Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2024
Monthly Digest on The African Union Peace And Security Council - January 2024
Date | January 2024
In January, under the chairship of Ghana, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) had a scheduled program of work consisting of five sessions and a field mission to Tigray. After the introduction of a new agenda item in the course of the month, six sessions were convened.
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of March 2024
Provisional Program of Work for the Month of March 2024
Date | March 2024
In March 2024, the Republic of Namibia will take over the role of chairing the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) from the Kingdom of Morocco. The provisional program of work of the month envisages a total of six substantive agenda items and an informal consultation of the PSC with the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC). Of the six substantive agenda items, four will address country-specific and regional situations while the remaining two will focus on thematic issues. One of the sessions to be held during the month will take place at Ministerial level while the remaining will be Ambassadorial level meetings. In addition, the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the Committee of Experts (CoE) will also be meeting during the month.
The first meeting of the PSC will be its informal consultation with the EUPSC, scheduled to take place on 01 March. It is worth noting that this is not the ordinary engagement between the two bodies. It is rather an informal meeting initiated in the context of the visit of members of the EUPSC. It is expected to serve as the platform for the two counterparts to exchange on issues related to working methods.
There will be two agenda items in the first substantive session of the month, on 04 March. The first agenda item is a briefing on the operation of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM). It is to be noted that in 2023, although indicated in the annual indicative program of work, the PSC overlooked to convene a session on SAMIM during the year. The upcoming briefing on SAMIM’s operations is expected to cover the state of operation of SAMIM and the situation in northern Mozambique. SADC would brief the PSC on progress made in the implementation of SAMIM’s mandates and key developments from SADC‘s decision to the extension of SAMIM’s mandate by an additional year, expected to end in July 2024. The session would additionally cover AU Commission’s recent activities in alignment with the PSC’s request at its 1119th session for the Commission to ‘…facilitat[e] the delivery of the equipment, directly to the Government of Mozambique at the Port of Nacala (Nampula Province), donated by the Government of the People’s Republic of China…’. A key update that may be highlighted in this respect is the November 2023 mission to Pemba, Mozambique, undertaken by the Director of Conflict Management of the AU PAPS Department, Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, aimed at handing over donated military equipment.
The second agenda item to be considered on 04 March is the Situation in Eastern DRC and the deployment of SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). Although the PSC has covered the increasing tensions between DRC and Rwanda and the escalation of conflict between the Armed Forces of DRC and the M23 in eastern DRC during previous sessions, this session marks the first time when the PSC will discuss the decision of SADC Heads of State and Government on the deployment of troops to the DRC on 08 May 2023. In the communiqué of the 1140th session when the PSC last considered the situation in eastern DRC, it highlighted the importance of dialogue between the two countries for de-escalating tensions and underscored the role of the Luanda and Nairobi processes, with a focus on the need for ensuring coordination and harmonization between these two processes. The deployment of SAMIDRC as a replacement of the East African Force which DRC hurriedly pushed out for failing to fight against the M23. Unlike the East African Force which was tied to the political track of the Nairobi process and the inter-state focused Luanda process, SAMIDRC lacks a political and peace track on which it is anchored. It seems that it takes the model of SADC’s deployment in Mozambique and yet the situation in eastern DRC is not akin to northern Mozambique. This is not without consequences for the Nairobi and Luanda processes.
On 08 March, the PSC will convene another country-specific session to receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia. As the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is nearing its final drawdown in December 2024 and with the PSC convening a total of five sessions on ATMIS vis-via Somalia in 2023, it is to be noted that Somalia has been and will remain one of the PSC’s key concerns in the region for 2024. During the 1173rd session, which was when it last discussed Somalia and operations of ATMIS, the PSC considered the second drawdown phase of ATIMS on the basis of the reports produced by the Joint Technical Assessment and the outcome of the Somalia Coordination Committee to steer their engagement. In alignment with the process of drawdown, the PSC decided on the withdrawal of 3000 ATMIS troops and 851 police personnel. Per the PSC decision, on 2 February, ATMIS reported the completion of phase two drawdown including the transfer of seven Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) to the government of Somalia and the closure of two additional FOBs. As the third phase of the drawdown nears, the AU Commission and ATMIS also held a consultative session with the Chiefs of Defense on 13 February to discuss the challenges that were encountered during the Phase 2 drawdown including the technical pause in September of 2023. Beyond that, the meeting also covered the plans for the Phase 3 drawdown and the implications it may have on the security situation in the country. As such, it is anticipated that the PSC will receive a briefing on the discussion that took place the previous month and anticipate the preparations for the phase 3 drawdown of ATMIS as well as the plan for avoiding the emergence of any security vacuum on the departure of ATMIS.
The PSC is scheduled to consider and adopt the programme of work for the month of April, on 08 March.
The next session taking place on 12 March will be dedicated to the situation in Abyei. To enable engagement with Sudan, a member state that is currently under suspension and hence cannot participate in AU activities including formal sessions of the PSC, an informal consultation is aimed to precede the formal briefing on Abyei. The last time the PSC convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Abyei was in September 2022, at its 1108th session, before the outbreak of the war in Sudan. This session came against the background of major spike of violence and fighting in Abyei during late 2023 and the preceding months. The coming session also offers the opportunity to follow-up on the implementation of the outcomes of the 1108th meeting, specifically the PSC’s request for the AU Commission to conduct a study on the root causes of instability in the region alongside a matrix of implementation of PSC’s decisions on Abyei.
From 14 to 16 March, the second forum on unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) will be held in Accra, Ghana. Following from the inaugural convening held in Accra from 15 to 17 March 2022, the coming forum serves to follow-up on the status of implementation of key elements of the Accra Declaration on UCG in Africa as well as the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and UCG adopted in May 2022 and the lessons from persisting challenges facing the continent with the continuation of the occurrence of coups and attempted coups.
On 19 March, the PSC will receive a briefing on the activities of the AU Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary bodies, FemWise and WiseYouth. Since the hiatus of engagement between the PSC and Panel of the Wise between 2017 -2022, the previous year saw a revival in engagement between the two bodies. The Panel of the Wise reinforcing the mandate of the PSC via its preventative diplomacy has increased its engagement with the PSC in 2023 by providing updates on its activities and conducting field missions to specific countries including Chad, in alignment with PSC’s directive. With the increasing conflicts across the continent, it is becoming imperative for the PSC to utilize the APSA tools in achieving its mandate. Building on the revitalization of engagement between the two bodies, the forthcoming session provides an opportunity for the PSC to continue increasing its engagement with the Panel to supplement and inform its work. The session will also be unique in that the PSC will receive a briefing not only on the activities of the Panel of the Wise, but also that of its subsidiary bodies, FemWise and WiseYouth. Although FemWise, established in 2017, is often dealt by the PSC under the context of its agenda on Women Peace and Security, the PSC has not engaged the FemWise within the framework of its exchanges with the Panel of the Wise. Similarly, this will also be the first instance the WiseYouth Network will brief the PSC as it was recently established and endorsed at the 35th Assembly of Head State Summit in 2022. Since the endorsement of the network, the WiseYouth has convened a consultative meeting to operationalize the network.
The last session of the month will be held on 22 March, at the Ministerial level. The session will be committed to one of PSC’s standing agenda items, Women Peace and Security (WPS), being convened within the framework of International Women’s Day, annually commemorated in March. A notable practice from the PSC’s previous session on WPS – the 1144th session – which is worth replicating was the participation of women from conflict-impacted areas in the meeting. Beyond their participation, these women representatives were able to provide the PSC with testimonies on how the ongoing conflicts in their respective regions and countries have disproportionately impacted women. In addition to upholding this practice by inviting women representatives from conflict affected countries, the upcoming session is expected to follow-up on some of PSC’s pending decision including its request for the AU Commission and Special envoy for WPS to undertake a comprehensive review of the involvement of women in the peace process.
Aside from these substantive sessions, the program of work for March envisages in the footnote a possible update briefing on the situation in Sudan. The program also anticipates a meeting of the MSC on 07 March, aimed at reflecting on ways of making the MSC more active in playing its role of supporting the PSC. The CoE is also scheduled to meet on 11 March, in preparation for the induction of the newly elected members of the PSC.
The induction of the 10 new members of the PSC, elected at the 44th ordinary session of the Executive Council and endorsed by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, is expected to be the last activity of the PSC for the month of March 2024. The induction program is scheduled to be held from 25 to 27 March, in Swakopmund, Namibia. This is an important occasion for the PSC to take stock of its working methods and the level of delivery of its mandate, the peace and security situation on the continent and the ways in which it can improve on its effectiveness in the execution of its mandate. This is indeed an opportune occasion considering the challenging continental and global dynamics.
Amani Africa wishes to express its gratitude to the Australian Embassy in Ethiopia for the support in the production of this Insight on the Monthly Programme of Work of the AU Peace and Security Council
Advancing the African position on the reform of the Security Council
Advancing the African position on the reform of the Security Council
Date | 28 February 2024
By Dr Tekeda Alemu
Former State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the UN
It is perhaps important to highlight two perspectives with respect to how the reform of the Security Council is more often than not, assessed and evaluated – one which is negative and considers the whole effort as almost worthless and essentially ‘unproductive quagmire’ and the other, rather hopeful and ambitious with perhaps a little unrealistic expectation which is rooted in the tendency to understate the obstacles. In fact, as we shall see in due course those obstacles are indeed huge, and nearly insurmountable.
The New Agenda for Peace, which is essentially a sequel to the 1992 Agenda for Peace, makes it all too apparent how much the world has changed in the last thirty-two years. It might not be proper to embellish the early 90s with exaggerated adulation, for it was also a period of the marginalization of Africa, but, no doubt, in terms of peace the world was in a much better situation than today. The security council was also less dysfunctional at the time. Now, we are in a new period which has potentially become more dangerous.
In the New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General of the United Nations does, among other things, two things which are equally very important. On one hand, he shows how much there is disappointment among nations and people over the failure of governments and international organizations to deliver for them.
As a consequence, he stresses, lack of trust in the potential of multilateral solutions has been growing. But the Secretary-General doesn’t stop there and is far from proposing that we wallow in despair. There could be a way out of this situation which nonetheless can be achieved only if the benefits of international cooperation become tangible and equitable, and states manage to overcome their division and seek pragmatic solutions to their problems. This is essentially a call for new multilateralism which, as he says, ‘demands that we look beyond our security interests’ and can be ‘pursued only alongside sustainable development and human rights’. Then the Secretary-General makes in the same New Agenda for Peace a very important point which makes the focus on the reform of the Security Council so critical. The following is what he says and deserves to be cited in full:
‘Building this new multilateralism must start with action for peace; not only because war undermines progress across all our agendas, but because it was the pursuit of peace that in 1945 united states around the need for global governance and international organization.’
As was said earlier, and as has now become universally accepted, the Security Council has become dysfunctional. Even earlier, the Council has never been fully functional. It is to be recalled that at the height of the Cold War, efforts to avert crisis leading to war, which would have been suicidal was handled through bilateral contact and negotiation between the two Super Powers of the day whereby third parties and the United Nations were mere spectators. One recalls the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
But, no doubt, the very philosophy and principle underpinning the special mandate of the Security Council as it relates to the Permanent Five and the veto power allows those countries to enjoy special privileges. At the creation of the United Nations and the drafting and approval of the Charter, it was felt that those privileges accorded to the Permanent Five though indicating asymmetry among member states, nonetheless helped maintain the peace and contributed to protecting the security of all.
The question now is, does this continue to be the case? Does the special privilege the Permanent Five continue to have help maintain peace and promote security? Or is it the case that what we see is in fact the opposite and that the Permanent Five far from contributing to peace and security have indeed become the source of the problem.
It is thus impossible to deny that there is a clear anomaly here which would have called for action if such action were to lead to the resolution of the problem. But under the circumstances, the hands of member states are tied by Article 108 and 109 of the Charter which make it impossible to amend the Charter without the consent of the Permanent Five. Article 109 allows the convening of a General Conference by a two-thirds vote of members for reviewing the present Charter, but as in Article 108, any change of the Present Charter requires agreement by all members of the Security Council.
What is aggravating the whole problem is the fact that those from whom so much is expected for peace are seen to do very little and, in fact, have become a bane for peace. In what is becoming very alarming, the situation continues to deteriorate and global goods are becoming bereft of reliable custodians. In the meantime, we realize that efforts are continuing at the United Nations by various groups among whom are the Africa Group, the group calling itself United for Consensus and the Group of Four, to promote their interests by securing positions in the Security Council that would allow them have greater voice.
At the end of the day, for most, perhaps unlike the Africa Group, the interest in having greater voice in the Security Council is in most cases a matter of prestige. There is also, no doubt, the possible potential reform of the Security Council has drawn the attention particularly of the Permanent Five, regarding the implication of the expansion of the membership of the Council for geopolitical matters and the balance of forces. Consequently, whatever is said by member states, particularly by the Permanent Five without exception, what is most prominent behind those statements is consideration of national interest. That is bound to make it very difficult for Groups such as the Africa Group for whom the reform of the Security Council is indeed of great importance to make real progress. This is going to require Africa to be wise, realistic and practical as it pursues it interest via the reform of the Security Council.
It might indeed be very fruitful to consider how Africa could take advantage of the situation if it found itself within a Security Council that has undergone through reform. Well, it all depends, among other things, on the kind of reform that the council might have gone through. With the situation of the Security Council remaining the same and the same Permanent Five wielding the same power, it is very difficult to imagine that there would be much difference in the situation from what it is today. But this perhaps deserves a closer look.
The Ezulwini Consensus is a common Africa position on the reform of the Security Council adopted in 2005. It calls for democratizing the Council and expanding its membership. The specific demand on the part of Africa is for two permanent seats and additional three non-permanent ones.
It is perfectly possible and legitimate to raise issues surrounding matters regarding the implementation of the demand, provided that the initial obstacle is overcome, i.e, there is consensus on accepting the Africa demand. What is important, first of all, is the acceptance of the legitimacy of the demand by Africa in light of its democratic nature and also given the totally dysfunctional nature of the Security Council at present, with little prospect that it would improve. When judging the Africa request it is very critical to consider how much effectively the present Council has assisted Africa to resolve its security challenges. The mantra or the phrase, African solutions to African problems, may not be fully in line with the principle of universality that underlines the very existence of the United Nations, but, on the other hand, that it might reflect the frustration of Africa at the double standard Africa often faces cannot be ruled out.
What all this seems to suggest is that the outcome document of the Summit of the Future, the Pact for the Future, if it is to be taken seriously, would need to take seriously the African common position. It wouldn’t help to focus on the potential weakness of the common position which can be rectified in due course. Obviously, as already indicated, the likelihood that the Permanent Five would allow amendments of the Charter to proceed, despite the creation of the impression to the contrary, is nearly zero.
Under these circumstances, one course of action that should be considered is the convening under Article 109 of the Charter, of a General Conference of the members of the United Nations for the purposes of reviewing the Charter. This can be done at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. But then paragraph 2, of the same Article109 requires the recommendation of the Conference to be ratified by all Permanent members of the Security Council. It seems no matter what we do, it appears that the hands of Africa would continue to be tied as far as finding a way out of this predicament.
But the advantage of the review conference is it might help to hold the feet of the Permanent Five to the fire, thus making it difficult for them to pretend to be supportive of the reform without actually doing so. But all the same, it might be useful to stress that the idea of the General Conference may need to be pursued seriously, including with the view to ensuring the idea to be included as part of the Pact for the Future.
However, there is a need for an important caveat here. What Africa needs to consider very seriously is what it needs to do to sort out its internal problems, both at individual country level as well as at the multilateral level, both at continental and regional levels. Let us be honest, we are not in good shape in all those levels. Our demand, our wishes and recommendations would be taken seriously when we also work hard in putting our house in order.
There is a lot of work that needs to be carried out in this regard. There is no other way to ensure that our interests are promoted.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Connectivity: the path to strengthening peace in Africa
Connectivity: the path to strengthening peace in Africa
Date | 28 February 2024
Tomorrow (29 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1203rd session to deliberate on the theme ‘connectivity: the path to strengthening peace in Africa’ at a ministerial level.
Nasser Bourita, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates of the Kingdom of Morocco and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024 is expected to deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is also expected to make a statement. Amani Abou-Zeid, Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy; Albert M. Muchanga, Commissioner for Trade and Industry; Nardos Bekele-Thomas, Chief Executive Officer of AUDA-NEPAD; Akinwumi A. Adesina, President of the African Development Bank; and the representative of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) are also expected to make statements.
This session, being convened for the first time under the specific framing, offers a key opportunity for the PSC to shift focus from the traditional security-centric approach, which often proves inadequate in addressing the complex peace and security challenges facing the continent, to a holistic approach that underpins the peace-security-development nexus. The session also provides a platform for PSC Members to critically reflect on how various forms of connectivity—such as air, rail, road, and digital networks—can be leveraged as vital pathways for promoting regional integration, development, and ultimately, contributing to continental peace and stability.
Agenda 2063, Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future, highlights the imperative of regional integration as a key pillar in Africa’s pursuit of inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development. Aspiration 2 specifically emphasizes the need for Africa to develop world class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa and which will improve connectivity through newer and bolder initiatives to link the continent by rail, road, sea and air, and developing regional and continental power pools, as well as information and communications technology (ICT). Agenda 2063 also outlines key flagship programmes aimed at enhancing connectivity and boosting economic growth and development. These include: the Integrated High Speed Train Network, the Grand Inga Dam Project, establishment of a Single African Air-Transport Market SAATM, the Pan-African E-Network, and cyber security.
Moreover, in July 2012, the AU Assembly adopted the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), a continental roadmap aimed at advancing regional and continental infrastructure (energy, transport, ICT, and trans-boundary water resources) from 2012 to 2040. The overarching objective is to facilitate continental integration in Africa, promote socio-economic development and poverty reduction through improved connectivity. In this context, in addition to highlighting how enhanced connectivity could contribute to the peace and stability of the continent, PSC Members can use the session as an opportunity to hear from the AU Commission and Member States on the progress made in the implementation of flagship projects outlined in Agenda 2063 and PIDA, as well as regional and national infrastructural initiatives aimed at fostering continental connectivity.
Indeed, connectivity emerges as paramount for facilitating the movement of goods, services, and people across the continent, enabling increased trade and economic integration, ultimately driving economic development, poverty reduction, and advancing the path to peace and stability in the continent. The concept note prepared for the session rightly notes that connectivity contributes to both stimulating economic growth and reducing factors that can fuel conflicts, such as poverty, youth unemployment, and inequality. It further highlights that a stronger and more integrated economy can act as a stabilizing factor by mitigating tensions and conflicts related to poverty and employment.
Currently, Africa lags behind in overall infrastructure growth and connectivity, with significant costs to its economic potential. According to a report, transport prices in Africa are estimated to be 50 to 175% higher than global averages, consuming over 20% of foreign earnings. The poor infrastructure is projected to reduce productivity across the continent by as much as 40%, leading to an annual reduction of national economic growth by 2%.
Digital connectivity also plays a key role in Africa’s economic transformation. According to econometric studies conducted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), even a modest 10% increase in mobile broadband penetration across Africa could yield a 2.5% increase in GDP per capita. Moreover, elevating internet penetration to 70% has the potential to spark a 9% surge in job creation compared to current levels. In 2023, World Bank’s flagship report underscored these effects, revealing that in Nigeria and Tanzania, exposure to internet coverage for three or more years led to a notable 7% reduction in extreme poverty, while labor force participation and wage employment saw an uptick of up to 8%. Given that education is the AU’s theme of the year, the session may particularly emphasize how connectivity, both in general and digital connectivity in particular, could deepen peace and security by promoting enhanced education in Africa.
Over the years, Africa has made remarkable strides in enhancing connectivity. In this respect, the AU-AUDA-NEPAD first ten-year PIDA implementation report reveals the significant increase in transport, energy, ICT and transboundary water resource infrastructure in the continent over the last ten years. 16,066 Km of road and 4,077 Km of railways have been developed, meeting 52% and 14% of the 2040 PIDA target, respectively. In the energy sector, 3,506 Km of transmission lines were installed with 7 GW hydro-electric generation capacity, achieving 13% of the 2040 target. In addition, over the past two decades, the continent has witnessed an unprecedented surge in internet adoption and connectivity, outpacing global averages. According to the World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a remarkable 115 percent increase in internet users from 2016 to 2021. Fuelled by these advancements, young Africans are leveraging cutting-edge technologies to launch innovative startups and address longstanding challenges across the continent. From the pioneering mobile banking services in Kenya to the life-saving medication deliveries facilitated by drones in Rwanda, Africa is witnessing a flourishing ecosystem of successful technological innovation.
Despite some positive developments, significant challenges persist. One such challenge is the lack of political commitment to allocate adequate resources for infrastructure investment. For instance, Amani Abou-Zeid highlighted during the recent Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee (STC) on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy that African governments have only dedicated approximately 3.5% of their GDP to infrastructure development over the last 20 years. This pales in comparison to China and India, who respectively allocate 7.7% and 5.2% of their GDP to infrastructure. Furthermore, African countries allocate a mere 1.1% of their GDP to digital investment, significantly lower than the 3.2% average observed in advanced economies. These statistics underscore the critical importance of increasing infrastructure investments in Africa to fully unlock its economic potential and promote peace and security.
The other challenge is the low involvement of the private sector. This is particularly evident from PIDA ten-year implementation report where the contribution of the private sector amounted to only 3% of the necessary financing, which is USD 67.9 billion, for the implementation of first phase PIDA projects. Enhancing the private sector in the investment on infrastructure indeed requires establishing conducive and predictable policies and regulatory frameworks.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Among others, the PSC is expected to reiterate the intrinsic linkages between peace, security and development, stressing the need to prioritize a holistic approach to address the underlying causes of conflicts in Africa. In this context, it may highlight the contribution of connectivity to both stimulating economic growth and reducing factors that can fuel tension and conflicts, such as poverty, youth unemployment, and inequality. Echoing the 4th Ordinary Session of the STC on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy, held in September 2023, the PSC may emphasize the need for harmonizing strategies, strengthening cooperation and accelerating implementation of projects to facilitate access to modern, sustainable, climate-resilient and universal access to infrastructure services with the view to enhancing connectivity and achieving the goals of Agenda 2063. Furthermore, the PSC may specifically underscore the concept of the ‘Integrated Corridor Approach’, a multi-infrastructure corridor approach to infrastructure development that works toward a more prosperous Africa by emphasizing projects that maximize job creation and climate friendliness. Finally, the aspiration of Agenda 2063 to develop world class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa and improve connectivity cannot be realized without commitment of huge resources. The PSC thus may underscore a need for leveraging Africa’s partnerships such as FOCAC, TICAD and the role of Africa’s financial institutions such as the African Development Bank and the building of public private partnerships as critical avenue for mobilizing funds.
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Date | 26 February 2024
Tomorrow (27 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to receive updates on the situation in South Sudan, as an agenda item of its 1202nd session.
Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief the Council on what he gathered from his recent visit to South Sudan on the state of the transition and the progress towards the holding of elections scheduled for end of 2024. As the country concerned, a representative of South Sudan is also expected to deliver a statement. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office, Joram Mukama Biswaro; representative of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); representative of Djibouti as Chair of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom are also expected to participate in tomorrow’s session.
As the country prepares to hold its first elections in December 2024 since its independence, President Salva Kiir Mayardit appointed the leadership of the National Elections Commission (NEC); the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and the Political Parties Council (PPC) on 3 November 2023. In its last meeting on the situation in South Sudan – the 1186th session held on 16 November 2023 –, the PSC welcomed the decision as an important step towards facilitating the constitution-making and electoral processes.
The December elections are expected to pave the way for the end of the transition period as envisaged in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement to the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). With only 10 months left before this important milestone in the country’s political trajectory, however, there appear to be serious concerns that the conditions necessary for holding credible elections are not yet in place. UNMISS Head Haysom explained these conditions in his most recent media briefing on 13 February. He underscored the need to decide on the type of elections to be held; agree on a realistic electoral calendar, taking into account operational, logistical, legal, and security issues; fast-track the implementation of the transitional security arrangements, agree on an electoral security plan, and deploy the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) to provide a secure environment.
There seems to be an emerging consensus that if these conditions are not met by April 2024, South Sudan may not be in a position to conduct free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. In the words of Haysom, ‘elections can be held in December, but only if the country’s leaders take urgent action to overcome key obstacles’. Similarly, RJMEC reported last month that ‘without adequate funding towards the unification of the Necessary United Forces, & the effective functioning of the Agreement Institutions & Mechanisms, including the recently reconstituted Political Parties Council, National Constitutional Review Commission & the National Elections Commission, South Sudan will continue to struggle to adhere to the implementation schedule of the R-ARCSS, & this could seriously jeopardise the holding of elections in Dec. 2024.’
The AU has been working closely with the UN and IGAD through the Trilateral mechanism to engage with the Government on the constitution-making and electoral processes. The South Sudanese government also set up a joint task force in July 2023 to coordinate efforts on these issues. At tomorrow’s meeting, the Trilateral mechanism is likely to report to the PSC on the state of constitution-making and electoral processes. All indications are that the AU needs to prioritise South Sudan in terms of the provision of support for the implementation of the key transitional processes necessary for the elections. More importantly, the AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.
“The AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.”
In the meantime, the security situation in South Sudan remains volatile. In a sign of the precariousness of the transitional process, on 24 January 2024, it was reported that fighting erupted in northern Unity State between SSPDF and SPLA-IO, in violation of a longstanding cessation of hostilities under the R-ARCSS and the current efforts to unify the national army under one command. The volatility of the security situation also involves the continued impact of inter-communal violence in various parts of the country including in Unity, Jonglei, Lakes, and Warrap states. According to UNMISS, ‘Warrap, in particular, has witnessed persistent cross-border clashes between the Dinka Twic and Dinka Ngok communities over territorial disputes in the Abyei Administrative Area, which has led to [the] loss of lives and properties, abductions as well as largescale displacement since last year’. The National Salvation Front (NAS), a non-signatory armed group, also continues to wage war against the South Sudanese government.
It seems that the South Sudanese government requested Kenya in December 2023 to take over the Rome process, which was initiated by the Community of Sant’ Egidio, a lay Catholic association, to facilitate talks between the South Sudanese government and non-signatory parties of the R-ARCSS. The Rome talks had been stalled for several months after the government withdrew its delegation but the parties met in March 2023 after the visit of Pope Francis to South Sudan in February 2023. Although there was a plan to hold a follow-up meeting in May 2023, apparently it did not take place. The PSC has been urging the parties to the Rome peace talks to resume negotiations, given the limited time available before the end of the transition period. After South Sudan’s request for Kenya to take over the Rome process, Kenya’s President William Ruto reportedly met and held discussions with officials of Sant’ Egidio in Rome during the Italy-Africa Summit in January and expressed his commitment to work with the former mediators. On 12 January 2024, he delivered message through the Principal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Korir Sing’Oei to General Paul Malong Awan Anei, Chairman, South Sudan United Front and through him to other key leaders of the South Sudan Opposition Movement (SSOMA). After a phone call he held with President Kirr on 23 January 2024, President Ruto reported on his X platform that he ‘reached out to all the hold-out opposition parties under the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance expressing my desire to ensure an all-inclusive and equitable mediation.’
The security situation coupled with the impact of climate change and increasing socioeconomic difficulties has worsened the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. This has been further compounded by the massive influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees due to the ongoing fighting in that country. According to OCHA, more than half a million Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees have entered South Sudan since the onset of the war in Sudan in April 2023. This is in addition to the 2.2 million internally displaced people in the country. However, the security and humanitarian situation in South Sudan does not seem to be getting the necessary attention because of other crises around the world. There also appears to be donor fatigue which limits the availability of resources.
On the margins of the 37th AU Summit, the AU Ad hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5) met at the Ministerial level to discuss the situation in South Sudan and exchange views on how to support the country in conducting successful elections by the end of this year. The C5 seems to have decided to undertake a ministerial visit to South Sudan to engage with all the parties and stakeholders to assess the situation on the ground and discuss the way forward.
Tomorrow’s meeting of the PSC happens ahead of the UNMISS mandate renewal in March. The outcome of the meeting is likely to provide the necessary guidance to the three African members of the Security Council as they engage in the upcoming mandate renewal negotiations. Given the prevailing concerns over various outstanding transitional processes and the holding of elections before the end of this year, there are speculations that the Security Council may opt for a technical rollover of the mandate until April pending South Sudan’s progress in its elections preparations and other outstanding tasks related to the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
In May, the Security Council is also expected to renew the sanctions regime imposed on South Sudan. The country has been calling for the lifting of the sanctions regime arguing that this will be critical to arm and equip the NUF for their effective deployment. In its most recent communique adopted on 16 November 2023 following its meeting on the situation in South Sudan, the PSC reiterated its call for the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the South Sudanese government to implement the R-ARCSS, particularly relating to transitional security arrangements.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for taking some of the necessary steps for the conduct of elections by December this year. It may urge the government to expedite implementation of key pending tasks required for the conduct of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. It may welcome the ongoing efforts being made in the constitution-making process and call on the Trilateral mechanism to strengthen and fast-track the process, in collaboration with the government of South Sudan. The PSC may also welcome the efforts of President Ruto to bring the hold-out armed rebel groups into the peace fold. It may also welcome the visit that Bankole undertook to South Sudan and may in this respect highlight the need for maintaining high-level and sustained attention and engagement in view of the current delicate stage of the transitional process in South Sudan. It may further call for the establishment of a preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections. The PSC may also call on all relevant stakeholders, particularly the R-TGoNU to avail conducive political and civic space to enable citizens’ free participation in the electoral processes. It may note and express concern over the recently reported fighting involving the armed elements of the signatories of R-ARCSS and the continued intercommunal violence in parts of the country and caution against its potential to reverse the gains made thus far. The PSC may also take note of the aggravated humanitarian situation which is compounded by the impacts of climate change and socioeconomic difficulties and appeal to partners and the international community to extend support and assistance to affected communities, including South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees.
Final Communique – Extraordinary Summit of The ECOWAS Authority of Heads Of State and Government on The Political, Peace and Security Situation in The Region
Final Communique – Extraordinary Summit of The ECOWAS Authority of Heads Of State and Government on The Political, Peace and Security Situation in The Region
Drama filled 37th African Union summit triggering question if it is an institution reforming or deforming
Drama filled 37th African Union summit triggering question if it is an institution reforming or deforming
Date | 24 February 2024
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
Tsion Hagos
Program Director, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
As the dust of the 37th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly that ended on 19 February 2024 at the headquarters of the AU, in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa settles, questions abound about what the dramatic scenes witnessed during the summit highlight about the state of the Union.
This Assembly came at a critical moment when the leadership and collective action of the membership of the AU to address the plethora of political, socio-economic and security challenges facing Africa are in huge demand. The opening speech of the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, made this clear when he rightly asked, for example, ‘[h]ow should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries without doing anything?’.
Regrettably, the summit did not fit the bill in terms of delving into and adopting meaningful policy action for addressing the pressing issues of this ‘heroic and glorious time’, as Faki dubbed it. However, it is not because, as one report erroneously put it, the summit ignored the ‘continent’s conflicts and political crises’. Indeed, from Faki’s clarion call for collective action through the various high-level meetings, these issues were not ignored.
“The summit did not fit the bill not because, as one report erroneously put it, it ignored ‘the continent’s conflicts and political crises.’”
A mini-summit was convened on the escalating conflict in Eastern DRC. The AU ad-hoc committee of five on South Sudan held a ministerial meeting. The Horn of Africa’s regional body the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Chairperson, Djibouti’s President, also initiated steps for the convening of an IGAD meeting on Somalia and Sudan, although this plan collapsed in the face of the drama that followed an incident involving Somalia’s President.
Apart from such high-level meetings on these conflict situations on the margins of the summit, the AU Assembly considered and deliberated on a report of the high-level committee on the situation in Libya. The summit also deliberated on all these and a range of other conflict situations as part of its consideration of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security.
Rather than lack of attention, what this summit could be faulted for is the inability of the conveners and participants of the summit to marshal consensus and adopt concrete measures for at least mitigating, if not effectively managing, the escalating tensions, crises and conflicts. Considering the global policy process for reform of the multilateral system, particularly within the framework of the Summit of the Future which is of strategic interest for Africa, this summit was also a missed opportunity for outlining an African common position as we argued here.
“Rather than lack of attention, what this summit could be faulted for is the inability of the conveners and participants of the summit to marshal consensus and adopt concrete measures for at least mitigating, if not effectively managing, the escalating tensions, crises and conflicts.”
Apart from the solid work done around AU’s priorities and modalities for the activation of its permanent membership in the G20 and the timely engagement on the reform of the global financial architecture, it is not evident what the AU can show for in finishing the summit at dawn on 19 February rather than as initially planned on 18 February.
“It is not evident what the AU can show for in finishing the summit at dawn on 19 February rather than as initially planned on 18 February.”
Beyond failing to deliver on the pressing issues facing the continent, as some including delegations of member states observed, this year’s summit was also unlike earlier summits in other respects. It was filled with dramatic events that highlighted lack of decorum, dwindling regard for AU processes and a complete absence of amity between governments of some countries.
“It was filled with dramatic events that highlighted lack of decorum, dwindling regard for AU processes and a complete absence of amity between governments of some countries.”
During the opening session of the heads of state and government meeting, about a dozen people staged a protest on the conflict in Eastern DRC from the press and observer gallery of Mandela Hall. The incident, involving shouting of slogans and displaying banners and physical signs, briefly disrupted the proceedings.
Before the start of the main summit, a mini-summit bringing together key regional states was held on the escalating conflict in Eastern DRC. Rather than serving as a platform for bridging the divide between the two countries, the mini-summit became a site for trading of accusations between the two countries.
Nothing came out of the mini-summit. Even more worryingly, the bitter exchanges between the leaders of DRC and Rwanda might have hardened the positions of the two countries, hence worsening the situation further.
Another dramatic event involved the protocol dispute concerning the President of Somalia. Apart from the bitter exchanges that were on display both in the closed-closed segment of the summit and persisted during the summit, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia insinuated that Ethiopian authorities tried to sabotage his participation in the AU summit. Rather than the use of institutional and diplomatic channels of the AU and perhaps signifying a lack of confidence in such channels, the President convened a press conference on the incidents that almost overshadowed the coverage of other aspects of the summit. In opting for taking the matter to the wider public and litigating it in the court of public opinion, it is far from clear that, beyond galvanizing Somalia’s public opinion, President Mohamud’s approach has actually earned the sympathy and support of the wider AU membership.
In respect of both the escalating tension between DRC and Rwanda and that of Somalia and Ethiopia, what is problematic is not simply the resort to grandstanding and its deleterious consequences on the AU and its processes. Perhaps more damaging for the AU is the failure of the conveners and the wider AU membership to prevail over the representatives of these countries and provide leadership for helping establish appropriate channels and mechanisms, at the very least, for helping ease the escalating tensions.
It was not any less dramatic to observe the AU Commission Chairperson lamenting that the ‘rampant tendency to make decisions without real political will to apply them has grown to such an extent that it has become devastating to our individual and collective credibility,’ noting that 93% of the decisions adopted during the past three years have not been implemented. As a statement of one delegation delivered during the summit that we have seen rightly pointed out, this implementation deficit is also due to ‘the continued proliferation of decisions, emanating from the plethora of items on the Assembly’s agenda,’ contrary to the aim of the AU reform to focus on strategic priorities of continental scope by rationalizing the agenda of the summit, addressing the decision-to-implementation gap and streamlining the working methods.
All of these highlight that the AU’s standing and credibility are under tremendous strain. It is no surprise that there are increasing questions, in view of the foregoing dynamics, about whether the AU is an institution in deforming rather than reforming. Indeed, the deeper issues these incidents signify and the breakdown of trust between the AU Commission and member States and among States themselves, the critical intangible ingredient for the effective functioning of international public service institution like the AU, suggest that nothing short of the very soul of the AU is at stake.
There is no single actor to blame for this state of affairs of our Union. All those with direct role in agenda-setting and decision-making on the part of the AU Commission, organs and member states bear responsibility. It is incumbent on each of them to assume their respective responsibilities for restoring decorum and spirit of cooperation to avoid the risk of a complete collapse of the credibility and legitimacy of this institution as a locomotive of collective pan-African action. A corollary to this is also reversing the underlying crises of ideas and leadership that Faki aptly described in terms of ‘a real decline in the beautiful spirit of African solidarity and Pan-Africanism, the soul of our renaissance.’
“There is no single actor to blame for this state of affairs of our Union. All those with direct role in agenda-setting and decision-making on the part of the AU Commission, organs and member states bear responsibility.”
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
