Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations
Ministerial session on financing of AU led peace support operations
Date | 22 September 2023
Tomorrow (23 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1175th meeting at a ministerial level to deliberate on financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The meeting will be held in the margins of the 78th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York, USA.
Cameroon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lejeune Mbella Mbella, chairperson of the PSC for the month of September, is expected to open the session. Moussa Faki Mahamat, the AU Commission Chairperson, will make a statement. Donald Kaberuka, the AU High-Representative for the Peace Find and Financing of the AU, is also expected to address the session. On the part of the UN, it is envisaged that Jean-pierre Lacroix, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, and Rosemary A. DiCarlo, UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will make statement as well. The representatives of the African Members in the UN Security Council (A3), namely Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique and the incoming two African members of the UN Security Council, Algeria and Sierra Leone, will also be present for this ministerial session.
The last time that the PSC met to discuss the issue of financing AU PSOs was on 12 May of this year during its 1153rd session, which was held at the ministerial level. In that session, the PSC authorized the A3 to ‘resume consultations with the relevant stakeholders towards the adoption of a UNSC resolution on financing AU-led PSOs.’ This set the negotiation process towards the adoption of UNSC resolution in motion, a process that was put on hold after the request of the PSC in September 2019 to suspend the negotiation over the draft resolution put forward by South Africa. (For more details see Amani Africa’s 10 May 2023 Special Research Report).
From our consultations, Ghana – who is spearheading the agenda of adopting a framework resolution on financing AU PSOs – has developed a draft resolution to start the negotiation process in the UNSC. It is anticipated that the draft resolution may be circulated sometime in October with the hope to table the resolution for voting in December during Ecuador’s Presidency. Tomorrow’s session thus offers an opportunity for the PSC to provide substantive and concrete guidance on how to proceed with the negotiation particularly on the remaining delicate issues in the coming months.
The renewed interest in and the window of opportunity towards the adoption of the long pending resolution is a result of various developments both at the level of the AU and the UN as well as changes in the peace and security dynamics and the dynamics in the UNSC. The AU Commission prepared what it called ‘African consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities’, which the AU Assembly considered and adopted in February 2023 at its 36th ordinary session. This Consensus Paper not only presented the advances that the AU made in strengthening its various institutional, normative and regulatory processes but it also clarified AU’s position on burden sharing.
On the part of the UN, following the presidential statement of August 2022 under Chinese presidency of the UNSC which requested UN Secretary-General to provide the Security Council, by 30 April 2023, a report on progress made by the UN and the AU to fulfil the commitments set out in resolutions 2320 and 2378, and recommendations to secure predictable, sustainable and flexible resources, the Secretary-General released the report on 1 May and presented to the UNSC during its 25 May 2023 session. The dynamics within the UNSC today is more favorable for the adoption of a resolution on financing than it was before as the statements delivered by UNSC members during the 25 May briefing clearly attest. Considering that a major factor for the collapse of the process for the adoption of a resolution in December 2018 was a US threat to veto the resolution, a notable positive development is US’s statement expressing more positive and supportive stance towards the adoption of the resolution.
Further to that, while the nature of the peace and security context increasingly demands the use of instruments that go beyond those applicable to UN peacekeeping and hence putting UN peace operations on the continent under increasing pressure, there is no appetite in the UN for deploying UN peacekeeping. Additionally, the recent geopolitical shifts that increasingly acknowledge Africa as a key global actor can find meaningful institutional expression through, among others, the decision to use UN assessed contribution for AU PSOs.
In the context of the last attempt for the adoption of a UNSC resolution during 2018/2019 and following the suspension of the process in September 2019, the issues requiring further engagement have been identified. Broadly speaking, four issues emerged as requiring further engagement between the AU and the UN to pave the way for the adoption of a UNSC resolution: the question of burden-sharing, compliance frameworks for human rights and international humanitarian law, fiduciary standards of financial arrangements and reporting, and oversight and command and control of the missions. (For more details on the history of the negotiation and the controversial issues, see Amani Africa’s 10 May 2023 Special Research Report).
Despite the favorable political dynamics within the UNSC, the negotiation over the draft resolution will not be easy. The 25 May 2023 UNSC briefing reveals that support on the part of UNSC members including some of the P5 remains uneven. In that regard, it is worth noting that the representative of the UK, during the 25 May briefing, stressed the need for the AU to ‘openly and clearly establish how it intends to share the financial burden’, and further warning that ‘any scope for misinterpretation will result in new initiatives being stalled’. Together with the issues that others like Brazil, Albania and Japan raised, further compromise and agreement may be required on some of these sticking issues.
During tomorrow’s session, it is expected that the PSC, apart from reiterating the progress made in enhancing ownership and burden sharing through the AU Peace Fund, may highlight the need for giving due recognition to the unaccounted aspects of the financial burden that AU member states bear in mobilizing and deploying troops who pay with their lives and limbs. It may further reaffirm the position of the Consensus Paper that the AU would cover the costs relating to the preparatory stages of the deployment of PSOs supported by UN assessed contributions. Considering the expectation on the part of some members of the UNSC for further commitment for financial burden sharing, the PSC may indicate in the context of the clear commitment that the AU demonstrated in recent years that instead of making unrealistic commitment for a specific percentage for all PSOs that may be funded through UN assessed contributions that further financial contribution is considered at the time of the planning and negotiation of the deployment of each PSO.
Tomorrow’s session will also serve as an opportunity for the PSC to also express its support for the financing model for accessing UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs as articulated both in the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s May 2023 report. With respect to oversight and command and control, the PSC may also welcome the proposed formula in the Secretary-General’s report as the basis for formulating the provisions in the resolution while affirming the importance of the development of joint AU-UN planning guidelines.
The PSC should take lessons from the 2018/19 negotiation process to avoid the risk of another failure. First, it is imperative to ensure the cohesion of the A3 members and that they are able to speak in one voice on controversial issues throughout the negotiation process. In that regard, an interesting development is PSC’s suspension of Gabon – a member of the A3 – after the 20 August military coup. It remains to be seen whether the sanction will affect Gabon’s relations with other A3 members, as well as the PSC while engaging on the file. Second, building a broader consensus with the UNSC members is also crucial. One immediate available avenue to that end is the upcoming 17th annual joint consultative meeting between the PSC and the UNSC, which is scheduled to take place from 5 to 6 October in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. PSC may commend the efforts of the A3, and request them to fast track the finalization of the draft resolution and the negotiation on the same in order to seize the current window of opportunity for the adoption of the resolution before the end of the year. The PSC may emphasize the need for a sustained engagement between the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the negotiation process; and to that end, it may request a regular briefing from the A3 until the successful completion of the negotiation process. The PSC may affirm AU-led PSOs authorized by the UNSC and funded through UN assessed contribution as being part of the range of tools that the UN deploys for maintenance of international peace and security. The PSC may also welcome the proposals contained in the Secretary-General’s May 2023 report notably with respect to monitoring and reporting, joint and consultative decision-making. It may commend the progress made by the AU for achieving ownership and burden sharing and signal that specific financial contribution by the AU for a PSO funded by UN assessed contribution is dealt with on a case-by-case basis. It may also express the need for the UNSC to recognize the important contribution of AU PSOs for international peace and security, hence for the realization of the primary responsibility of the UNSC.
Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa
Discussion on Financing AU Peace Support Operations in Africa
Date | 12 May 2023
Tomorrow (12 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1153rd session at a ministerial level to discuss the issue of financing AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Africa.
Uganda’s minister of Foreign Affairs, Odongo Jeje Abubakhar, Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, is expected to open the session followed by remarks from Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), as well as remarks from Mohammed El-Amine Souef, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) is expected to address the PSC and provide overview of the Secretary-General’s report released early this month. The representative of the European Union (EU) could be also among the speakers.
The session on financing AU PSOs comes in the context of a new momentum for the resumption of negotiation on a framework UNSC resolution on financing of AU-led PSOs that has stalled since 2019. In February of this year, the 36th ordinary session of the AU Assembly adopted what the AU referred to as ‘African consensus paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities.’ On 1 May, the UN Secretary-General officially released the report on the Implementation of UNSC resolutions 2320(2016) and 2378(2017), which is scheduled to be considered by the UNSC on 25 May. These two documents set the stage for starting the negotiation on a UNSC framework resolution that secures concrete commitment from the Council on the use of UN assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs.
Happening at the ministerial level, tomorrow’s session presents the PSC the opportunity to provide strategic guidance on how to take forward the agenda of financing within the UNSC and the respective roles and responsibilities of the various AU actors in that regard. It could also serve as a platform for the PSC to create awareness and shared understanding on some of the key issues highlighted in the two documents and those areas that may require further engagement and negotiated compromise.
There are around four issues, which all received attention in the two documents and are expected to required further engagement. The first of this has to do with burden sharing. This relates to the percentage of the budget of AU-led PSO supported by UN funding that the AU contributes to. One of the issues in this regard was the clarification needed on contribution of 25 % of PSOs budget. The Consensus Paper stated that the 25% of AU’s budget would be dedicated to supporting ‘priority initiatives of the AU in support of peace and security efforts on the continent.’ From the 25% of the Union’s annual budget that is committed to the overall peace and security work of the AU, the budget for PSOs is expected to cover the preparation stage of AU led PSOs.
During the session, member states may also raise the question of various unaccounted costs that they absorb when deploying for PSOs. As highlighted in Amani Africa’s latest report, there may also be a need for the AU to commit to a percentage of the financial burden of the PSOs that will be supported by UN assessed contributions. The PSC may thus need to consider how to provide further clarification that specifies the percentage of the cost of the peace operations that AU’s contribution constitutes even if this would be a percentage that is symbolic of AU’s willingness for burden sharing.
On the financing model, the Consensus Paper proposed three financing options. The first model is the establishment of AU-UN Hybrid mission based on the UNAMID experience. The second model is what the Consensus Paper described as an ‘Enhanced UN Logistics Support Package (LSP)’ – a financing option that has been tested in Somalia since 2009 to support AMISOM/ATMIS but with the support additionally covering monthly stipends to the police and military components as well as death and disability compensation (AMISOM/ATMIS plus model). While these two converge with the two financing options supported by the Secretary-General’s report, the Consensus Paper additionally envisaged that sub-regional peace support operations also benefit from UN assessed contributions. The Secretary-General’s report does not close the door for such operations but requires that such operations are brought under AU decision-making and financial management frameworks.
The other area is the question of decision-making, oversight and command and control, which does not seem to be sufficiently reflected in the consensus paper. Previous negotiations on the matter highlighted the disagreement between AU and UN over who provides the strategic and political guidance to the AU-led PSOs that are primarily funded through UN assessed contributions. The view on the part of the AU is that its deployment of PSOs using UN assessed contributions should not be seen as just a sub-contracting by the UN of its peace operations responsibility to the AU. As such it expects to exercise a level of control over the PSOs it deploys under UNSC authorization and UN assessed contributions support. The Secretary-General’s paper provides a diagram of the decision-making process and acknowledges the authority of the AU. What the scope of this control by AU would be clear when negotiating the language in the draft resolution.
The other issue related to the strengthening of human rights compliance and financial transparency and accountability mechanisms. Both the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s repot provide updates on the progress made in this respect by the AU meeting the expectations set in the two UNSC 2016 and 2017 resolutions. It is expected that the PSC will welcome the Secretary-General’s report and call on the UNSC to heed the call of the Secretary-General and adopt the resolution on financing of AU-led PSOs through UN assessed contributions.
In terms of next steps, it would also be of interest for PSC on the process and arrangements that should be put in place for sustained consultation and close coordination. The various consultations would understandably need to be organized in a way that addresses the specific areas of concern of various role players. The PSC may in this respect welcome the roadmap that the A3 have prepared. It may also call for creating a dedicated standing coordination arrangement to ensure close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC, the A3, the AU Permanent Observer Mission to UN and the wider Africa Group in New York throughout the negotiation process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects AU’s position.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC is expected to reiterate the key aspects of the consensus paper, including AU’s understanding of the 25% commitment, the different financing options outlined; progress made in addressing some of the concerns raised in previous negotiation on the matter. PSC may welcome the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of UNSC resolutions 2320 and 2378 and may endorse the strong call of the Secretary-General for the UNSC to adopt a resolution on use of assessed contributions for AU-led peace support operations authorized by the UNSC. The PSC may also authorize the A3 to resuscitate the negotiations on the resolution on the basis of the Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s report, which was developed in close coordination with the AU Commission. For ensuring close & sustained consultation and ensure that the various AU actors speak with one voice, the PSC may call for the establishment of a standing consultation and coordination arrangement dedicated to this file and for the duration of the negotiations. At the level of the PSC, it may decide to have this agenda to be a regular item of the monthly program of work of the PSC every month until the conclusion of the negotiations on the draft resolution and establish a committee made up of three to five members involving Ghana as a state with membership in both the PSC and the UNSC. Considering that the negotiation over the resolution is also political as the Secretary-General’s report underscored and the strategic significance of this file, the PSC may call for the AU Commission and member states to be seized of, provide leadership and take active part throughout the negotiation process at the highest levels.
Seizing the New Momentum for UNSC Resolution on UN funding of AU Peace Operations
Amani Africa Publications
May 10, 2023
This special research report seeks to examine how the AU Consensus Paper and the Secretary-General’s report advance the consideration of the draft resolution in the UNSC, the issues that may still require further engagement and negotiated compromise, the next steps in the process for updating and presenting the draft resolution, and the role expected of various African policy actors for running smooth and effective show in the negotiation process.
Cash strapped African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) starts its second year facing uncertain financial future
Cash strapped African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) starts its second year facing uncertain financial future
Date | 4 April 2023
Bitania Tadesse
Program Director, Amani Africa
Zekarias Beshah
Training and Research Coordinator, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
This month marks exactly one year since the transition of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). On 8 March 2022, at its 1068th session, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), in one of the notable highlights of its work during 2022, ‘authorized’ ATMIS to take effect as of 1 April 2022. Unlike other peace support operations, ATMIS is authorised with a defined expiry date, hence expected to end by 31 December 2024 upon the full assumption of security responsibilities by the Somali Security Forces (SSF). The communiqué of 1068th session is one of, if not, the longest Communiqués of the PSC with 33 paragraphs, capturing various aspects of the reconfiguration and phased implementation of the mandate of ATMIS.
In the work of the PSC in 2022, ATMIS, along with the situation in Somalia, received a lion’s share of PSC’s agenda. Indeed, as Amani Africa’s review of the PSC for 2022 revealed, out of the 17 sessions dedicated to the East and Horn of Africa region, a region that received the largest percentage of PSC’s engagement both in sessions and field visits in 2022, the situation that received the most attention with seven sessions was Somalia/AMISOM/ATMIS. Much of PSC’s intense engagement on Somalia/ATMIS had to do with the transition of AMISOM to ATMIS and the reconfiguration and effective operationalization of a reconfigured ATMIS. Within this context, the most recurrent issue, both at the start of ATMIS and subsequently, is the funding of the mission.
Pursuant to the communiqué of the 1068th session of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2628, ATMIS military component maintains current AMISOM size of 18,586 troops during Phase I, and the first drawdown of 2000 troops was expected to take place at the end of this Phase slated for 31 December 2022. As indicated in Amani Africa’s March 2022 monthly digest, the phased drawdown of ATMIS forces, as outlined in the communiqué of the PSC’s 1068th session, would not be linear but contingent on developments on the ground including security and preparation of the SSF at the requisite number and capacity to take over responsibility. It thus came as no surprise that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) requested the postponement of the first drawdown scheduled for December 2022. The PSC in the 1121st session convened on 11 November 2022 expressed support for FGS’s request to extend the timeline for the drawdown of the 2000 troops from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023. Despite this change, the PSC affirmed the timelines for subsequent drawdowns and eventual exit of ATMIS on 31 December 2024.
During the one year period, ATMIS continues to make progress in the execution of its mandate working closely with FGS and the reconfiguration and incremental transfer of its responsibilities, although it suffers from lack of a Force Commander for unduly prolonged period of time. ATMIS played critical role in securing the presidential election and the peaceful transfer of power to the elected President in June 2022. While it is not taking a lead role in the new offensive launched against Al Shabaab apparently on account in part of the funding problem, ATMIS provides logistical support including air cover and medical evacuation for the local forces and SSF executing the offensive.
ATMIS also faced the worst that such a mission can experience. It sustained its first and one of the worst attacks that the AU Mission sustained in recent years, leading to the death of 30 Burundian soldiers when on 3 May Al Shabaab hit the ATMIS base in the village of El-Baraf, about 150 kilometres north of Mogadishu. As an attack that clearly highlights the heavy price that ATMIS personnel pay in the line of duty, the PSC underscored the need for enhancing ‘the capacity of ATMIS, including by availing the Mission with all necessary human, material, technical and financial resources, including force enablers and multipliers, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate.’
Even in the face of such fatal attacks, ATMIS started its journey and remains with a significant funding shortfall. The seriousness of this shortfall is of such a nature that one of the recurrent themes that featured throughout PSC’s sessions on ATMIS is the financing of ATMIS. Its 1075th session was particularly dedicated to the financing issue where PSC noted with ‘deep concern’ the commencement of the mission without the required resources. Despite the direct funding by the European Union (EU) (€120 million) and the United Kingdom (UK) (€29.6 million), the mission’s budget deficit for the year 2022 was around €25.8 million. This funding shortfall has increased further for 2023.
With the aim to address the budget shortfall, PSC sought different options in various of its sessions including an appeal to the UN Security Council to hold a special session on financing ATMIS and the SSF (1075th session); a call on EU and other partners to establish a financial support package (1075th session); and a request on AU Commission and UN, along with IGAD and partners, to jointly organize international pledging conference by March 2023 (1121st session). The PSC also stressed, in all its communiques adopted at the sessions on ATMIS, the need for accessing UN assessed contributions for sustainable and predictable funding necessary for the effective execution of the mandate of the mission.
While no breakthrough has emerged and many of these options such as the convening of pledging conference are as yet to be tried, the AU Commission along with FGS during the week of 20 March undertook a roadshow in an effort to inject urgency to mobilize funds to make up for the funding shortfall. This involved travels to and holding of convening with partners in New York and Washington DC for soliciting action to resolve the dire funding gap facing ATMIS. These took place during the week leading to the one year anniversary of ATMIS on 1 April. Talking to people who were in these meetings in New York, there was no indication of any new pledges. Those already contributing expressed frustration about lack of engagement of countries such as China and gulf countries for making contributions.
On its part while the AU is set to use the Conflict Reserve Fund (CRF) of the AU Peace Fund towards ATMIS as decided by the AU Assembly, the scale of the shortfall is such that during the PSC session held last month (March 2023), AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye indicated that the AU would be forced to bring forward the June 2023 timeline for the first drawdown of ATMIS. Noting that the mission is in a dire financial situation, Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Rosemary DiCarlo, warned the situation poses a significant risk to the security transition and could threaten hard-won gains. Although in the words of DiCarlo the common objective of realizing ATMIS mandate depends on predictable, sustainable and multi-year funding for ATMIS and adequate resourcing for the Somali security transition, ATMIS faces very uncertain financial future notwithstanding the heavy price its personnel pay in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is to be seen whether there will be successful follow up to the PSC’s reiteration, under its most recent communique of the 1143rd session, of its earlier calls for the convening of a special session by the UN Security Council and the convening of a pledging conference by the UN Secretary General and the AU Commission Chairperson.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 2022
MONTHLY DIGEST ON THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 2022
Date | September 2022
In September, Ghana was the monthly Chairperson of the Africa Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC). From the items making up the agenda of the Provisional Program of Work at the beginning of the month, the PSC did not consider one agenda item and another item that did not initially feature in the program of work was added during the month. In total, the PSC convened six sessions. Four of these sessions were committed to thematic agenda, while two addressed country/region specific issues.
Briefing on the AU Peace Fund
Briefing on the AU Peace Fund
Date | 16 September 2022
Tomorrow (16 September), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene a joint-meeting with the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Sub-Committee on Budget Matters along with the Board of Trustees of the AU Peace Fund, to discuss the status of the AU Peace Fund operationalisation.
Apart from the remarks of the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, the opening segment of the session is envisaged to feature remarks of the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund and the Chairperson of the AU Committee of (F15). The substantive session is envisaged to involve update on the status of the Peace Fund. In this respect, the Deputy Chairperson of the AUC, who is a member of the Executive Management Committee of the Peace Fund, will brief the session on the rational for the establishment and operationalizing a high-performing Fund in line with international best practice. This is followed by an update by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) on ‘Evolving consensus on financing AU Peace Support Operations and priority utilization of the Fund’.
The last time Council convened a session to discuss the AU Peace Fund was in October 2021, at its 1036th meeting. At that session, Council deliberated on the utilisation of the Peace Fund on priority areas including support to peace processes in specific conflict and crisis affected member states including Libya, Mali, Somalia and Sudan. Tomorrow’s briefing presents the opportunity for Council to receive updates and reflect on the latest developments regarding operationalisation of the Peace Fund. The session is unique in bringing together all the major stakeholders, thereby presenting an opportunity for achieving consensus on the full operationalization of the Fund including the proposed piloting of the utilization of a specified amount of the Fund.
The major developments since the last session of the PSC include the finalization of the identification of the priority areas for use of funds from the interest accrued to the current contributions to Peace Fund. It is to be recalled that the PSC discussed and agreed on the utilization of the AU Peace Fund through pilot projects from the accrued interest during its 13th retreat on its working methods in the context of AU Institutional Reforms (ref. PSC/Retreat.13 dated 27-29 May 2021) held in Mombasa Kenya.
The AU Commission engaged the Board of Trustees of the Peace Fund towards the pilot utilization of the Peace Fund in 2022 through costed and prioritized programmatic activities to address urgent peace and security challenges on the Continent. The representatives of the Executive Committee composed of the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioner for PAPS, in consultation with the AU High Representative on Financing of the AU and the Peace Fund, have identified priorities for utilisation of the Fund. Within this framework, 21 priority areas were identified.
The Board of Trustees approved for consideration and adoption by the relevant AU policy organs the use of $ 8.4 million from the interest accrued to the Peace Fund to implement pilot projects. During the 4th Mid-Year Coordination Meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia, the Executive Council approved an additional $5 million for the Crisis Reserve Fund (CRF). The revolving $5 million for the CRF proposed for the pilot phase is expected to be used for activities that do not exceed one year.
Through CRF the AUC envisages to support startup costs of missions authorized by relevant AU policy organs, emergency situations that exceed the capacity of member states, activities that can be undertaken in a short period and activities that can rapidly bring change in the peace and security situation. The CRF fund allows the PSC and the AUC to respond to emerging crises for which provision could not have been made in the annual regular budget for peace and security.
During the consideration of the report on the CRF in Lusaka, one of the issues raised centered around the extent to which the relevant bodies were consulted and whether due process has been followed as stipulated in the Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR). The concept of implementing a pilot project under the three windows of the Peace Fund has been largely welcomed but the Executive Council could not consider the proposed project for approval. Hence this Joint Briefing session is meant to provide firm clarity on compliance with the FRR and ensure that the relevant AU bodies achieve common understanding. It also serves to pave the way for proposed $8.4 million for the pilot projects that is yet to be approved by the PRC for adoption by AU policy organs.
In addition to reaching agreement on priority areas, the legal, operational and governance mechanisms relevant for the full functioning of the Fund have also been established. This includes finalisation of the process of drawing programmes and costing priority areas for utilisation; establishment and operationalisation of the Board of Trustees and the Executive Management Committee; adoption of modalities for the recruitment of Independent Evaluation Panel and Fund Managers; and commencement of processes for the establishment of the Peace Fund Secretariat. The PAPS Department has also prepared the Monitoring and Evaluation framework for the budget proposal for the pilot utilization of the Peace Fund.
On 30 June 2022, the Board of Trustees held a meeting to review the progress obtained in operationalising the Peace Fund. Key progresses noted at the meeting include the appointment of two external, independent Fund Managers – Old Mutual Investment Group from South Africa and Sanlam Investments East Africa from Kenya. Further to that, the Financial Rules for the Peace Fund have also been adopted as part of the AU’s financial rules and regulations in February 2022.
With respect to the status of contributions of member states to the Peace Fund, as of mid-August 2022, the amount from member states assessed contributions stands at $279,069,008.43. Together with voluntary contributions, interest earned on investment of Peace Fund assets and the transfer of the Legacy Peace Fund to the revitalized Peace Fund, the total amount of the Peace Fund stood at $321,504,709.15 as of mid-August 2022. According to the AU report presented to the 41st Ordinary Session held in Lusaka last July, twenty-two (22) AU member states paid their 2022 Peace Fund assessments in full while five (5) member states had made partial payments as at 30 June 2022. Twenty-eight (28) member states had not made any payment to their 2022 Peace Fund assessments. Apart from collection of assessed contribution of member states, there is also the ongoing process for achieving consensus on the contribution of six member states from the North region and the collection or clearing of arrears by defaulting member states.
On the process for achieving the modalities for contribution to the Peace Fund by the six countries, the Executive Council through its Decision (EX.CL/Dec.1162(XL) of February 2022 directed the Commission to work closely with the F15 and the Office of Legal Counsel to analyze proposals made by the Countries of the Northern Region regarding the assessment of member states to the Peace Fund and the implications thereof and recommend solutions in accordance with the legal frameworks of the African Union. While consultations have accordingly been carried out, breakthrough has as yet to emerge finding a proposal that is satisfactory to all while complying with the legal requirements. In terms of collection or clearing of arrears, the report of the Joint-Sitting of the Ministerial Committee on Scale of Assessment and Contributions and the Committee of Fifteen Ministers of Finance (F15) highlighted that Seychelles had fully implemented its payment plan and cleared all its arrears to the budget of the Union. Somalia and Burundi had not made payments in 2022 in line with their payment plan for clearing arrears. Also, Libya and Sudan have yet to conclude the consultations with the Commission to agree on their respective payment plans.
Such progress in the operationalization of the Peace Fund notwithstanding, also of significance for tomorrow’s session is the need for momentum for finalising the common African position on accessing UN assessed contributions for financing AU peace and security activities. It is to be recalled that after the stalling of the efforts of the African 3 non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 2018 and 2019 to get adoption of a resolution on UN assessed contributions for AU led or authorized peace support operations, the matter was referred back to the AU to provide guidance through a common position. In this regard, a notable progress attained in 2021 has been the development of a ‘Zero Draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities.’ At the 23rd and 24th PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) meetings, the Zero Draft was considered and the CoE gave inputs for further refinement of the draft. However, the updated draft is as yet to be presented and considered by the PSC before its submission to the AU Assembly for final approval. During tomorrow’s session, one of the issues on which Adeoye could provide update is where this process stands and the next steps for finalizing it and resuming the engagement with the UNSC on accessing assessed contributions.
At the time of going to production, while an outcome document is expected, the form that it will take was unknown. Council and the PRC Sub-Committee on Budget Matters are expected to welcome the commendable progress obtained in the operationalisation of the AU Peace Fund and the steps taken for the utilisation for pilot priority areas. The meeting is expected to endorse the $8.4 million and the additional $5 million of the CRF for adoption by the AU policy organs, so that the utilization of peace fund for the pilot priority projects would fully commence in 2023. The meeting may call on defaulting member states to pay their assessed contributions on time, including those member states expected to finalize the clearing of arrears. It may also urge concerned member states and the AU Commission to fortify efforts towards reaching consensus on contribution of the six countries from the North region to the Peace Fund. The meeting may welcome the progress made in developing the consensus position and encourage the speeding up of the remaining steps for resuming the engagement of the UNSC on accessing UN assessed contributions for AU led peace support operations.
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 41ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE 4TH AU MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING IN LUSAKA
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE 41ST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND THE 4TH AU MID-YEAR COORDINATION MEETING IN LUSAKA
Date | August 2022
INTRODUCTION
The 41st Ordinary Session of the Executive Council and the 4th AU Mid-year coordination meeting were held on 14-15 July and 17 July respectively in Lusaka, Zambia. The meetings were preceded by the 44th Ordinary of the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) held from 20 June to 8 July in Addis Ababa under the chairship of Senegal.
Briefing on financing for ATMIS
Amani Africa Publications
Date | 12 April 2022
Tomorrow (12 April) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1075th session to discuss the financing of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) which replaced AMISOM as of 1 April 2022.
Following the opening remark by Willy Nyamitwe, Permanent Representative of Burundi to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to provide update on the state of mobilization of funds for ATMIS. It is also anticipated that the representatives of the two partner organizations of the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) will also make intervention. Police and Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs) are also expected to participate in the meeting.
It is to be recalled that the AUPSC authorized this new mission at its 1068th meeting held on 8 March 2022 with a mandate to degrade Al-Shabaab; provide security to population centres and open the main supply routes; develop the capacity of the Somali Security Forces to enable them to take over security responsibilities by the end of the transition period in December 2024; support peace and reconciliation efforts of the Somali Federal Government; and help develop the capacity of the security, justice and local authority institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States. Subsequently, the UN Security Council also unanimously adopted resolution 2628 on 31 March 2022 endorsing the decision to reconfigure AMISOM into a new transition mission.
Despite the fact that ATMIS took over from AMISOM and its mandate commenced on 1 April 2022, its funding requirements remain unsettled. What further complicates the matter is that the troops are said to have not been paid for the month of March which underscores the urgency of addressing the financing issue. Troop Contributing Countries will likely raise this issue at the meeting.
The imperative of securing sustainable and predictable financing for the mission has been a perennial issue. It was also raised during the discussion and negotiation on ATMIS both in Addis Ababa and New York as a critical issue for the success of the mission. In its 8 March Communique, the AUPSC ‘reaffirm[ed] the critical importance of sustainable and predictable financing, at adequate levels and for the full duration of the mission from 1 April, 2022 up to 31 December, 2024.’ Accordingly, the AUPSC ‘appeal[ed] to the UN, European Union and other partners to establish a financial support package, including through UN assessed contributions, taking into consideration the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.’
Resolution 2628 also ‘underline[d] the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorised by the Security Council and under the Security Council’s authority consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter.’ This resolution of the UN Security Council ‘encourage[d] the Secretary-General, African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for ATMIS, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations, African Union, the European Union, and to other partners, and considering the limitations of voluntary funding, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for ATMIS’.
The UN is expected to continue providing logistical support package to the new mission. UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is mandated to provide logistics support to ATMIS uniformed and civilian personnel. This Support is provided through a combination of assessed budget and voluntary contributions from member states to the AMISOM Trust Fund. UK is said to have contributed recently some amount of money to the Trust Fund. UNSOS is also mandated to provide logistical support to the Somali Security Forces which is funded through voluntary contributions from member states to a Trust Fund managed by UNSOS. The Security Council has expressed its intentions to consider increasing the number of Somali security forces eligible for support through the UN Trust Fund and urged member states to continue contributing to the fund. But the use of UN assessed contributions to finance the mission, a longstanding request by the AU, is not being considered due to strong opposition by some permanent members of the Security Council. These members do not appear to be particularly keen to discuss the financing issue in a mission-specific context like ATMIS.
The EU has been a major financial partner of AMISOM and it is expected to continue financing ATMIS. However, the EU has not yet made any commitment to finance the expense of ATMIS in full. The EU was part of the consultations on the reconfiguration of AMISOM to ATMIS as part of the Quartet format (Somalia, AU, EU and the UN). Consultations between the AU and EU has continued. On 30 March 2022, a delegation from the EU held a meeting with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye. The meeting centered on the EU Peace Facility, with affirmation of EU’s continued support to AU’s peace support efforts in the spirit of the Joint AU-UN vision adopted at the February 2022 AU-EU summit. While the EU put forward a proposed budget towards funding ATMIS, this does not meet the full funding requirements of ATMIS. It is not clear whether EU’s proposed funding amount short of the funding requirements of ATMIS is a result of current pressure facing the EU on account of the war on Ukraine and the resultant unexpected resource mobilization for meeting resource needs relating to the crisis arising from the war.
There are understandable concerns about how realistic the objectives set out for ATMIS are in the light of the current political and security dynamics in Somalia. Particularly, there is recognition that the success of the mission hinges on the full and effective implementation of the Somali Transition Plan and the ability of the government to mobilize the necessary forces. Past experiences in the implementation of the plan are far from reassuring in this regard. The relation between the federal government and the regions continues to be complicated as the government seeks to centralize power. The political situation in the country remains tense due to the infighting between the President and the Prime Minister and the ongoing electoral process with reports of potential violence in the context of the plan for certification of Members of Parliament. These conditions of heightened demand for the role of ATMIS in this delicate context make the need for filling in the funding gaps for ATMIS even more pressing.
At the time of going to publication, it remains uncertain if this session would have an outcome document. The PSC is expected to commend the TCCs and PCCs of ATMIS for continuing to deliver their responsibilities, despite remaining challenges. In terms of addressing the funding gaps, there are four options. The first is to go back to the EU and negotiate on additional funding to meet the shortfall. It is not clear if there is room for further negotiation with the EU on this and as such it is an option with limited chance of success. The second option is the possibility of filling the funding gaps from AU member states funds. Here as well current economic situation of member states and the funding of the AU is such that there may not be room for this option unless special dispensation for utilization of unused funds from other areas of the AU is going to be secured. The third option is to make a case to the UNSC to authorize the use of assessed contribution for filling in the funding gap of ATMIS. This speaks to the terms of Resolution 2628 which endorsed the PSC decision on the deployment of ATMIS. But it is difficult to see whether agreement would be reached on availing this option within reasonable time to address current funding shortfall of ATMIS. The fourth and last resort option is the convening of a funding summit for ATMIS for raising fund from AU member states and partners.
PSC meeting on the AU Peace Fund and the financing of AU led peace support operations
Amani Africa Publications
Date | 05 October, 2021
Tomorrow (5 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1036th session to consider the strategic priorities for the utilisation of the AU Peace Fund and the consensus paper on financing of AU led peace support operations using UN assessed contributions.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the AU, Alfredo Nuvunga, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. The Chairperson of the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE) for the month of August 2021, Jean Djounkeng, is expected to present the outcome of the meetings of the CoE on both the strategic priorities for utilising the AU Peace Fund and the consensus paper on using UN assessed contributions to finance AU led peace support operations. The AU High Representative for the Peace Fund, Dr Donald Kaberuka may also address the PSC.
The AU Peace Fund was established to finance the organization’s peace and security activities, including in mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity and peace support operations. In 2016, the AU Assembly at its 27th Ordinary Session held in July 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda, decided to revitalize the Peace Fund. Accordingly in its decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) on the financing of the Union adopted member states agreed to endow the AU Peace Fund with $400m. Since 2017, fifty-four (54) AU Member States have contributed to the AU Peace Fund and a total of $217m has been collected. The $400 million amount that member states agreed to mobilize for the Peace Fund would cover the three windows covering various streams of activities a) preventive diplomacy, mediation activities (Window 1 of the Peace Fund), b) building of critical APSA capabilities (Window 2) and c) peace support operations (Window 3) as well as a crisis reserve facility (with an amount of no less than 50 million USD) for funding rapid response to emergency crisis.
As part of the effort for the full operationalize of the Fund, the AU has been working to put in place the necessary oversight and administrative structures. The Chairperson of the Commission appointed five African members of the Board of Trustees representing the five regions of the continent. Representatives of the UN and the EU also seat at the Board representing international partners. The AU has also been in the process of recruiting management and staff who will serve in the secretariat. The AU policy organs have decided that ‘the AU Peace Fund should not be utilised until all the governance and management structures are fully established.’
With specific reference to the utilization of the Fund, a High-Level Retreat on the operationalisation of the peace fund was also held with the participation of the AU PSC, the Bureau of the Permanent Representatives Committee, the Board of Trustees and Executive Management Committee of the AU Peace Fund, the Chair of the Sub-committee on General Supervision Budget and Administrative, the AU High Representative for Financing the Union and the Peace Fund, the Chairperson of the Committee of Fifteen Finance Ministers (F15) and the Chair of the Sub-Committee on Audit Matters. It is to be recalled that the PSC held the high-level retreat on 11 January 2020. The retreat agreed to implement, among others, the development of the Peace Fund Workflow processes and Strategic Priorities to be funded from the Peace Fund.
Subsequently, the AU PSC during its retreat in Mombasa in May 2021 considered the presentation of the AU Commission on the strategic priorities for the AU Peace Fund. As a follow up of the discussions in the Mombasa retreat and for presenting the specific proposals on priorities of the three windows of the AU Peace Fund, the Committee of Experts held its 23rd and 24th meetings on 9 and 23rd August 2021 respectively. The two meetings of the CoE focused on both the identification of the priorities for the three windows and the zero draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities. It is the outcome of these meetings that the Chairperson of the CoE for August is expected to present to the PSC.
With respect to the utilization of the Peace Fund, the CoE have agreed that it is only the interest accrued to the Peace Fund endowment that will be made available for supporting priorities in the three windows of the Fund. With respect to Window 1, the priority activities which have been identified for inclusion at the end of the meeting of CoE include peace mediation efforts in ongoing crisis namely the political impasse in Somalia, situation in Cabo Delgado, Sudan and South Sudan, the transitions in CAR, Chad, Libya, and Mali and deployment of special envoys. Instead of the proposed inclusion in Window 1 of the dialogue in Ethiopia and the GERD negotiations, the CoE proposed the inclusion of the reactivation of the Role of the AU Special Envoy for Western Sahara and his/her deployment pursuant to PSC Communique [PSC/AHG/COMM.2(CMLXXXIV)] adopted by the PSC’s summit level 984th session. For Window 2, the priorities identified include strengthening the capacity of the AU Liaison Offices, particularly in Early Warning, Mediation, and Preventive Diplomacy, training of mediation and dialogue experts and development of a roaster of mediation experts, strengthening of RECs/RMs capacities on AU Human Rights and IHL compliance standards, and operationalization of the PCRD Centre.
For Window 3, the proposed priority activities include deployment of Gender Experts and Child Protection Officers in AU Peace Support Operations; Supporting pre-deployment assessment missions and regular monitoring and evaluation of existing missions; Supporting strategic lift of troops, equipment and weapons to conflict/crisis zones; Fully operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF); and Strategic planning for Human Resources and Military Observers.
In spite of the progress made in revitalizing the AU Peace Fund, from the very beginning of the process as set out in the June 2015 decision of the AU Assembly, 75 % of peace and security activities will be supported through international financing its peace operations on the continent. This year, the African members of the Security Council have been trying to advance the issue in the context of the discussions and negotiations on the mandate renewal of AMISOM. However, their proposal was not incorporated into resolution 2568 (2021) that renewed the mandate of the mission. They have also been trying to advance discussions on the Secretary-General’s proposal for a UN support Office to the G-5 Sahel joint force but it was opposed by UK and the US which do not support using UN assessed contributions for such forces and instead favor bilateral arrangements to provide support.
This notwithstanding, efforts are underway to revive the broader discussion on the financing of AU-led peace support operations through UN assessed contribution. In July, the AU PAPS Commissioner, Ambassador Bankole Adeoye briefed the Council on the work that is being done by the Commission to elaborate a common African position on the matter. The AU PSC Committee of Experts have been working on the draft zero consensus paper and it is expected to be considered by the PSC during its meeting on Tuesday. In his latest annual report to the Security Council on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the UN Office to the African Union, the Secretary-General supported the efforts ‘to reinvigorate discussions between the two Councils on financing African Union peace support operations through United Nations assessed contributions’. He also noted that ‘the issue of a common African position on the funding of peace support operations is being considered by the African Union Peace and Security Council and the outcome of those discussions is awaited’.
The development of a common African position on the financing issue is indeed a step in the right direction. It is expected to facilitate a clear decision by the AU policy organs, which will then pave the way for the African members of the UNSC to resuscitate the discussion on the issue with a view to eventually securing a concrete commitment from the Security Council.
At the time of finalizing this ‘Insight’, the expected outcome of tomorrow’s session was unknown. PSC may commend the AU Commission and the CoE and with some amendments endorse the priority areas identified for the three windows of the Peace Fund. PSC may also welcome the “Zero Draft African Consensus on Accessing Sustainable and Predictable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities” and draw attention to the areas that will need further concretising. The PSC may also give guidance on the process for holding consultations with relevant stakeholders before finalizing the draft consensus position, including constructively engage with the UN Secretariat to reach agreement on the proposals identified in the draft.
Session on the Common African Position on the Financing of AU led Peace Support Operations through UN Assessed Contributions
Amani Africa Publications
Date | 21 July, 2021
Tomorrow (21 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold a session on the common African Position on the Financing of AU led peace support operations through UN assessed contributions. The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to brief the council on the progress and state of development of the common position.
The AU Assembly in its decision of its 14th extraordinary summit requested the PSC to articulate a common African position on financing peace support operations in Africa, to guide the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3) in championing and mobilizing support within the UNSC for adoption of a resolution that will enable Africa to access UN assessed contribution for peace support operations in the Continent.
It is also to be recalled that the PSC at its 881st session held in September 2019 took a view that ‘a better articulated and African owned common position’ before a draft resolution on financing of AU peace operations through UN assessed contributions is tabled for consideration by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This decision was taken against the background of issues that emerged as the A3 members of the UNSC were seeking during 2018 and 2019 to secure a UNSC resolution authorizing in principle under agreed upon conditions the use of UN assessed contributions for AU led UNSC authorized peace support operations on a case-by-case basis.
The A3 spearheaded by Ethiopia initiated a draft resolution on financing to be adopted in December 2018 under the Cote d’Ivoire Presidency of the Security Council. However, the US threatened to Veto the resolution. Following the introduction of a so- called compromise text proposed by France to accommodate the US, the vote on the A3 draft resolution was postponed (Please refer to the Amani insight on this issue). South Africa, who initially brought the issue of financing to the Security Council in its previous membership, made the issue one of the priorities of its tenure during 2019-2020. After holding consultations on the matter including a visit by the Permanent Representatives of the A3 to Washington, D.C. to engage with the United States, including the Congress, White House and the Department of State, South Africa introduced a new and slightly updated text from the initial A3 draft and the so-called compromise draft.
When the PSC finally reviewed the matter, it felt that the latest updated draft did not adequately reflect AU interests. The PSC opted for deferring the consideration of the draft text by the UNSC pending the holding of adequate consultation at the level of the AU leading towards a common position. This aims at providing greater clarity on various issues, including on the implementation of the 75/25 formula and on the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and its role for burden sharing. The common African position elaborated by the Commission is expected to explain some of these issues in order to ensure greater understanding and consensus within the AU and help the discussion in the UNSC move forward.
During tomorrow’s session Commissioner for PAPS, Adeoye, who revived the process for the adoption of the common position, is expected to provide update to the PSC on steps taken towards the elaboration of the common position and the orientation of the common position that will be the basis for resuscitating the discussion on A3 sponsored resolution on financing AU peace operation through UN assessed contributions. The common position is expected to take stock of and build on the various efforts undertaken both at the level of the UN and the AU.
It is worth noting that the issue of predictable and reliable financing has been one of the longstanding subjects in the AU-UN relationships on peace and security in Africa. In 2008, the UN Panel led by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi on the subject recommended in its report the use of United Nations-assessed funding to support United Nations- authorized African Union peacekeeping operations for a period of no longer than six months. This was further reinforced by the UN’s 2015 High Level International Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) Report, which recommended the use of United Nations-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the AU and/or African Member States.
On the part of the AU, the Policy Organs had adopted milestone decisions in 2015 and 2016 on financing of the AU and the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund. Accordingly, the A3 were called upon to champion the financing of AU led peace support operations. This paved the way for the adoption of resolution 2320 (2016), facilitated by Senegal, which stressed ‘the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.’ The subsequent resolution 2378 (2017), whose adoption was facilitated by Ethiopia, expressed the UNSC’s intention to consider partially funding AU-led peace support operations authorized by the Council through UN-assessed contributions ‘on a case-by-case basis.’
One of the factors for the delay in adopting the common position related to the factors that impeded progress in the UNSC. In 2018, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia proposed a joint draft resolution which tried to secure a clear commitment from the Council to decide in principle to finance AU led peace support operations. The draft text had received wider support within the UNSC and the broader UN membership. However, the US under Trump administration was not willing and ready to accommodate the AU request and, in fact, threatened to exercise its veto power if the African members decide to go ahead and table the draft text for a vote.
With the Biden administration in the US and its renewed multilateral engagement, there appears to be a new window of opportunity to revive the financing issue. Both Chairperson Moussa Faki and UNSG Antonio Guterres are also expected to exert reinvigorated efforts to enhance the AU-UN partnership in their new mandate by, among others, ensuring progress on the financing issue. This will certainly unleash the potential of the partnership across the whole spectrum of peace operations. Furthermore, the EU leadership seems to be much more committed and determined to enhance its partnership with the AU and may likely pull its weight behind the AU if there is readiness to resuscitate the discussion on this issue.
This said, however, it should also be understood that the discussion on this issue would not be easy. COVID-19 has had its own impact on the discussion on peacekeeping. Increasing financial pressures, among other reasons, is forcing the UN to downsize and/or draw down peacekeeping missions in recent years. Some experts are anticipating that the tendency in the future could possibly be to prioritise affordable alternatives, such as observer missions and civilian special political missions.
Even though the Biden administration could be favorably disposed to the discussion on the issue, there is a need for serious discussion to reach a shared understanding on the way forward. This necessitates engaging the Biden administration in earnest, including the state department, National Security Council and the department of defense. It is also important for the AU to engage Congress and canvass the necessary support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations building on willingness of some congressmen to support the idea of financing AU led peace support operation as part of enhancing the role of the US.
The development of a common African position is indeed a step in the right direction and it is expected to facilitate a clear decision by AU, which will then pave the way for the A3 to resuscitate the file and try to secure a concrete commitment on the issue from the UNSC. The process will definitely take time and the necessary preparatory work for laying the ground work needs to be developed. The AU Commission and the UN Secretariat need to follow up on the implementation of their Joint Declaration of 6 December 2018, and work towards making tangible progress on some of the agreed issues as they relate to the financing issue, including the full operationalisation of the peace fund, reporting, oversight and accountability.
Most importantly, there is need to learn the right lessons from the experiences of 2018 and 2019. Ensuring greater clarity on the implementation of the AU Peace fund and demonstrating concrete commitment in sharing the burden would be vital. The full operationalization of the African Standby Force would go a long way in demonstrating AU’s commitment to shoulder responsibility on matters of peace and security in Africa. It would be absolutely important that the AU common position is accompanied by a solid roadmap with clear time lines for holding consultations and mobilizing support from all the relevant interlocutors on this file while ensuring close coordination of the AU Commission, the PSC and the A3 throughout the process for having a UNSC resolution that adequately reflects the common position.
While no formal outcome is expected from tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC is expected to provide input both on what is expected to be contained in the common position and the timeline for finalising the drafting for fulfilling the request of the AU Assembly, particularly the decision of its 14th extraordinary session held on 6 December 2020.