Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - February 2021

Somalia

Date | February 2021

Ghana assumed chairship of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) in February. The monthly Programme of Work of the PSC initially envisaged only two substantive sessions and a meeting to consider the report on its activities and peace and security in Africa. However, Council convened an additional session around the end of the month, which was committed to the theme ‘elections in Africa’.

Read Full Document

Session on the Horn of Africa

Session on the Horn of Africa

Date | 26 November 2020

Tomorrow (26 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to discuss on the situation in the Horn of Africa, with a specific focus on how best to support the transitions in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. It is organized at the initiative of Ethiopia, as Chairperson of the PSC for the month, the session is intended to put the limelight on positive developments in these countries with a view to identify ways of consolidating conditions for expanding stability and peace in these situations. The session is expected to take place through VTC.

The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui is scheduled to make a statement. The Chairperson of the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) Thabo Mbeki is also expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of countries of the Horn of Africa under consideration, namely, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan are also expected to make statements. UN Special Envoy of the Horn of Africa, Parfait Onanga- Anyanga, representatives of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the European Union are amongst the speakers that will also be addressing the PSC.

The last time the Council convened a session on the Horn of Africa was at its 810th meeting, held on 22 November 2018, which among others requested the AU Commission to provide quarterly briefings on the regional developments, though it did not materialize as the
Council rather held several country specific sessions on member states of the region. This session, convened after a two-year hiatus, is expected to shed light on the positive developments in the region, specifically the transitions underway in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, and explore ways and means to support these promising but fragile transitions.

The Horn of Africa region has indeed registered positive strides in recent times. Tomorrow’s session is expected to capture the political transition underway in Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan with the potential to move the region along the road to sustainable peace. In relation to Somalia, the upcoming election is expected to dominate the Council’s discussion given the fast- approaching electoral season with a decisive impact on the future of the country. It is to be recalled that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Members of States (FMS) achieved progress in September over the modalities of the election after rounds of negotiations and consultations. The parties were also able to reach a compromise on some of the outstanding issues. Among others, they agreed to shelve the universal suffrage (one-person-one-vote) in favor of the indirect voting arrangement; to hold the parliamentary elections from 1 to 27 December and the presidential election on 8 February 2021; and form a dispute resolution committee to address electoral disputes.

The positive steps are, however, fraught with challenges, which, if not properly managed, could spiral into violence and indeed reverse the progress achieved. A key challenge remains the fragile security situation for the election to take place. Al-Shabaab has continued to unleash its potent force as it stepped up attacks in recent months. Dozens are killed, including civilians, due to clashes between Al-Shabaab’s fighters and security forces as well as roadside bombings. Tension may escalate in the run-up to the elections; and any delay from either side in the implementation of the compromises reached in September may risk conflict. Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe rejects the upcoming election from taking place in Gedo demanding withdrawal of federal government’s force from the region. The standoff may further deteriorate in the coming weeks leading up to the election. The security situation of Somalia is further compounded with the prevailing humanitarian crisis accentuated by floods, locust swarm and COVID19. There is therefore a need for steps to be taken for mitigating the adverse consequences of these persisting challenges, including ensuring through political and technical support that Somalia averts fiercely contested elections marred by irregularities and violence.

The other issue that will be discussed for consolidating stability in Somalia is the international security support for the country, notably the role of AMISOM. AMISOM’s drawdown is planned to proceed with its mandate ending on 28 February 2021 to clear the path for Somalia to take the lead over its security matters. It is to be recalled that the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2520 (2020) to renew AMISOM’s mandate until February 28 2021 despite PSC’s decision to extend the mandate for 12 months from May 27, 2020 during its 923rd session. The session affords a good opportunity for member states to deliberate on the future of AMISOM in light of the political and security developments in Somalia and assess the readiness of the government of Somalia to assume full responsibility over its security by the end of 2021 in accordance with the security transition plan. For the PSC, it is also of interest that the AU articulates AU’s views on the UN’s strategic assessment on the security support needed to prepare Somalia to take lead in security by end of 2021, and to take decisions on AMISOM’s reconfiguration envisaged under Resolution 2520.

Sudan has seen the most promising positive developments in the Horn of Africa region. Further positive developments emerged as the PSC convenes its 952nd meeting on the situation in Sudan held on 6 October and since then. It is to be recalled that the Transitional Government of Sudan, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) clinched a landmark peace deal on 3 October in Juba, a step welcomed by the Council in its 952nd session. The peace deal sets out that rebel leaders will take seats in the sovereign council while their armed factions integrated into the national army. As the first step to give effect to the terms of the peace deal, the joint meeting of the Sovereign Council and Cabinet approved the agreement as well as its harmonization with the Constitutional Declaration, the provisional constitution covering the transition period. Accordingly, changes have been made to the composition of the Sovereign Council by raising the number of seats to 14 so as to accommodate the 3 seats allocated for the rebel groups’ signatories of the peace agreement. The return of SRF’s leader, Al-Hadi Idriss, to Khartoum on November 15- a move hailed by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, head of Sudan’s ruling sovereign council- is also a major advance that gives impetus for the implementation of the peace agreement.

The removal of Sudan from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) is another positive development that would interest PSC members. It is to be recalled that the Council, in its previous session on Sudan, appealed to the US to the removal of Sudan from the SST list without any conditions. On 23 October, the US President Trump signed order to delist Sudan after USD 335 million wired in form of compensation for victims of the 1998 terrorist attack, opening the path for the recovery of Sudan’s battered economy. This is a big step forward to start the long road to economic recovery, which the Council is expected to welcome. The removal is hoped to attract foreign investment and unblock Sudan from accessing possible debt relief under IMF and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. It is to be recalled that the PSC appealed to the international community to support Sudan in overcoming its economic difficulties in cognizant of the critical role that the economic revival could play in keeping the transition on track.

Yet, securing participation of rebel groups that have not joined the Sudan peace agreement- the Sudan Liberation Movement-North led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu (Sudan’s largest single rebel group) and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Army led by Abdel-Wahid Nour- should be secured. The economy is still in shambles while inflation continues to surge due to soaring food prices. Protests are reported in Khartoum and other cities in October over the worsening economic situation. In the Eastern part, community clash erupted between ethnic Beja and Beni Amer following Prime Minister Hamdok’s dismissal of ethnic Beni Amer governor of Kassala state on October 13.

The last time the PSC considered the situation in South Sudan was in its 945th session held on 15 September 2020 South in which the Council commends parties for the positive steps taken in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and further encouraged them to step up their efforts in the implementation of all outstanding Transitional tasks. However, little has moved since then except with some headways made on the issue of responsibility sharing at the state and local government levels. One of the outstanding issues that may be of interest to the Council is the deadlock over the governor of the oil-rich state of Upper Nile, which the Council urged both parties to resolve the issue to the earliest possible. President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar were able to work out on the appointment of nine out of the ten state governors, but failed to agree on the governor of the state of Upper Nile. A controversial opposition commander, General Johnson Olony Thabo was nominated by Dr. Rieck Machar in June, a nomination rejected by President Salva Kiir. There is a growing hope that the impasse will be resolved soon with reports emerging on Kiir’s change of mind on the matter.

Also a step forward in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement is parties reaching a deal on the allocation of positions including deputy state governors, state advisors, and County Commissioners- a move previously appealed by the PSC during its 945th session. Another development that might interest the Council is the recently concluded national dialogue conference, an initiative launched by President Kiir in 2016 to foster national unity and reconciliation, held in Juba from November 3-17. The event was attended by more than 600 participants though the absence of SPLM- IO and National Democratic Movement (NDM) possibly dent its success. This is against the expectation of the PSC which previously called for the positive engagement of all actors including the holdouts in the dialogue.

A major development threatening the peace agreement and the transition in South Sudan is the perpetual culture of defection and change of allegiance, which, in the words of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), is ‘contrary to the letter and spirit of the Agreement’. In October, Paul Malong’s SSOMA faction South Sudan United Front/Army defected to Kiir’s forces and reported launching attacks on Machar’s force. In November, wave of defection hits SPLMO-IO, raising the stakes for the peace agreement. Secretary General, Tingo Peter; deputy chairperson for foreign relations committee, Pasquale Clement Batali; and General Lok Tang Reat who was at the epicenter of the December 2013 fighting in Juba, are cases in point.

While the formation of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) in February is a big milestone for South Sudan, the continued delays over the restructuring of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the security arraignment trail the implementation process. It is to be recalled that the 36th Extraordinary Meeting of the IGAD Heads of State and Government held in July 2020 appealed to President Kiir to dissolve the current Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) before 26th July and the parties to reconstitute the TNLA within 7 days of its dissolution. This has not materialized yet. The creation of a unified national army and the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) not only move at snail’s pace but also enmeshed by web of challenges including lack of resource.

The expected outcome is Communique. The Council is expected to welcome the positive developments in the Horn of Africa and recognize the looming challenges with the potential to reverse the gains made thus far; and in this regard, it may call for more enhanced support by IGAD, UN, EU and the rest of the international community for the transition in these countries. The PSC may also renew the mandate of the AUHIP for a further period of 12 months as per the usual practice. The Council is expected to note with appreciation the progress made by the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal member States on the modalities of the 2020/21 elections and urge the two parties to continue their constructive engagement to carry out credible election without sliding into election related violence. It may reiterate the importance of implementing the transitional plan that laid out the steps for Somalia to assume full responsibility over its own security matter and urge FGS and FMS to commit themselves for the implementation of the plan. The Council may appeal to international partners to provide backing for Somali political forces to achieve political settlement including over sharing of power and resources between federal government and federal member stated and technical and financial support for ensuring inclusive, peaceful and free and transparent elections. It may further call upon the EU, UN and other partners to continue their financial support to AMISOM which is playing critical role in the peace and stability of Somalia. The PSC may also call on the UNSC to ensure that the views of the AU are fully taken into account in the UN’s assessment, under UNSC Resolution 2520, of the security need of Somalia as the drawdown of AMISOM continues.

The Council is expected to welcome Sudan’s removal from the SST list and may further call up on international partners to honor their pledges made during the High- level Sudan partnership conference in June 2020 in the effort to support Sudan’s economic revival. The Council is also expected to welcome positive measures taken by parties to the October 3 peace deal between the Transitional Government of Sudan, the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and Sudan Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) including raising the number of the Sovereign Council to 14 and the return of SRF leader, Al-Hadi Idriss to Khartoum. The Council may once again reiterate the call on the holdout groups, particularly Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction led by Abdelwahi Mohamed al-Nour and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu to renounce any form of violence and commit themselves to the peace process.

The Council may commend the positive steps taken by President Salva Kiir Mayardit and Dr. Riek Machar in the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement, particularly the progresses made in relation to the appointment of deputy state governors, state advisors and county commissioners. The Council may once again call upon President Kiir and Dr. Riek Machar to settle the deadlock over the appointment of governor to the Upper Nile State. It may also commend President Kiir for convening the national dialogue conference held in Juba from November 3 to 17. The Council may also wish to express its grave concern over the continued delay in restructuring the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, the slow pace in the creation of a unified force and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs; and urge parties to the peace agreement to expedite these processes as critical measures for sustaining gains made in the slow transitional process. The Council may also express the need for addressing risks resulting from the instabilities, divisions and defections affecting the parties to the peace agreement. The PSC may call for the creation of conditions for civil society organizations to contribute to efforts for consolidation of peace including through supporting the implementation of the outcome of the national dialogue process and the transitional justice mechanisms of the peace agreement.


PSC VTC Session on the situation in Somalia

Somalia

Date | 24 September, 2020

Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia

Tomorrow (24 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to have a session on the situation in Somalia. The PSC is expected to consider the report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia. It is envisaged that the meeting will take place through VTC.

The Chairperson’s Report, prepared in accordance with the communiques of the 848th and 923rd sessions of the PSC and para 36 of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2520(2020), is expected to be introduced by Smail Chergui, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Francisco Madeira, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of Mission of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is also expected to provide update to the Council. As per the practice of the Council, it is expected that the representative of Somalia will also make a statement during the partially open segment of the session.

The last time the Council met to discuss the situation in Somalia was in May 2020, when it decided to renew the mandate of AMISOM and requested the Commission to review the AMISOM CONOPS, by September 2020, in order to align it with urgent priorities. The AU Commission is also expected to work closely with the United Nations, and the Government of Somalia to conduct, by 15 November 2020, an independent comprehensive assessment of the security environment giving due attention to broader and comprehensive stabilization and security requirements, with a view to presenting options for consideration to the PSC and UN Security Council on the role of the AU, UN and international partners in Somalia post-2021. Discussions are said to be currently underway in this regard.

Tomorrow’s session will be taking place against the backdrop of intense political engagements to address the political tensions among Somali political forces, which, among others, led to a vote of no confidence by Parliament in the Prime Minister and his resultant resignation. As Somalia gears up to hold elections, intense discussions have been underway between the leadership of Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States on the conditions and terms for the holding of the election sanctioned under Somalia’s Constitution. Agreement was reached between the Somalia Federal Government and three of the five regional leaders of Somalia at the meeting held on 21 August in Dhusamareb.

The outcome of the Dhusamareb meeting, which led to the establishment of a technical committee to come up with the election modalities, was very much welcomed. Accordingly, agreement has been reached on a revised national election model known as the “Electoral Constituency Caucuses” with some changes to the outcome of the Dhusamareb meeting. This indirect election system is now expected to replace the one person one vote election envisaged under the Constitution. While the new election model is similar to the past clan-based indirect voting, attempt has been made to try to make it more inclusive by increasing the number of MPS casting the vote. However, this new model has as yet to be approved by the two chambers of parliament. The term of the parliament is to expire in November and President Formajo’s term will end in February next year. While the agreement on the model for the election helps in easing the political tensions, it remains to be seen if this would completely settle the power tussle that fuels the tension both among federal institutions and between the Federal Government and some of the regional governments.

Although members of the UNSC expressed regret that the agreed modalities fall short of the longstanding goal of direct voting for members of parliament in this election cycle, they acknowledged that the agreement was reached on the basis of a Somali led and Somali owned dialogue. Somalia’s international partners also underscored the need for the 2020/21 electoral process to be free, fair, transparent, and inclusive. They also called for a roadmap with clear milestones, agreed among Somali political leaders, to ensure decisive democratic progress going forward. Furthermore, the Partners appealed to the leadership of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States to continue meeting regularly in a spirit of dialogue and compromise to address urgent national priorities, including security and economic reform as well as inclusive politics.

Having reached agreement with the leaders of the Federal Member States, President Formajo appointed Hassein Roble as his new Prime Minister. This was following the resignation of Former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire from his position after a vote of no confidence against him. Not surprisingly, the Khaire has already announced his candidature to run for the Presidency.

Tomorrow’s meeting is also coming against the background of mounting security threats, and increasing humanitarian challenges and the briefings will provide update on developments since the last PSC session in May. The security situation remains very concerning. Al-Shabaab attacks have intensified lately, giving rise to fears that the terrorist group may elevate its attacks ahead of national elections in the country. Series of deadly terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by the group recently in Mogadishu and several other regions claiming the lives of many innocent civilians. A number of factors have allowed the group to intensify its attack, including the prevailing tension between the center and the region, its exploitation of local dynamics, and issues surrounding delivery on the benchmarks in the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP) including slow pace of progress in the building of the Somali security institutions. The COVID pandemics and heavy rainfall and flashfloods, which coupled with the problem of dessert locusts, have also exacerbated the humanitarian situation in Somalia.

In terms of the role of AMISOM, its support to the Somali National Forces (SNF) in degrading the activities of Al Shabaab remains absolutely critical. It is to be recalled the PSC has been expressing concern over the security implications of AMISOM’s drawdown. In this regard, in its communique of the 923rd session, it has stressed the imperative need for a halt in further reduction of AMISOM uniformed personnel to ensure the safe holding of elections and the successful implementation of the Somali Transition Plan leading to 2021. The briefing from SRCC is expected to provide update on the activities of AMISOM and issues of command and control and the operationalization of the force enablers including air assets specifically raised in the previous session of the PSC.

Another issue in respect of which tomorrow’s session will provide update is the request the PSC made in its 923rd session communique regarding the revision of the STP. The AUPSC in particular called for a comprehensive review of the Somali Transition Plan and its implementation modalities, led by the FGS, with full participation of the AU, UN, EU and key FGS bilateral partners by July 2020, in order to provide a solid basis for the reprioritization of critical elements in the Transition Plan leading to 2021, which would also inform AMISOM’s CONOPs review and guide the confirmation of Somali priority initiatives for post-2021, as well as support by the international community. There has however been inadequate progress. With the very little time left before the election and the end of the year, there is now a pressing need for finalizing this work.
At its meeting tomorrow, Council is expected to take note of the progress made in the discussion between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States and welcome the agreement reached on the modalities for the upcoming elections. It may also wish to encourage the Somali Political Stakeholders to continue their dialogue and cooperation to ensure conditions propitious for the holding of elections and promote greater stability in the Country. The AUPSC may also strongly condemned the upsurge of terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab which claimed the lives of many innocent civilians, paying tribute to the Somali Armed Forces and AMISOM for their continued efforts in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Underscoring the continued critical role of AMISOM, the PSC may also urge for the mobilization of support for AMISOM. With respect to the STP, the Council may reiterate its previous decisions for its comprehensive review and urge that this process is completed without further delay to recalibrate the priority areas for AMISOM’s support and updating its CONOPS. It may also urge the Federal Government and the Federal Member States to speed up the process of recruitment and deployment of SSF and the integration of the regional forces into the SSF. The AUPSC may also express concern over the serious humanitarian situation because of the multiple challenges facing Somalia and appeal to the international community for enhanced support to the country to reach out to those in urgent need of life-saving assistance.


Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the Renewal of the Mandate of AMISOM

Somalia

Date | 07 May, 2020

Tomorrow (7 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a briefing on the situation in Somalia and consider the renewal of the mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires on 27 May. The PSC will base its consideration of this agenda on the basis of the briefings from AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui and the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of Mission of the AMISOM, Francisco Madeira. It is expected that the representative of Somalia will also share a statement as per usual practice.

Somalia continues to face multifaceted challenges. The global COVID-19 pandemic, the locust invasion affecting east Africa and the massive floods caused by heavy rains in the region are further compounding its situation. The country is expected to hold elections in 2020/2021, which is considered to be a key milestone in the stabilization and peacebuilding efforts of Somalia but in the face of these unprecedented challenges, the future of the election could possibly be hanging in the balance. Progress has been made over the last couple of months in pushing forward the legislative agenda, notably the finalization of the electoral law and the Public Finance Management and Corporate Legislation Act but there is need to enhance dialogue in finalizing the constitutional review process.

Unfortunately, Somalia’s politics has been overshadowed by the prevailing tension between Mogadishu and the regions.

Therefore, easing these tensions will be critical in finalizing the constitutional review and ensure the smooth and peaceful conduct of the election to lay the foundation for democratic and inclusive politics. This requires that constructive dialogue takes place between Mogadishu and the regions to overcome differences and resolve the prevailing stalemate.

The controversy surrounding the election in Jubaland was one of the contentious and divisive issues between the Federal Government and the Jubaland administration.

The dialogue between the Jubaland administration and the leadership of the Jubaland Council for Change, which culminated in a reconciliation agreement signed on 23 April is welcomed by international partners. Unlike other times, the AU and IGAD are conspicuously absent from the list of partners who endorsed the statement welcoming the reconciliation, which came out on 28 April 2020. The statement welcomed this positive development, which will contribute to de-escalating the ongoing tensions in the region. Similar other initiatives are also said to be underway in South West State and Galmudug to form unified and inclusive administrations.

That tensions have been rising in the larger neighborhood are not helping matters. Somalia has also been a battlefield for competition among other extra regional actors. The need for regional consensus and unity of purpose in support of Somalia is, therefore, deemed critical to preserve the gains made over the past decade.

The deadly crash on Tuesday of a Kenyan cargo plane operated by African Express and chartered by an NGO to deliver medical supplies to Somalia has the potential to exasperate tensions with various speculations circulating on social media. President Formajo is said to have called President Uhuru to express regrets and convey condolences for the loss of lives. He also offered readiness to work with the relevant Kenyan authorities to investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident.

According to AMISOM, the leadership of Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia have agreed to investigate the incident, which claimed the lives of six people.

In terms of the overall security situation, Al Shabaab remains a potent force capable of causing havoc and mayhem in the country. It continues to perpetrate indiscriminate attacks using IEDs to target civilians, government institutions, AMISOM and humanitarian actors operating on the ground. Defeating Al-Shabab and expanding state authority has indeed been a matter of priority. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Somaliled Transition Plan has been rather slow and there is a long way to go before the Somali National Army is ready to take over full and effective security responsibilities from AMISOM. That is why it is important that the drawdown of AMISOM forces in accordance with resolution 2472 (2019) should be predicated on the evolving situation on the ground. In addition to the military strategy, there is also the issue of putting in place a socio-political strategy involving some form of negotiation, engagement that encourages desertion and surrender of Al Shabaab fighters and deradicalization processes as important component of success in the effort to degrade and end the threat posed by this militant group.

In terms of the security situation, another issue that may be of interest to PSC members is the reports of civilian casualties from the continuing air strike by US forces in Somalia. What steps are taken to avoid civilian casualties, coordination in undertaking strikes with Somalia authorities, investigations into incidents of civilian injury, killings and damage, and the provision of compensation for the affected are matters on which the PSC could seek clarification.

In this context, the High-Level Virtual Meeting on Somalia, which took place on 29 April 2020, underscored the need to take a fresh look at what steps need to be taken by Somalia and international partners to enable Somalia to assume primary responsibility for security and facilitate the completion of AMISOM’s mandate. The communique issued following the virtual meeting emphasized the need for a common, coordinated and comprehensive approach among the Somalia stakeholders on the one hand and with AMISOM troop contributors on the other hand, which would enable the Somali Federal government to pursue the security sector reforms necessary, including force generation to develop the capability needed to relieve AMISOM of security responsibilities for Somalia. Accordingly, the meeting called for the transition plan to be revised and updated with clear defining roles for all key stakeholders. The meeting also recognized the need for a further reconfiguration of AMISOM and called for the upcoming mandate renewal of the mission to consider the realities on the ground.

It is expected that Chergui will provide insights on the implications of the outcome of this meeting regarding the role of AMISOM and indeed the process of its drawdown. Based on this input and indeed the views from the representative of Somalia, the expectation is that the PSC will forward its proposal to serve as the basis for the UNSC decision in this regard. In its communique, the AUPSC may express sympathy and condolence over the loss of lives due the plan crash.

The Council may note the many complex and difficult challenges facing Somalia and call for concerted international effort in support of the country. It may highlight in this regard the looming humanitarian crisisfacing the country due to the impact of COVID-19, the locust invasion and the heavy floods. The PSC may wish to note the progress made in terms of the preparations for the upcoming elections, particularly the legislation of important laws. The Council may reiterate its concern over the prevailing tensions between the Federal Government and the regions and urge the Somali stakeholders to exert every possible effort to resolve their differences through constructive dialogue and negotiation with a view to building the necessary political consensus towards the election. It may also urge further concerted engagement regarding the constitutional review process.

The PSC could welcome the signing of the reconciliation agreement between the Jubaland administration and the leadership of the Jubaland Council for Change and encourage reconciliation initiative currently underway in other regions.

The Council may express concern over the volatile security situation in Somalia and condemn the continued attack by Al-Shabaab. In this context, it may call for reinvigorated efforts in fighting the menace of terrorism in Somalia not only militarily but also through social and political means including processes that encourage desertion of Al Shabaab fighters, deradicalization and reintegration into society. The PSC may also express concern over civilian casualties resulting from US air strikes and urge for investigation and compliance with due process of the law with adequate compensation for affected families and communities. Council may express concern over delays in the implementation of the Somalia-led Transition Plan and welcome the outcome of the High-Level Virtual meeting held recently. It may appeal to the Security Council to consider its decision on the drawdown of AMISOM forces considering the situation on the ground during the upcoming discussion on the mandate renewal of the mission. It may also reiterate its appeal to the United Nations and other international partners for ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for AMISOM.


Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia

Somalia

Date | 24 February, 2020

Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia

South Sudan’s military said on Monday it will retaliate against the attacks by the militia group, the National Salvation Front (NAS) led by renegade general Thomas Cirilo which previously opted out of the 2018 revitalized peace deal.

Lul Ruai Koang, military spokesperson warned that they are ready to retaliate against NAS in case of continued attacks on their positions and on civilians.

“South Sudan People’s Defense Force (SSPDF) reaffirms commitment to the Rome declaration, but reserves the right to respond with deadly force in self-defense and that of civilians and their properties,” Koang said in a statement issued in Juba.

NAS refused to sign the revitalized peace deal to end the more than five years of conflict, since the outbreak in December 2013, as it called for renegotiation of the peace pact to include a federal system of governance.

This came following last week’s deadly ambush by the rebel group on the convoy of James Wani Igga, second vice president, which left six of his bodyguards killed.

NAS, a rebel group fighting against the government in Central and Western Equatoria State recently claimed responsibility for the attack that took place at Lobonok, which is the home area of the second VP located on the outskirts of the capital.

Koang also blamed NAS for the Aug. 7 attack on a local gold mine, which left nine civilians killed.

He called on the ceasefire monitors to investigate violations.

The government on Jan. 13 inked a peace deal dubbed the “Rome Declaration” in Rome, with the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance (SSOMA), a coalition of opposition groups that did not sign the 2018 peace agreement.

NAS is part of SSOMA but its persistent attacks on government troops have meant violation of the Cessation of Hostilities under the Rome Declaration.

The revitalized peace deal was inked in Ethiopia in September 2018 between the government and the main opposition, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)-In-Opposition led by now First Vice President Riek Machar.

Under the ten-point statement dubbed the Rome declaration, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to cease hostilities and continue to dialogue.


Briefing on the situation in Somalia

Somalia

Date | 13 December, 2019

Tomorrow (13 December) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on the situation in Somalia and the activities of AMISOM. As
Somalia is gearing up to hold elections next year, the PSC is expected to make a thorough assessment of the
progress made and the challenges that lie ahead. The AU Peace and Security Department and the Special Representative of the AUC Chairperson to Somalia and head of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Francisco Madeira, are expected to brief the PSC. During the introductory part of the session, following the practice of the PSC the Inter‐ Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), particularly Ethiopia as the Chair of IGAD and African Member of the UN Security Council (A3), the UN office to the AU (UNOAU) and the European Union (EU) will also make their statements at the session are expected to make a statement.

Tomorrow’s session is expected to address various issues including the preparations for the 2020 national elections, the recent political and security developments in Somalia and the implementation of AMISOM’s mandate under the revised CONOPS adopted in May 2019. The 2020 election is a key milestone in the stabilization and peacebuilding of Somalia and the holding of “one man, one vote” election in the country for the first time in fifty years will be historic. In this regard, finalizing the Constitutional Review, adopting the amended Federal Constitution and the electoral law, allocating the necessary resources for the election and creating a safe and secure environment for the conduct of the election are considered priority areas. At the Somalia Partners Forum held on 2 October 2019, in Mogadishu, Somalia has committed itself to expediting the constitutional and legislative processes with a view to adopting the electoral laws this month and the Federal Constitution in June next year, while international partners agreed to provide the necessary support in this regard.

However, the prevailing tension between Mogadishu and the regions has been an obstacle in establishing broad political consensus in the country. There is concern that the situation may escalate ahead of elections.

Therefore, easing these tensions will be very critical to ensure the smooth and peaceful conduct of the election and lay the foundation for ensuring democratic and inclusive politics. This requires that constructive dialogue takes place between Mogadishu and the regions to
overcome differences and resolve the prevailing stalemate. Indeed the most recent agreement reached between the Federal Government of Somalia and the leadership of Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASWJ) is a positive step. The meeting between President Farmajo and two former Presidents, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud and Sheikh Sharif was welcomed by international partners as a step in the right direction and further engagement was
encouraged among key stakeholders at national and regional levels to ensure broader consensus on the holding of peaceful and credible elections. In terms of the regional dynamics, tensions were also rising between Somalia and Kenya in relation to their maritime dispute.

The meeting of President Farmajo and President Kenyatta in Nairobi last month to improve strained relations was very much welcomed. This is believed to have positive impact not only for the bilateral relations between the two countries but also the peace and security of the wider region.

The security situation in Somalia remains volatile. Al‐Shabaab remains a serious threat continuing to create havoc and mayhem but, according to AMISOM, there has been a decline in Al‐Shabab’s activities over the last three months owing to a number of factors, including an
increase in the number of lethal strikes against Al‐Shabaab by partners, with the arrival of the Somali rains, which made it difficult for the group to operate and the successive operations conducted jointly by Somali security forces and AMISOM. This is said to have forced the group to concentrate its activities in and around Mogadishu. The mortar attack on the Airport zone where AMISOM Headquarters and the UN compound are located is a case in point. Ensuring public security and safety in preparation for the election is absolutely vital and AMISOM is said to have repositioned itself to do that and also strengthen its support to the Somali electoral
security task force.

The implementation of the Somali‐led Transition Plan has been a matter of priority. The progress made in reforming the Somali security forces and in undertaking joint operations with AMISOM, including the recovery of some territories from Al‐Shabab and handover of forward operating bases to the Somalia National Army has been considered encouraging. However, the pace of implementation has been rather slow and there is a long way to go before the Somali National Army is ready to take over full and effective security responsibilities from AMISOM. Therefore, there is need to undertake the necessary assessment to make sure that the drawdown of AMISOM forces in accordance with resolution 2472 (2019) is calibrated with the evolving situation on the ground.

The humanitarian situation in Somalia has also been a cause of concern. According to the UN, heavy seasonal rains triggered floods affecting thousands of people in the southern part of the country. The situation is taking a heavy toll on the people. Farmlands and other infrastructures have been destroyed. There is need for urgent humanitarian response to reach out to people in the worst affected areas. In terms of Somalia’s long‐term peacebuilding needs and its development agenda, Somalia is making progress in its discussions with the international financial institutions towards securing a debt relief. The progress in its reform efforts, including in improving public financial management and revenue generation, as well as adopting a new National Development Plan have been recognized as positive steps by international partners. At the Somalia Partners Forum, it has agreed with international partners on “a Mutual Accountability Framework to narrow their joint focus to priority areas for action and resources in order to achievThe expected outcome of the meeting is a communique.

The PSC is expected to take note of the progress made in Somalia and underscore the need to expedite preparations to ensure a peaceful, free, fair and credible election next year. The Council may reiterate its concern over the prevailing tensions between the Federal Government and the regions and urge the Somali stakeholders to exert every possible effort to resolve their differences through constructive dialogue and negotiation with a view to building the necessary political consensus towards election 2020. In this context, it may welcome the meeting between President Farmajo and the two Former Presidents. It may also welcome the easing of tensions between Somalia and Kenya following the meeting of the leadership of the two countries.

The Council may express concern over the volatile security situation in Somalia and the continued attack by Al‐Shabaab. In this regard, it may underline the need to create a safe and secure environment for the holding of peaceful election next year. It may also point out the need for a comprehensive assessment of the security situation in the country in light of the conditions‐based gradual withdrawal of AMISOM in line with the relevant security council resolutions and the decisions of the AUPSC. The Council could express concern on the humanitarian situation and call for the mobilization of international assistance in support of people who are affected by the recent flooding. It may, on the other hand, express satisfaction with the progress made in the reform efforts and the positive momentum built in the discussion with the IFIs with regard to debt relief.


PSC Session on Kenya-Somalia maritime boundary dispute

Somalia

Date | 3 September, 2019

Today (3 September) at 3pm the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold a session on the maritime boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia. This session is a follow up to the earlier 871st session of the PSC.

It was put on the agenda following a request from Kenya for this matter to be considered by the PSC. While Kenya and Somalia have been debating the delimitation of their maritime boundaries since 2009, in recent years the tension over the boundary dispute shows signs of boiling over.

Following the signing in 2009 of a ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic to grant to each other No-Objection in respect of submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’, Somalia and Kenya made a
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), whose role is to make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf (as per the MoU both within and beyond) 200 nautical miles. As provided for in the MoU, the CLCS’s process is limited to the delineation of the continental shelf and is to be without prejudice to the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two parties.

It was agreed in the MoU that the delimitation of their maritime boundaries, in the areas under dispute to be ‘on the basis of international law.’ While the CLCS process for the delimitation of the continental shelf was underway, in 2014, Somalia instituted proceedings against Kenya at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) requesting the latter to determine, on the basis of international law, the complete course of the single maritime boundary dividing all the maritime areas appertaining to Somalia and to Kenya in the Indian Ocean, including the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.

The proceeding before the ICJ has gone through various stages. Following the institution of the proceeding, the ICJ received submissions from both Kenya and Somalia. Pursuant to the procedures of the ICJ, Kenya made submissions raising objections to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and to the admissibility of Somalia’s application before ICJ in October 2015. The ICJ as per its procedures received the observations of Somalia on Kenya’s objections in February 2016. In September 2016, the ICJ as per established practice held public hearings on Kenya’s preliminary objections. Following review of the written submissions as well as those in the public hearings, the ICJ delivered its judgment on Kenya’s preliminary objection in February 2017. With Kenya’s objections rejected by the ICJ, the proceeding moved to the next stage
involving consideration of the submissions of the two states on the merits of the case. During
the remaining period of 2017 and in 2018, ICJ received counter memorial from Kenya. After granting the submission of a reply by Somalia and a rejoinder by Kenya, the ICJ has proceeded to receive to receive the reply by Somalia to Kenya’s counter memorial and Kenya’s rejoinder to Somalia’s reply.

TCurrently, the proceeding is at a stage for conducting public hearings. To this end, the ICJ has set the period between 9 and 13 September for holding public hearings on the merits of the
case. Kenya objected to the proceedings before the ICJ. It was of the opinion that the 2009 MoU, which the ICJ considered to be a treaty binding under international law, required the two countries to negotiate delimitation of the disputed boundary, and to do so only after completion of CLCS review of the submissions that the two states made on the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. It was also Kenya’s view that the MoU has set the method of negotiation for delimitation of the disputed boundary.

TAs the ICJ proceedings continue unabated and efforts for settling the matter out of the ICJ process failing, tensions have been mounting between Kenya and Somalia. The tension boiled over particularly after reports that Somalia plans to auction for oil exploration blocks in the disputed area during an event held in London in early February 2019. In response, Kenya recalled its ambassador to Somalia, Lukas Tumbo, and summoned his Somali counterpart in Kenya, Mohamoud Nur, demanding a withdrawal of the maps that were displayed in London. Various developments including disputes over the treatment of Somalia officials in Kenya and air travel between the two countries have in the ensuing months have further exacerbated the tension. There are
legitimate concerns that the situation also endangers the peace process in Somalia, particularly AMISOM for which Kenya is a major contributor. These concerns also relate to the impact this mounting tension would have over Kenya’s role as the major host of Somalia refugees.

TAs noted above, the PSC considered the issue for the first time at its 871th session held on 22 August 2019. While Kenya presented a briefing statement during that session, Somalia declined to attend the session sending instead a note verbal indicating that the matter was pending before ICJ. While invitations have been extended to it, it was not clear if Somalia would participate in today’s session.

TA major sticking point relates to the possibility of settling the matter out of court. If efforts made thus far including intervention by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are anything to go by, it seems unlikely that the ICJ proceeding will stop. It also remains unclear there is a way for the PSC to stop the ICJ process at this point in time other than through the agreement of the two states (Of course the
PSC can appeal to the ICJ to the sensitivities of the situation for peace and security and speed
up the process).

TYet in the light of the escalating situation, the PSC has a role to play. As pointed out in the AU’s User Guide on African Border Dispute Settlement pointed out, ‘[b]oundary disputes are not only of concern for the States that directly contest the boundary; they can affect the stability of the international system as a whole. Accordingly, the system of international dispute settlement provides a role for regional and international organisations – such as the African Union and the United Nations – to facilitate boundary dispute resolution.’ Within this context, it is possible and even necessary that the PSC, parallel to the ICJ, initiates measures to de-escalate the tension between the two countries and ensure that it would not lead to conflicts. Perhaps part of the effort is to find ways of mitigating the fall out that may arise from the eventual outcome of the ICJ process.

TAt the time of going to press, it remained unclear the form that the outcome of the session would take. If there would be an official outcome, it is sure to be a communique. It is expected that the PSC will urge the two countries from taking actions that would exacerbate the crisis. It is also possible for the PSC to urge the two states to avail themselves for a mediation process that the AU and the regional organization the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) could facilitate.


PSC session on Somalia and AMISOM

Somalia

Date | May 7, 2019

Tomorrow (May 7), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 847th session. The session will focus on the situation in Somalia and renewal of the mandate of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Acting Director of AU Peace and Securtiy Deparmtnet, Admore Kambudzi and Special Representative for Somalia and Head of AMISOM Francisco Caetano Jose Madeira are also expected to brief the council on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM. Ambassador of Rwanda, Hope Tumukunde Gasura, will deliver a statement as the PSC Chair of the month. The representative of the UN is expected to make an intervention. The representatives of Somalia and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are also invited to make a statement in the opening segment of the session.

During the session, the PSC is expected to consider two reports: the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia and the 5th AU-UN Joint Review of AMISOM. Based on these reports, the PSC is also expected to renew the mandate of AMISOM for another twelve months.

Pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution 2431 (2018) and PSC 782 communiqué, AMISOM’s mandate has been renewed until May 31 2019 with a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five formed police units, and with reduced level of uniformed AMISOM personnel to a maximum level of 20,626 by February 2019. As per the requirement of Resolution 2431 and to meet the reduced force size of AMISOM, 1000 troops from the Burundian contingent have been withdrawn. Although the drawdown is in line with the UNSC decision, the withdrawal of a particular Troop Contributing Country has created tension between Bujumbura and the AU Commission and has also been challenged by Hirshabelle state where the forces are located. All these efforts are geared towards the gradual handover of responsibilities to Somali security forces by December 2021.

The PSC is expected to review the political and security situation in Somalia, including the implementation of the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP) and the National Security Architecture (NSA) FGS. Also of interest to the PSC is the three phase strategy in the transition plan that identifies the necessary steps leading up to the 2021 national elections by focusing on operational activities, supporting activities and institution building. In line with the first phase of the plan which spans up to June 2019, AMISOM has handed over to the government of Somalia the national stadium and the Jaalle Siyaad Military Academy, both have been used as military bases. More difficult handovers are also expected to follow later in the year including the main roads linking Mogadishu with the main towns in South West.

As a follow up to the above decisions of the UNSC and the PSC, the AUC Chairperson has already presented his report at the 806th PSC meeting. The report has particularly indicated the political challenges due to the increasing rivalry between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS). Since then, while there have been some positive developments in the relationship between the two levels of government, the centralization push of the FGS continues to fuel tension. It is reported that a meeting of President Abdullahi Formaajo and the leaders of FMS has convened in Garowe to resolve disputes between the two levels of government.

In terms of the security situation, as recurring incidents of Al Shabaab attacks attest and highlighted in the Chairperson’s report, security also remains a major challenge. On 23 March, Al-Shabaab fighters detonated a suicide car bomb storming a government building, killing 15 people including the country’s deputy labor minister. On 18 April, a car bomb exploded in Mogadishu, killing five people. The following day, five family members of the deputy minister for fisheries were fatally shot. There are
concerns that attacks would escalate during the Ramadan fasting season. Against the background of the above observation of the communiqué of the 827th session, these recurring attacks and the continuing gaps in capacity of national institutions, there is continuing concern of great risk of a security vacuum particularly with the ongoing transition and reconfiguration of AMISOM and if the necessary capacity is not met by the Somali Security Forces (SSF).

It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 827th session has adopted the 2018-2021 AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPs). Developed based on the Somali Transition Plan (STP), the Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) of AMISOM and of the SSF, the CONOPs provide a roadmap towards the complete withdrawal of AMISOM troops and handing over of responsibility to Somalia authorities. The communiqué of the session emphasized that the effective implementation of the CONOPs and the STP highly depends on the ‘generation of the Somali Security forces…continued provision of required trained and equipped personnel by Police and Troop Contributing Countries and availability of required and predictable resources for AMISOM’s sustainment to support the FGS’.

The UNSC 2431 (2018) has extended the mandate of AMISOM to pursue three strategic
objectives: to facilitate gradual handing over responsibilities to (SSF), to reduce the threat of Al-Shabaab and other armed groups and to assist SSF to provide security for the political processes at all levels. For PSC members it would be of interest to inquire on the 10-months progress and challenges in fulfilling the key assignments by AMISOM and to receive update on the reconfiguration of the peacekeeping mission. One notable development has been the initiative by the AU for developing an AU political strategy for Somalia.

The Chairperson’s report is expected to provide update on the reconfiguration that took place in the military, civilian and police component. On the military aspect, the capacity of SSF in taking over from AMISOM is expected to be highlighted and the need to enhance coordination and information sharing among the various security actors will be a key factor to enhance protection and security. For the police component, the reconfiguration looks into the increased police presence in the various AMISOM sectors and to support the roles of the military and civilian components as well engage in trainings of national police personnel. This will also be accompanied by the reconfiguration of equipments. The civilian component has increasingly been involved in the implementation of the STP particularly in the political analysis and human rights monitoring.

The expanded role of the police and civilian components is also in line with the 782nd ministerial meeting of the PSC that calls for AMISOM’s mandate in ‘political and stabilization role into all sectors, including ensuring international humanitarian law and human rights compliance and accountability, progressive training and mentoring of Somali National Army, Somali Police Force and
Darwish forces required to successfully implement the STP’. The session, in addition to the ongoing efforts may also provide an overview of the planned implementation of phase two and three of the STP and the AMISOM CONOPs and key recommendations on next steps.

In terms of determining the outcome of the session, it may be of interest for the PSC to review developments in light of these benchmarks set in the communiqué of its 827th session. In this respect, a major consideration is the serious threat that Al Shabaab continues to pose and the security risk that arises from the implementation of the withdrawal of AMISOM without the presence of trained and prepared Somalia forces to take effective control of responsibility from where AMISOM withdraws.

If the risk of reversal of the security gains is to be ensured, the situation seems to warrant that more effort is made into putting in place effective SSF able to take over from AMISOM and the pace and timeline of the drawdown of AMISOM is reviewed accordingly. It is also important that AMISOM is provided with the resources and support that are necessary for reinforcing its effectiveness as it implements the
process of withdrawal.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. Tomorrow’s meeting is expected to extend the mission’s mandate until 2020 and to specify the deliverables to be undertaken under
the new mandate in line with the 2018-2021 CONOPs and STP. It is also expected to highlight the adjustments that should be made in terms of the pace of withdrawal of AMISOM and the deployment of the requisite force enablers particularly in terms of aviation capacity. This decision will be followed by UNSC resolution that
is expected to be passed at the end of this month.


Consideration of the new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of AMISOM

Somalia

Date | 4 February, 2019

Today (4 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider and adopt the new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) of African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM) when it meets at 3pm. Although initially planned in the program of work for 15 February, it is brought forward to today as we indicated in our review of the Program of Work for the month late last week.

The AU Department of Peace and Security is expected to present the CONOPS. Following applicable rules and established practice, invitations have also been extended to all AMISOM troop/police contributing countries (Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) to participate in the session.

It is to be recalled that the PSC at its 806th session expressed its expectation to the consideration and adoption of the new revised CONPOPs of AMISOM. It was the ministerial meeting of the PSC held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 30 June at its 782nd session which, on renewing the mandate of AMISOM and within the framework of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2431 called for the development of a new AMISOM CONPOPS.

Developed on the basis of the framework of the AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA), the Somali Security Forces (SSF), the 2018 AU-UN Joint Review, the National Security Architecture (NSA), the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and UNSC Resolution 2431, the CONOPS are designed to guide the operations and organizational reorientation of AMISOM for the transitional period of 2018-2021 during which AMISOM transitions and hands over security responsibilities to Somali Security Forces (SSF).

The CONOPS provide the operational framework for the implementation of the AMISOM exit strategy designed to reduce the threat from al-Shabab, secure the political process and transfer security responsibilities to Somali forces. Based on review of the prevailing political situation and threat analysis in the operational environment in Somalia, the CONOPS provides for a three-phased process of the reconfiguration and progressive handing over of responsibilities to SSF.

Phase I runs until 30 June 2019, during which AMISOM will be reconfigured to enable it to degrade al-Shabaab, secure Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR, hold and secure Leego, protect key population centers identified especially along the MSRs, collapse or consolidate existing FOBs and build ones (where appropriate jointly with SSF) and commence a multi-faceted transition from AMISOM to SNA/SSF. During Phase II, which runs from July 2019 to December 2020, SSF are expected to take increasing lead role to degrade al- Shabaab, build and hold positions along MSRs and continue to strengthen population centers with Somali or AMISOM police gradually taking over security of the main population centres. Phase III, which runs until December 2021 the end time of AMISOM’s operations, AMISOM takes the role of supporting the leadership of SSF and prepare for exit by 2021. In all the three phases, AMISOM will reconfigure its uniformed personnel while strengthen the role and presence of its police and civilian components to key locations. The CONOPS also outline the revised tasks of the military, police and civilian components of AMISOM.

The CONOPS and the effective implementation are premised on a number of assumptions including improvement in the political situation such as the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) of Somalia working in partnerships, the generation of the required trained, equipped, and sustained SSF, adequate logistics support and effective strategic communications.

Yet, as the recent experience in the situaiton in Somalia shows, it is unlikely that there will be a linear implementation of the CONOPS and the AMISOM exit strategy. The first challenge comes from Al Shabaab. Despite gains registered in pushing back the terror group, it continues to orchestrate major attacks including those targeting AMISOM, SSF, FGS and UN. On 2 January 2019, in a sign of possible shift in tactics, Al-Shabab launched a series of mortar attacks against AMISOM camp in Mogadishu landing particularly affecting UNSOM compound. Outside Mogadishu as well Al Shabaab’s attacks remain high targeting convoys in Middle Juba, Lower Juba, Gedo, Hiiran and Bay regions. On 2 February, al Shabaab exploded a suicide car bomb outside a military base for Ethiopian soldiers.

That the implementation of the exit strategy and the different phases of the CONOPs depend on security situation came out when the initial plan of the withdrawal of 1000 AMISOM troops was
postponed from the initial period of October 2018 to February 2019.

The other challenge is in the political front. Here the major problem is the lack of cohesion among Somali government actors. There have been major issues between FGS and the FMS affecting the
implementation of the STP. There have been issues within the FMS of Somalia as well.

In terms of the drawadown of the size of AMISOM, a major issue has been whose troops should withdraw. The CONOPS envisage that the 1000 troops that will be withdrawn by end of February 2019 would be from Burundi. There seems to be no agreement on the criteria for troop withdrawal. Burundi appears to insist that the withdrawal has to be on the basis of equitable proportion from each of AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries, while the CONOPS is based on consideration of threat analysis. Indeed, one of the reasons for the factors for early convening of today’s session was to get the endorsement of the PSC in order to meet the planned deadline for the withdrawal of the 1000 troops by end of the month.

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué, which is expected to endorse the CONOPS.


The situation in Somalia

Somalia

Date | 07 November, 2018

Tomorrow (7 November) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 806th session, the first session of the month under the chairpersonship of Djibouti, dedicated to the situation in Somalia. During the session the PSC is expected to receive the report of the African Union (AU) Commission (AUC) Chairperson on the situation in Somalia. The AU Peace and Security Department and the Special Representative of the AUC Chairperson to Somalia and head of the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), Francisco Madeira, are expected to make statement and introduce the report of the chairperson.

During the introductory part of the session, following the practice of the PSC the Inter‐ Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), particularly Ethiopia as the Chair of IGAD and African Member of the UN Security Council (A3), the UN office to the AU (UNOAU) and the European Union (EU) will also make their statements at the session are expected to make a statement.

The report, which covers the period from August to November 2018, provides updates on the major political and security developments in Somalia and issues pertaining to AMISOM. In the political front, the report presents developments relating to the implementation of the Somali Transitional Plan (STP), including agreement on the political roadmap for 2020, the constitutional review process, the federal system and the legislative and institutional preparations for the 2021 general election.

For PSC members, it would be of interest to inquire on challenges pertaining to the implementation of the required measures in these various areas, including significant number of key legislations, within the timelines set and on how AMISOM meaningfully contribute for achieving the timelines.

In the political front, the major issue of concern for Somalia, highlighted in the report, is the deterioration in the relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS). As the Chairperson’s report notes, the major developments in this regard include the communiqué of the FMS meeting of 8 September in Kismayo announcing severance of relationship with the FGS and the refusal of the FMS to attend the emergency meeting that President Mohamed Farmaajo called for 17 and 18 September 2018. During a meeting held in Garowe, Puntland, the FMS have established security arrangements, which,
according to the Chairperson’s report, not only represent a departure from the STP but also duplicate the role of
the National Security Council (NSC).

Despite efforts for bridging the difference through intervention by the Federal Parliament and a ministerial committee, not only that the efforts failed to achieve breakthrough but the division is further deepening.

While he was attending a peace event in Juba, South Sudan last week, President Farmaajo criticized the FMS. Highlighting their failure to provide basic services to their residents, he rejected their demand for more political mandate and called their engagement in foreign policy, a sphere exclusive to the federal government, unacceptable. In this context, it is worth noting that the political crisis in Somalia is in part a result of the entanglement of Somalia in the Gulf crisis. Indeed, Somalia has become the country most affected by the exportation into the Horn of Africa of the destabilizing rivalry between Middle Eastern countries and among the Gulf states.

There are increasing concerns that the rising tension between the FGS and the FMS would adversely affect not only the political reconciliation efforts in Somalia but also the elections that the FMS are expected to have in the coming months. Indeed, there are signs that the elections planned for November 17 in South West could be derailed. On 4 November, the Upper House of Parliament issued a statement warning against