Policy for AU PSOs. There is also the comprehensive assessment of the experience of AU peace operations vis-à-vis compliance with human rights, international humanitarian law and conduct and discipline standards. As noted in the 13 March 2018 session of the PSC, other dimensions of AU work include a child protection institutional framework or architecture and the work currently underway with respect to the women, peace and security agenda of the AU.
While the protection of civilians has become central component of AU peace and security work, delivering on this agenda has not always been easy for the AU and its peace support operations. The major issues faced in pursuing this civilian protection agenda include clearly formulated and contextually tailored civilian protection mandate, translation of the mandate into operational guidelines including diversity of perspectives, lack of clarity on what the civilian protection mandate entails both with respect to security measures and in terms of civilian tasks, the possession of the requisite skills and awareness by personnel, lack of resources in terms of supply of the requisite logistics and equipment, and the involvement of mission personnel in perpetration of abuses including sexual exploitation and abuse.
For PSC members and the AU broadly, the content of the Kigali principles and their value addition to existing protection of civilians agenda of the AU would be of particular interest. The Kigali principles address the various issues that affect not only the effective implementation of protection of civilians but also peace support operations mandate broadly. One such issue is training on protection of civilians, which underscores the responsibility of T/PCCs for ensuring the provision of training on protection of civilians before deployment. In underscoring the importance of the role of mission leaders in the implementation of the civilian protection mandate, principle 2 of the Kigali Principles provides troop-contributing states should ensure that their sector and contingent commanders, as well as their nominees for mission leadership positions, have a high level of training and preparedness on peacekeeping operations and, particularly, on the protection of civilians.
The use of force and rules of engagement are other items rightly addressed in various parts of the Kigali Principles. The principles emphasize the need for personnel to be prepared to use force as necessary and within the mandate and to act, in accordance with the rules of engagement, where the host government does not show capacity or willingness to protect civilians. On the rules of engagement, principle 9 underscores the need for seeking clarity on the rules of engagement including on the circumstances under which use of force is permitted.
Other issues covered in the Kigali Principles include caveats, delays in response and rapid deployment; resources and capabilities; respect for human rights and IHL and conduct and discipline as well as accountability of personnel; and consultations in the development and review of mandates. Clearly, in emphasizing discipline and accountability of personnel, the Kigali principles highlight the challenges to protection emanate not only from the external sources of threat and the limitations affecting peace support operations but also at times from those that are mandated and expected to protect them from other threats.
The expected outcome of the session is a statement. Apart from calling on AU member states to endorse the principles, the statement is expected to provide for the dissemination of the principles among AU member states in the context of the ongoing efforts for the operationalization of the African Standby Force. Given their major contribution on enhancing the role of T/PCCs, the use of the Kigali principles by the AU, Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) not only as useful benchmark in engaging with member states but also as useful means for empowering T/PCC’s in shaping and effectively implementing the civilian protection agenda is also expected to be part of the outcome. The outcome is also expected to underscore the importance of ownership of the principles by member states particularly T/PCCs for guiding their actions in the protection of civilians including protection of educational and health infrastructure and personnel.
Insights on the PSC Update on PSC’s May 2018 Program of Work
Amani Africa
Date | May 2018
The PSC program of work for the month of May 2018 saw major restructuring of the sequence of the agenda items, and included some new additional themes since Amani published the Insight on the
program on 29 May 2018.
The second week of the PSC saw the most changes as the PSC shifted its field mission to Darfur from the 16th to 19th of May to from 5 to 9 May 2018. The PSC session on African Migrants Crisis, Imperative for Expediting Free Movement Policy in Africa was held on 11 May instead of the provisional slot on the 10th. The 11 May meeting also considered and adopted the Draft Provisional Program of the PSC for the Month of June.
The Report on the Continental Results Framework for Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the Women Peace and Security Agenda in Africa has been brought forward from
21 May to 16 May. A new agenda was also added to the 16 May session of the PSC. The PSC had a briefing on the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA) and the renewal of the RCI-LRA.
On 18 May, the PSC considered the report on its field mission to Sudan and the status of implementation of UNAMID’s downsizing and reconfiguration. The open session on ‘Climate Induced Conflicts: Sources of Insecurity in Africa’, initially planned for 15 May, now takes place on 21 May. The second open session on the ‘Principles of Protection of Civilians in Conflict Situations in Africa’ initially scheduled for 8 May will take place on 22 May.
On 24 May, the PSC briefing session on ‘Illicit Flow and Financing of Arms in Africa’ will be held as initially planned. The theme of this session forms part of the areas specifically singled out for action in the AU Agenda on Silencing the Guns.
On 31 May, the last session of the month will also go as planned. The session which will take place at ministerial level will focus on two themes. The first is on the ‘role of Africa in the harmonization of initiatives and operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahel’. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the Chairperson of the AU Commission is expected to brief the Council. The second item will be on the Chairperson’s ‘Report on Security and Migration in Africa’.
Report of the PSC field mission to Sudan and UNAMID
Amani Africa
Date | 18 May, 2018
Tomorrow (18 May) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session on the report on its field mission to Sudan and UN/AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The Peace and Security
Department and the Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID Jeremiah Mamabolo are scheduled to brief the PSC. The PSC Secretariat is expected to introduce the report. The consideration of the Special Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary General of the UN on the Strategic Review of UNAMID envisaged in the agenda for this session as set out in the updated PSC program of work for May has been postponed for June.
The agenda for the session anticipates the participation in this session of the UN office to the AU (UNOAU) and representatives of the African members (A3) of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and
the five permanent members of the UNSC. The PSC undertook its field mission to Sudan from 5 to 9 May. Apart from engaging various stakeholders around the ongoing review and downsizing of UNAMID and the preparations for smooth transition, the field mission aimed at providing the PSC with first hand information on the current state of the peace and security situation in Darfur. This visit follows the Joint visit to Darfur of Smail Chergui, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in April 2018.
In Khartoum, the PSC held discussions with the General Commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid Commission on humanitarian issues and with Sudan’s Commissioner for DDR on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process being implemented by the Government of Sudan in Darfur. It also met the Director of the Darfur Peace Follow up Office and discussed the implementation of the residual activities on Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). The senior government officials with whom the PSC met include the Minister of Defense of Sudan and the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan. The PSC also met with the African Group of Ambassadors.
In Darfur, it met with the Acting Governor of Northern Darfur State and other officials of the state and discussed the political, security and humanitarian situation in Northern Darfur. It visited Soroti and interacted with IDPS on the security and humanitarian situation at Zam Zam IDP camp. The PSC delegation also held a meeting with the Joint Special Representative and UNAMID team in El Fasher in Darfur.
From its visits and interactions, the PSC has established that the security situation in Darfur has stabilized. Most notable in this regard is the cessation of direct hostilities between government forces and armed groups in Darfur. The implementation of the weapons collection campaign of the government seems to be limiting militias and bandits from freely using their weapons and thereby contributing further to the improvement of the security situation.
Despite such improvements in the security situation in Darfur, concerns remain. There are incidents of inter-communal violence leading to major displacement of civilians. Over 11,000 civilians fled their homes to IDP camps following inter-communal clashes in Jebel Marra area last month. Another source of threat for civilians comes from attacks from armed militias and criminals. There are also incidents of clashes relating to the compulsory collection of weapons. From the perspective of lasting peace and realization of full political solution, there are fundamental challenges. Despite the improvement in the security situation, IDPs could not return to their territories. Their land has been taken over. Additionally, no full political settlement accepted by all armed and political forces in Darfur has been achieved. Notwithstanding the absence of direct hostilities, armed rebel groups still exist in Darfur. While the manifestations of the conflict in terms of direct armed fighting has ended or been reduced, the underlying causes of the conflict and the consequences of the conflict remain unresolved.
As highlighted during the PSC briefing on the joint visit of Chergui and Lacroix, these remaining issues underscore a need for supporting the stabilization process in Darfur and the effort for full political solution. This also emphasizes that the implementation of the phasing out or withdrawal of
UNAMID should be done without creating security vacuum and the risk of relapse of conflict in Darfur.
The briefing on UNAMID would focus on the ongoing review and downsizing of UNAMID. Currently, phase two of the reconfiguration of the mission running until end of June is underway. The repatriation of three infantry battalions from the mission handing over the team sites to formed police units has been ongoing, with the repatriation of the two battalions from Rwanda and Senegal.
As the delay in the departure of the third battalion from Ethiopia until the end of June for addressing prevailing security conditions shows, there is a level of flexibility required in the implementation of the reconfiguration of UNAMID. With the closure also of three military sector headquarters (Sectors East, North and West) during this second phase, the force will be left with two sectors the Jebel Marra Task Force, with its headquarters at Zalingei, and the State Security Assistance Force, with its headquarters at Nyala.
In April, the Joint AU-UN Strategic Review of UNAMID undertook a two-week visit to Sudan. Apart from considering a new mission concept with adjusted priorities, the review will lead to a report that will be submitted to the PSC in early June. While, as it pushes for the withdrawal of UNAMID, the Government of Sudan has requested the UN for a peacebuilding support in Drafur, it remains uncertain if Darfur would be put under the UN Peacebuilding Commission mandate.
This session presents the PSC the opportunity to assess the ongoing reconfiguration of UNAMID and to set some of the parameters for further review and reconfiguration of the mission. In this respect, while there is support for and consensus in the PSC for the process of withdrawal of UNAMID, there is recognition that this has to be done in a planned and phased way. As the PSC indicated in its statement on its filed visit urging ‘all Sudanese parties to commit to the full realization of peace and stability in Darfur’, there is a need both for mobilization of support for stabilization of the region and full political settlement in Darfur.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. This will present the PSC’s appreciation of the current security and humanitarian situation in Darfur and its assessment of the implementation of the reconfiguration of UNAMID. While expressing its expectation to receive the Special Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary General of the UN on the Strategic Review of UNAMID, the PSC could also articulate its expectations on the pace and scale of the reduction of the force size of UNAMID and the review of UNAMID’s mandate whose renewal is due on 30 June.
The role that the AU could play in supporting the stabilization process in Darfur and the steps to be taken in this respect including the conduct of a needs assessment are also matters that could feature in the outcome of this session.
The status of the RCI-LRA and renewal of its mandate
Amani Africa
Date | 16 May, 2018
Tomorrow (16 May) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing session on the status of implementation of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) and the renewal of the mandate of the regional operation. The agenda for the session, which was added subsequent to the adoption of the program of the PSC for the month of May, envisaged submission of a report of the African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson to guide the deliberations and the Council’s actions. Instead of the report, expected to be finalized after the meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) – the political management body of the RCI-LRA –, the PSC will receive a briefing on the status of implementation of the RCI-LRA.
Apart from the briefing that Smaïl Chergui, African Union (AU) Commissioner for Peace and Security, is expected to provide, the representatives of the RCI-LRA member countries, namely the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Uganda and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) are expected to participate and make statements. The countries most affected by the LRA notably CAR and to some extent DRC are expected to call for the sustaining of the RTF operations. Others expected to make statements include representatives of the UN, the US and the European Union.
It is to be recalled that the US, which provided Special Forces and logistical support to the operations of the Regional Task Force (RTF), suspended its engagement in March 2017. Subsequently, Uganda, which has been the main contributor of the RTF announced withdrawal of its 2,000 troops from the CAR. The operation of the RTF headquarter in the CAR has also been suspended, thereby limiting AU’s engagement with the sectors which operate within their national territories.
Given the limited capacity and participation of the CAR in the anti-LRA operation and the lack of cross-border operation between CAR and DRC, there are concerns that the withdrawal of Ugandan forces would result in a security vacuum, which the LRA forces could use to regroup. While the details would only come from the AUC Chairperson’s report, it is of interest for PSC members to know how the withdrawal of troops and US logistical support and freezing of the RTF headquarters is affecting on the anti-LRA operations and the mandate of the RCI-LRA. As the recent meeting of the Sector Commanders of the AU RTF held at the AU headquarters on 28-29 March highlighted, one issue of particular interest is the reactivation of the RTF with the re-establishment of the force headquarters. Yet, the required funding for the force headquarters has to be mobilized.
For PSC members, this session also presents an opportunity for receiving update on the implementation of the various follow up items from its last decision. This is particularly the case with respect to the realignment of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of the RTF with the new developments of the withdrawal of Ugandan troops and US Special Forces. The same is true of the PSC’s call for the convening of a summit the RCI-LRA countries to provide guidance on the future configuration of the RCI-LRA.
In terms of the status of implementation of the RCI-LRA, the briefing is also expected to update PSC members on the level of threat that the LRA continues to pose and recent developments in terms of the counter-LRA operations. It would also provide highlights on the state of coordination with the UN, including within the framework of the joint convening of the Sector Commanders meeting in collaboration with the UN Regional Office in Central Africa.
With respect to renewal of the mandate of the RCI-LRA, it is anticipated that the PSC will be requested to renew the mandate of the mission for a short period, pending the finalization of the Chairperson’s report that will follow the meeting of the JCM of the RCI-LRA. The usual one-year period of renewal of mandate is expected to take place on the basis of the details that the Chairperson’s report would provide on the plan for the RCI-LRA operation and its mandate.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Apart from welcoming the efforts to sustain the counter LRA operation, the PSC is expected to call for mobilization of logistical and other support to the RTF contingents and to design and implement projects for the stabilization and rehabilitation of the LRA affected areas. Expressing its expectation for receiving the report of the AUC Chairperson, the PSC is also expected to renew the mandate of the RCI-RTF for a short period of three months.
