Consideration of the Half Year Report on Elections in Africa: July to December 2022 and outlook for 2023
Consideration of the Half Year Report on Elections in Africa: July to December 2022 and outlook for 2023
Date | 20 January 2023
Tomorrow (20 January), African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1132nd session to consider AU Commission Chairperson’s half year report on elections in Africa.
The Permanent Representative of Uganda to the AU and the stand-in Chair of the PSC for the month of January, Rebeca Amuge Otengo, will deliver opening remarks while the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present the half year report. The representatives of Member States that held elections in the second half of 2022 and those that are expected to organize elections in the first half of 2023 are expected to deliver statements. The Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also among the speakers during tomorrow’s session.
The Chairperson’s half year report on elections in Africa is in line with the PSC’s decision at its 424th session of March 2014 to receive quarterly briefings on national elections in Africa. Since then, PSC has been receiving the report on a regular basis – twice a year since recent times. The last time the Chairperson presented his half year report was during PSC’s 1096th session in August last year, covering elections conducted between January and June 2022. Tomorrow’s briefing is expected to provide updates on the outcomes of elections conducted in the second half of 2022 (July to December) as well as preview of upcoming elections that are expected to take place in the first half of 2023. In addition, the report is expected to reflect on some of the key trends observed in the continent’s electoral and political governance.
Between July and December 2022, eight Member States organized presidential and parliamentary elections. Kenya, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea held general elections while Lesotho, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal organized parliamentary elections. On the other hand, Tunisia organized a constitutional referendum on 25 July 2022, followed by parliamentary elections in December. AU deployed election observation mission (EOM) in all these countries except for Sao Tome and Principe to assess the electoral process. AU’s newly introduced integrated post-election preventive diplomacy and mediation approach was also employed in the context of Kenya’s election, which proved to be successful in Zambia and The Gambia in 2021.
One of the key positive trends likely to be highlighted by the Chairperson’s report is that all the elections during the reporting period were conducted in a relatively calm political atmosphere, evidencing the deepening and consolidation of democracy in the continent. The peaceful transfer of power in Kenya was particularly notable as it turned the page on its violent electoral history. One factor contributing to the peaceful conclusion of Kenya’s hotly anticipated Presidential election, held on 9 August, was the major shift in terms of candidates’ mobilization strategies where campaigns were largely issue-centred as opposed to ethnicity. Opposition leader Raila Odinga’s recourse to the judiciary over election dispute and his subsequent acceptance of the decision of the court that upheld William Ruto’s Presidential victory is not only a sign of political maturity but also contributed to stave off electoral violence in the country.
Majority of the elections under the reporting period were competitive. Oppositions made significant gains for instance in the parliamentary elections in Angola, Senegal, Sao Tome and Principe. Angola’s MPLA ruling party was declared winner in the most hotly contested 24 August general elections, but opposition (UNITA) received 44 percent of the vote to MPLA’s 51 percent. In Senegal, the President’s coalition narrowly won the 31 July legislative election with 82 seats while the opposition gained 80 seats of the national assembly’s 165. The opposition Independent Democratic Action (ADI) won Sao Tome and Principe’s 26 September legislative elections. Similarly, the newly formed opposition Revolution for Prosperity Party (RFP) won the 7 October parliamentary elections taking 56 of the 80 seats. Yet, in some context, there is a long way to go to make the elections competitive as observed in the case of Equatorial Guinea where the incumbent President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo was re-elected for a sixth term with nearly 95 percent vote.
Some Member States also leveraged technology for voter registration and transmission of results, which indeed contributed to enhance the transparency and integrity of the electoral process. A case in point is Kenya’s 9 August Presidential elections, which introduced additional voter identity verification features in the Kenyan Integrated Election Management Systems (KIEMS) kit to provide for biometric and alphanumeric identification of voters on election day. This change provided the capture and transmission of images of the duly completed presidential election results forms from the polling station to the National Tallying Centre, which made provisional results publicly accessible. Similarly, Nigeria is prepared to deploy technology from voter registration to voter accreditation and result management in the upcoming general elections, boosting public confidence over the credibility of the election. Angola also introduced diaspora voting for the first time, highlighting the importance of ensuring the participation of citizens living abroad in democratic processes.
Africa’s electoral landscape has registered considerable progress, but challenges remain. One of the main challenges observed during the reporting period has been low voter turnout as starkly manifested in the context of Tunisia’s constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections. The election in Tunisia may particularly interest members of the PSC considering the growing concern over the risk of democratic backsliding in that country. The new constitution that was put forward by the President Kais Saied for referendum is believed to provide sweeping power to the President while weakening the legislative and judicial branches of the government. The constitution was approved overwhelmingly but nearly 70 percent of Tunisians did not vote. Even more striking was the 17 December parliamentary elections (first round), witnessing a historical low turnout of 11.22 percent, according to the official figures. Sources indicate that this figure is perhaps the second lowest voter turnout ever recorded worldwide in an election since 1945. The second round is set for 20 January, but the low turnout in the first round could be seen as the harbinger of looming political crisis.
While many African countries are organizing periodic elections in accordance with their constitutions, some countries particularly those that are in political transitions have also failed to meet agreed timelines. Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan were supposed to organize elections in 2023 and complete transitions, but that could not materialize. After missing the planned 24 December 2021 general elections, agreement on alternative election timeframe is not in sight for Libyans as political impasse continued. Guinea Bissau also failed to organize its legislative elections on 18 December 2022, further complicating the political condition of the country.
In relation to election outlook for 2023, Several Member States are expected to hold presidential and/or parliamentary elections. Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Gabon are set to elect their Presidents while countries like Eswatini, Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Djibouti, Benin are expected to conduct parliamentary elections. On the other hand, Mali is scheduled to organize constitutional referendum this March and its legislative elections around October 2023 to pave the way for the February 2024 Presidential election. Most of these countries are yet to announce the exact date for the elections. However, six of them, namely Nigeria, Benin, Djibouti, Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone will hold elections in the first half of 2023. The Chairperson’s half year report is likely to focus on Nigeria’s Presidential election as it is going to happen in few weeks – on 25 February. Bankole is expected to brief members of the PSC about Nigeria’s state of preparedness for the elections based on the report of the Special Pre-electoral Political Mission led by Phumzile MlamboNgcuka, former Deputy President of South Africa and Member of the AU Panel of the Wise, which was deployed by the Commission in November 2022.
Incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari will stepdown after two-terms in office, further consolidating Nigeria’s democracy and setting good lessons to the region that is experiencing resurgence of coup and third-termism. Election preparation seems on the right track with a surge of new voter registrations, particularly among the youth. In a major shift to previous elections, the upcoming election is also witnessing credible presidential candidates outside the two parties that have been ruling Nigeria since the restoration of democratic rule in 1999. But security threats and the use of technology in some parts of the country are likely to remain key challenges.
The expected outcome is a communique. PSC may congratulate those Member States that successfully conducted peaceful elections during the reporting period. It may particularly welcome the peaceful transfer of power in Kenya. PSC may take note of the evolving culture of holding of regular elections in the continent. PSC is also expected to express its concern over persisting challenges, weakening confidence in elections in delivering democratic change as evidenced, for example, by low voter turnout. PSC may highlight the imperative of addressing such challenge, particularly through undertaking inclusive national dialogue. It may call on those member States preparing to conduct their elections in the second half of the year, to put their utmost efforts towards ensuring the conduct of peaceful, fair, credible, and transparent elections in accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. PSC may commend the AU Commission for its continued efforts in supporting Member States to hold credible elections, including through the deployment of observation mission. It may also encourage Member States to implement the recommendations provided by the election observation missions to deepen democratic elections in their respective jurisdictions. In that relation, PSC may find it important to remind AU Commission on the need to continue the practice of what is called a ‘Return Visit’ of the election observer team to the country where they observed elections to follow up on the implementation of AUEOM recommendations, which was first employed in November 2021 in the context of Zambia.
Sanctions and Enforcement Capacities: Deterrence Against UCG
Sanctions and Enforcement Capacities: Deterrence Against UCG
Date | 15 August 2022
Tomorrow (15 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1100th session to discuss “sanctions and enforcement capacities: deterrence against unconstitutional changes of government (UCG)”.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to deliver a statement. Representatives of the respective Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) are also expected to deliver statements while presentations will be made by representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Institute of Security Studies (ISS).
The recent resurgence in UCG in the continent, noted particularly over the course of 2021, has brought the issue to the fore of policy discourse continentally in the AU and various state and non-state actors and regionally at RECs/RMs. Regionally, the policy debate has been dominant in West Africa, within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As highlighted in Amani Africa’s Policy Brief, the fact that sanctions imposed on Mali did not deter subsequent coups in four other cases has brought into sharp focus the efficacy of the responses of the AU and RECs/RMs.
While some of the recent conversations on UCG in the continent have focused on the critical importance of comprehensively addressing governance deficits, human rights violations and other governance related underlying root causes which create the fertile ground for coups, the debate within the AU and among the wider policy stakeholders illustrated that not any less important is the issue of ensuring enforceability and impactfulness of sanctions imposed once UCG takes place in a given member State. Beyond the emergence of divergent perspectives in the PSC about whether and when to apply the enforcement measures of suspension and sanctions, the importance of this issue also came out during the March 2022 Accra Forum that the PSC convened in Ghana. In addition to reflecting on the challenges faced so far in applying the enforcement measures (of suspension from AU and/or regional bodies), tomorrow’s session may also serve as an opportunity for building on and articulating modalities for effective operationalization of commitments made under the Accra Declaration with respect to enforcing UCG sanctions.
When addressing the issue of enforceability of sanctions against UCG, one of the first considerations that will require close examination is the existence of a comprehensive framework which establishes clear designation criteria, thresholds and categories for imposition of sanctions as well as conditions that need to be met for lifting them. It is true that the AU Constitutive Act, the Lome Declaration of 2000, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of 2007, the PSC Protocol and the practice of the PSC in enforcing the AU norms on UCG show that there is adequate clarity about the automaticity of suspension from the AU in cases of UCG, most notably coups. The PSC for example invoked Article 7(1)(g) to suspend AU member states for 19 times. Only in two instance that the PSC withheld the automatic application of suspension (November 2014 on Burkina Faso & April 2019 on Sudan), underscoring that automatic suspension from participating in the AU upon the occurrence of UCG in a member state is the norm.
It is worth noting that this clarity and largely consistent application has significantly contributed to the decline of coups until their unprecedented upsurge in 2021. As established in our policy brief of May 2022 published ahead of the Malabo Summit, ‘until 2021, the trends in the occurrence of coups in Africa is largely characterized by decline, despite its sporadic occurrence in a range of one to two coups per year (in the years when it occurred).’ Prior to 2021 the maximum that Africa experienced a coup since 2000 was in 2003. Since then, there were a few years (2005, 2008 and 2012) when a maximum of two coups occurred, with several years passing without coups.
However, with the unprecedented number of coups in 2021/22, signs of doubt on upholding this established norm and practice on applying suspension has been observed on the part of policy makers (including some PSC members). It is however critical to resist any temptation to blame the lack of effectiveness during 2021/22 on the norm that may lead to the revision or the scraping of the normative automaticity of suspension and the dominant practice of applying it (throwing the baby with the bath water). Instead, attention should focus on whether there is weakening of the strong political commitment & wider public support for the AU norm of zero tolerance against coups. Indeed, although the lack of regard by coup perpetrators is mostly a product of national political power dynamics, this weakening of both political commitment in AU & wider public support for zero tolerance would not be without its contribution. Tomorrow’s session affords the PSC an opportunity for finding ways of strengthening strong political commitment within the AU (both on the part of member states and AU Commission) for upholding the principle of zero tolerance for coups irrespective of their origins.
Equally significant in restoring confidence in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and hence the automatic suspension of States upon occurrence of coups is to ensure that the enforcement of suspension for coups is backed by strong consensus within the AU and at the level of RECs/RMs with formidable backing from AU’s partners. The weaker the consensus among AU member states and between the AU and RECs and the divided the backing of the UN, EU and major powers, the less effective will suspension by AU & RECs/RMs against coups would be.
When it comes to enforcement measures other than suspension (namely diplomatic, territorial and economic sanctions), the major gap (other than the fact that the AU lacks the economic tools (such as those at the disposal of the EU) or (economic & military tools, at the disposal of the UN Security Council) both at the AU and RECs/RMs levels is the absence of a common framework on what kind of sanctions to be applied, under what circumstances, the mechanism for monitoring and the criteria for the lifting of such sanctions. On account of this, participants of the Accra Forum have undertaken to ensure the development of a ‘comprehensive framework establishing different categories of sanctions that may be gradually applied, upon the approval of the relevant AU policy organs, in accordance with the gravity of the violation or threat to the constitutional order.’ It is critical that the PSC uses tomorrow’s session for initiating a process for developing a framework for sanctions, which could also potentially serve as basis for reforming the UN’s sanctions regime, which has increasingly become under scrutiny.
Another important point that must form part of the discourse on imposition and enforcement of sanctions is ensuring protection of the rights and welfare of ordinary citizens of the concerned member State. Imposition of blanket economic and financial sanctions on member States or the closure of borders have had disastrous impacts on populations as multiple examples across the world stand to demonstrate. Mali’s recent experience has particularly invoked much concern and is among the factors that have informed the need to convene tomorrow’s session on sanctions. It is to be recalled that following the inability of Mali’s transition authorities to conduct elections by the timeline stipulated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc imposed sanctions against Mali at its Extraordinary Summit of 09 January 2022. At its 1057th session, the PSC also endorsed ECOWAS’s decision, albeit reluctantly and with a proviso on the need for ensuring that it does not affect the general public. The sanctions which carried measures such as closure of borders, suspension of economic and financial transactions and suspension of financial assistance, affected the country’s economy which has already been battered by insecurity and impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, the sanctions were felt more among ordinary citizens. The resultant public anger against the sanctions and ECOWAS contributed to the weakening of the efficacy of the sanctions.
One key lesson to draw from Mali’s experience is therefore the importance of making sanctions as specifically targeted as possible. In order to make sanctions impactful and avert negative implications on wider populations, they need to as much as possible be targeted against specific individuals and entities. So far, the PSC has dealt with UCG in various member States 23 times. Out of these, the Council imposed targeted sanctions only four times – at its 168th, 204th, 363rd and 551st sessions – while it merely resorted to suspension in all other cases. Equally important is the need for building into sanctions, well-crafted carve-out clauses that ensure that lifesaving activities such as provision of humanitarian assistance or access to life supporting supplies are not impeded.
Another critical area that has contributed to the lack of effectiveness of enforcement measures against UCG is the lack of consistent application. At one level this has to do with inconsistency in how the AU applied, for example, suspension. The seizure of power by the military in Chad by suspending the constitutional process is case in point. The failure of the PSC to apply the same measures it applied on Mali has led to legitimate charges of selective application and double standard of the norms. At another level, there is also the fact that the AU is more disposed to take measures against coups than other forms of unconstitutional changes of government outlined in the Lome Declaration of 2000 & ACDEG. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance that the AU develops a predictable process for taking measures against extension of term limits within the framework of Article 23(5) of ACDEG.
The role of various complementary measures is another essential consideration that should be taken into account while imposing sanctions. If the ultimate objective of restoring constitutional order is to be realised, enforcement measures (whether suspension and/or sanctions) need to be combined with parallel, complementary measures such as diplomatic engagement with the concerned member State and support to national dialogue. The need for diplomatic engagements with transition authorities should not however be regarded as a factor for dispensing with more serious measures such as suspensions. In this regard, the Lome Declaration of 2000 clearly requires that such diplomatic engagements are undertaken parallel to the suspension of the country concerned following UCG.
The outcome of the session is expected to be a Communiqué. Council may reaffirm the conclusions of the Accra Forum on strengthening the efficacy of enforcement measures and request that the measures outlined in this regard in the Accra Declaration are followed up and reports are submitted to the PSC within specified timelines. It may underscore the need for restoring the political commitment of the AU and other stakeholders in the principle of zero tolerance to coups and the automatic application of suspension upon the occurrence of UCG such as coups as a matter of principle. The PSC may also underscore the need for building strong consensus within the AU and among other stakeholders with the relevant leverage when considering and adopting enforcement measures. It may call on the AU Commission, in collaboration with RECs, to work towards the development of a comprehensive sanctions framework which illustrates relevant criteria and benchmarks for imposition, monitoring and lifting of sanctions. It may also urge the immediate activation of its Sanctions Committee which, supported by an expert body, could play an instrumental role in monitoring implementation of sanctions imposed by the Council and in assessing fulfilment of conditions for their lifting thereof. It may also reiterate the sentiment of the Accra Declaration on ensuring that sanctions do not harm the ordinary citizens of a non-complying member State. It may further highlight the importance of having clarity on the goals intended with sanctions so that they do not aggravate political disputes and the need to closely examine the humanitarian and human rights consequences of sanctions, particularly on countries experiencing overlapping governance, security and humanitarian crises.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Date | 02 August 2022
Tomorrow (02 August), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1096th session to consider the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa conducted during the first half of 2022.
Following opening remarks of the Permanent Representative of The Gambia to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Jainaba Jagne, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement and introduce the report.
The Chairperson’s report on elections in Africa is regularly submitted to the PSC in line with the Council’s request made at its 424th session to receive quarterly briefings on national elections conducted in the continent. In recent years, the report is presented twice a year. Following the report of the Chairperson on elections conducted during the second half of 2021 (July to December 2021), which was considered by the PSC at its 1062nd session convened on 31 January 2022, tomorrow’s briefing is expected to provide updates on elections conducted from January to June 2022 as well as preview of those expected to take place during the second half of 2022.
In the first half of 2022, a major milestone achieved in the conduct of elections in Africa was the finalisation of Somalia’s much delayed parliamentary and presidential elections on 15 May. It is to be recalled that Somalia’s general elections were originally agreed to commence in December 2020 but was not honoured as the then incumbent President sought to extend his term of office plunging the country into a constitutional and political turmoil. On 14 April 2022, senators and members of the parliament were sworn in and on 15 May, they voted for the president and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected as the new president of Somalia, bringing to conclusion the protracted electoral process. The peaceful handover of power from outgoing President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo to the elected incoming President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was not only a great achievement for Somalia, but also an exemplary record of democratic practice for the Horn of Africa region where such a tradition is in short supply. Despite its successful completion, the election was unfortunately marred by procedural irregularities and incidents of violence which resulted in multiple civilian casualties. Moreover, the election modality of “one-person-one-vote” incorporated in the provisional constitution could not be implemented in the election of the members of the House of the People. The 30% quota for women in parliament agreed in the September 2020 Electoral Agreement could also not be met with women constituting only 21% of elected members of the parliament. This is a notable decrease from the 24% achieved in the 2016 election, suggesting a concerning regression in efforts aimed at increasing women’s meaningful engagement and participation in politics.
The election of members of the National Assembly of The Gambia was another one of the elections that was anticipated to take place in the first half of 2022. In December 2021, Gambia successfully completed its first Presidential election since the defeat of former President Yahya Jammeh in 2016. As a test for democratic transition, the completion of the presidential election, preceded by political wrangling among various political parties and on the record of the incumbent, was an important milestone for the country. The National Assembly election was conducted against the backdrop of the presidential election and was successfully concluded on 09 April 2022. According to the statement issued by the AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM) to Gambia on its preliminary findings, the election was conducted under a peaceful atmosphere and in an orderly manner, a standard that is becoming common in describing elections in Africa but qualitatively lower than the standards of ‘free, fair and credible’. A shortcoming noted by the AUEOM was the delay experienced in legal reforms to address gaps in the legal framework for elections, including promotion of women and youth participation through affirmative action. Indeed, the lack of such reforms has contributed to the very low participation of women – out of the 246 candidates nominated to occupy seats in the National Assembly, only 19 were women.
Mali was also among the member States anticipated in the previous report of the AU Commission Chairperson, to conduct general elections during the first half of 2022. In line with the 2020 Transition Charter of Mali, the country was set to conduct general elections on 27 February 2022, putting an end to the transition period. As highlighted in the Chairperson’s previous report, the new political dynamics, following the May 2021 coup, made the 2022 elections timeline infeasible. Based on the recommendations made at the “National Refoundation Conference”, Mali’s transition authorities decided to extend the transition period for over three years of additional period, provoking imposition of sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After continuous diplomatic efforts and engagements between Mali’s transition leaders and ECOWAS Mediator for Mali, Goodluck Jonathan, Mali adopted a new transition timetable on 01 July which adjusts the duration of the transition to be 24 months, starting from 29 March 2022. At its 61st Ordinary Session which took place on 3 July 2022, ECOWAS lifted the economic and financial sanctions it imposed against Mali, having regard to the new transition calendar. It did however maintain Mali’s suspension from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies as well as individual sanctions imposed against specific groups and personalities.
During the second half of 2022, three key AU member States are expected to conduct elections – Angola, Kenya and Senegal. Angola is set to have its presidential and legislative elections on 24 August, with reports indicating registration of over 14 million voters expected to head to the polls. President João Lourenço, who will again be running for president, and his party, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), will be confronting a newly formed opposition coalition, the United Patriotic Front which is led by Costa Junior of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
Kenya’s general elections are scheduled to take place on 09 August. While the incumbent president Uhuru Kenyatta is standing down after his two terms in office and setting a good example against third-termism for the rest of the continent, the contest between Deputy President William Ruto and opposition leader Raila Odinga – now backed by current President Kenyatta – is already creating much tension. Given the country’s recent history of highly contested polls and election violence, the forthcoming elections will be among those that will require close monitoring by relevant actors including the AU. In that spirit, the AU, along with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC), has already deployed a joint high-level pre-election assessment mission to Kenya from 14 to 21 May 2022. Following the invitation by the Kenyan Government, the AU will also be deploying an international election expert mission to observe the general elections.
Following the local elections which took place on 27 January, Senegal’s parliamentary elections were just concluded successfully on 31 July, paving the way for the 2024 presidential election. In the local elections, the presidential party conceded defeat in the capital city, Dakar as well as the southern city of Ziguinchor and confronted tougher competition at the parliamentary elections with the key opposition coalition parties having forged a deal to unite and join forces ahead of the elections. Reportedly, about 7 million voters participated in the parliamentary elections to elect 165 representatives in the National Assembly. A short-term EOM was also deployed by the AU to observe the elections and the findings of the mission are expected to feature in the report of the AU Commission Chairperson for the upcoming reporting period (second half of 2022).
The peaceful as well as credible and transparent conduct of the elections in these three countries will be critical in consolidating electoral processes and advancing democracy in the continent.
Further to the three member States, Libya and Chad are also among those States with 2022 set as their timeline for conducting elections. Libya’s general elections postponed from December 2021 still remain indefinitely postponed despite some proposals having been made with recommended timelines within 2022. The political crisis involving the contestation between the interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and Fathi Bashagha, appointed Prime Minister by the east-based House of Representatives, punctuated by armed confrontations, continues to undermine progress. It seems most unlikely for the country to hold the elections in 2022. Chad is also expected to conduct national elections in September. However, having regard to the slow transition process, including the delays experienced in setting the date for national dialogue – finally announced to commence on 20 August – which is expected to serve as a precursor for the elections, there is a high likelihood for the transition timeline to be extended.
In addition to reflecting on elections in these and other relevant member States, the Chairperson’s report is also expected to highlight some of the key trends observed in the continent’s electoral and political governance. In that regard, tomorrow’s session is expected to pay attention to the democratic backslide recently experienced due to unconstitutional changes of government in multiple member States and the unique challenges of conducting elections in the context of countries in transition. Election related violence, electoral malpractice, and high political tensions could also be some of the concerning trends that may be highlighted.
The expected outcome of the session is a Communiqué. Council may congratulate those member States that peacefully finalised their elections during the reporting period and encourage their fortified efforts towards ensuring democratic governance in their respective countries and the continent at large. It may also note the conclusion of the protracted elections in Somalia and welcome the peaceful transfer of power from the incumbent to the newly elected President, setting an example for the Horn of Africa region. It may call on those member States preparing to conduct their elections in the second half of the year, to put their utmost efforts towards ensuring the conduct of peaceful, fair, credible and transparent elections in accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. It may also urge political parties and independent election candidates to make full use of all available legal channels to settle any election disputes that may arise and to refrain from any recourse to election-related violence and to this end urge national electoral bodies and dispute settlement mechanisms to ensure that they abide by and uphold the highest standards to safeguard the integrity of electoral processes and afford all parties reliable and trustworthy avenues for dispute settlement. Council may further commend the AU Commission for the support provided to member States which conducted elections during the reporting period and encourage its further engagement and provision of support to those member States currently preparing to organise elections during the next reporting period.
Briefing on Civil Military Relations: A Factor for Peace and Security in Africa
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 18 May 2022
Tomorrow (18 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will receive a briefing on civil-military relation as a factor for peace and security in Africa, as one of the agenda items of its 1085th session. The briefing takes place ahead of the Extraordinary Summit on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG) scheduled to take place on 28 May, presenting the opportunity for Council to contribute to policy proposals to be presented at the Summit.
Following opening remarks by Churchill Ewumbue-Monono, Permanent Representative of Cameroon to the AU and the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of May, Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), is expected to make a statement. Representatives from respective Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) may also take part in the discussions.
While the PSC is convening a session dedicated to the specific issue of civil-military relations for the first time, many of its previous sessions addressing UCG in concerned member States have been instrumental in highlighting the importance of clear separation of powers, roles and functions between the military and civilian leadership. For instance, at its 996th session addressing the situation in Chad which ensued following the death of President Idriss Deby Itno and subsequent power grab by the military, Council emphasised the imperative of clear separation of roles between the State’s military body and the transitional government, with the former focusing on ensuring the country’s defence and security, while the later concentrates on political and other public policy issues.
Moreover, at its other sessions on UCG such as the 1000th session convened following the 24 May 2021 coup in Mali and the 1030th session addressing the 5 September 2021 coup in Guinea, Council has urged the militaries of each of these concerned member States to refrain from interfering in political processes, clarifying that political affairs fall outside of the scope of military powers. Council’s request at its 1041st session for the Sudanese military to respect their constitutional mandate following the military takeover of power on 25 October 2021, as well as the requests at its 1016th session on the situation in Chad and 1064th session on the situation in Guinea for the members of the militaries of these member States to abstain from taking part in elections at the end of the transition periods have also been essential in defining the nature of and limits to military power.
Despite these important remarks which have been critical in highlighting the limits and boundaries to the powers exercised by the military and in underlining the separate roles and responsibilities of civilian and military organs of government, the nature of civil-military relations in African member States, which is at the core of problems leading to UCG and other political instabilities, hasn’t received the needed attention from the PSC or concerned RECs/RMs. Tomorrow’s session therefore presents the opportunity for Council to discuss this crucial issue and reflect on how it has contributed to the spike in UCG witnessed in the continent throughout 2021 and well into 2022, as well as its implication to broader governance challenges in the continent.
One of the features of civil-military relations in Africa which may draw the Council’s interest is the prevalent politicisation of the military. Such politicization entrenches the army deep into politics, thereby depriving it of its independence from and impartiality to political power struggles. This also creates the interests of members of the army in being involved in politics as a means of advancing particular political ambitions. Similarly, the engagement of the army in economic activities also leads to its embeddedness in pursuing economic gains.
The first source of challenge to civil-military relationship is the heavy reliance of the civilian political leaders on coercion and the use of security institutions including the army for purposes of deepening their grip on power. Not only do such practices blur the lines of military mandates and lay a fertile ground for oppression of citizens and violation of basic human rights and freedoms, they also can lead to the fragmentation of the army by giving rise to different factions. To ensure therefore that civil-military relations are not guided by political interests, it is imperative that civilian oversight on the military is subject to and is conducted in strict compliance with constitutionally established rules that ensure full guarantee both the constitutionality of the orders that the army is expected to follow from civilian leadership and maintain its integrity and impartiality. As important is the adoption of minimum legal standards properly outlining the type and scope of law enforcement activities which fall within the mandates of the military and identifying the circumstances upon which armies may be deployed for managing internal security challenges.
Another key issue for properly functioning civil-military relations in the continent include the weakness of civilian institutions and the lack of democratic governance and constitutional rule, which result in the absence of efficient mechanisms for transparency and accountability, making it impossible to create a functional structure for civilian oversight.
In some cases, as demonstrated in the recent coups in Mali and Chad, there is also the issue of the loss of confidence of their militaries in civilian leaders when they fail to provide them with the necessary material and morale support, which in the context of heavy casualties suffered by members of the army due to terrorist attacks leads to deepening frustrations and resentment against the civilian leadership. This can easily boil over when the civilian leadership is also perceived to be engaging in or tolerating corruption that divert resources away from supporting the work of the army. For example, in the case of Burkina Faso, the lack of effective leadership by the democratically elected leaders in addressing terrorism, insurgency and instability that has gripped the country and reports of corruption were presented as justification for the military’s intervention through overthrowing the elected civilian leaders.
Management of security sector reform (SSR) processes in member States undergoing transitions in a manner that permits genuine and effective reflection on security governance and challenges is also an essential part of averting potential relapse as experienced in member States such as Mali and Sudan. While the speedy restoration of constitutional order in member States undergoing transitions is well within the spirit of AU norms banning UCG, restoration of constitutional order without the necessary SSR that tackles the security sector governance issues that precipitated the coup would lead to a repeat of the coup, as the experience in Mali after the 2012 coup aptly illustrates. The importance therefore of implementing and making use of the AU SSR Policy as critical instrument for achieving constitutionally sound civil-military relationship cannot be overemphasised.
The management of civil-military relations is of importance not only in the context of UCG and to member States in transition, but also with respect to broader governance issues. The implementation of codes of conduct that are in line with the constitutional obligations and the international human rights and international humanitarian law standards is key. Also of significance is the need for regularly updating the professional standards, the provision of the requisite supplies and benefits and the technical competence of the military is critical. It is therefore critical to consider crisis in civil-military relations as part of AU’s framework for early warning and conflict prevention.
The outcome of tomorrow’s session is expected to be a Communiqué. Drawing from the deliberations on civil-military relation as a core factor contributing to the occurrence of coups in the continent, Council may emphasise the intricate link between democratic deficit, State fragility and instability. Council may also call for the updating by member States of existing military codes of conducts to make them up to date and compliant with standards of impartiality and independence from politics, and basic human rights and international humanitarian law standards. It may also highlight the importance of reviewing existing AU norms banning UCG with a view to address conditions that provide the pretext for military intervention in politics, including the politicisation of militaries and security forces. The PSC may call for the use of the AU SSR Policy formwork in countries that experienced military coups as a basis for ensuring successful SSR to prevent recurrence of coups. Council may also seek advice from the Military Staff Committee (MSC) on how AU norms and policy instruments can be utilised to provide guidance in addressing issues relating to civil-military relations in the continent.
Consideration of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Elections in Africa
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 31 January, 2022
Tomorrow (31 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is set to convene its 1062nd session to consider among its agenda items, the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on elections in Africa conducted during the second half of 2021 (July to December 2021).
Following opening remarks by Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Representatives of AU member States which conducted elections during the reporting period are also expected to deliver statements.
In line with the request made at its 424th meeting to receive quarterly briefings on national elections conducted in Africa, tomorrow’s session is expected to provide updates on elections held in the continent during the second half of 2021 and provide preview of those expected to take place in 2022. The session will follow the previous briefing presented to the Council at its 1034th session where the outcomes of elections held during the period from January to June 2021 were discussed.
The countries that held elections during the reporting period on which the report of the Chairperson is expected to provide update are Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Morocco, Sao Tome and Principe, The Gambia and Zambia. Only in Sao Tome and Principe, where the first round of the presidential elections could not secure a majority vote for any of the candidates, was a second round of elections were held. AU election observer mission was deployed to nearly all of these member States. During the reporting period, in addition to the deployment of short-term election observations the AU has also contributed through the provision of technical and financial support to election management bodies and other relevant actors (in The Gambia and Somalia); undertaking multidimensional needs assessment missions (to Chad, Mali and The Gambia) and deployment of preventive diplomacy missions (to Zambia and The Gambia) as indicated in the Chairperson’s report.
Somalia and Libya were the other two AU member States that were scheduled to organise and conduct both presidential and parliamentary elections in the second half of 2021. While Somalia was able to complete the election for members of the upper house of parliament (the House of the People) by mid-November 2021, the election of members of the lower house, who will in turn be in charge of electing the president jointly with members of the upper house, is still underway. As of 9 January 2022, Somalia’s leaders have reached agreement to complete the ongoing election of lower house members of parliament by 25 February 2022.
Following the signing of the 2020 Ceasefire Agreement, one of the main strides achieved in Libya was the determination of a timeline for general elections, which were scheduled to take place on 24 December 2021. A major precondition for the successful organisation of the elections was the completion of the constitutional framework and electoral laws well ahead of the agreed timeline. It is also to be recalled that at its 997th ministerial session, the PSC welcomed the agreement reached to organise the national elections and requested the AU Commission to deploy AU election observation mission to Libya. However, due to the growing disagreement over legal procedures and the delay in the finalization of list of candidates, the general elections were postponed to 2022. With the new proposed date of 24 January becoming untenable to hold elections, after consultations with presidential hopefuls the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General told reporters that it is very reasonable and possible for Libyans to cast their votes in June 2022.
Chad’s legislative elections, originally scheduled for 13 December 2020 and later postponed for 24 October 2021, were also indefinitely postponed.
Together with the delayed elections in Libya and Somalia, some fourteen AU member states are scheduled to hold presidential and/or parliamentary elections during 2022. Apart from Libya and Somalia, others that also face uncertainties about the timing of elections include Mali and Guinea. Mali’s general elections, which were scheduled for 27 February 2022, may experience delays as the transitional government has recently announced a new electoral roadmap. Given the challenging political and security context, Mali’s transition through the conduct of peaceful and democratic elections will benefit from the AU’s close follow up and timely support including through high-level engagement with relevant Malian stakeholders.
In line with the 6 months’ timetable established by the regional body Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following Guinea’s military coup of 5 September 2021, Guinea is also expected to conduct general elections in March 2022. While Guinea’s transitional government has finalised the formation of the National Transitional Council (CNT) – the body that determines the electoral calendar, the transitional authorities have already indicated more time may be required for constitutional review and institutional reforms, which makes it unlikely for the elections to be held within the timeline established by ECOWAS.
Some of the other expected elections upcoming in 2022 include the Gambia’s legislative elections which are scheduled to take place in the first half of the year as well as Kenya’s and Angola’s general elections planned for the second half of 2022. As in the past, Kenya’s election is expected to attract particular interest, including in terms of requiring diplomatic measures to ensure that the elections are free from violence and conditions for the acceptance of the outcome of elections by candidates are created.
In addition to elaborating on the elections conducted during the reporting period and providing highlights on upcoming elections, the Chairperson’s report is also expected to capture key emerging trends in Africa’s electoral and political governance. In that regard, the winning of presidential elections in Zambia, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe, and the securing of majority parliamentary seats in Morocco by opposition parties is a noteworthy progress that may be emphasised in the report. Similarly, a notable decrease in election-related violence, increase in self-funding of elections by respective member States and improved technical management of elections are some of the positive trends that may also be highlighted. As underscored in the Chairperson’s report, there was also a significant increase in voter turnout during the reporting period which is a change from the previous report that indicated about voter apathy as trend that dominated elections in Africa. This development is also indicative of the promotion of popular participation in elections which is an important aspect of democratic processes as stressed by the PSC at its 713th session.
A rather worrying trend that may be reflected is the growing postponement or continuity of postponement of elections in multiple member States despite the commendable commitment to electoral calendars in a number of other member States. Other concerning trends that Council may be briefed about include the increase in hate speech and misinformation, inadequate public services and corruption, intense political tension and instances of election-related violence and resurgence in unconstitutional changes of government.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC may commend all those countries that concluded their elections without major problems and congratulate countries in which the opposition won elections and smooth transfer of power took place. Council may reaffirm its total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government and express its full support for the democratic will of citizens as expressed through free, fair and credible elections. The PSC may also condemn the extension of term limits through flawed constitutional processes which is also triggering popular discontent and protest and eroding the legitimacy of governments. In light of the increasing misuse of social media and the cyber space to spread misinformation specially during election periods, Council may call on member States to continuously engage their citizens by providing credible and factual information in relation to electoral processes and sensitize their citizens to increase their active and informed participation. It may also call on member States with unduly delayed elections to ensure that political actors commit to agreed electoral calendar and elections are held per such agreement to avoid the uncertainty and crisis of legitimacy that delay in the conduct of elections leads to. The Council may also welcome and commend the efforts of the PAPS Department for introducing to the AU election observation system a gender and youth balanced composition of observer missions, an Experts Advisory Panel as well as better interaction between the AU and Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) in monitoring elections. Commending the AU Commission for the support provided to member States which conducted elections during the reporting period, Council may appeal to the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) to allocate increased financial resources to the AU Commission for the continued support in the continent’s electoral processes.
Open Session on Promoting Constitutionalism, Democracy and Inclusive Governance to Strengthen Peace, Security and Stability in Africa
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 27 January, 2022
Tomorrow (27 January), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to hold its 1061st meeting. The open session will take place under the theme ‘Promoting Constitutionalism, Democracy and Inclusive Governance as a Means of Strengthening Peace, Security and Stability in Africa’.
Following opening remarks by Permanent Representative of Ghana to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month, Amma Adomaa Twum-Amoah, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye is expected to make a statement. Emma Birikorang Deputy Director of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC) and Paul Simon, the East Africa Regional Representative and Representative to AU of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are also expected to deliver presentations. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) as well as members of the international community represented in Addis Ababa are also expected to participate in the session.
Tomorrow’s session comes against the backdrop of the resurgence in unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and related challenging political transitions witnessed in the continent throughout 2021. During the year, the continent has seen the occurrence of four successful coups (in Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan). As 2022 commences, another coup has taken place in Burkina Faso following the detention of President Kabore by mutinous soldiers. In light of this concerning trend, the upsurge in UCG formed part of the key issues addressed at the Eight High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa convened from 2 to 4 December 2021 in Oran, Algeria. As a key recommendation, participants of the seminar proposed the review of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as well as the 2000 Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Change of Government, in order to ensure that these frameworks are more suitable to the contemporary peace and security landscape of the continent. The sessions is expected to reflect on the concerning resurgence in UCG and its implication on constitutionalism and democracy as well as its impact on peace and security in Africa.
The AU already has developed various norms promoting democracy and constitutionalism and banning UCG in the form of key instruments including the AU Constitutive Act, the PSC Protocol, the 2000 Lomé Declaration, the Ezulwini Framework, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter). There is however lack of consolidated approach in the implementation of these instruments. Further to condemning UCG and imposing applicable sanctions whenever they take place, it is important to ensure that the underlying root causes which lay a fertile ground for the occurrence of coups are also addressed. As observed in various previous cases, some of the key underlying causes of UCG in Africa relate to democratic deficits, mainly the extension of term limit through contested constitutional amendments and the absence of transparency and credibility in the conduct of elections. The importance of adhering to basic democratic principles as a way of averting the risk of UCG is also clearly captured in the 2000 Lomé Declaration. One of the points worth reflecting at tomorrow’s session is therefore the importance of adopting a consolidated approach in implementing AU norms on democracy and constitutionalism in order to prevent the very occurrence of UCG by addressing the root cause as well.
Over the years, the PSC has convened various sessions dedicated to the theme of UCG and popular uprising which are essential in informing tomorrow’s session. The latest of these sessions was the 871st session convened on 22 August 2019, where the PSC noted governance issues as one of the underlying root causes of conflicts and crises in Africa. Studies also indicate that coups experienced in Africa between 1960 and 2000 have had devastating impact on the continent’s stability. Another important PSC session on the topic was the 432nd session convened on 29 April 2014 which served to adopt some key decisions including the establishment of a sub-committee which could undertake an in-depth review of AU’s relevant normative frameworks to develop a consolidated approach in responding to UCG and popular uprising in Africa. Tomorrow’s session may serve to follow up on the progress in the establishment of this sub-committee.
In addition to ensuring coherence in the implementation of AU norms on democracy and constitutionalism, it is also important to address how the AU should approach cases of popular uprising. The AU is yet to develop a norm on popular uprising and elaborate its correlation with UCG. It is noteworthy that while condemning violent uprisings, the PSC has at various occasions affirmed the legitimacy of peaceful popular uprisings. For instance, at its 432nd session the council underscored some of the circumstances which would justify popular uprising, underscoring the oppressive nature of regimes; systematic abuse of human rights; and failure of governments to fulfil their responsibilities as the conditions which could trigger “the right of the people to peacefully express their will against oppressive systems”. In responding to the military takeover of power in Sudan in 2019 at its 840th session, the PSC also made a clear distinction between its condemnation of the military’s power grab and its recognition of the aspiration of the Sudanese people “to the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically design and choose institutions that are representative and respectful of freedoms and human rights”.
Another critical issue which warrants the Council’s attention is the growing concern over security challenges, particularly terrorist insurgency and the lack of effective government response which has in multiple cases served as the central justification given by militaries for staging coups. Notwithstanding the manipulation of such justification as a means of legitimising suspension of constitutions, there is indeed a growing frustration over the lack or inadequate government response to security challenges. In addition to its immediate security related impact therefore, the absence of an effective government response to security threats endangers not only the stability of a country but also democratic rule. Hence, as the rate and complexity of security threats in the continent increase, governments role remains important in the way it handles and responds to such threats.
Incorporating indicators related to human rights and governance within AU’s continental early warning system could also be an important aspect which the Council may consider. Closely monitoring situations in individual member States which are at risk of experiencing disruptions to constitutional rule could play a crucial role in averting UCG by setting the stage for the deployment of AU’s preventive diplomacy. Lack of inclusive governance, political confrontations, highly contested elections, constitutional amendments to extend presidential term limits, and grave violations of human rights and democratic principles are some of the major warning signs of disruption to democratic rule as well as peace and security in Africa.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a communiqué. The Council may condemn all acts which endanger constitutionalism and democracy and threaten the continent’s peace and security. It may express concern over the increasing trend of UCG in Africa and it may underline the importance of enforcing and advancing the relevant AU norms to curb this trend. In this respect, it may urge all AU member States to sign, ratify and implement relevant AU norms on human rights and democracy. It may also follow up on the implementation of its previous decisions on the theme, particularly the request made at its 432nd session for the AU Commission to finalise the draft AU framework on responses to popular uprisings and to submit the draft for Council’s consideration. Council may also request the AU Commission to propose modalities for the review of AGA and the Lomé Declaration as well as other relevant AU instruments including the Banjul Charter.
Consideration of the Midyear Report of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union on the Elections in Africa (January - June 2021)
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 23 September, 2021
Tomorrow (23 September) African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1034th session to consider the midyear report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the elections in Africa.
Following the opening remarks of the PSC Chairperson of the month and Permanent Representative of Chad to the AU, Mahamat Ali Hassan, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to present the midyear report on elections held in the continent. Representatives of member States that organized elections during the period from January to June 2021 may deliver statements.
The midyear briefing is based on PSC’s request, at its 424th meeting held in March 2014, to receive quarterly briefings on national elections in Africa as part of AU efforts towards conflict prevention on the continent. Since then, the Council has been briefed by the AUC on a regular basis. This briefing follows the previous one, which took place during the 982nd meeting in February, to highlight the outcome of elections organized between January and June 2021 and provides an outlook of the elections set to take place between July and December of this year. Apart from providing reviews and outlooks of the elections, the bi-annual briefing is also expected to shed light on key trends in governance, patterns emerged in the conduct of elections, the electoral support and interventions made by the Commission, as well as policy recommendations.
From the 17 presidential and parliamentary elections on the AU calendar for 2021, 11 presidential and parliamentary elections, namely Uganda, Niger (runoff), Cote d’Ivoire, CAR, Congo, Djibouti, Benin, Chad, Cape Verde (parliamentary), Algeria, and Ethiopia) were conducted between January and June 2021. For the second half of the year, seven elections are organized or are expected to take place, which includes Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, Morocco, Somalia, Cape Verde (presidential), The Gambia and Libya.
In relation to the governance issues in the continent, the midyear report captures four key trends: the increasing appeal for democratic dividends around the continent; the “choiceless” nature of electoral politics; voter apathy; and the persistent challenge of the concentration of power at the centre. These worrying governance trends are further compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected the quality of elections in the continent. The resurgence of unconstitutional change of government in Africa, which witnessed three military seizure of power this year alone, is also a clear indication of the ‘deepening democratic deficit’ that the continent is facing.
One of the positive developments witnessed in the reporting period likely to be highlighted in the report is Niger’s first-ever democratic power transfer since its independence in 1960, although the attempted coup few days before the presidential inauguration signals the fragility of the democratic gains. The other positive trend is member states ability and will to stick to their electoral calendars despite the enormous challenge posed by COVID-19 pandemic and other political and security issues. Given that the PSC (for instance during its 982nd and 713th meetings) emphasized the importance of mobilizing funds from within the continent with the view to reducing external manipulation and influence, there are encouraging trends in this regard as well. The report indicates that four of the member states that conducted elections during the reporting period ‘primarily financed’ their elections by national funds. The increasing participation of women and youth in the electoral process is another area of positive development though there are still limitations in the participation of the same as candidates.
Despite electoral progress in some member states, challenges to elections in Africa have persisted in the reporting period. Volatile security atmosphere not only dented the credibility of some of the elections but also affected voter turn out. Security threats, political tension, shrinking political space, opposition boycott, and low voter turnout have continued to be worrying trends affecting the elections in some member states. It is worth noting that elections conducted amid intense political climate and high opposition boycott are clear indications of deep-seated divides, highlighting the imperative of political dialogue to accompany elections.
Some elections including the April presidential election in Benin exhibited continued challenge of voter apathy. There is a need to address the factors behind this problem given that voter participation is one key element of credible election. It is to be recalled that the PSC, at its 713th session in August 2017, ‘urged member states to make deliberate efforts towards ensuring and promoting participation in democratic process’.
In relation to the elections that happened in third quarter of the year (covers Sao Tome and Principe, Zambia, and Morocco), of particular interest to the Council is the general elections in Zambia held last month where power has been transferred peacefully to an opposition leader after incumbent Edgar Lungu conceded defeat. The successful transfer of power is a testament to the effective electoral support provided by the AU, which deployed election observation mission to Zambia led by former President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Bai Koroma.
The PSC may also wish to discuss those elections scheduled to take place during the fourth quarter of the year, particularly in Somalia, The Gambia, and Libya. The power tussle between the Prime Minister and the President in Somalia not only risks escalation into an open conflict but also threatened to derail the Presidential election slatted for next month. In Libya, uncertainties are looming on whether the conduct of the parliamentary and presidential elections is feasible within the agreed timeline of 24 December as some of the contested issues (such as the types of elections to hold in December, a referendum on a draft constitution and qualifications to stand as candidate) remains yet unresolved. Given its history of engagement in supporting the transition in Somalia, The Gambia and Libya and the high stakes involved, it is a high time for the AU to utilize all the available tools to keep the electoral process on track.
With respect to the practice and methodology of election observation, AU has deployed short-term election observation and technical missions to all countries that organized elections during the reporting period except for Cape Verde and Algeria (on account of logistical reasons). As highlighted in the Chairperson’s report, in case of Ethiopia, AU deployed a long-term election observation mission in addition to short-term AU Election Observation Missions (AUEOMs). While positive measures have been taken to make AU observation missions more effective and efficient, one important issue worth following up for the PSC is its decision, at its 713th meeting (2017), for the establishment of monitoring and follow-up mechanisms for the implementation of the recommendations of the observation missions. The other issue is on the progress in terms of building synergies with regional mechanisms, particularly through deploying Joint High Level Political Mission (JHLPMs) and championing joint election observation missions, as stressed by the Council during its 653rd session in 2017. The joint deployment of JHLPM in The Gambia and Ghana, as well as AU and ECOWAS co-leading pre-election mission in Niger in 2020 are some of previous experiences for the Commission to build on in this regard.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. It is expected that the PSC would congratulate those member states who successfully conducted their elections during the reporting period. The Council may welcome the growing positive trend of peaceful transfers of power in some member states, notably in Niger and Zambia. However, the Council is also likely to express concerns over persisting challenges of elections including tense political climate, insecurity, opposition boycott, and low voter turnout. In this respect, the Council may encourage member states to take all the necessary steps to create conducive conditions for conducting credible, peaceful and democratic elections. On AU election observation mission, the Council is likely to echo the communique of its 713th meeting in stressing the importance for member states to ensure the implementation of the recommendations of AUEOM.
The Council may also encourage the Commission to build more synergies with regional mechanisms on election related matters, particularly through the deployment of JHLPMs as well as joint election observation missions. In relation to the upcoming elections in Somalia, the Gambia and Libya, the Council may request the Commission to use all the available tools at its disposal to support the election process in these countries, particularly through the deployment of strategic technical support to the electoral management bodies (EMBs) as well as preventive diplomacy and mediation interventions. As elections continue to be conducted within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council may reiterate its call for member states to ‘expedite the adoption, and there after the implementation of AU Guidelines on Elections in Africa in the Context of COVID-19 pandemic and other Public Health Emergencies’ with the view to ensuring safety and security of people.
VTC Session on AU Guidelines on Elections in the context of COVID-19
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 29 January, 2021
Tomorrow (29 January) African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will have its 977th session on the AU guidelines on elections in the context of COVID-19 pandemic and other public health emergencies. The session is expected to take place through VTC.
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Senegal, Baye Moctar Diop, will make opening remarks in his capacity as the PSC chair of the month. The Commissioner of the Political Affairs of the AU, Minata Samate Cessouma and Director of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), Dr. John Nkengasong, are also expected to brief the Council.
At its 935th meeting convened on 9 July 2020, the PSC requested the AU Commission to provide a regular briefings to the Council on elections in Africa and ‘expedite the development of guidelines for the organization of credible elections, in the context of public health emergencies and humanitarian disasters’. Tomorrow’s session provides the Council the opportunity to follow up on this request and consider ‘African Union guidelines for elections during COVID-19 and other public health emergencies’, which has been developed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the AU Commission.
In her presentation, Commissioner Samate is likely to mention the May 2020 DPA’s briefing to the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) of the AU on the impact of COVID-19 on elections in Africa where the PRC noted the lack of a common guiding framework for the conduct of elections in the context of COVID-19 and other public health emergencies (PHEs). It is also worth recalling that one of the recommendations that culminated from the May 2020 peer-learning consultative meeting of the African Election Management Bodies (EMBs) on Covid-19 and election in Africa, which was convened by the DPA in collaboration with the Association of African Electoral Authorities (AAEA) and EMBs Networks of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), has been for the AU to develop guideline on the issue.
The briefing may shed light on the context that necessitates the preparation of the guideline. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has presented a dilemma to member states that on one hand they need to hold a periodic and credible election, but on the other hand, they have the responsibility to protect lives. Regular, free, fair and transparent election is a democratic imperative, which member states are required to uphold. The briefing, in this regard, is likely to make reference to the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance as well as the 2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, which clearly require member states to hold credible and regular elections as a key ingredient of democracy.
The COVID-19 pandemic has posed an additional layer of challenge to the already fragile electoral process in Africa. Vibrant and democratic elections usually engage large number of people during political campaign and voting days with the potential to accelerate the spread of the virus, posing a huge health risks. This may discourage voters’ turnout, particularly those in the vulnerable brackets, with a repercussion on the credibility and inclusivity of elections, not to mention the competing priorities that governments face (upholding a democratic imperative at the same time protecting the safety of citizens). In this respect, the guideline alludes to Covid-19’s risk not only to the health of African people but also to the health of democracy.
According to the 2020 elections calendar of the DPA, national elections were slated to take place in seventeen member states. With the outbreak of the pandemic, some countries (such as Burundi, Mali, Malawi, Benin, Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon, Niger, Central Africa) decided to go ahead with the elections as originally planned amid high public risk posed by the pandemic, while others, such as Ethiopia, postponed.
Member states will continue to grapple with COVID-19 related challenges this year as well, as a dozen of African countries are set to hold national elections including Ethiopia, Chad, Libya, Somalia, and the Republic of Congo. Given the uncertainty surrounding the pandemic (particularly concerning how long it is going to last), and the potential for the occurrence of other PHEs, and as elections cannot be postponed indefinitely; it remains imperative to develop a guideline that would help adapting the electoral processes to the new circumstances of what has been referred to as the ‘new normal’. In this context, the guideline is envisaged as a blueprint for member states and EMBs to navigate their way through elections amid COVID-19 and other PHEs that may emerge in the future. As indicated in the guideline, it constitutes a non-binding continental framework for guaranteeing the holding of safe and credible elections by providing ‘a comprehensive practical tool and contextually adaptable directives for electoral administration in contexts of PHEs’.
Samate may also take the opportunity to stress that the guideline is by no means to replace national electoral laws nor is its intention to serve as a binding legislative instrument for AU, RECs or member states. The guideline, rather, clearly states that it is meant to ‘complement existing national laws, rules, regulations and procedures for conducting elections…’ and ‘reinforce the norms and instruments on election at the national, regional and continental levels.’
In her briefing, Samate is also likely to focus on the key aspects of the guideline such as: the strategic considerations for conducting or postponing elections, the implications of COVID-19/PHEs on elections and its mitigation measures, and duties and responsibilities of key stakeholders. It is worth noting that on 22 July 2020 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) also issued a statement on ‘Elections in Africa during the COVID-19 Pandemic’ recognizing the need to ensure respect for the right to regular, free, fair and credible elections while complying with the public health measures necessary to safeguard the health and life of the public when convening elections during the pandemic.
The briefing by Nkengasong is expected to provide insights on the specific health protocols that need to be followed in the context of elections. As suggested in the draft guideline, these include ensuring observance to COVID-19 protocols (physical distancing, regular hand-washing, use of sanitizers); limiting number of people during political campaigns or civic and voter education as well as ensuring alternative modalities such as virtual platforms; increasing the number of polling centres; and providing longer and staggered voting periods.
Given the restrictions that the COVID-19 public health measures entail on various freedoms related to the holding of elections, the guideline offers guidance on key strategic considerations that should inform member state’s decision on whether to hold or postpone elections during COVID-19/PHEs, while it recognizes this as a constitutional prerogative. In this respect, Samate is likely to highlight two points in her briefing as captured in the guideline. The first is the need for member states to critically engage in assessing its specific context against the existence of enabling environments to deliver democratic, credible and peaceful elections amid COVID-19/PHEs. The second is the importance for member states to ensure that the decision either to hold or postpone elections are always outcomes of consultation, dialogue and consensus among key stakeholders. This should include, underscored in the 22 July Statement of the ACHPR, ensuring observance of applicable constitutional procedures, including judicial certification or review, as has been done, for example in the Central African Republic.
The guideline discusses at length how COVID-19/PHEs could affect the different electoral activities that fall within one of the electoral phases: the pre-election, election and post-election phases. It further suggests key mitigation measures that need be taken into account by EMBs, political parties, CSOs, and other stakeholders to ensure that the pandemic or other PHEs do not compromise the credibility of elections in Africa.
Of a particular interest to PSC in relation to the different mitigation measures could be the viability of electronic voting in the African context. Many have already flagged the risk of political backlash that rushing into electronic voting may entail in countries with no requisite infrastructure. In this connection, the WHO general guideline on election during COVID-19 makes an important caveat that ‘in the Africa setting electronic voting is still a long way to go, so election will have to be through in person voting’. While the AU guideline advices African EMBs to embrace new technology for elections, it emphasizes that national consultation, dialogue, consensus, and mutual trust among all key actors should precede the adoption of the new modality.
The briefing may also touch upon the duties and responsibilities of key stakeholders- notably AU, RECs, member states, EMBs, election observation and monitoring bodies, political parties, and civil societies- in ensuring safe and credible elections in Africa amid COVID-19/PHEs.
Nkengasong is further expected to provide update to the PSC members on the situation of Covid-19 in Africa. It is to be recalled that the Council requested Africa CDC to continue providing regular briefings on the ‘progress, trends and challenges in the fight against COVID-19 pandemic in the continent’ during its 935th session. The director is likely to highlight the recent spike of COVID-19 cases with a second wave of the pandemic hitting the continent, which is further compounded by the emergence of new COVID-19 variants. Despite the efforts to secure vaccines both within the COVAX initiative (which aims to buy and deliver to the poorest countries), an effort recently supplemented by AU’s securing 270 million vaccine doses, the Director may caution the availability of vaccines beyond those on the frontline in the short term. As such, the representative may advice member states to reinforce safety measures, lending hand in emphasizing the importance of implementing the guideline.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is expected to welcome the preparation of the guideline and may wish to commend the efforts of the DPA and others involved in developing the guideline. The Council may acknowledge the importance of the guideline in providing a practical guide for member states, EMBs, civil society organizations, domestic and international observer groups, political parties and other stakeholders on how to conduct safe and credible elections within the context of COVID-19/PHEs, and may decide to adopt the guideline. The Council may further encourage member states and EMBs to give effect to the guideline by developing their own national policy on elections during COVID-19 and other PHEs that are suitable to their contexts. It may also call upon the AU commission, RECs, member states, EMBs, political parties, civil societies, think tanks, domestic and international observers and other stakeholders to engage in popularizing this guideline for its effective implementation. As holding safe and credible elections is first and foremost the responsibility of member states, the PSC may urge them to commit all the means and resources required to ensure that the enforcement of COVID-19/PHEs measures do not compromise the conduct such elections in a free, fair and credible manner.
Briefing on Elections in Africa in the Context of the COVID19 Pandemic
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 09 July, 2020
Tomorrow (9 July) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold its 935th meeting to receive a briefing on elections in Africa in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.
It is expected that PSC members will conduct the meeting through video teleconference. It is expected that AU Commissioner for Political Affairs Minata Samate Cessouma will brief the Council.
Since the advent of the pandemic in the continent, countries have adopted various measures to curb the spread of the COVID19 pandemic through various social distancing measures, lockdowns and declaration of state of emergency or state of disaster. The nature of the pandemic and the public health response measures are such that they directly affect electoral processes. The COVID19 measures affect not only the logistical preparation for elections but also the exercise of various rights including the convening of political meetings and rallies that are key for communicating the agenda of contesting political parties and for the electorate to express its views on its needs and be informed of the position of the candidates.
On the other hand, electoral processes by their very nature lead to the gathering of people, the convening of political meetings and the staging of rallies. As such, if not conducted with due regard to the social distancing measures, electoral processes can become the ground for the spread of COVID19 and the resultant rise in the morbidity and mortality that the virus causes.
Tomorrow’s briefing on elections will be the first one to be taking place in the context of COVID19 and presents an opportunity for considering how COVID19 affects electoral plans in Africa. It would additionally afford the opportunity to consider on whether and how elections could be held amid the pandemic and the parameters to be observed if they are to be postponed.
According to the AU calendar of elections, there are about 18 planned elections in 2020 in Africa. The Department of Political Affairs is scheduled to provide an overall update on current developments in countries that have recently concluded elections, those that are preparing to undertake elections and those that have decided to postpone elections.
The last time the PSC held a session on elections was at its 869th on 19 August 2019. In the communiqué, the PSC underlined the need for strengthened citizens participation in democratic process and it also requested the finalization of the reports of AU Election Observation Missions in a timely manner and the early planning for the deployment of the AU Election Observation Missions.
During tomorrow’s session, the PSC may assess the challenges COVID19 poses on electoral processes in Africa. More particularly, of interest to the PSC would be an overview on the challenges that have emerged due to the COVID19 pandemic and their impact on holding transparent, fair and free elections in Africa. Considering these issues affords the PSC an important opportunity to provide guidance to member states on how to manage elections in the context of COVID19. This is important in order to ensure that the holding of elections under restricted conditions or postponement of elections due to COVID19 measures would not lead to electoral disputes and instability. The elections that are expected to receive attention include the recently concluded ones in Burundi, Mali, and Malawi as well as the constitutional referendum in Guinea. The briefing may also provide an overview of upcoming elections in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, and postponed elections in Ethiopia and Chad. The Council may also particularly address countries such as Somalia and Central African Republic that are experiencing fragile transition and instability and are planning elections in 2020.
From the list of countries that held elections or scheduled to hold elections, it is clear that not all of them are on the same standing in terms of the sensitivity of the election for unstable contestation. This means that apart from the general guidance required on how elections may be held in all the countries, there is a need for paying particular attention to the situation of elections in countries with fragile transitions.
The briefing may highlight challenges related to restrictions on mobility. This can have negative impacts on candidates communicating with their supporters and electorates critically engaging with political parties and candidates. As the election in Mali illustrated, the other challenge is also related to the low voter turnout due to fear related to the spread of the pandemic.
The other impact is that it has adversely affected the deployment of independent observers in countries that have held elections this year. Restrictions on international travels means that the AU has not been able to deploy international observers in some of the recent elections held in the context of COVID19. One of the issues that members of the PSC may wish to get information on during the briefing is the adjustments and new changes that the Department of Political Affairs introduced in its provision of support to member states in the context of COVID19.
With respect to the various avenues taken by member states the PSC may address key elements on the processes and procedures of elections. First, for countries that have opted to hold elections, it may urge Africa CDC to develop and adhere to strict safety and public health guidelines to prevent the further spread of the virus. It will be essential for the PSC to urge member states to evaluate their capacity to hold credible and transparent elections while keeping citizens safe. Moreover, these measures have also direct effect on the level of participation of election observers. Hence, the PSC may also request member states to address challenges and provide alternative plans to fill this gap.
Second, with regards to countries that opt to postpone elections, the PSC may urge for the respect of legal processes and political consensus, to prevent instability or charges of unconstitutionality. The PSC may pronounce itself on the need to comply with established constitutional processes when opting for postponing elections. Additionally, consideration should be had for states to build consensus with all the stakeholders including electoral bodies, opposition parties and civil society actors not only to address the legitimacy deficits that may result from postponement of elections but also to ensure that postponement does not lead to political instability. Irrespective of whether member states opt to postpone or hold elections, there is also a need for ensuring that there is greater transparency by governments on their decisions and the process they use for arriving at such decision.
Also, of interest for PSC members is to receive indication from the briefing on countries expected to have highly contested elections and countries expected to hold elections in fragile transitions. These countries require particular attention not only to ensure that COVID19 does not further exacerbates an already volatile situation but also to ensure that contestations surrounding election does not undermine their efforts towards containing the virus. For example, in Malawi, the newly elected government changed the plan for the inauguration of the new president on account of reports of spike in the spread of the virus during the electoral process.
In the context of recent elections, the briefing by DPA may also highlight positive developments including the role of an independent judiciary in the democratization process of countries as demonstrated in the election in Malawi. The briefing may also present best practices that might guide countries that are planning to hold elections.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to address the various challenges arising from COVID19 and their effects on planned elections and the electoral process. It may in particular express concern on the negative impacts of COVID19 on holding elections in context that is free from fear and insecurity. With respect to member states that opt for proceeding with scheduled elections, the PSC may urge that they comply with the applicable standards of holding free, fair and credible elections. To this end, it may call on those states to put in place the necessary public health measures including social distancing and hygiene measures during the electoral process. For member states that opt for postponing elections, it may urge them to ensure that proper constitutional procedures are followed and close working relationship and consultations are maintained with all stakeholders in rescheduling the calendar for the elections. The PSC may call on Africa-CDC working with the Department of Political Affairs to develop guidelines on the holding of elections in the context of COVID19. It may request the AU Department of Political Affairs to adjust the provision of its support to member states to the COVID19 environment to ensure that its critical role in the democratization process through supporting electoral processes is not disrupted as a result of COVID19.
Brainstorming Session on “Popular uprisings” and its Impact on Peace and Security on the Continent
Elections and Governance Issues
Date | 22 August, 2019
Tomorrow (22 August) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will hold its 871st meeting. This is designed to be a brainstorming session on the concept of “popular uprisings” and its impact on peace and security on the continent.
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) are expected to brief the PSC. The Department of Political Affairs that has been engaged on the subject of popular uprisings and unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) is also best placed to provide insights on the subject. Ambassador Albert Chimbindi, chair of the month, is expected to make a statement highlighting the issues that need to be interrogated during the session.
While recent events in Algeria and more specifically Sudan reignited policy interest in the subject, it was the popular uprisings that erupted in North Africa in 2011 that first brought the issue of popular uprising to the fore of continental peace and security agenda. The AU responded to those events, particularly the precedent setting events in Tunisia, in relation to its norm banning unconstitutional change of government (UCG). Although in a strictly legalistic interpretation the ouster through street protest of Tunisia’s then President Ben Ali in early 2011 could have been deemed an UCG on account of the fact that it was not constitutionally envisaged, the PSC did not consider the lack of stipulation of changing government through popular uprising in Tunisia’s constitution as an UCG. Instead, it expressed its respect for the democratic aspiration and the will of the people, implying that the demand for constitutional rule is not simply about respecting constitutional processes for their own sake but about safeguarding the will of the people.
Clearly the issue of popular uprising has since that time become recurrent, it was in 2014 that the PSC looked specifically into the question of the relationship between popular uprising and UCG. Under Nigerian chairmanship in April 2014, the PSC dedicated its 432nd session to the theme ‘unconstitutional changes of government and popular uprisings – Challenges and lessons learnt’. In the statement issued at the session, the PSC affirmed the legitimacy of popular uprisings. It in particular held that ‘[i]n circumstances where governments fail to fulfill their responsibilities, are oppressive and systematically abuse human rights or commit other grave acts and citizens are denied lawful options,’ it ‘recognized the right of the people to peacefully express their will against oppressive systems.’
At the same time, the PSC in this statement also underscored the need ‘for developing a consolidated AU framework on how to respond to situations of unconstitutional changes of government and popular uprisings’. It in particular noted that such a framework ‘should include the appropriate refinement of the definition of unconstitutional changes of government, in light of the evolving challenges facing the continent, notably those related to popular uprisings against oppressive systems, taking into account all relevant parameters.’ Indeed, this is important since the AU norm on UCG as it stands offers no clear and systematic guidance on how to differentiate legitimate popular uprising from acts that can be considered as UCG and on how to respond to such popular movements. The PSC accordingly tasked ‘the Commission to prepare the elements of the framework and to submit to it for consideration.’
While there has been efforts within the Department of Political Affairs to undertake the review process, there has been no follow up on this subject from the side of the PSC. Instead, the issue featured as part of the final report of the AU High-level Panel on Egypt in June 2014. Observing the lacuna in the AU norm on UCG, the Panel proposed the elaboration of a guideline for determining the compatibility of popular uprisings that result in a change of government with the norms on UCG. According to the proposal, for popular uprisings to be compatible with existing AU norms, consideration should be had to the following five elements: ‘(a) the descent of the government into total authoritarianism to the point of forfeiting its legitimacy; (b) the absence or total ineffectiveness of constitutional processes for effecting change of government; (c) popularity of the uprisings in the sense of attracting significant portion of the population and involving people from all walks of life and ideological persuasions; (d) the absence of involvement of the military in removing the government; (e) peacefulness of the popular protests’.
As can be seen from these considerations, rather than being completely new the Panel built on the press statement of the PSC from its 432nd session as the references to failure of the government or its descent into repressive authoritarian rule and the lack of any effective constitutional means for changing the government (the principle of last resort) make it clear.
In a measure that illustrated an emerging norm affirming the legitimacy of popular uprisings, the PSC reiterated the language it used in its press statement of 432nd session in the case of Burkina Faso. The PSC in the communique of its 465th session relating to the situation in Burkina Faso of made reference to “the recognition of the right of peoples to rise up peacefully against oppressive political systems”. Even more recently in relation to the situation in Sudan, the PSC clearly stated its recognition of the ‘legitimate aspirations of the Sudanese people to the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically design and choose institutions that are representative and respectful of freedoms and human rights’. The PSC accordingly made a distinction between the popular protests in Sudan and the military takeover of power, which it condemned as being contrary to the AU norm on UCG.
Clearly, AU’s treatment of the popular uprisings in North African, Burkina Faso and most recently in Sudan vis‐à‐vis its norm on UCG has signaled a new approach in interpreting legal frameworks that provide justification and legitimacy for popular uprisings in ousting authoritarian regimes. Yet, although the considerations elaborated in the final report of the AU High‐level Panel on Egypt offer the framework for establishing the framework for distinguishing those popular uprisings that constitute UCG from those that do not, there has been no follow up to the Panel’s useful foundational work. Accordingly, there remain lack of clarity including on the question of what makes an uprising or protest movement popular and hence consistent with the AU norm on UCG.
The most recent background to the agenda of this session is the surge of protest events on the continent. While these events have been witnessed in many parts of the continent, they have been notable, among others, in Burundi, Congo, DRC, and Ethiopia. Indeed, some of the conflict data sets notably the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) noted that, accounting for a total of 5660 events in 2017, protests and riots have become the leading conflict or crisis events on the continent.
This session affords the PSC an opportunity for clarifying a number of questions related to popular uprisings including vis‐à‐vis the list of considerations developed in the June 2014 AU High‐Level Panel report. Apart from the question noted above, these questions include who makes the determination of when an uprising becomes popular, what sets ordinary protest events apart from popular uprisings and whether there is a threshold that should be met for making such determination. While these questions are important, it is worth recognizing that there can be no full proof and mathematically precise formula for making determination on these questions.
What these questions rather highlight is the need for following up on the outstanding tasks stipulated in the press statement of the 432nd session of the PSC. The PSC is holding tomorrow’s brainstorming session five years after its landmark meeting on UCG and popular uprising in 2014. This presents it with the opportunity for making such follow up to the outcomes of its 432nd session.
As a brainstorming session, the expected outcome of the session remains unclear. Yet, irrespective of whether the outcome takes the form of a communique or press statement, it is expected that the PSC would reiterate its 432nd session on the need for addressing the gap in the AU normative framework. More specifically, the PSC may also task the AU Commission to establish an ad hoc body composed of the PSC Committee of Experts and legal experts who have studied the issue to produce and submit to it a proposal with objective guidelines on determining popular uprisings based on the various PSC outcome documents and the outline set out in the report of the AU High‐Level Panel and with the support of the Department of Political Affairs and the AU Legal Counsel. The PSC may also call on for addressing the root causes of popular dissent highlighted in its 432nd session including through the expansion of the democratic space, respect for constitutional term limits, ensuring the credibility of elections as the normal avenue for changing governments and by addressing socio‐economic grievances and inequalities.