Today (15 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene an emergency session to consider the constitutional rapture in Madagascar. This 1306th session of the PSC has been called following the risk of a military seizure of power becoming a reality, following weeks of public protests and the President’s escape from the country, declaring fear of a coup after an elite force of the military took the side of protestors.

The session will commence with the opening remarks of Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for October. Mahmoud Youssouf, Chairperson of the AU Commission, is expected to make a statement framing the policy issues for the PSC decision and the AU Commission’s assessment of the situation. The PSC may also hear from the Representative of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Madagascar. The concerned Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), will make a statement, so as to the Chargé d’affaires of Madagascar, as representative of the country concerned.

This meeting comes just less than 24 hours after the emergency session of the PSC held on Monday, 13 October. The 1305 session of the PSC, held as an emergency session, was called following a major escalation in the political instability of Madagascar.  It in particular came after tensions escalated dramatically over the weekend of 11–12 October, when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protestors and marched alongside demonstrators in Antananarivo and entered symbolic public spaces such as May 13 Square. Their support for the protestors, reportedly welcomed by some protesters, has blurred the line between civilian unrest and exploitation of the situation by some in the army. In the communiqué that it adopted after the meeting, the PSC stated, among others, that it ‘totally rejects any attempt at unconstitutional changes of government.’ It further urged ‘all united of the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate, and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country.’

News outlets reported that the public protest was initially triggered by widespread frustration over chronic power and water outages, compounded by rising living costs, unemployment, and public disillusionment with governance. What began as localised, youth-led (Gen Z) protests in late September quickly evolved into a nationwide movement calling for greater accountability and political reform. It attracted the support of opposition politicians.

The state’s response has been increasingly heavy-handed, with security forces employing live ammunition and tear gas to disperse demonstrators. The UN reported that over 22 people were killed, a number the government contested. Civil society groups and international media report dozens of fatalities, while hospitals in the capital struggle to treat casualties amid growing shortages. The government has justified its actions as necessary to preserve order, but its credibility has been further eroded by the visible divisions within the security establishment and by mounting accusations of repression.

With the heavy-handed response failing to yield fruit and a key segment of the army taking sides with the protestors, the government also attempted to make symbolic concessions. President Andry Rajoelina dissolved the government and named a new prime minister, demanding an effective response to the demands of the public. As the situation further escalated during the weekend, he also called for dialogue. These efforts did not placate protestors who insisted on his departure from power.

It did not take long after the elite CAPSAT unit of the military expressed support to protestors that Rajoelina fled the country to an unknown destination. With no segment of the political, institutional and social sectors of society coming to his defence, the President’s attempt to assert his authority solely on the basis of constitutional technicalities, such as his declaration of dissolution of the national Assembly, did not last nor did it succeed. What started as a support of an elite segment of the army for the public protest against governance failures evolved into the full-fledged ouster of the President and the seizure of political power by the army.

Ahead of the announcement of the seizure of power by the army, the National Assembly, which Rajoelina tried to dissolve through a letter that did not carry the seal of authority, adopted a motion impeaching Rajoelina with those members of the Assembly present and voting supporting the impeachment, except one who voted against the motion.

The Constitution of Madagascar envisages the processes that need to be followed in the event of the vacancy of the position of the president due to impeachment or abandonment of the position by the president. Following the adoption of the motion of impeachment, the National Assembly submitted the matter of filling the vacancy to the High Constitutional Court. It was reported that despite the provisions of the Constitution which stipulate that the President of the Senate or, in his or her absence, the President of the Assembly assumes the role of President temporarily, the High Constitutional Court ‘invited’ CAPSAT leader Col. Michael Randrianirina to ‘exercise functions of head of state.’ Yet, there is no provision in the Constitution that vests authority in the Court to assign such functions to the army. The court also asked Randrianirina to hold elections within 60 days of its decision, citing the Constitution’s Article 53, which requires a presidential election within 30 to 60 days after the High Constitutional Court declares the office vacant.

Notwithstanding the attempt on the part of the National Assembly and the Court to follow the Constitution, albeit selectively on the part of the Court, Colonel Randrianirina, after announcing the seizure of power, declared the dissolution of all institutions except the lower house of parliament. ‘The following institutions are suspended: the Senate, the High Constitutional Court, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the High Court of Justice, and the High Council for the Defence of Human Rights and the Rule of Law,’ a statement from the country’s military leaders read. Contrary to the Constitution and what the High Constitutional Court stipulated, a committee led by the military would rule the country for a period of up to two years alongside a transitional government before organising new elections.’

In the light of these series of developments, the PSC has to make a determination of whether an unconstitutional change of government took place in Madagascar during tomorrow’s session. While provision has been made by the PSC for sending a joint mission to Madagascar in the communiqué of its 130th session, and SADC took a decision to deploy a fact-finding mission, there are adequate facts that are incontestable for enabling the PSC to make the determination. First, it is not contested that the President of the country no longer holds the office: He had fled the country, the National Assembly impeached him, and the High Constitutional Council declared the position of the President vacant. Second, the High Constitutional Court’s invitation of Colonel Randrianirina to step in for exercising the role of President does not have any constitutional basis. It is nothing more than an exercise in giving a military seizure of power a semblance of ‘legality,’ similar to what happened in Chad in 2021. Third, it cannot also be contested that the army that took power froze the country’s Constitution by suspending key institutions of the Constitution. Fourth, in the statement it issued, the army that seized power declared that a committee that is led by itself will lead the country for two years. Taken together, these incontestable facts that don’t need any verification establish the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government, involving seizure of power by the army. As such, the PSC has no option but to treat the situation in Madagascar as an unconstitutional change of government.

Internal dynamics of the PSC is such that some member states may argue against the application of Article 7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol, which requires the PSC to suspend a country that experienced an unconstitutional change of government, even when they may agree that what happened was a coup or an unconstitutional change of government. Such an approach would constitute a serious deviation from the clear terms of not only the PSC Protocol but also the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and most importantly the AU’s grand law, the Constitutive Act. Additionally, there is no advantage to be gained by the AU if it considers the situation as a coup but fails to attach the consequences relating thereto as clearly stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the AU. However, the PSC may face a backlash if it falls short of applying the AU rules on unconstitutional changes of government fully. It loses whatever leverage that the application of the rules fully would give the AU for ensuring that the grievances of the people are addressed through reforms and in pushing for the restoration of constitutional order. Further to this, the PSC may face charges of selective application and double standards. It would also face an increasing crisis of legitimacy and credibility in continuing to keep the suspension of the five AU member states currently under suspension.

The expected outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC is expected to express its condemnation of the occurrence of an unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar, with the seizure of power by the army. It may decide to apply Article 7(1)(g) of the Protocol and suspend Madagascar from the AU pending the transfer of political power by the army to a civilian administration in accordance with the procedures set in the constitution and the restoration of the suspended constitutional processes. The PSC may reiterate its position of the 1305th session, urging the Madagascar Armed Forces to uphold their constitutional mandate and to refrain from meddling in the political affairs of the country. It may also urge that the PSC may take note of the plan of SADC to dispatch a fact-finding mission and request the AU Commission to send a delegation that accompanies the SADC mission. The PSC may additionally express its readiness to receive the report on the fact-finding mission and review, as necessary, its policy position on the situation on the basis of SADC’s fact-finding report. It may also reiterate its request that the Chairperson of the AU Commission urgently appoint a special envoy on Madagascar. Echoing the Statement of the Chairperson of the SADC Organ, the PSC may also impress upon the de facto authorities their obligations under various AU instruments to respect and safeguard the rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens. It may also call for close coordination between the AU and SADC. It may urge all AU member states and the international community to support the decision of the PSC and the initiatives of the AU and SADC towards supporting measures for addressing the grievances of citizens, particularly the youth and the restoration of constitutional order in Madagascar.