Tomorrow (16 December), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the situation in Sudan.

The session is expected to begin with opening remarks by Ennio Maes, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for December, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Adama Dieng, the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities, may also brief the PSC. Representatives of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations (UN) are also expected to deliver statements.

In October 2025, following the fall of El Fasher, the PSC held an emergency session on the situation in Sudan, particularly on the atrocities that ensued following the city’s fall. As noted in our Monthly Digest, although the atrocities reportedly committed by the RSF during and after the fall of El Fasher are of a scale and nature that could trigger Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act—which confers upon the AU the power to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances—the emergency session missed an opportunity for the PSC to take bold decisions, including the invocation of Article 4(h). Instead, the PSC largely confined itself to reiterating decisions adopted more than a year ago.

From the communiqué it adopted after the session, the PSC tasked the AU Commission ‘to regularly monitor and report such heinous crimes committed throughout Sudan, in order to put in place preventive measures and reduce the risk of recurrence; develop proposals on how to address them to prevent their further escalation; [and] develop a plan for the protection of civilians, and make recommendations to the PSC within three weeks.’

PSC went further and directed the Chairperson of the AU Commission to engage with the Members of the PSC Presidential Ad-hoc Committee, under the leadership of Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, to urgently facilitate the negotiation process between the leaders of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including the holding of an AU Special Summit on Sudan. It also reiterated its call for the Subcommittee on Sanctions, in collaboration with CISSA and AFRIPOL, to identify all external actors supporting the warring parties and recommend measures to be taken by the PSC within three weeks. Another assignment included tasking the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Mass Atrocities to undertake a fact-finding mission to Sudan and report back to the Council with recommendations within three weeks. This, however, did not happen. Since then, the Special Envoy undertook a visit to Port Sudan on 16 November and engaged Sudanese authorities and civil society actors, as well as people affected by the fighting. At tomorrow’s session, the PSC is expected to follow up on progress in the implementation of these decisions, including an update on the Special Envoy’s visit to Port Sudan.

The RSF are now advancing aggressively into Kordofan, with major cities such as El-Obeid squarely in its sights. Having defeated the SAF in El Fasher in October– an assault that triggered widespread atrocities, including the reported killing of at least 1,500 civilians and the displacement of tens of thousands – the RSF currently holds the battlefield momentum in Sudan’s escalating war.

Early this month, RSF seized the 22^nd SAF division headquarters in Babanusa, West Kordofan State. Going further, the RSF seized the strategic Heglig oilfield in South Kordofan, forcing the SAF to withdraw into neighbouring South Sudan. Reports indicate that the South Sudanese government, SAF and RSF have reached an agreement to allow South Sudanese troops to move into Heglig to secure the critical oil infrastructure in the region, which is vital for both Sudan and South Sudan. This oil-rich region was a flashpoint in 2012 when a brief war took place between Sudan and South Sudan over control of the area. The Heglig crisis was resolved following intense diplomatic efforts involving the AU and UN that eventually resulted in South Sudan forces withdrawing from the area.

Most recently, on 13 December, drone attacks targeted the logistics base of the United Nations Interim Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in Kadugli, Sudan, killing six peacekeepers and injuring eight others. UN Secretary-General António Guterres strongly condemned the ‘horrific’ attacks, warning that they may constitute war crimes.

On 21 October 2025, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) released its Fact-Finding Report that documented the atrocities committed by the warring parties since the outbreak of the war on 15 April 2023. The report observed that the conflict is ‘characterised by total lack of regard to the rules of war and the human rights standards under the African Charter.’ It further held that Sudanese civilians ‘endured all forms of atrocities and the worst humanitarian conditions.’ Recognising that the situation in Sudan warrants the application of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the report called on the AU ‘deploy an AU peacekeeping mission to Sudan consistent with article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act to assist in the process of stabilizing the situation in Sudan and offer necessary protection to civilians including the establishment of safe and demilitarized humanitarian corridors.’ However, the PSC did not consider the report when it held its 1308th emergency session following the fall of El Fasher. Since then, the ACHPR physically handed in the Fact-Finding Report to the Chairperson of the AU Commission during a meeting held on 19 November at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The fact that the report was not scheduled to be presented to the PSC is a major omission, given that the fact-finding mission was initiated following and within the framework of the decision of the PSC Communiqué, PSC/HoSG/COMM, adopted at its 1218th meeting of 21 June 2024.

On 4 December, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk rang the alarm bells on another wave of atrocities in Sudan amid an escalation of fighting in the Kordofan region. At least 269 civilian deaths from aerial strikes, artillery shelling, and summary executions since 25 October, when RSF captured Bara city in North Kordofan. The High Commissioner noted that the number could be much higher, given reports of retaliatory killings, arbitrary detention, abductions, sexual violence and forced recruitment, including of children, but telecommunications and internet outages hinder accurate reporting.

Additionally, his office reported that an RSF drone attack on 3 November killed 45 people in El Obeid, North Kordofan, while an aerial strike carried out by the SAF on 29 November in Kauda, South Kordofan, resulted in the deaths of at least 48 people, most of them civilians. His office also highlighted the dire humanitarian situation, particularly in Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan, which have been besieged by the RSF and SPLM-N, with famine confirmed in Kadugli and a high risk of famine in Dilling. El Obeid in North Kordofan is also partially surrounded by the RSF. His office made it clear that all parties continue to block humanitarian access and operations.

On 8 December, the United Nations Security Council held closed consultations on Sudan, focusing on the ongoing situation in Kordofan. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Tom Fletcher and High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk briefed Council members on the appalling humanitarian and human rights conditions in the region. Türk apparently echoed the statements he released on 4 December, stating that ‘we cannot remain silent in the face of yet another man-made catastrophe.’ He also urged an immediate end to the fighting and called for life-saving aid to reach those facing starvation, appealing to all actors with influence over the parties to halt hostilities and stop the flow of arms fueling the conflict. On his part, Fletcher seems to have highlighted the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Sudan. With 20 million people in urgent need of assistance, Sudan is one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. In November, he visited Darfur—the epicentre of the crisis. In the Council, he appears to have emphasised the need for renewed international attention to Sudan and the importance of advancing the political process to achieve a ceasefire.

Despite the involvement of multiple actors to advance the peace process in Sudan, progress has been elusive. The latest initiative is the US-led effort to revive the peace process through the convening of a Quad meeting, comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The foreign ministers of the Quad countries issued a joint statement on 12 September calling for a humanitarian truce, for an initial three months, to enable the swift entry of humanitarian aid to all parts of Sudan, to lead immediately to a permanent ceasefire. Then, an inclusive and transparent transition process should be launched and concluded within nine months. The AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) issued a joint statement on 14 September, welcoming the Quad initiative and affirming its full alignment with the AU/IGAD roadmaps.

The initiative received mixed reactions from the belligerents and other Sudanese actors. The SAF rejected the initiative as biased and strongly opposed the UAE’s role in the Quad, denouncing it as an attempt to dismantle the SAF in favour of the RSF. The SAF reiterated its commitment to continue fighting until the RSF is expelled from all occupied areas. Other stakeholders also expressed mistrust, viewing the initiative as an externally driven solution and emphasising the need for Sudanese ownership of the peace process. In contrast, the RSF—widely condemned by the international community for committing mass atrocities and war crimes—appears to have made a tactical move to welcome the initiative in an effort to rehabilitate its image and expressed its readiness to engage in talks. Nonetheless, it does not appear to be committed to the talks and has reportedly violated the terms of the humanitarian truce.

In apparent elevation of US interest to engage in peace efforts at the highest levels, in November, President Donald Trump said that the U.S. would put greater focus on ending the war after being urged by the Saudi Crown Prince. In his November press briefing, Secretary of State Marco Rubio recognised the involvement of external actors in the Sudan conflict and noted ongoing engagements at the highest level to exert pressure on these actors. Despite this high-level attention, the fighting has continued to escalate with the RSF capturing further territories. While the expression of interest at the highest levels is welcomed by some, it remains far from certain that it would substantially change the conditions for peacemaking, with some pointing to Washington’s inability to sustain engagement as its recent peace efforts in DRC show and its limited leverage, considering its strategic relationships with key external actors involved in the war.

As the PSC convenes its meeting tomorrow to discuss the situation in Sudan, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an informal interactive dialogue to discuss ways and means of reinvigorating the peace process. All those involved in the peace process, including the AU and IGAD, are expected to attend the meeting and address the Council.

Amid the escalating conflict in Sudan and the resulting humanitarian and human rights crises, discussions on punitive measures are gaining momentum. Apparently, there are behind-the-scenes discussions among like-minded Security Council members regarding the possible imposition of additional sanctions. It remains to be seen whether these efforts gain any traction over the coming days and months. Meanwhile, on 20 November, the European Union imposed sanctions on Abdelrahim Dagalo, the RSF’s second-in-command. On 9 December, the US sanctioned four individuals and four entities linked to a transnational network—composed primarily of Colombian nationals and companies—that recruits former Colombian military personnel to fight for the RSF and provides training to its fighters, including children.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to reiterate its grave concern over the escalating fighting in Sudan. It may condemn the atrocities being committed in the course of the escalating violence, including those perpetrated particularly by the RSF since the PSC’s last meeting. Welcoming the Fact-Finding report of the ACHPR and noting the mission undertaken by the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and other Mass Atrocities, the PSC may reaffirm the need for continuous documentation of the atrocities and violations being perpetrated in the course of the War in Sudan. In this respect, the PSC may request the AU Commission Chairperson to establish a standing mechanism for the monitoring, documentation and reporting of violations being perpetrated in Sudan, consisting of a team made up of the ACHPR and the Special Envoy. The PSC may also underscore that there is no military solution to the war in Sudan and urge the parties to collaborate with the initiatives for securing cessation of hostilities and the AU and IGAD-led political process for securing a political settlement in Sudan. The PSC may echo the statement of the AU Commission and IGAD on efforts by the Quad, emphasising the need for respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sudan and the cessation by external actors of supplying weapons and other resources that fuel the fire of war in Sudan. Considering its earlier decision assigning various AU entities to track and report on the source and means of supply of support exacerbating the war in Sudan and the lack of progress in this respect, the PSC may request that a former head of state of respectable standing is tasked with the role of overseeing the documentation and reporting to the PSC on the sources, actors and means of supply of support. The PSC may also urge the need for African and international actors supporting the efforts for the provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need, including by assisting Sudanese local humanitarian actors and ensuring the protection of humanitarian access and actors.