Situation in Somalia and Operations of ATMIS
Situation in Somalia and Operations of ATMIS
Date | 11 November 2022
Tomorrow (11 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to consider as an agenda item of its 1121st session, the request submitted by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to extend Phase 1 of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) CONOPS and to delay the drawdown of 2000 troops from December 2022 to June 2023.
The session will have two segments. In the first, open segment, opening remarks will be delivered by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, to be followed with statements by the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye and the Representative of the Federal Republic of Somalia, as the concerned country. In the closed segment of the session, Interim Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia and Acting Head of ATMIS, Fiona Lortan will present a briefing to the Council.
It is to be recalled that Council last discussed the situation in Somalia and operations of ATMIS at its 1112th session which took place on 10 October 2022. The session served to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the situation in Somalia and implementation of ATMIS’s mandate. At the session, Council drew attention to the fast approaching deadline of the drawdown of 2000 ATMIS troops which according to PSC’s decision outlined in the Communiqué of its 1068th session, is expected to take place by 31 December 2022. Tomorrow’s session is being convened in the context of this approaching deadline and the request submitted by FGS to extend the timeline of Phase 1 of ATMIS CONOPS which envisages the reduction of 2000 uniformed personnel by the end of December 2022.
Despite the registration of notable success in degrading Al-Shabaab, the terrorist group not only continues to maintain presence in multiple parts of the country, but is also continuing to plan and orchestrate its devastating attacks. As recent as 29 October 2022, Al-Shabaab carried out two major bombings in Mogadishu. The death toll from these attacks has reached over 120 people and continues to increase as many of the hundreds of people injured from the bombings are under intensive care and in critical conditions. The intensity and resulting death toll from these bombings is said to make the attack the second deadliest attack in Somalia’s history after the 14 October 2017 attack which claimed the lives of 587 people and injured hundreds more. Days after the attacks in Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab fighters carried out another bombing targeting a Somali military base in central Galgaduud region. In addition to killing several soldiers, the fighters reportedly stole multiple weapons and military vehicles.
It emerges from these and other recent Al-Shabaab attacks that the terror group has the ability to carry out consecutive and at times, simultaneous attacks and is in possession of explosives that can cause heavy and wide-range damage to both human life and infrastructure. In the AU Commission Chairperson’s report submitted to the PSC’s 1112th session, it is also noted that not only is Al-Shabaab proving to be highly adoptive, it is also acquiring new capabilities in terms of both means and methods of carrying out attacks. It is noted for instance that the terrorist group has been able to acquire commercial drones, foreign fighters and snipers while also enhancing its ability to rapidly mobilise its forces and conduct swift intelligence-led targeted operations. These realities on the ground, along with the need to avoid any vacuum that may result from reduction of ATMIS at a time when the government affiliated forces are engaged in heavy fighting against the group, are likely among the factors informing FGS’s request to delay the envisaged drawdown of 2000 ATMIS uniformed personnel by the end of December 2022.
On its part, ATMIS has been able to carry out multiple successful operations against Al-Shabaab, jointly with the Somali Security Forces (SSF). As observed in the AU Commission Chairperson’s report, the mission has been engaged in key initiatives that have made significant military gains for SSF including the use of local community defence groups fighting alongside the national security forces, to liberate villages in the Hiraan region of Hirshabelle state and Galmudug. It has also been playing a significant role in providing operational support to the Somali Police Force in addition to its other multiple contributions. ATMIS however faces considerable challenges, mainly related to the absence of predictable funding and limitation of human resources – the last one being a major factor in overstretching existing ATMIS forces. This issue is also directly related to the slow progress obtained in Somalia’s force generation and integration, as an adequate generation of force under SSF would have lessened the existing burden on ATMIS. Speedy force generation and timely implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP) therefore remain key for the gradual handover of security responsibilities from ATMIS to SSF. It may hence interest Council to hear about the specific factors that continue to constrain the FGS in the implementation of the STP and the force generation and mobilisation process, in order to reflect on ways to address these challenges.
Phase 1 of ATMIS drawdown (reconfiguration) is also well underway but continues to experience delays due to the lagged process of force generation and mobilisation by the SSF. While ATMIS has already proposed prioritising reconfiguration of forces to reinforce Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and requested FGS to avail the agreed number of troops to take over the FOBs, FGS is clearly facing difficulties in availing the required forces. At its 1112th session, it is to be recalled that the PSC called on the international community and member States to provide support to the FGS in its force generation and integration efforts, in order to avoid delays being faced in the transition of security responsibilities from ATMIS to SSF. Council may wish to reiterate its call at tomorrow’s session.
On the political front, Somalia continues to register notable progress in terms of efforts aimed at strengthening both internal reconciliation (between FGS and Federal Member States (FMS) in particular) as well as external/foreign relations. Following his inauguration in June 2022, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has been advancing the agenda of reconciliation and building an inclusive federal system in Somalia, in addition to being actively engaged in expanding diplomatic relations with multiple countries. In terms of priority areas, the FGS has adopted a four-year work plan, which has been endorsed by the FMS, envisaging activities within six major areas including security, justice, reconciliation, economic development, social development, and foreign relations. For the AU and other key partners of Somalia including UN and EU, it is critical to take note of these priorities and align their support along these lines.
Tomorrow’s session may also serve to reflect on the concerning humanitarian situation in Somalia. The current drought in Somalia is said to surpass the historic droughts of 2010/11 and 2016/17, both in its severity and duration. According to the UN, 7.8 million people in Somalia are affected by the drought as at end of October 2022. Among these are 1.1 million people who have been displaced due to the impacts of the drought. Of the affected people are also 1.8 million children who face acute malnutrition – accounting for over 50% of the total child population in the country – and 301,000 people facing phase-5/catastrophic level Acute Food Insecurity. In multiple of the drought affected areas, 10,440 cholera cases and 59 deaths were also recorded by the UN since January 2022. Added to these figures is the continuing displacement of people due to insecurity and intensifying conflicts between Al-Shabaab and government forces. In the month of September 2022 alone for instance, 101,000 people were newly displaced due to insecurity and conflict.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. Council may commend the government of Somalia for political milestones achieved particularly in advancing engagement with FMS and setting national priorities. It may commend ATMIS for its perseverance and its continued support to the SSF in degrading Al-Shabaab. It may also condemn in strongest terms the recent consecutive attacks carried out by the insurgent group in various parts of the country and pay condolence to the families of those who lost their lives in these attacks. Having deliberated on the request of FGS to extend Phase 1 of ATMIS CONOPS and to delay the drawdown of 2000 troops to June 2023, Council may underscore the importance of fortified efforts of partners and international community to support the government of Somalia in carrying out all necessary tasks for the gradual handover of security responsibilities from ATMIS to the SSF, particularly in the area of force generation and integration. In this regard, it may accept the request on extension. Considering the implications of the extension on resources and logistics as well as the overall exit plan, the PSC may request the AU Commission to hold consultations with all the stakeholders to achieve consensus on the adjustments to the exit plan and the mobilization of the resources for implementing the adjusted plan. Council may further emphasise the importance of securing predictable, sustainable and flexible financing in order to ensure the mission’s continued effective and impactful operation and to maintain the security gains ATMIS and Somali forces continue to register. The Council may also urge the need for concerted efforts in the force generation and integration of SSF to ensure timely progress in the transfer of security responsibilities from ATMIS. Noting the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the country and particularly the grave impact of the current drought, Council may call on the international community to mobilise timely humanitarian assistance to avert further suffering.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Chad
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Chad
Date | 11 November 2022
Tomorrow (11 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1121st session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Chad.
The session is expected to have two segments. In the first segment which will be open to invited guests, opening remarks will be delivered by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Namibia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Emilia Ndinealo Mkusa, to be followed with a statement from the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat. Representative of the Republic of Chad and Representative of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) will also deliver statements during the open segment. In the second, closed segment of the session, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye will present a statement to be followed with a briefing by Basile Ekouebe, AU High Representative for Chad.
Since the emergency session on Chad that was held following the death of President Idriss Deby in April 2021, the PSC held about four sessions after that on the situation in Chad including two that were held within the framework of countries in transition. Tomorrow’s session will be the first session of 2022 that is entirely dedicated to the situation in Chad. The last time the PSC held a dedicated session on Chad was in August 2021. The need to have a dedicated session on Chad is pursuant to 19 September PSC’s 1106th session which ‘decided to convene a special session in due course to specifically consider the political transition in Chad’ and the various major recent developments.
In September the PSC held a meeting on countries in transition and one of the cases it considered was the situation in Chad. The session took place during the time when Chad was holding its national dialogue which was launched on 20 August after 16-month rule by the military junta and two months before the end of transitional period. The much-awaited national dialogue was concluded on 8 October. Although the dialogue brought a large number of stakeholders around 1400 participants from the civilian and military side, there were however notable absences namely the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, the “Les Transformateurs” party, and the Wakit Tama coalition. The national dialogue, also referred to as the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) was held in a tense atmosphere characterized by boycotts of political opposition parties and civil society organizations and also by clashes between security forces and demonstrators.
While the expectation was for the national dialogue to lead to a free and fair election, the outcomes were far from the set objectives. On October 1 the national dialogue forum announced the extension of the transition to elections for another 24 months, agreed to keep the head the Transitional Military Council (TMC) Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno as the interim head of state and also decided that he is eligible to run for the presidency when election are held. It is to be recalled that the chair of the military junta made reference to the possibility of the extension of the 18 months depending on two factors: agreement of Chadians ‘to move forward at the planned pace’ and the second is that partners assist Chad to ‘finance the dialogue and the elections.’
The announcement by the national dialogue forum was highly criticized and faced a lot resistance. Opposition groups called for a protest on the day in which the transitional period was supposed to end, October 20, to denounce the delay in the transition. The violent crackdown by security forces on that day led to the death of 50 individuals and hundreds of people were injured, according to the figures presented by Prime Minister Saleh Kebzado. The government also declared a state of emergency in the capital N’Djamena and two other cities to allow local authorities to take any necessary measure to suppress the protests. The government also banned Wakit Tamma and suspended activities of political parties involved in the demonstrations.
On the day of the protest, the AUC Chair tweeted that he strongly condemns the repression of the demonstration which led to the killing of people and called on the parties to respect human lives and property and find peaceful ways to overcome the crisis.
Following the deadly protest, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) held its second extraordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government on 25 October fully focusing on the situation in Chad. The ECCAS Summit expressed its concern about the demonstrations of 20 October 2022 which resulted in loss of lives and the destruction of properties following the dialogue. As a way of supporting Chad in this difficult transition process, ECCAS appointed President Felix Tshisekedi Tshilombo, of DRC and current ECCAS Chairperson, as the Facilitator of the transition process in Chad. It is envisaged that President Tshisekedi will be assisted by two Special envoys: the President of the Council of ECCAS Ministers and the President of the ECCAS commission.
During its last meeting on Chad (996th session), the Council requested, among others, the completion of the transition to democratic rule within 18 months, effective from 20 April 2021; assurances that the Chairman of Transitional Military Council (TMC) and its members do not run in the upcoming national elections; and the urgent revision of the Transition Charter. In am interview with a Jeune Afrique magazine in June 2021, the leader of TMC, Mahamat Deby, ‘did not rule out’ the possibility of extension of the 18 months deadline attaching the elections on two conditions. The first is that ‘Chadians are able to agree to move forward at the planned pace’ and the second is that partners help Chad to ‘finance the dialogue and the elections.’ On the other hand, to allay concerns about their future plans, in a statement made on 20 May, the TMC members and its leader affirmed that they are not taking part in the upcoming elections, which is in adherence to the PSC’s demands.
The outcomes of the national dialogue and the political crisis, involving protests and deadly crackdown by security forces against peaceful protesters mark major departure from the expectations set in the decisions of the PSC and the initial promise of the TMC leadership. It is to be recalled that despite the fact that the military seized power unconstitutionally, suspending the Constitution and dissolving the government, the PSC, unlike in the case of Mali, did not apply the rule under Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol. This decision has exposed the PSC to charges of inconsistency and selective application of the ban on military seizure of power and dented the credibility of both the PSC and the AU’s policy of zero tolerance to military seizure of power. Indeed, when the TMC deviated from and violated some of the conditions set by the PSC, again the PSC did not take any measure. In the process, the PSC unwittingly came to be seen as being too weak and flexible such that the TMC felt emboldened to use its control of the transitional process for entrenching its grip on power, with complete disregard to AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government. In the light of this, the fact that the national dialogue process led to outcomes that go directly against the requirements that the PSC set in the communiqué of its 996th session does not come as a complete surprise, although was not inevitable and the transition could have unfolded following the parameters set by the PSC.
Considering the direct and full breach of the parameters that the PSC set in the decision it adopted at its 996th session and the fact that the PSC avoided the application of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol on suspension at the time in full expectation of compliance by the TMC with the conditions now flaunted, the major policy issue that the PSC faces is to determine how to respond to these breaches. The PSC has two choices. One is to allow the decision on both the extension of the transitional period and the candidacy of the leader and members of the TMC for election at the end of the transition, with or without protesting against these decisions. This will deal a further blow to the credibility of the PSC. The other is for the PSC to uphold its decision set out in the communique of the 996th session and apply Article 7(1)(g) by suspending Chad. The PSC at its 996th session opted not to suspend Chad with the understanding that the TMC will comply with the conditions it set. With those conditions in the communique of the 996th session having been disregard, the logical thing to do for the PSC is to apply the suspension. This measure would also help in restoring the credibility the PSC lost for failing to apply the suspension during its 996th session.
No doubt that the determination of the PSC may not be based purely on the foregoing considerations. Indeed, there are countries who view the situation in Chad through the prism of Chad’s role in the region and the risk that Chad’s neighbors in particular face in their relationship in the security sphere with the TMC. These countries would therefore focus on the short term perceived negative ramifications to their security cooperation with Chad of the possible suspension of Chad. As such, they will oppose suspension of Chad. There would be others who would put the case of Chad in the larger context of the resurgence of military seizure of power in Africa. They may stress the need for engagements with Chad within the parameters agreed to by all AU member states and avoid the long term consequences and the precedent not taking action would set.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC may take note of the report of the AUC Chairperson on the situation in Chad. The Council may reiterate its zero tolerance to any form of unconstitutional change of government. It may strongly oppose the announcement made by the national dialogue forum which contravenes previous directions set by the PSC. In this regard, the PSC could decide to suspend Chad until the transitional process is carried out in accordance with the initial understanding. It may express its deep dissatisfaction with the extension of the transition period and the decision for Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno to run as presidential candidate during the election to be held at the end of the traditional period. The Council may call on the head of the TMC and the members to honor their commitments. The PSC may recall and reiterate its previous decision of 996th which asserted that ‘no form of extension of the transition period prolonging the restoration of constitutional order, would be acceptable to the AU’. It may also reiterate its decision for the members of the TMC not to run for election. The PSC may condemn the political repression and heavy crackdown by security forces on protestors and call for an independent investigation on the killings of 20 October. It may take note of ECCAS summit decisions for initiating diplomatic efforts and may welcome the appointment of President Tshisekedi as the facilitator for the situation in Chad. It may task the AUC to work closely with ECCAS in support of the political transition in Chad.
