Today (6 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council will hold a ministerial session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. The session, not initially envisaged in the Provisional Program of Work of the PSC for January 2026, is convened following a request.

Following opening remarks by Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Chairperson of the PSC for January 2026, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement. Abdisalam Abdi Ali, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia, is also expected to deliver a statement as the concerned country. In addition, Abdoulkader Houssein Omar, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Djibouti, is scheduled to make a statement in his capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the concerned regional economic community/regional mechanism (REC/RM).

Since its proclamation of independence from Somalia in May 1991, Somaliland, the territory of the northern region of Somalia, has remained without any de jure recognition from any state in the world. This changed at the very end of 2025 with Israel becoming the first state to officially recognise the independence of Somaliland. On 26 December 2026, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel and Somaliland had signed a joint declaration establishing full diplomatic relations, describing it as being ‘in the spirit of the Abraham Accords.’ Despite the willingness that Somaliland authorities expressed for joining the Abraham Accords, Israel’s recognition garnered no backing from any other country, even outside of the region.

Despite the enthusiastic reception in Somaliland of Israel’s official recognition as a historic development, Somalia, as the state with de jure authority over Somaliland, released a strong statement rejecting Israel’s decision, calling it an ‘attack on its sovereignty’ and an ‘unlawful action and asserting that the territory remains ‘an integral, inseparable and inalienable’ part of Somalia. Mogadishu was not alone in the rejection of Somaliland’s recognition. Countries in the region and beyond joined Somalia in their rejection of Somaliland’s recognition by Israel. Djibouti expressed its steadfast support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Other countries, including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, also expressed strong opposition. Similarly, the European Union reaffirmed, through its spokesperson, ‘the importance of respecting the unity, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’ Meanwhile, the United States did not immediately follow Israel in recognising Somaliland; however, President Donald Trump reportedly stated, ‘Everything is under study… We will study it.’

For Africa and the AU, the issue of Somaliland is not completely new. Following its declaration of ‘republic’ in 2002 and invitation by Somaliland to the AU for undertaking a fact-finding mission, the AU dispatched such a fact-finding mission to Somaliland between 30 April and 4 May 2005, led by former AU Commission Deputy Chairperson, Patrick Mazimhaka. In December 2005, Somaliland submitted its application for membership in the AU. Somaliland’s President Dahir Rayale Kahin met on 16 May 2006 with the then AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare to discuss the matter.

Despite the legal issues that it raises, ordinarily it is not understandably approached as being exclusively a legal matter. Indeed, the legal dimension of Somaliland’s status has at best been approached in general terms through the lens of the AU’s and its predecessor Organisation of African Unity (OAU) principles of respect for the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states, while it has neither been adjudicated in a proper judicial setting nor a legal opinion been given on it. The prevailing wisdom in the OAU/AU at the time and since then has been that this is a matter best considered as essentially being a strategic issue that needs to be handled, having regard to sensitivities around territorial integrity of states, stability and regional peace and security, hence without totally dismissing Somaliland’s quest. During tomorrow’s session, another legal issue, namely the legality of Israel’s decision, may attract attention. However, given that recognition of states under international law is a sovereign matter, much of the focus for member states could be on the strategic implications of Israel’s actions.

This recognition came at a time of major geopolitical rivalry and rising tension along the coast of the Red Sea and Gulf of Eden, involving various regional powers, including, among others, Turkey, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. Geographically, Somaliland occupies a critical position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. This chokepoint is a vital artery for global commerce and energy shipments – including oil and gas – moving between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. In recent years, the attacks by Yemeni Houthis on ships heading to Israel have significantly affected traffic. In exchange for its recognition, Israel is expected to gain a foothold across Yemen’s coast, potentially availing it access to bases or ports for maritime intelligence and security operations on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This may also enable Israel to check on the growing interest of Turkey in Somalia.  There are also fears that Somaliland may be used for the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza.

More generally, Israel’s recognition also broke a longstanding diplomatic understanding internationally that any recognition of Somaliland would follow the lead of Africa and the AU. Additionally, beyond traditional concerns of opening Pandora’s box, there are also concerns, as made apparent by the statement of Somalia, that it may have adverse peace and security implications. It also lacked any regional or international support.

Some of these issues emerged in the statements from the regional grouping IGAD and the AU Commission itself. The IGAD statement, which reaffirmed its commitment to the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Somalia, held that ‘any unilateral recognition runs contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, the Constitutive Act and the Agreement establishing IGAD’ and expressed its commitment to ‘inclusive political processes and regional cooperation in support of lasting peace, stability and prosperity for Somalia and the wider IGAD region.’ In an approach that appears to completely shut any pathway for Somaliland’s recognition, the AU Commission Chairperson, in his statement, rejected ‘firmly’ ‘any initiative or action aimed at recognising Somaliland as an independent entity.’ He warned that such action runs ‘risks setting a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.’

On 29 December, the UN Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. During the session, various members of the UNSC and others who, on request, intervened rejected Israel’s action and emphasised the need for respecting the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. Similarly, the African 3plus members of the UNSC, including Somalia, echoed the statement of the AU Commission. Highlighting the need for addressing the determination of the final status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, in his briefing during the UNSC session, UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East, Mohamed Khiari, called on ‘Somali stakeholders in peaceful and constructive dialogue, in particular recalling the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué on talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland.’

It is generally expected that members of the PSC would echo support for the principle of territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of states. They may also affirm the need for respecting the position of the AU and regional bodies such as IGAD. It may not also come as a surprise if reference is made to the 2005 AU fact-finding mission and the 2023 Djibouti Communiqué, to which the UN Assistant Secretary for the Middle East made reference during the UNSC session, to underscore the need for addressing the status of Somaliland through diplomatic means, with sensitivity and regard to stability, enhancement of peace and democratic system governance. Given the geopolitical context of the Horn of Africa and the dynamics in the AU, some may also caution that the situation is not instrumentalised by extra-regional actors to settle political scores and fuel division in the region.

At the time of going to press, it remained unclear what form the outcome of the session may take. It is, however, expected that the PSC, drawing on the statement of the AU Commission Chairperson, would reject Israel’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland. It may also welcome the statement of IGAD. The PSC, echoing the AU Commission Chairperson statement, is also expected to reaffirm the territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Somalia. It may also urge that all states respect the AU’s constitutive act and the longstanding principle of the territorial integrity of AU member states. The PSC may also state that no situation should be used as a theatre for advancing geopolitical interests of actors outside of the region, and instigate tension and division in Somalia and the region. It may call for constructive dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland, following the December 2023 Djibouti Communiqué.