Tomorrow (18 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1265^th session to discuss the situation in South Sudan.

The Permanent Representative of Morocco to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for March, Mohammed Arrouchi, will deliver the opening remarks, followed by an introductory report from the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson to South Sudan is also expected to brief the Council. As per the applicable practice and established procedure, a representative of South Sudan is expected to make a statement as a country concerned. A representative of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Mission in South Sudan may also deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session came amidst heightened tensions between longtime rivals President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar, following the 4 March incident when the White Army, Nuer militia linked with Riek Machar, overran a South Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) base in Nasir, Upper Nile State—a strategic town on the South Sudan-Ethiopia border. The violence was triggered reportedly due to disagreements over the replacement of the existing SSPDF in Nasir stationed for close to eight years with a combined force of SSPDF, Agwelek, and Abushok militias.

Tensions had been building since January and February, not only in Upper Nile State but also in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. On 27 February, it appears that Machar requested a face-to-face meeting with President Kiir to address deteriorating security situations in these regions. Machar cited attacks by SSPDF forces on areas controlled by SPLM-IO in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal and accused SSPDF and allied militias of violating the Permanent Ceasefire Agreement by deploying forces to Nasir, including the Agwelek and Abushok militias. This deployment was seen as a violation of the 2018 revitalised peace agreement, which envisages the deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces.

In response to escalating tensions, on 27 February, the African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) expressed deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in Upper Nile State, as well as clashes in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal involving signatory parties to the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The statement warned that failure to address these incidents could undermine the Permanent Ceasefire, urging all parties to utilise established mechanisms under the R-ARCSS to de-escalate tensions and restore calm.

This call went unheeded, and tensions escalated into violence in Nasir on 4 March, followed by the arrest of several senior SPLM/A-IO military and government officials, including a deputy military chief and two ministers allied with Machar in the capital, Juba. The situation worsened on 7 March when an attack on a UNMISS operation to evacuate stranded SSPDF personnel resulted in tragic casualties, including the late General Majur Dak, several soldiers, and a UN crew member.

Despite President Kiir’s assurance on 7 March that South Sudan would not revert to war, tensions remain high in Juba and elsewhere, prompting widespread concerns about the potential collapse of the 2018 Revitalised Peace Agreement, which ended a five-year civil war claiming nearly 400,000 lives. In his briefing to IGAD’s 43rd extraordinary summit, Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu warned that ‘the Nasir clashes are the latest episode in a series of incidents and cyclic violence pushing South Sudan ever closer to the brink of war.’ Indicating the gravity of the situation, reports suggest that Uganda has deployed special forces to Juba despite denials by South Sudan’s government.

Against these developments, regional and international organisations reacted. On 8 March 2025, the Chairperson of the AU Commission issued a statement expressing deep concern over the escalating tensions and clashes, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirming the AU’s longstanding appeal for South Sudanese parties to fully implement the revitalised peace agreement. IGAD also convened its 43rd extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan, held on 12 March 2025. In the communiqué adopted at the summit, IGAD urged the parties to immediately de-escalate tensions, demanded the release of detained officials, instructed the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms (CTSAMVM) to investigate the Nasir clashes and the attack on the UN helicopter to establish facts and ensure accountability, and called for the reactivation of various security mechanisms impacted by the arrests. The regional bloc further agreed to form an IGAD Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan to engage and monitor the restoration of calm and the implementation of the revitalised peace agreement. The Sub-committee was tasked with travelling to Juba immediately to assess modalities for initiating inclusive dialogue.

The renewed tensions are unsurprising given the lack of meaningful progress in implementing key provisions of the revitalised peace agreement, including drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). In September 2024, the parties to the peace agreement extended the transitional period by another two years, pushing the long-awaited first elections to December 2026 without a clear plan for implementing the new transitional roadmap within the agreed timeline.

Delays in deploying the NUF, a critical component of the agreement under chapter two essential for the country’s peace and stability, have become a major obstacle to its full implementation. Reports indicate that since the graduation of 53,000 unified forces in phase one, only seven per cent of the required 83,000 have been deployed, while the long-overdue training for phase two has yet to commence due to a lack of funding. The government’s failure to allocate the necessary resources for training has been a key factor in these delays. Moving forward, prioritising phase two training and ensuring the full deployment of the unified forces at their required strength of 83,000 remains critical to enhancing security, addressing rising subnational violence, and preventing incidents like the clashes on 4 March.

As the IGAD Executive Secretary noted in his briefing to the extraordinary summit, mechanisms established to oversee security arrangements, such as the Joint Defence Board (JDB), have fallen into disuse, while mutual confidence within the Presidency, as established by the agreement, has been gravely undermined. The JDB, composed of chiefs of staff, directors general of the national security service, police, and other organised forces, is mandated to exercise command and control over all forces under the revitalised peace agreement. However, its failure to convene regular meetings and prevent escalating tensions has further weakened security arrangements. Ensuring the full functionality of the JDB is now more urgent than ever.

The spillover of Sudan’s conflict may be another factor behind the renewed tensions in South Sudan. According to a recent report on the fighting in South Sudan, one major impact is South Sudan’s economic crisis, triggered by damage to its main oil export pipeline near Khartoum amid fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This disruption has cost South Sudan two-thirds of its revenue and fueled widespread discontent. As Sudan’s conflict drags on, South Sudan appears to be struggling to maintain neutrality between the two warring parties, SAF and RSF. Reports indicate that economic pressures have drawn President Kiir closer to the RSF and its alleged backer, the UAE, a shift further intensified by the RSF’s alliance with the SPLM-North, a Sudanese rebel group aligned with Juba. What makes the suspicion about Port Sudan’s possible hand is the interest of the SAF in using its allies in South Sudan to squeeze RSF out of the areas on the border with South Sudan.

The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to welcome the convening of IGAD’s 43rd Extraordinary Summit and endorse its outcomes, particularly the decision to establish an IGAD Ministerial-level sub-committee on South Sudan. It may call on the AU Commission to coordinate with this committee to facilitate dialogue and ensure the full implementation of the revitalised peace agreement to prevent further violence and the risk of renewed conflict. Expressing deep concern over the recent violence in Nasir County, Upper Nile State, the PSC may stress the need for de-escalation and urge parties to uphold the peace agreement. In line with IGAD’s summit conclusions, it may call for the immediate release of detained officials as a critical de-escalation measure. The PSC may also condemn the attack on the UN aircraft and the death of UN personnel, which could constitute a war crime. In this regard, it may support IGAD’s decision to conduct an investigation, through CTSAMVM, into the Nasir clashes and support the UN’s initiatives to investigate the UN helicopter attack to ensure accountability. The PSC may further urge the parties to expedite the implementation of key provisions of the revitalised agreement, including drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections, and deploying the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF). It may also call for strengthening oversight mechanisms such as the Joint Defence Board. The PSC may call on the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) to dispatch to South Sudan a high-level mission as a critical step to de-escalate the situation and prevent both the relapse of South Sudan into conflict and the risk of merger of the conflict in Sudan into South Sudan.  Finally, it may request the AU Commission to put in place an emergency task force dedicated to the situation in South Sudan, both for monitoring and crafting interventions for preventive diplomacy.