Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1100^th session to discuss “sanctions and enforcement capacities: deterrence against unconstitutional changes of government (UCG)”.

Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to deliver statements while presentations will be made by representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS).

The recent resurgence in UCG in the continent, noted particularly over the course of 2021, has brought the issue to the fore of policy discourse continentally in the AU and various state and non-state actors and regionally at RECs/RMs. Regionally, the policy debate has been dominant in West Africa, within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As highlighted in Amani Africa’s Policy Brief, the fact that sanctions imposed on Mali did not deter subsequent coups in four other cases has brought into sharp focus the efficacy of the responses of the AU and RECs/RMs.

While some of the recent conversations on UCG in the continent have focused on the critical importance of comprehensively addressing governance deficits, human rights violations and other governance related underlying root causes which create the fertile ground for coups, the debate within the AU and among the wider policy stakeholders illustrated that not any less important is the issue of ensuring enforceability and impactfulness of sanctions imposed once UCG takes place in a given member State. Beyond the emergence of divergent perspectives in the PSC about whether and when to apply the enforcement measures of suspension and sanctions, the importance of this issue also came out during the March 2022 Accra Forum that the PSC convened in Ghana. In addition to reflecting on the challenges faced so far in applying the enforcement measures (of suspension from AU and/or regional bodies), tomorrow’s session may also serve as an opportunity for building on and articulating modalities for effective operationalization of commitments made under the Accra Declaration with respect to enforcing UCG sanctions.

When addressing the issue of enforceability of sanctions against UCG, one of the first considerations that will require close examination is the existence of a comprehensive framework which establishes clear designation criteria, thresholds and categories for imposition of sanctions as well as conditions that need to be met for lifting them. It is true that the AU Constitutive Act, the Lome Declaration of 2000, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of 2007, the PSC Protocol and the practice of the PSC in enforcing the AU norms on UCG show that there is adequate clarity about the automaticity of suspension from the AU in cases of UCG, most notably coups. The PSC for example invoked Article 7(1)(g) to suspend AU member states for 19 times. Only in two instance that the PSC withheld the automatic application of suspension (November 2014 on Burkina Faso & April 2019 on Sudan), underscoring that automatic suspension from participating in the AU upon the occurrence of UCG in a member state is the norm.

It is worth noting that this clarity and largely consistent application has significantly contributed to the decline of coups until their unprecedented upsurge in 2021. As established in our policy brief of May 2022 published ahead of the Malabo Summit, ‘until 2021, the trends in the occurrence of coups in Africa is largely characterized by decline, despite its sporadic occurrence in a range of one to two coups per year (in the years when it occurred).’ Prior to 2021 the maximum that Africa experienced a coup since 2000 was in 2003. Since then, there were a few years (2005, 2008 and 2012) when a maximum of two coups occurred, with several years passing without coups.

However, with the unprecedented number of coups in 2021/22, signs of doubt on upholding this established norm and practice on applying suspension has been observed on the part of policy makers (including some PSC members). It is however critical to resist any temptation to blame the lack of effectiveness during 2021/22 on the norm that may lead to the revision or the scraping of the normative automaticity of suspension and the dominant practice of applying it (throwing the baby with the bath water). Instead, attention should focus on whether there is weakening of the strong political commitment & wider public support for the AU norm of zero tolerance against coups. Indeed, although the lack of regard by coup perpetrators is mostly a product of national political power dynamics, this weakening of both political commitment in AU & wider public support for zero tolerance would not be without its contribution. Tomorrow’s session affords the PSC an opportunity for finding ways of strengthening strong political commitment within the AU (both on the part of member states and AU Commission) for upholding the principle of zero tolerance for coups irrespective of their origins.

Equally significant in restoring confidence in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and hence the automatic suspension of States upon occurrence of coups is to ensure that the enforcement of suspension for coups is backed by strong consensus within the AU and at the level of RECs/RMs with formidable backing from AU’s partners. The weaker the consensus among AU member states and between the AU and RECs and the divided the backing of the UN, EU and major powers, the less effective will suspension by AU & RECs/RMs against coups would be.

When it comes to enforcement measures other than suspension (namely diplomatic, territorial and economic sanctions), the major gap (other than the fact that the AU lacks the economic tools (such as those at the disposal of the EU) or (economic & military tools, at the disposal of the UN Security Council) both at the AU and RECs/RMs levels is the absence of a common framework on what kind of sanctions to be applied, under what circumstances, the mechanism for monitoring and the criteria for the lifting of such sanctions. On account of this, participants of the Accra Forum have undertaken to ensure the development of a ‘comprehensive framework establishing different categories of sanctions that may be gradually applied, upon the approval of the relevant AU policy organs, in accordance with the gravity of the violation or threat to the constitutional order.’ It is critical that the PSC uses tomorrow’s session for initiating a process for developing a framework for sanctions, which could also potentially serve as basis for reforming the UN’s sanctions regime, which has increasingly become under scrutiny.

Another important point that must form part of the discourse on imposition and enforcement of sanctions is ensuring protection of the rights and welfare of ordinary citizens of the concerned member State. Imposition of blanket economic and financial sanctions on member States or the closure of borders have had disastrous impacts on populations as multiple examples across the world stand to demonstrate. Mali’s recent experience has particularly invoked much concern and is among the factors that have informed the need to convene tomorrow’s session on sanctions. It is to be recalled that following the inability of Mali’s transition authorities to conduct elections by the timeline stipulated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc imposed sanctions against Mali at its Extraordinary Summit of 09 January 2022. At its 1057^th session, the PSC also endorsed ECOWAS’s decision, albeit reluctantly and with a proviso on the need for ensuring that it does not affect the general public. The sanctions which carried measures such as closure of borders, suspension of economic and financial transactions and suspension of financial assistance, affected the country’s economy which has already been battered by insecurity and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the sanctions were felt more among ordinary citizens. The resultant public anger against the sanctions and ECOWAS contributed to the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions.

One key lesson to draw from Mali’s experience is therefore the importance of making sanctions as specifically targeted as possible. In order to make sanctions impactful and avert negative implications on wider populations, they need to as much as possible be targeted against specific individuals and entities. So far, the PSC has dealt with UCG in various member States 23 times. Out of these, the Council imposed targeted sanctions only four times – at its 168^th, 204^th, 363^rd and 551^st sessions – while it merely resorted to suspension in all other cases. Equally important is the need for building into sanctions, well-crafted carve-out clauses that ensure that lifesaving activities such as provision of humanitarian assistance or access to life supporting supplies are not impeded.

Another critical area that has contributed to the lack of effectiveness of enforcement measures against UCG is the lack of consistent application. At one level this has to do with inconsistency in how the AU applied, for example, suspension. The seizure of power by the military in Chad by suspending the constitutional process is case in point. The failure of the PSC to apply the same measures it applied on Mali has led to legitimate charges of selective application and double standard of the norms. At another level, there is also the fact that the AU is more disposed to take measures against coups than other forms of unconstitutional changes of government outlined in the Lome Declaration of 2000 & ACDEG. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that the AU develops a predictable process for taking measures against extension of term limits within the framework of Article 23(5) of ACDEG.

The role of various complementary measures is another essential consideration that should be taken into account while imposing sanctions. If the ultimate objective of restoring constitutional order is to be realised, enforcement measures (whether suspension and/or sanctions) need to be combined with parallel, complementary measures such as diplomatic engagement with the concerned member State and support to national dialogue. The need for diplomatic engagements with transition authorities should not however be regarded as a factor for dispensing with more serious measures such as suspensions. In this regard, the Lome Declaration of 2000 clearly requires that such diplomatic engagements are undertaken parallel to the suspension of the country concerned following UCG.

The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council may reaffirm the conclusions of the Accra Forum on strengthening the efficacy of enforcement measures and request that the measures outlined in this regard in the Accra Declaration are followed up and reports are submitted to the PSC within specified timelines. It may underscore the need for restoring the political commitment of the AU and other stakeholders in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and the automatic application of suspension upon the occurrence of UCG such as coups as a matter of principle. The PSC may also underscore the need for building strong consensus within the AU and among other stakeholders with the relevant leverage when considering and adopting enforcement measures. It may call on the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to work towards the development of a comprehensive sanctions framework which illustrates relevant criteria and benchmarks for imposition, monitoring and lifting of sanctions. It may also urge the immediate activation of its Sanctions Committee which, supported by an expert body, could play an instrumental role in monitoring implementation of sanctions imposed by the Council and in assessing fulfilment of conditions for their lifting thereof. It may also reiterate the sentiment of the Accra Declaration on ensuring that sanctions do not harm the ordinary citizens of a non-complying member State. It may further highlight the importance of having clarity on the goals intended with sanctions so that they do not aggravate political disputes and the need to closely examine the humanitarian and human rights consequences of sanctions, particularly on countries experiencing overlapping governance, security and humanitarian crises.

Tomorrow (18 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on civil-military relation as a factor for peace and security in Africa, as one of the agenda items of its 1085^th session. The briefing takes place ahead of the Extraordinary Summit on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) scheduled to take place on 28 May, presenting the opportunity for Council to contribute to policy proposals to be presented at the Summit.

Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives from respective Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) may also take part in the discussions.

While the PSC is convening a session dedicated to the specific issue of civil-military relations for the first time, many of its previous sessions addressing UCG in concerned member States have been instrumental in highlighting the importance of clear separation of powers, roles and functions between the military and civilian leadership. For instance, at its 996^th session addressing the situation in Chad which ensued following the death of President Idriss Deby Itno and subsequent power grab by the military, Council emphasised the imperative of clear separation of roles between the State’s military body and the transitional government, with the former focusing on ensuring the country’s defence and security, while the later concentrates on political and other public policy issues.

Moreover, at its other sessions on UCG such as the 1000^th session convened following the 24 May 2021 coup in Mali and the 1030^th session addressing the 5 September 2021 coup in Guinea, Council has urged the militaries of each of these concerned member States to refrain from interfering in political processes, clarifying that political affairs fall outside of the scope of military powers. Council’s request at its 1041^st session for the Sudanese military to respect their constitutional mandate following the military takeover of power on 25 October 2021, as well as the requests at its 1016^th session on the situation in Chad and 1064^th session on the situation in Guinea for the members of the militaries of these member States to abstain from taking part in elections at the end of the transition periods have also been essential in defining the nature of and limits to military power.

Despite these important remarks which have been critical in highlighting the limits and boundaries to the powers exercised by the military and in underlining the separate roles and responsibilities of civilian and military organs of government, the nature of civil-military relations in African member States, which is at the core of problems leading to UCG and other political instabilities, hasn’t received the needed attention from the PSC or concerned RECs/RMs. Tomorrow’s session therefore presents the opportunity for Council to discuss this crucial issue and reflect on how it has contributed to the spike in UCG witnessed in the continent throughout 2021 and well into 2022, as well as its implication to broader governance challenges in the continent.

One of the features of civil-military relations in Africa which may draw the Council’s interest is the prevalent politicisation of the military. Such politicization entrenches the army deep into politics, thereby depriving it of its independence from and impartiality to political power struggles. This also creates the interests of members of the army in being involved in politics as a means of advancing particular political ambitions. Similarly, the engagement of the army in economic activities also leads to its embeddedness in pursuing economic gains.

The first source of challenge to civil-military relationship is the heavy reliance of the civilian political leaders on coercion and the use of security institutions including the army for purposes of deepening their grip on power. Not only do such practices blur the lines of military mandates and lay a fertile ground for oppression of citizens and violation of basic human rights and freedoms, they also can lead to the fragmentation of the army by giving rise to different factions. To ensure therefore that civil-military relations are not guided by political interests, it is imperative that civilian oversight on the military is subject to and is conducted in strict compliance with constitutionally established rules that ensure full guarantee both the constitutionality of the orders that the army is expected to follow from civilian leadership and maintain its integrity and impartiality. As important is the adoption of minimum legal standards properly outlining the type and scope of law enforcement activities which fall within the mandates of the military and identifying the circumstances upon which armies may be deployed for managing internal security challenges.

Another key issue for properly functioning civil-military relations in the continent include the weakness of civilian institutions and the lack of democratic governance and constitutional rule, which result in the absence of efficient mechanisms for transparency and accountability, making it impossible to create a functional structure for civilian oversight.

In some cases, as demonstrated in the recent coups in Mali and Chad, there is also the issue of the loss of confidence of their militaries in civilian leaders when they fail to provide them with the necessary material and morale support, which in the context of heavy casualties suffered by members of the army due to terrorist attacks leads to deepening frustrations and resentment against the civilian leadership. This can easily boil over when the civilian leadership is also perceived to be engaging in or tolerating corruption that divert resources away from supporting the work of the army. For example, in the case of Burkina Faso, the lack of effective leadership by the democratically elected leaders in addressing terrorism, insurgency and instability that has gripped the country and reports of corruption were presented as justification for the military’s intervention through overthrowing the elected civilian leaders.

Management of security sector reform (SSR) processes in member States undergoing transitions in a manner that permits genuine and effective reflection on security governance and challenges is also an essential part of averting potential relapse as experienced in member States such as Mali and Sudan. While the speedy restoration of constitutional order in member States undergoing transitions is well within the spirit of AU norms banning UCG, restoration of constitutional order without the necessary SSR that tackles the security sector governance issues that precipitated the coup would lead to a repeat of the coup, as the experience in Mali after the 2012 coup aptly illustrates. The importance therefore of implementing and making use of the AU SSR Policy as critical instrument for achieving constitutionally sound civil-military relationship cannot be overemphasised.

The management of civil-military relations is of importance not only in the context of UCG and to member States in transition, but also with respect to broader governance issues. The implementation of codes of conduct that are in line with the constitutional obligations and the international human rights and international humanitarian law standards is key. Also of significance is the need for regularly updating the professional standards, the provision of the requisite supplies and benefits and the technical competence of the military is critical. It is therefore critical to consider crisis in civil-military relations as part of AU’s framework for early warning and conflict prevention.

The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. Drawing from the deliberations on civil-military relation as a core factor contributing to the occurrence of coups in the continent, Council may emphasise the intricate link between democratic deficit, State fragility and instability. Council may also call for the updating by member States of existing military codes of conducts to make them up to date and compliant with standards of impartiality and independence from politics, and basic human rights and international humanitarian law standards. It may also highlight the importance of reviewing existing AU norms banning UCG with a view to address conditions that provide the pretext for military intervention in politics, including the politicisation of militaries and security forces. The PSC may call for the use of the AU SSR Policy formwork in countries that experienced military coups as a basis for ensuring successful SSR to prevent recurrence of coups. Council may also seek advice from the Military Staff Committee (MSC) on how AU norms and policy instruments can be utilised to provide guidance in addressing issues relating to civil-military relations in the continent.

Tomorrow (27 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1061st meeting. The open session will take place under the theme ‘Promoting Constitutionalism, Democracy and Inclusive Governance as a Means of Strengthening Peace, Security and Stability in Africa’.

Following opening remarks by Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Emma Birikorang Deputy Director of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) and Paul Simon, the East Africa Regional Representative and Representative to AU of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also expected to deliver presentations. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as members of the international community represented in Addis Ababa are also expected to participate in the session.

Tomorrow’s session comes against the backdrop of the resurgence in unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and related challenging political transitions witnessed in the continent throughout 2021. During the year, the continent has seen the occurrence of four successful coups (in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan). As 2022 commences, another coup has taken place in Burkina Faso following the detention of President Kabore by mutinous soldiers. In light of this concerning trend, the upsurge in UCG formed part of the key issues addressed at the Eight High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa convened from 2 to 4 December 2021 in Oran, Algeria. As a key recommendation, participants of the seminar proposed the review of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as well as the 2000 Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government, in order to ensure that these frameworks are more suitable to the contemporary peace and security landscape of the continent. The sessions is expected to reflect on the concerning resurgence in UCG and its implication on constitutionalism and democracy as well as its impact on peace and security in Africa.

The AU already has developed various norms promoting democracy and constitutionalism and banning UCG in the form of key instruments including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol, the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the Ezulwini Framework, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter). There is however lack of consolidated approach in the implementation of these instruments. Further to condemning UCG and imposing applicable sanctions whenever they take place, it is important to ensure that the underlying root causes which lay a fertile ground for the occurrence of coups are also addressed. As observed in various previous cases, some of the key underlying causes of UCG in Africa relate to democratic deficits, mainly the extension of term limit through contested constitutional amendments and the absence of transparency and credibility in the conduct of elections. The importance of adhering to basic democratic principles as a way of averting the risk of UCG is also clearly captured in the 2000 Lomé Declaration. One of the points worth reflecting at tomorrow’s session is therefore the importance of adopting a consolidated approach in implementing AU norms on democracy and constitutionalism in order to prevent the very occurrence of UCG by addressing the root cause as well.

Over the years, the PSC has convened various sessions dedicated to the theme of UCG and popular uprising which are essential in informing tomorrow’s session. The latest of these sessions was the 871st session convened on 22 August 2019, where the PSC noted governance issues as one of the underlying root causes of conflicts and crises in Africa. Studies also indicate that coups experienced in Africa between 1960 and 2000 have had devastating impact on the continent’s stability. Another important PSC session on the topic was the 432nd session convened on 29 April 2014 which served to adopt some key decisions including the establishment of a sub-committee which could undertake an in-depth review of AU’s relevant normative frameworks to develop a consolidated approach in responding to UCG and popular uprising in Africa. Tomorrow’s session may serve to follow up on the progress in the establishment of this sub-committee.

In addition to ensuring coherence in the implementation of AU norms on democracy and constitutionalism, it is also important to address how the AU should approach cases of popular uprising. The AU is yet to develop a norm on popular uprising and elaborate its correlation with UCG. It is noteworthy that while condemning violent uprisings, the PSC has at various occasions affirmed the legitimacy of peaceful popular uprisings. For instance, at its 432nd session the council underscored some of the circumstances which would justify popular uprising, underscoring the oppressive nature of regimes; systematic abuse of human rights; and failure of governments to fulfil their responsibilities as the conditions which could trigger “the right of the people to peacefully express their will against oppressive systems”. In responding to the military takeover of power in Sudan in 2019 at its 840th session, the PSC also made a clear distinction between its condemnation of the military’s power grab and its recognition of the aspiration of the Sudanese people “to the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically design and choose institutions that are representative and respectful of freedoms and human rights”.

Another critical issue which warrants the Council’s attention is the growing concern over security challenges, particularly terrorist insurgency and the lack of effective government response which has in multiple cases served as the central justification given by militaries for staging coups. Notwithstanding the manipulation of such justification as a means of legitimising suspension of constitutions, there is indeed a growing frustration over the lack or inadequate government response to security challenges. In addition to its immediate security related impact therefore, the absence of an effective government response to security threats endangers not only the stability of a country but also democratic rule. Hence, as the rate and complexity of security threats in the continent increase, governments role remains important in the way it handles and responds to such threats.

Incorporating indicators related to human rights and governance within AU’s continental early warning system could also be an important aspect which the Council may consider. Closely monitoring situations in individual member States which are at risk of experiencing disruptions to constitutional rule could play a crucial role in averting UCG by setting the stage for the deployment of AU’s preventive diplomacy. Lack of inclusive governance, political confrontations, highly contested elections, constitutional amendments to extend presidential term limits, and grave violations of human rights and democratic principles are some of the major warning signs of disruption to democratic rule as well as peace and security in Africa.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The Council may condemn all acts which endanger constitutionalism and democracy and threaten the continent’s peace and security. It may express concern over the increasing trend of UCG in Africa and it may underline the importance of enforcing and advancing the relevant AU norms to curb this trend. In this respect, it may urge all AU member States to sign, ratify and implement relevant AU norms on human rights and democracy. It may also follow up on the implementation of its previous decisions on the theme, particularly the request made at its 432nd session for the AU Commission to finalise the draft AU framework on responses to popular uprisings and to submit the draft for Council’s consideration. Council may also request the AU Commission to propose modalities for the review of AGA and the Lomé Declaration as well as other relevant AU instruments including the Banjul Charter.