Advancing the African position on the reform of the Security Council
Advancing the African position on the reform of the Security Council
Date | 28 February 2024
By Dr Tekeda Alemu
Former State Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and Permanent Representative to the UN
It is perhaps important to highlight two perspectives with respect to how the reform of the Security Council is more often than not, assessed and evaluated – one which is negative and considers the whole effort as almost worthless and essentially ‘unproductive quagmire’ and the other, rather hopeful and ambitious with perhaps a little unrealistic expectation which is rooted in the tendency to understate the obstacles. In fact, as we shall see in due course those obstacles are indeed huge, and nearly insurmountable.
The New Agenda for Peace, which is essentially a sequel to the 1992 Agenda for Peace, makes it all too apparent how much the world has changed in the last thirty-two years. It might not be proper to embellish the early 90s with exaggerated adulation, for it was also a period of the marginalization of Africa, but, no doubt, in terms of peace the world was in a much better situation than today. The security council was also less dysfunctional at the time. Now, we are in a new period which has potentially become more dangerous.
In the New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary General of the United Nations does, among other things, two things which are equally very important. On one hand, he shows how much there is disappointment among nations and people over the failure of governments and international organizations to deliver for them.
As a consequence, he stresses, lack of trust in the potential of multilateral solutions has been growing. But the Secretary-General doesn’t stop there and is far from proposing that we wallow in despair. There could be a way out of this situation which nonetheless can be achieved only if the benefits of international cooperation become tangible and equitable, and states manage to overcome their division and seek pragmatic solutions to their problems. This is essentially a call for new multilateralism which, as he says, ‘demands that we look beyond our security interests’ and can be ‘pursued only alongside sustainable development and human rights’. Then the Secretary-General makes in the same New Agenda for Peace a very important point which makes the focus on the reform of the Security Council so critical. The following is what he says and deserves to be cited in full:
‘Building this new multilateralism must start with action for peace; not only because war undermines progress across all our agendas, but because it was the pursuit of peace that in 1945 united states around the need for global governance and international organization.’
As was said earlier, and as has now become universally accepted, the Security Council has become dysfunctional. Even earlier, the Council has never been fully functional. It is to be recalled that at the height of the Cold War, efforts to avert crisis leading to war, which would have been suicidal was handled through bilateral contact and negotiation between the two Super Powers of the day whereby third parties and the United Nations were mere spectators. One recalls the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
But, no doubt, the very philosophy and principle underpinning the special mandate of the Security Council as it relates to the Permanent Five and the veto power allows those countries to enjoy special privileges. At the creation of the United Nations and the drafting and approval of the Charter, it was felt that those privileges accorded to the Permanent Five though indicating asymmetry among member states, nonetheless helped maintain the peace and contributed to protecting the security of all.
The question now is, does this continue to be the case? Does the special privilege the Permanent Five continue to have help maintain peace and promote security? Or is it the case that what we see is in fact the opposite and that the Permanent Five far from contributing to peace and security have indeed become the source of the problem.
It is thus impossible to deny that there is a clear anomaly here which would have called for action if such action were to lead to the resolution of the problem. But under the circumstances, the hands of member states are tied by Article 108 and 109 of the Charter which make it impossible to amend the Charter without the consent of the Permanent Five. Article 109 allows the convening of a General Conference by a two-thirds vote of members for reviewing the present Charter, but as in Article 108, any change of the Present Charter requires agreement by all members of the Security Council.
What is aggravating the whole problem is the fact that those from whom so much is expected for peace are seen to do very little and, in fact, have become a bane for peace. In what is becoming very alarming, the situation continues to deteriorate and global goods are becoming bereft of reliable custodians. In the meantime, we realize that efforts are continuing at the United Nations by various groups among whom are the Africa Group, the group calling itself United for Consensus and the Group of Four, to promote their interests by securing positions in the Security Council that would allow them have greater voice.
At the end of the day, for most, perhaps unlike the Africa Group, the interest in having greater voice in the Security Council is in most cases a matter of prestige. There is also, no doubt, the possible potential reform of the Security Council has drawn the attention particularly of the Permanent Five, regarding the implication of the expansion of the membership of the Council for geopolitical matters and the balance of forces. Consequently, whatever is said by member states, particularly by the Permanent Five without exception, what is most prominent behind those statements is consideration of national interest. That is bound to make it very difficult for Groups such as the Africa Group for whom the reform of the Security Council is indeed of great importance to make real progress. This is going to require Africa to be wise, realistic and practical as it pursues it interest via the reform of the Security Council.
It might indeed be very fruitful to consider how Africa could take advantage of the situation if it found itself within a Security Council that has undergone through reform. Well, it all depends, among other things, on the kind of reform that the council might have gone through. With the situation of the Security Council remaining the same and the same Permanent Five wielding the same power, it is very difficult to imagine that there would be much difference in the situation from what it is today. But this perhaps deserves a closer look.
The Ezulwini Consensus is a common Africa position on the reform of the Security Council adopted in 2005. It calls for democratizing the Council and expanding its membership. The specific demand on the part of Africa is for two permanent seats and additional three non-permanent ones.
It is perfectly possible and legitimate to raise issues surrounding matters regarding the implementation of the demand, provided that the initial obstacle is overcome, i.e, there is consensus on accepting the Africa demand. What is important, first of all, is the acceptance of the legitimacy of the demand by Africa in light of its democratic nature and also given the totally dysfunctional nature of the Security Council at present, with little prospect that it would improve. When judging the Africa request it is very critical to consider how much effectively the present Council has assisted Africa to resolve its security challenges. The mantra or the phrase, African solutions to African problems, may not be fully in line with the principle of universality that underlines the very existence of the United Nations, but, on the other hand, that it might reflect the frustration of Africa at the double standard Africa often faces cannot be ruled out.
What all this seems to suggest is that the outcome document of the Summit of the Future, the Pact for the Future, if it is to be taken seriously, would need to take seriously the African common position. It wouldn’t help to focus on the potential weakness of the common position which can be rectified in due course. Obviously, as already indicated, the likelihood that the Permanent Five would allow amendments of the Charter to proceed, despite the creation of the impression to the contrary, is nearly zero.
Under these circumstances, one course of action that should be considered is the convening under Article 109 of the Charter, of a General Conference of the members of the United Nations for the purposes of reviewing the Charter. This can be done at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. But then paragraph 2, of the same Article109 requires the recommendation of the Conference to be ratified by all Permanent members of the Security Council. It seems no matter what we do, it appears that the hands of Africa would continue to be tied as far as finding a way out of this predicament.
But the advantage of the review conference is it might help to hold the feet of the Permanent Five to the fire, thus making it difficult for them to pretend to be supportive of the reform without actually doing so. But all the same, it might be useful to stress that the idea of the General Conference may need to be pursued seriously, including with the view to ensuring the idea to be included as part of the Pact for the Future.
However, there is a need for an important caveat here. What Africa needs to consider very seriously is what it needs to do to sort out its internal problems, both at individual country level as well as at the multilateral level, both at continental and regional levels. Let us be honest, we are not in good shape in all those levels. Our demand, our wishes and recommendations would be taken seriously when we also work hard in putting our house in order.
There is a lot of work that needs to be carried out in this regard. There is no other way to ensure that our interests are promoted.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Connectivity: the path to strengthening peace in Africa
Connectivity: the path to strengthening peace in Africa
Date | 28 February 2024
Tomorrow (29 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1203rd session to deliberate on the theme ‘connectivity: the path to strengthening peace in Africa’ at a ministerial level.
Nasser Bourita, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates of the Kingdom of Morocco and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024 is expected to deliver opening remarks. This will be followed by remarks from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is also expected to make a statement. Amani Abou-Zeid, Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy; Albert M. Muchanga, Commissioner for Trade and Industry; Nardos Bekele-Thomas, Chief Executive Officer of AUDA-NEPAD; Akinwumi A. Adesina, President of the African Development Bank; and the representative of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) are also expected to make statements.
This session, being convened for the first time under the specific framing, offers a key opportunity for the PSC to shift focus from the traditional security-centric approach, which often proves inadequate in addressing the complex peace and security challenges facing the continent, to a holistic approach that underpins the peace-security-development nexus. The session also provides a platform for PSC Members to critically reflect on how various forms of connectivity—such as air, rail, road, and digital networks—can be leveraged as vital pathways for promoting regional integration, development, and ultimately, contributing to continental peace and stability.
Agenda 2063, Africa’s blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future, highlights the imperative of regional integration as a key pillar in Africa’s pursuit of inclusive and sustainable socio-economic development. Aspiration 2 specifically emphasizes the need for Africa to develop world class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa and which will improve connectivity through newer and bolder initiatives to link the continent by rail, road, sea and air, and developing regional and continental power pools, as well as information and communications technology (ICT). Agenda 2063 also outlines key flagship programmes aimed at enhancing connectivity and boosting economic growth and development. These include: the Integrated High Speed Train Network, the Grand Inga Dam Project, establishment of a Single African Air-Transport Market SAATM, the Pan-African E-Network, and cyber security.
Moreover, in July 2012, the AU Assembly adopted the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), a continental roadmap aimed at advancing regional and continental infrastructure (energy, transport, ICT, and trans-boundary water resources) from 2012 to 2040. The overarching objective is to facilitate continental integration in Africa, promote socio-economic development and poverty reduction through improved connectivity. In this context, in addition to highlighting how enhanced connectivity could contribute to the peace and stability of the continent, PSC Members can use the session as an opportunity to hear from the AU Commission and Member States on the progress made in the implementation of flagship projects outlined in Agenda 2063 and PIDA, as well as regional and national infrastructural initiatives aimed at fostering continental connectivity.
Indeed, connectivity emerges as paramount for facilitating the movement of goods, services, and people across the continent, enabling increased trade and economic integration, ultimately driving economic development, poverty reduction, and advancing the path to peace and stability in the continent. The concept note prepared for the session rightly notes that connectivity contributes to both stimulating economic growth and reducing factors that can fuel conflicts, such as poverty, youth unemployment, and inequality. It further highlights that a stronger and more integrated economy can act as a stabilizing factor by mitigating tensions and conflicts related to poverty and employment.
Currently, Africa lags behind in overall infrastructure growth and connectivity, with significant costs to its economic potential. According to a report, transport prices in Africa are estimated to be 50 to 175% higher than global averages, consuming over 20% of foreign earnings. The poor infrastructure is projected to reduce productivity across the continent by as much as 40%, leading to an annual reduction of national economic growth by 2%.
Digital connectivity also plays a key role in Africa’s economic transformation. According to econometric studies conducted by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), even a modest 10% increase in mobile broadband penetration across Africa could yield a 2.5% increase in GDP per capita. Moreover, elevating internet penetration to 70% has the potential to spark a 9% surge in job creation compared to current levels. In 2023, World Bank’s flagship report underscored these effects, revealing that in Nigeria and Tanzania, exposure to internet coverage for three or more years led to a notable 7% reduction in extreme poverty, while labor force participation and wage employment saw an uptick of up to 8%. Given that education is the AU’s theme of the year, the session may particularly emphasize how connectivity, both in general and digital connectivity in particular, could deepen peace and security by promoting enhanced education in Africa.
Over the years, Africa has made remarkable strides in enhancing connectivity. In this respect, the AU-AUDA-NEPAD first ten-year PIDA implementation report reveals the significant increase in transport, energy, ICT and transboundary water resource infrastructure in the continent over the last ten years. 16,066 Km of road and 4,077 Km of railways have been developed, meeting 52% and 14% of the 2040 PIDA target, respectively. In the energy sector, 3,506 Km of transmission lines were installed with 7 GW hydro-electric generation capacity, achieving 13% of the 2040 target. In addition, over the past two decades, the continent has witnessed an unprecedented surge in internet adoption and connectivity, outpacing global averages. According to the World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a remarkable 115 percent increase in internet users from 2016 to 2021. Fuelled by these advancements, young Africans are leveraging cutting-edge technologies to launch innovative startups and address longstanding challenges across the continent. From the pioneering mobile banking services in Kenya to the life-saving medication deliveries facilitated by drones in Rwanda, Africa is witnessing a flourishing ecosystem of successful technological innovation.
Despite some positive developments, significant challenges persist. One such challenge is the lack of political commitment to allocate adequate resources for infrastructure investment. For instance, Amani Abou-Zeid highlighted during the recent Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee (STC) on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy that African governments have only dedicated approximately 3.5% of their GDP to infrastructure development over the last 20 years. This pales in comparison to China and India, who respectively allocate 7.7% and 5.2% of their GDP to infrastructure. Furthermore, African countries allocate a mere 1.1% of their GDP to digital investment, significantly lower than the 3.2% average observed in advanced economies. These statistics underscore the critical importance of increasing infrastructure investments in Africa to fully unlock its economic potential and promote peace and security.
The other challenge is the low involvement of the private sector. This is particularly evident from PIDA ten-year implementation report where the contribution of the private sector amounted to only 3% of the necessary financing, which is USD 67.9 billion, for the implementation of first phase PIDA projects. Enhancing the private sector in the investment on infrastructure indeed requires establishing conducive and predictable policies and regulatory frameworks.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. Among others, the PSC is expected to reiterate the intrinsic linkages between peace, security and development, stressing the need to prioritize a holistic approach to address the underlying causes of conflicts in Africa. In this context, it may highlight the contribution of connectivity to both stimulating economic growth and reducing factors that can fuel tension and conflicts, such as poverty, youth unemployment, and inequality. Echoing the 4th Ordinary Session of the STC on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy, held in September 2023, the PSC may emphasize the need for harmonizing strategies, strengthening cooperation and accelerating implementation of projects to facilitate access to modern, sustainable, climate-resilient and universal access to infrastructure services with the view to enhancing connectivity and achieving the goals of Agenda 2063. Furthermore, the PSC may specifically underscore the concept of the ‘Integrated Corridor Approach’, a multi-infrastructure corridor approach to infrastructure development that works toward a more prosperous Africa by emphasizing projects that maximize job creation and climate friendliness. Finally, the aspiration of Agenda 2063 to develop world class infrastructure that criss-crosses Africa and improve connectivity cannot be realized without commitment of huge resources. The PSC thus may underscore a need for leveraging Africa’s partnerships such as FOCAC, TICAD and the role of Africa’s financial institutions such as the African Development Bank and the building of public private partnerships as critical avenue for mobilizing funds.
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Briefing on the situation in South Sudan
Date | 26 February 2024
Tomorrow (27 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to receive updates on the situation in South Sudan, as an agenda item of its 1202nd session.
Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to brief the Council on what he gathered from his recent visit to South Sudan on the state of the transition and the progress towards the holding of elections scheduled for end of 2024. As the country concerned, a representative of South Sudan is also expected to deliver a statement. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for South Sudan and Head of AU Liaison Office, Joram Mukama Biswaro; representative of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC); representative of Djibouti as Chair of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for South Sudan and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) Nicholas Haysom are also expected to participate in tomorrow’s session.
As the country prepares to hold its first elections in December 2024 since its independence, President Salva Kiir Mayardit appointed the leadership of the National Elections Commission (NEC); the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC), and the Political Parties Council (PPC) on 3 November 2023. In its last meeting on the situation in South Sudan – the 1186th session held on 16 November 2023 –, the PSC welcomed the decision as an important step towards facilitating the constitution-making and electoral processes.
The December elections are expected to pave the way for the end of the transition period as envisaged in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement to the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). With only 10 months left before this important milestone in the country’s political trajectory, however, there appear to be serious concerns that the conditions necessary for holding credible elections are not yet in place. UNMISS Head Haysom explained these conditions in his most recent media briefing on 13 February. He underscored the need to decide on the type of elections to be held; agree on a realistic electoral calendar, taking into account operational, logistical, legal, and security issues; fast-track the implementation of the transitional security arrangements, agree on an electoral security plan, and deploy the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) to provide a secure environment.
There seems to be an emerging consensus that if these conditions are not met by April 2024, South Sudan may not be in a position to conduct free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. In the words of Haysom, ‘elections can be held in December, but only if the country’s leaders take urgent action to overcome key obstacles’. Similarly, RJMEC reported last month that ‘without adequate funding towards the unification of the Necessary United Forces, & the effective functioning of the Agreement Institutions & Mechanisms, including the recently reconstituted Political Parties Council, National Constitutional Review Commission & the National Elections Commission, South Sudan will continue to struggle to adhere to the implementation schedule of the R-ARCSS, & this could seriously jeopardise the holding of elections in Dec. 2024.’
The AU has been working closely with the UN and IGAD through the Trilateral mechanism to engage with the Government on the constitution-making and electoral processes. The South Sudanese government also set up a joint task force in July 2023 to coordinate efforts on these issues. At tomorrow’s meeting, the Trilateral mechanism is likely to report to the PSC on the state of constitution-making and electoral processes. All indications are that the AU needs to prioritise South Sudan in terms of the provision of support for the implementation of the key transitional processes necessary for the elections. More importantly, the AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.
“The AU needs to put in place a high-level and standing preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections.”
In the meantime, the security situation in South Sudan remains volatile. In a sign of the precariousness of the transitional process, on 24 January 2024, it was reported that fighting erupted in northern Unity State between SSPDF and SPLA-IO, in violation of a longstanding cessation of hostilities under the R-ARCSS and the current efforts to unify the national army under one command. The volatility of the security situation also involves the continued impact of inter-communal violence in various parts of the country including in Unity, Jonglei, Lakes, and Warrap states. According to UNMISS, ‘Warrap, in particular, has witnessed persistent cross-border clashes between the Dinka Twic and Dinka Ngok communities over territorial disputes in the Abyei Administrative Area, which has led to [the] loss of lives and properties, abductions as well as largescale displacement since last year’. The National Salvation Front (NAS), a non-signatory armed group, also continues to wage war against the South Sudanese government.
It seems that the South Sudanese government requested Kenya in December 2023 to take over the Rome process, which was initiated by the Community of Sant’ Egidio, a lay Catholic association, to facilitate talks between the South Sudanese government and non-signatory parties of the R-ARCSS. The Rome talks had been stalled for several months after the government withdrew its delegation but the parties met in March 2023 after the visit of Pope Francis to South Sudan in February 2023. Although there was a plan to hold a follow-up meeting in May 2023, apparently it did not take place. The PSC has been urging the parties to the Rome peace talks to resume negotiations, given the limited time available before the end of the transition period. After South Sudan’s request for Kenya to take over the Rome process, Kenya’s President William Ruto reportedly met and held discussions with officials of Sant’ Egidio in Rome during the Italy-Africa Summit in January and expressed his commitment to work with the former mediators. On 12 January 2024, he delivered message through the Principal Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Korir Sing’Oei to General Paul Malong Awan Anei, Chairman, South Sudan United Front and through him to other key leaders of the South Sudan Opposition Movement (SSOMA). After a phone call he held with President Kirr on 23 January 2024, President Ruto reported on his X platform that he ‘reached out to all the hold-out opposition parties under the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance expressing my desire to ensure an all-inclusive and equitable mediation.’
The security situation coupled with the impact of climate change and increasing socioeconomic difficulties has worsened the humanitarian situation in South Sudan. This has been further compounded by the massive influx of Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees due to the ongoing fighting in that country. According to OCHA, more than half a million Sudanese refugees and South Sudanese returnees have entered South Sudan since the onset of the war in Sudan in April 2023. This is in addition to the 2.2 million internally displaced people in the country. However, the security and humanitarian situation in South Sudan does not seem to be getting the necessary attention because of other crises around the world. There also appears to be donor fatigue which limits the availability of resources.
On the margins of the 37th AU Summit, the AU Ad hoc Committee on South Sudan (C5) met at the Ministerial level to discuss the situation in South Sudan and exchange views on how to support the country in conducting successful elections by the end of this year. The C5 seems to have decided to undertake a ministerial visit to South Sudan to engage with all the parties and stakeholders to assess the situation on the ground and discuss the way forward.
Tomorrow’s meeting of the PSC happens ahead of the UNMISS mandate renewal in March. The outcome of the meeting is likely to provide the necessary guidance to the three African members of the Security Council as they engage in the upcoming mandate renewal negotiations. Given the prevailing concerns over various outstanding transitional processes and the holding of elections before the end of this year, there are speculations that the Security Council may opt for a technical rollover of the mandate until April pending South Sudan’s progress in its elections preparations and other outstanding tasks related to the implementation of the R-ARCSS.
In May, the Security Council is also expected to renew the sanctions regime imposed on South Sudan. The country has been calling for the lifting of the sanctions regime arguing that this will be critical to arm and equip the NUF for their effective deployment. In its most recent communique adopted on 16 November 2023 following its meeting on the situation in South Sudan, the PSC reiterated its call for the lifting of the arms embargo to enable the South Sudanese government to implement the R-ARCSS, particularly relating to transitional security arrangements.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to commend the Reconstituted Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for taking some of the necessary steps for the conduct of elections by December this year. It may urge the government to expedite implementation of key pending tasks required for the conduct of free, fair, credible, and peaceful elections. It may welcome the ongoing efforts being made in the constitution-making process and call on the Trilateral mechanism to strengthen and fast-track the process, in collaboration with the government of South Sudan. The PSC may also welcome the efforts of President Ruto to bring the hold-out armed rebel groups into the peace fold. It may also welcome the visit that Bankole undertook to South Sudan and may in this respect highlight the need for maintaining high-level and sustained attention and engagement in view of the current delicate stage of the transitional process in South Sudan. It may further call for the establishment of a preventive diplomacy mechanism for regularly monitoring the situation, maintain close contact with all stakeholders and promote together with other entities including the C5, UN, RJMEC and IGAD a platform for promoting dialogue and consensus among the South Sudanese major stakeholders on the various transitional processes and the preparations for the holding of elections. The PSC may also call on all relevant stakeholders, particularly the R-TGoNU to avail conducive political and civic space to enable citizens’ free participation in the electoral processes. It may note and express concern over the recently reported fighting involving the armed elements of the signatories of R-ARCSS and the continued intercommunal violence in parts of the country and caution against its potential to reverse the gains made thus far. The PSC may also take note of the aggravated humanitarian situation which is compounded by the impacts of climate change and socioeconomic difficulties and appeal to partners and the international community to extend support and assistance to affected communities, including South Sudanese returnees and Sudanese refugees.
Final Communique – Extraordinary Summit of The ECOWAS Authority of Heads Of State and Government on The Political, Peace and Security Situation in The Region
Final Communique – Extraordinary Summit of The ECOWAS Authority of Heads Of State and Government on The Political, Peace and Security Situation in The Region
Drama filled 37th African Union summit triggering question if it is an institution reforming or deforming
Drama filled 37th African Union summit triggering question if it is an institution reforming or deforming
Date | 24 February 2024
Tefesehet Hailu
Researcher, Amani Africa
Tsion Hagos
Program Director, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
As the dust of the 37th ordinary session of the African Union (AU) Assembly that ended on 19 February 2024 at the headquarters of the AU, in Ethiopia’s capital Addis Ababa settles, questions abound about what the dramatic scenes witnessed during the summit highlight about the state of the Union.
This Assembly came at a critical moment when the leadership and collective action of the membership of the AU to address the plethora of political, socio-economic and security challenges facing Africa are in huge demand. The opening speech of the AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, made this clear when he rightly asked, for example, ‘[h]ow should we stop watching terrorism ravage some of our countries without doing anything?’.
Regrettably, the summit did not fit the bill in terms of delving into and adopting meaningful policy action for addressing the pressing issues of this ‘heroic and glorious time’, as Faki dubbed it. However, it is not because, as one report erroneously put it, the summit ignored the ‘continent’s conflicts and political crises’. Indeed, from Faki’s clarion call for collective action through the various high-level meetings, these issues were not ignored.
“The summit did not fit the bill not because, as one report erroneously put it, it ignored ‘the continent’s conflicts and political crises.’”
A mini-summit was convened on the escalating conflict in Eastern DRC. The AU ad-hoc committee of five on South Sudan held a ministerial meeting. The Horn of Africa’s regional body the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Chairperson, Djibouti’s President, also initiated steps for the convening of an IGAD meeting on Somalia and Sudan, although this plan collapsed in the face of the drama that followed an incident involving Somalia’s President.
Apart from such high-level meetings on these conflict situations on the margins of the summit, the AU Assembly considered and deliberated on a report of the high-level committee on the situation in Libya. The summit also deliberated on all these and a range of other conflict situations as part of its consideration of the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security.
Rather than lack of attention, what this summit could be faulted for is the inability of the conveners and participants of the summit to marshal consensus and adopt concrete measures for at least mitigating, if not effectively managing, the escalating tensions, crises and conflicts. Considering the global policy process for reform of the multilateral system, particularly within the framework of the Summit of the Future which is of strategic interest for Africa, this summit was also a missed opportunity for outlining an African common position as we argued here.
“Rather than lack of attention, what this summit could be faulted for is the inability of the conveners and participants of the summit to marshal consensus and adopt concrete measures for at least mitigating, if not effectively managing, the escalating tensions, crises and conflicts.”
Apart from the solid work done around AU’s priorities and modalities for the activation of its permanent membership in the G20 and the timely engagement on the reform of the global financial architecture, it is not evident what the AU can show for in finishing the summit at dawn on 19 February rather than as initially planned on 18 February.
“It is not evident what the AU can show for in finishing the summit at dawn on 19 February rather than as initially planned on 18 February.”
Beyond failing to deliver on the pressing issues facing the continent, as some including delegations of member states observed, this year’s summit was also unlike earlier summits in other respects. It was filled with dramatic events that highlighted lack of decorum, dwindling regard for AU processes and a complete absence of amity between governments of some countries.
“It was filled with dramatic events that highlighted lack of decorum, dwindling regard for AU processes and a complete absence of amity between governments of some countries.”
During the opening session of the heads of state and government meeting, about a dozen people staged a protest on the conflict in Eastern DRC from the press and observer gallery of Mandela Hall. The incident, involving shouting of slogans and displaying banners and physical signs, briefly disrupted the proceedings.
Before the start of the main summit, a mini-summit bringing together key regional states was held on the escalating conflict in Eastern DRC. Rather than serving as a platform for bridging the divide between the two countries, the mini-summit became a site for trading of accusations between the two countries.
Nothing came out of the mini-summit. Even more worryingly, the bitter exchanges between the leaders of DRC and Rwanda might have hardened the positions of the two countries, hence worsening the situation further.
Another dramatic event involved the protocol dispute concerning the President of Somalia. Apart from the bitter exchanges that were on display both in the closed-closed segment of the summit and persisted during the summit, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia insinuated that Ethiopian authorities tried to sabotage his participation in the AU summit. Rather than the use of institutional and diplomatic channels of the AU and perhaps signifying a lack of confidence in such channels, the President convened a press conference on the incidents that almost overshadowed the coverage of other aspects of the summit. In opting for taking the matter to the wider public and litigating it in the court of public opinion, it is far from clear that, beyond galvanizing Somalia’s public opinion, President Mohamud’s approach has actually earned the sympathy and support of the wider AU membership.
In respect of both the escalating tension between DRC and Rwanda and that of Somalia and Ethiopia, what is problematic is not simply the resort to grandstanding and its deleterious consequences on the AU and its processes. Perhaps more damaging for the AU is the failure of the conveners and the wider AU membership to prevail over the representatives of these countries and provide leadership for helping establish appropriate channels and mechanisms, at the very least, for helping ease the escalating tensions.
It was not any less dramatic to observe the AU Commission Chairperson lamenting that the ‘rampant tendency to make decisions without real political will to apply them has grown to such an extent that it has become devastating to our individual and collective credibility,’ noting that 93% of the decisions adopted during the past three years have not been implemented. As a statement of one delegation delivered during the summit that we have seen rightly pointed out, this implementation deficit is also due to ‘the continued proliferation of decisions, emanating from the plethora of items on the Assembly’s agenda,’ contrary to the aim of the AU reform to focus on strategic priorities of continental scope by rationalizing the agenda of the summit, addressing the decision-to-implementation gap and streamlining the working methods.
All of these highlight that the AU’s standing and credibility are under tremendous strain. It is no surprise that there are increasing questions, in view of the foregoing dynamics, about whether the AU is an institution in deforming rather than reforming. Indeed, the deeper issues these incidents signify and the breakdown of trust between the AU Commission and member States and among States themselves, the critical intangible ingredient for the effective functioning of international public service institution like the AU, suggest that nothing short of the very soul of the AU is at stake.
There is no single actor to blame for this state of affairs of our Union. All those with direct role in agenda-setting and decision-making on the part of the AU Commission, organs and member states bear responsibility. It is incumbent on each of them to assume their respective responsibilities for restoring decorum and spirit of cooperation to avoid the risk of a complete collapse of the credibility and legitimacy of this institution as a locomotive of collective pan-African action. A corollary to this is also reversing the underlying crises of ideas and leadership that Faki aptly described in terms of ‘a real decline in the beautiful spirit of African solidarity and Pan-Africanism, the soul of our renaissance.’
“There is no single actor to blame for this state of affairs of our Union. All those with direct role in agenda-setting and decision-making on the part of the AU Commission, organs and member states bear responsibility.”
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Fight against terrorism and violent extremism
Fight against terrorism and violent extremism
Date | 22 February 2024
Tomorrow (23 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1202nd session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.
Following opening remarks by Mohamed Arrouchi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for February 2024, Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) is expected to make a statement. Lallali Idriss Lakhdar, Acting Director of the Africa Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) is also expected to make a presentation.
The AU Commission Chairperson’s report on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism was last considered by the PSC at its 1182nd session held on 27 October 2023. One of the concerning trends identified in this report was the alarming geographical spread of terrorism in the continent, particularly in the Sahel region and the growing risk of expansion to the coastal sates of west Africa. The latest report of the Chairperson to be considered by the PSC tomorrow is expected to demonstrate the continuing increase both in incidences and geographic spread of terrorism in Africa.
Heading into 2024, the threat of terrorism and violent extremism is predicted to remain one of the most pressing peace and security concerns the continent will continue to grapple with. By the end of 2023, ACSRT’s database indicated 99% increase in the number of terrorist attacks and 53% in the number of terrorist related deaths noted in the period from January to December 2023, as compared to the previous year of 2022. The database further registered 8 terrorist attacks and 43 terrorism-related deaths per day, for the same period.
Aside from the geographic spread and growing prevalence of terrorist activities, what makes the threat even more concerning is the increasing complexity it involves associated with geo-politics, involvement of external actors and local dynamics of countries affected by terrorism. As may be observed in the Chairperson’s report, there is a noted intersect between terrorist groups, some of whom are affiliated with global radical religious movements, and local militia groups engaged in armed conflict with member states. This intersection between terrorist groups and local conflict dynamics manifests in either one of two ways – a collaboration between terrorist groups and local militias, or contestations between the two actors for resources and control over territories. Needless to say, both of these dynamics entail serious challenges. In those cases where states, in their fight against terrorists, resort to the use of militias to effectively take advantage of their knowledge of local terrain and their understanding of cultural contexts, issues associated with human rights abuse and violations have also proven to become widespread.
Another important trend worth noting is the increasing shift in the perpetration of terrorist attacks, from civilians to military personnel and equipment. While civilians still continue to be the predominant primary victims of terrorist attacks in the continent, terrorist groups seem to be gradually demonstrating their capabilities to successfully orchestrate attacks against state security apparatus. According to data recorded by the ACSRT for the period from January to December 2023, ‘out of 2,952 terrorist attacks, 1,597 were against civilian targets, 1,218 were against military/security targets and installations, 89 were against International Organizations and deployments, and 48 were against Government Officials, Institutions, and Infrastructure’.
In terms of regional concentration of terrorist attacks and activities, the Sahel region continues to dominate, taking up 35% of the total attacks recorded in the course of 2023. Jihadist groups including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are the main terrorist sects that are currently active in this region. With Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the three states in the region most affected by the scourge of terrorism, currently undergoing complex political transitions and faced with serious governance crisis, the conditions are tilted in favour of these terrorist groups to further intensify their insurgency and meet their objectives of expanding their operations into coastal west African countries. Amid withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) from Mali and the decision made by transition authorities of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as well as the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) – opting to form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) as an architecture of collective defence and mutual assistance mechanism – the region is experiencing major shifts and uncertainties that create a fertile environment for terrorist actors to strengthen their positions. This is further complicated by geopolitical contestations and involvement of foreign actors in the region.
The issue for the AU and the PSC in the face of such challenging dynamics is how to prioritize and enhance support and engagement in the effort to contain and ultimately overcome the terrorism menace in the central Sahelian states without being restrained by the post-coup complex transition that the countries are going through.
Following the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Lake Chad basin and the Great Lakes Region respectively registered significant increase in violent incidents related to terrorist actors. In the Horn of Africa, one of the critical developments has been the strengthening of attacks by Al-Shabaab against military and security personnel. With the deadline for final withdrawal of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) fast approaching and little indication of full readiness of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to take on complete security responsibilities, the intensification of Al-Shabaab’s activities as demonstrated through some of its more recent attacks against local administrations and protected locations in the capital city, Mogadishu, is definitely a worrying sign.
In the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP and Boko Haram continue their insurgencies targeting particularly the north-eastern parts of Nigeria and the north of Cameroon. Trends of power struggle between these two main terrorist groups has been one of the concerning developments in the region which may interest the PSC to reflect on with an emphasis on the kind of impact such insurgent infighting will have on the already dire security situation.
The Great Lakes Region also continues to experience a spike in incidents associated with terrorist actors, mainly the Alliance Democratic Forces (ADF)/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which has allegiance to Daesh/ISIS. Majority of the terrorist attacks recorded in the region took place in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) although Uganda also experienced some attacks. According to data registered by the ACSRT, DRC accounts for the majority of the total terrorism related civilian deaths in the continent and has the highest number of civilian casualties recorded in a single country.
In addition to these region-specific trends, the PSC may also take note of the emerging concern related to the use of technological advancements for terrorist activities. Terrorist groups in the continent increasingly use technologic advancements in at least three ways. The first one of these is the use of new technologies such as cryptocurrencies to finance their activities in a manner that avoids the risk of being tracked by law enforcement. The use of cyberspace such as ‘Dark Web’ for conducting transactions including trade of drugs and weapons as well as human trafficking is another way through which terrorist groups make use of technology to fund their operations. The second use of technology for terrorist actors is the ease it creates for the dissemination of their ideology and propaganda. This enables recruitment of members and coordination of activities with speed and in an untraceable manner. Lastly, terrorist actors in the continent are increasingly using technologies such as AI and Drones for purposes of surveillance and spying. Further to infiltrating state positions, the use of Drones by terrorist groups for carrying out attacks is also an impending concern.
Despite the deployment of counter-terrorism efforts at the national and regional levels across the continent, the threat not only continues to persist but evidently intensifies over time. In addition to fortifying collaborations centred around the cross-boundary and transnational nature of the threat, it is also critical to re-examine the predominantly hard-security natured response deployed to eliminate the threat of terrorism in Africa.
In this respect, aside from receiving updates regarding counter-terrorism operations in the continent, the PSC may also reflect on bolstering the deployment and expanded use of non-military response approaches beyond the existing hard-security measures. It is expected that tomorrow’s session in this respect would build on earlier sessions to put emphasis on support for expansion of local governance structures and delivery of basic public and social services, the provision of livelihood support and humanitarian assistance and the design and implementation of development programs tailored to the conditions of areas affected by and are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Not any less important is the use of negotiation and national reconciliation as vehicle for both facilitating the surrender and rehabilitation of fighters and achieving political settlement of the conflict dynamics that made the emergence of such groups possible.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the continuing increase in the spread of terrorism in the continent. Noting and commending the AU Commission and the ACSRT for the ongoing efforts to support member states in their counter-terrorism efforts including through capacity-building activities, the PSC may urge member states to allocate adequate resources for the development and implementation of strategies for counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. Emphasising the major contribution of governance crisis to fuelling the threat of terrorism in Africa, the PSC may also call on member states to work towards addressing governance issues that serve as underlying root causes. The PSC may call on the ACSRT to work closely with the AUDA/NEPAD and the relevant development and infrastructure departments of the AU as well as the AU PCRD Centre for promoting the design and implementation of non-security interventions as critical measures for expanding state authority. It may also reiterate its endorsement of the use of negotiation and reconciliation processes as the means for the final settlement of conflicts involving terrorist groups. In this respect, the PSC may request the AU Commission to develop guidelines on the use of negotiations, reconciliation and mediation for settling conflicts involving terrorist groups drawing on avenues for such possibilities from countries affected by terrorism. Having regard to the transnational nature of terrorism, the PSC may further underscore the importance of enhanced collaboration and coordination between member states as well as with Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), including through the deployment of joint operations. Taking into account the growing use of technologies for supporting and perpetrating terrorist activities, the PSC may highlight the need for undertaking a study on the effect of technological advancements on the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.
2024 ELECTION OF THE 10 MEMBERS OF THE PSC: CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS
2024 ELECTION OF THE 10 MEMBERS OF THE PSC: CONDUCT AND OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS
Date | 20 February 2024
One of the key outcomes of the 44th ordinary session of the Executive Council was the election of ten members of the AU Peace and Security Council, for two-year terms. Our latest policy brief provides analysis on the conduct and outcome of the elections and what the election means and tells us about the new composition of the PSC and the implications thereof.
