Consideration of the situation in Sudan
Date | 13 February 2025
Tomorrow (14 February), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1261st session at the heads of state and government level to consider the situation in Sudan on the margins of the AU Summit.
The session will commence with an opening remark by Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of Equatorial Guinea and Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for February 2025, followed by introductory remarks of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat. Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti and Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations are also expected to make interventions. Since Sudan is suspended following the October 2021 coup that laid the foundation for the eruption of the conflict in April 2023, it would not be invited to make a statement during the summit.
The ongoing conflict in Sudan, which is nearing its second anniversary in April 2025, has caused massive destruction, civilian casualties, and an unprecedented humanitarian disaster. The violence has taken a devastating toll on the Sudanese people, exacerbating pre-existing economic and political challenges. Most notably, the current dynamics have raised risks of the country’s division into various territories under the control of rival armed groups and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).
When the PSC met last on 9 October 2024 at its 1235th session to consider the report of the PSC’s field mission to Port Sudan requested for the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration of 11 May 2023. It also demanded that the parties to the conflict ensured a safe and unhindered access to the population in need and particularly demanded the RSF urgently lifts the siege on El Fasher.
The developments that have unfolded since then have seen intensified military confrontation with the SAF and RSF engaging in fierce territorial battles. The SAF has made significant advances, regaining several parts of central Sudan, including parts of Khartoum, lifting a months-long siege on its general command headquarters. As the SAF is moving to establish a new government, Taqaddum, one of Sudan’s largest civilian alliances that is accused of supporting RSF, also recently announced its split over differences over the formation of a parallel government. The fragmentation of civilian alliances, along with the fragmentation of armed groups that is underway, further complicates prospects for a political resolution. Moreover, despite the changes in the battlefield dynamics that currently seem to favour SAF in some areas, a decisive military victory for either side remains unlikely. Given that both sides remain bent on continuing fighting, Sudan remains faced with the perpetuation of a protracted war. Most worryingly, this also pushes Sudan ever closer to the worst-case scenarios of fragmentation (Libya scenario) or collapse (Somalia scenario). This danger has become more imminent following the declaration of SAF to amend the constitutional declaration of 2019 to give more power to the military-dominated Sovereign Council and form a government headed by a prime minister and RSF’s declaration for forming a government in areas under its control. Given Sudan’s strategic location, its collapse or division would have far-reaching consequences across the Lake Chad, Great Lakes, North Africa, and Horn of Africa regions. The stakes for the heads of state and government of the PSC meeting tomorrow could not, therefore, be higher and more pressing.
The humanitarian crisis has also deteriorated significantly, with more than 14 million internally displaced and more than half of the Sudanese population requiring urgent assistance. Blocked access to humanitarian corridors also remains a major challenge, preventing critical food and medical aid from reaching affected populations. Famine conditions have been confirmed in multiple areas, including IDP camps in North Darfur and the Western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan. Reports indicate that only 25% of health facilities remain operational, heightening the risk of disease outbreaks and compounding the already dire humanitarian crisis.
Reports indicate both warring parties have committed grave human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, and ethnic-targeted attacks, particularly in Darfur and Al-Jazirah states. In a statement issued on 29 October, the AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, expressed deep concerns over escalating violence, including mass killings, summary executions, abductions, and sexual violence, warning that the full scale of atrocities remains obscured due to a telecommunications blackout. A significant development in recognition of the widespread human rights violations has been the U.S. government’s determination that the RSF has committed acts of genocide. In light of these, tomorrow’s session may wish to follow up on a previous decision it passed in its 1213th session, for the AU High-Level Panel on Sudan to directly engage with the AU Special Envoy for the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, to develop proposals on how to address ongoing atrocities and develop a plan for the protection of civilians.
In light of the urgency for operationalising PSC decisions on ensuring the protection of civilians, there is a need for the PSC to facilitate the effective functioning of the Special Envoy on the Prevention of Genocide and Other Atrocities by tasking him to take the responsibility of monitoring and reporting on civilian protection challenges for identifying ways and means of mitigating the challenges. The PSC may also accord Sudanese local actors engaged in facilitating humanitarian support diplomatic recognition and urge their protection from attacks and support by the international community by channelling support to them as well as ensuring that they are protected from violent attacks. It may also specifically consider putting in place an internationally monitored humanitarian corridor to halt the expansion of famine and ensure that those in need have access to life-saving humanitarian support.
Multiple regional and international actors have attempted to mediate the conflict, yet no effective peace process has as yet emerged. The AU itself has deployed multiple diplomatic mechanisms, but all these efforts have largely remained ineffective to change the course of events in the fighting in Sudan and in ameliorating the plight of Sudanese caught up in the crossfire of the raging war.
The latest initiative of the PSC, the Ad Hoc Committee of Five Heads of State and Government also fell into paralysis, with some of the members of the Committee either rejected by one of the parties or perceived to be partisan in the ongoing conflict. The resulting stalling of the Committee’s operation has undermined confidence in its role as an important body. This necessitates that the PSC considers to reconstitute the presidential ad hoc committee.
On this proliferation and fragmentation of the peace process, the PSC, in its 1218th session, reiterated its concern about the proliferation of mediation initiatives and emphasised the need for enhanced coordination and complementarity of peace efforts through AU-established coordinating mechanisms. In late January 2025, Mauritania, the current AU chair, hosted the third consultative meeting aimed at enhancing coordination of peace efforts for Sudan with the UN, AU, EU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, and key state actors like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. Yet, the coordination mechanism’s very ad hoc and sporadic convenings and the lack of shared strategy anchoring continues to impede its role of facilitating coherence and coordination of various initiatives for halting the war and facilitating peace in Sudan. In the light of this, the PSC may consider changing the current arrangement and constitute a more functional and effective framework. One option for this could be the establishment of an International Contact Group of Sudan as a mechanism that would facilitate coordination, enhance diplomatic leverage and align peace efforts. This mechanism, anchored on a shared strategy crafted by drawing on the AU roadmap, would streamline actions by various international actors, ensuring a unified approach toward achieving a ceasefire, improving humanitarian access and advancing peace negotiations.
Another critical issue that has been complicating the conflict’s resolution has been foreign involvement on either side of the parties to the conflict. The 1218th PSC session had directed the Sub Committee on sanction to collaborate with the AU Commission and Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA) to ‘identify all external actors supporting the warring factions militarily, financially and politically, as well as make proposals on how to contain each of them within a stipulated timeframe.’ While the initial timeframe, set to three months, was due in September 2024, the Council is yet to receive the proposals. In this context as well, one of the factors that seem to get in the way of delivering on this mandate is the level of sensitivity of the matter and the fact that both the AU Commission and CISSA are constrained by political sensitivities. As such, the Summit may seek to establish a high-level task force headed by a credible former head of state and task it to investigate, document, and report the sources and channels of supply to the Council. The task force could also mobilise diplomatic and institutional pressure and action on foreign actors supplying arms and finances to the warring parties.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communique. The PSC may express its deep concern about the deepening fighting and its consequences for the unity and territorial integrity of Sudan and for the peace and stability of the region. It may reiterate its call for an urgent cessation of hostilities and, in light of the upcoming Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which is set to begin on the first of March, call on parties to the conflict to observe a total humanitarian ceasefire throughout the month of Ramadan. The PSC may decide to establish a high-level task force headed by a credible former head of state and task it to investigate, document and report the sources and channels of supply to the Council. It may also decide to establish an International Contact Group of Sudan as a mechanism that would facilitate coordination, enhance diplomatic leverage and align peace efforts. The PSC may additionally decide to reconstitute the presidential ad hoc committee by confining the membership to countries that are not neighbours of and geographically far from Sudan and requesting its activation within three weeks period. Given the famine conditions threatening the lives of people in the affected areas, the PSC may call for the establishment of an internationally monitored humanitarian corridor. Council may call for the task the AU Commission to prepare a plan for the deployment of a humanitarian ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The Council may also call for the restoration of the national telecommunication networks as part of the urgent measures for the protection of civilians.
