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	<title>PSC Meetings with EU Organs Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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	<title>PSC Meetings with EU Organs Archives - Amani Africa</title>
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		<title>17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC</title>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 06:15:21 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>5 November 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/17th-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/">17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-0"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>17<sup>th</sup> Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 5 November 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (6 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 17<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting, following the 9<sup>th</sup> informal joint retreat taking place today.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to deliver opening remarks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting. During the negotiation on the agenda for the informal retreat and the consultative meeting, there were some items that were proposed by both sides that did not make it to the final agenda due to a lack of agreement. These include Peace Support Operations and UNSC Resolution 2719, the role of exploitation of natural resources in conflicts, Somalia, the situation in the Horn of Africa &amp; Ukraine as a standalone agenda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The agenda remains largely unchanged from last year, except that the item previously framed as Somalia and AUSSOM now focuses exclusively on AUSSOM. Other agenda items include the situations in Sudan, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Notably, South Sudan remains absent from the agenda despite the significant deterioration in its political and security situation since March and the country’s planned first elections since independence in 2011, scheduled for 22 December 2026. As in last year’s meeting, the two sides are also expected to discuss global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’, at the initiative of the EUPSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>On AUSSOM</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Ethiopia, Uganda, and Côte d’Ivoire are expected to take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Finland, Cyprus, Slovakia and Denmark from the EU side. The engagement comes at a critical juncture for the AU mission in Somalia, as AUSSOM faces mounting financial, logistical, political and operational challenges that cast uncertainty over its immediate future.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 2 November, Uganda’s acting military spokesperson <a href="https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/2117187964761485709">announced</a> the commencement of troop withdrawals from Somalia after two decades of deployment. According to the spokesperson, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) had begun withdrawing troops deployed under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government of Somalia, effective immediately. The withdrawal of around <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8zxlqxwed4do">2,000</a> troops under these arrangements is expected to be completed within days, while Ugandan troops serving under AUSSOM will be withdrawn gradually by the end of 2027.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This development adds to the uncertainty surrounding AUSSOM, which has faced severe funding shortfalls since its launch in January 2025. These challenges were further compounded by the announcement from the US in July 2026 that it would not support the continuation of the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) beyond AUSSOM’s current authorisation, which expires at the end of this year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It was against this context that AUSSOM troop-contributing countries (TCCs) convened their second Extraordinary Summit in Kampala on 31 July. The Summit called for a unified, integrated mission support capability mandated by the UN Security Council to ensure uninterrupted support for 18–24 months. Such an arrangement would facilitate the achievement of agreed milestones, strengthen Somali security institutions and enable an orderly transfer of security responsibilities. The Summit also mandated the foreign ministers of TCCs, in coordination with the AU and Somalia, to establish a Joint Task Force to mobilise diplomatic and financial support, including through a donors’ and partners’ conference.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the US later on announced that it would allow a one-year period for the drawdown of UNSOS by the end of 2027 without a commitment to extend the logistical support by UNSOS to AUSSOM, there is so far no plan on how to fill in the end of the logistical support from UNSOS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In tomorrow’s consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are therefore expected to exchange on options for managing the financial and logistical uncertainty facing AUSSOM at the end of its current mandate by the end of December 2026 and the associated security vacuum this may create. The application of Resolution 2719 is likely to remain a key issue, particularly as successive PSC–UN Security Council consultations have failed to reach agreement on its application to AUSSOM due to US opposition. It remains to be seen whether the PSC and EUPSC will reaffirm their common position on the framework as a viable financing mechanism, as they did last year. It is recalled that the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/EU-AU-PSC-to-PSC-Joint-Communique.pdf">joint communiqué</a> adopted at their previous consultative meeting stressed the need to fully and effectively implement Resolution 2719 to ensure predictable, sustainable and adequate financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations, including AUSSOM, as the only viable way of securing the gains that have been made so far. Given that the EU has been the largest single financial contributor to the AU missions in Somalia, providing nearly <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/16/eu-support-to-somalia-council-approves-further-support-under-the-european-peace-facility-to-the-somali-national-army-and-to-the-military-component-of-the-african-union-transition-mission-in-somalia/">€2.7 billion</a> since 2007, the two sides may also call on other international partners to increase their support for AUSSOM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Most significant for tomorrow’s consultation is the preparation and implementation of a realistic transition plan for the managed unwinding of AUSSOM, as well as mitigating security risks that may arise from an unplanned and rushed withdrawal of AUSSOM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Sudan</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that DRC, Ethiopia, Algeria and Somalia will make statements from the AUPSC side and Slovenia, Poland, the Netherlands, France and Germany will make lead remarks for the EUPSC side.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Discussions are expected to build on the PSC’s August field mission to Khartoum, with some from the PSC likely to share observations on what they encountered and established during the field mission. There have been notable developments since then, both in the conflict dynamics and the regional and extra-regional entanglement in the conflict, which may also attract some engagement. The consultation is also expected to focus on ongoing diplomatic initiatives and peace efforts. In this regard, both sides may highlight recent engagements of the Quintet (AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN), including its September Good Offices Mission to Khartoum and October consultations with Sudanese civil society and political groups in Addis Ababa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Efforts to coordinate diplomatic initiatives would also receive attention. On 23 September, the Quintet and Quad held their first joint high-level meeting, bringing together the two coordination mechanisms. This was followed by the sixth consultative meeting on enhancing coordination of peace initiatives in Sudan, held in Geneva on 21 October. The meeting brought together countries sponsoring major peace initiatives, members of the Quad, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Quintet, and neighbouring and regional countries, with the aim of aligning diplomatic efforts around the urgent needs of the Sudanese people.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the domestic political front, the SAF-backed Preparatory Committee for a Sudanese-led dialogue was established in late August, an initiative <a href="https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20260831/african-union-commission-welcomes-sudanese-sudanese-dialogue-initiative">welcomed</a> by the AU Commission Chairperson. However, Sudanese authorities indicated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) would be excluded from the process. The Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud) rejected the initiative and <a href="https://sudantribune.com/article/318282">criticised</a> the position of the Commission, warning that a military-controlled political process without a ceasefire could entrench Sudan’s de facto division. Against this backdrop, the PSC and EUPSC are likely to reaffirm the need for a humanitarian truce and cessation of hostilities as steps towards a permanent ceasefire, followed by an inclusive national dialogue and civilian-led political transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">External involvement in the conflict may also feature in tomorrow’s discussion. The September 2026 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session63/advance-versions/a-hrc-63-23-auv.pdf">report</a> of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan highlighted foreign recruitment and external support networks fuelling the conflict. The two sides are therefore expected to condemn external interference and call on external actors to cease providing support to the belligerents.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Eastern DRC</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The draft agenda envisages that France, Croatia, Belgium and Germany will take the lead in delivering intervention from the side of the EU, while South Africa and Gabon will take the lead on the side of the AU. The two sides are expected to review developments on the ground and progress across the various mediation tracks, particularly AU-led mediation efforts. The PSC may highlight the AU High-Level Panel of Facilitators’ shuttle diplomacy in October, which included meetings with AFC/M23 leaders in Goma on 5 October, President Paul Kagame in Kigali on 7 October and President Félix Tshisekedi in Kinshasa on 9 October, aimed at advancing existing peace commitments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Under the Qatar-led Doha process, the Congolese government and AFC/M23 met in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August, agreeing on a mechanism to address implementation challenges and a roadmap for negotiating outstanding protocols under the November 2025 Doha Framework for Peace. Progress has also been made in operationalising the ICGLR-led Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), including the establishment of its secretariat and reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi in October. Meanwhile, the US-led Washington process continued through the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism, which held its seventh meeting in Geneva on 16–17 September. This was followed by a meeting of military officials from the DRC and Rwanda, alongside representatives of the AU, the US and Qatar, in Garmisch, Germany, on 20–22 October. However, tensions have persisted, with the US imposing financial and asset-blocking sanctions on Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and the Zagima Credit and Saving Society, a financial institution serving Rwanda’s security services, on 28 October, citing continued support for M23. On 2 November, the US also announced the termination of Rwanda’s eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite these diplomatic efforts, the security and humanitarian situation remains dire, with continued fighting in North and South Kivu, increasing use of armed drones and mounting civilian suffering. According to Africa CDC figures, the latest Ebola outbreak has surpassed 10,000 cases and 5,000 deaths. Another notable development was the announcement in Goma on 12 October of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition comprising M23 and other groups under former President Joseph Kabila, further complicating the conflict dynamics. During a recent engagement with UN officials led by MONUSCO head James Swan, the coalition <a href="https://aa.com.tr/en/africa/drc-rebels-threaten-to-abandon-doha-peace-talks-over-proposed-constitutional-referendum/4110599">reportedly</a> threatened to withdraw from the Doha Framework Agreement if the government proceeded with its proposed constitutional referendum.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As in previous consultations, the PSC and EUPSC are expected to condemn the destabilising activities of armed groups in eastern DRC, call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and demand the unconditional withdrawal of all uninvited foreign forces, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2773 (2025). They may also call for the dismantling of parallel administrative structures established by M23 in areas under its control and reiterate their condemnation of the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources in eastern DRC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Sahel and Lake Chad </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The draft agenda envisages that Spain, Czechia, Malta and Denmark will take a lead in making an intervention from the side of the EU, while Morocco, DRC, Nigeria, Algeria and Cameroon will lead the intervention from the side of the PSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The security situation in the Sahel has deteriorated further since the October 2025 PSC–EUPSC consultative meeting, marked by intensified terrorist attacks. On 25 April, JNIM and Tuareg separatist fighters launched coordinated attacks across Mali, targeting Bamako and military installations. In Niger, the January attack on Diori Hamani International Airport by Islamic State Sahel Province was followed by another attack by JNIM in June.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">PSC may highlight the AU’s intensified diplomatic engagement with Sahelian states. AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf visited Mali in July and subsequently Burkina Faso, reaffirming the AU’s commitment to constructive engagement. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1356.1.comm_en-1.pdf">1356<sup>th</sup></a> session, the PSC welcomed these efforts and called for continued high-level engagement, including with Niger, to support political transitions and confidence-building. The AU High Representative Mamadou Tangara also participated in the inaugural ECOWAS–AES ministerial dialogue in Dakar on 17 October, reaffirming the AU’s readiness to facilitate cooperation between the two blocs through MISAHEL.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the EUPSC side, it may also highlight that the EU has recalibrated its engagement, including the appointment of Birgitte Nygaard Markussen as its new Special Representative for the Sahel in July to advance its renewed regional approach and strengthen political dialogue. The European Parliament also <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/afet-workshop-on-a-new-eu-approach-to-th/product-details/20260613WKS07241">examined</a> options for re-engaging with the Sahel in July.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Dakar talks between ECOWAS and AES, which established joint working groups to develop a framework for future cooperation, offer an opportunity to rebuild regional security coordination despite the AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS. The PSC and EUPSC are likely to welcome this development during tomorrow’s consultations and may explore ways to better coordinate their approaches and support efforts to comprehensively address the multidimensional challenges of the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With respect to Lake Chad, as in previous years, tomorrow’s consultations are expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, progress in implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR), and the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The two sides are likely to express concern over the persistent threats posed by Boko Haram, ISWAP and other terrorist groups despite the MNJTF’s efforts to degrade their operational capabilities. Niger’s withdrawal from the MNJTF in March 2025 has further complicated regional security efforts. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1347.1.comm-EN.pdf">1347<sup>th</sup></a> session, the PSC expressed deep concern over the resulting security vulnerabilities and urged Niger to reconsider its decision and resume full participation in the MNJTF, a call the two sides may reiterate.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The MNJTF’s financial constraints and operational gaps are also expected to feature during the consultation. In this regard, the PSC may reiterate its position from the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1318.comm_en.pdf">1318<sup>th</sup></a> session and explore with its EU counterparts the possibility of applying UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to support the MNJTF. The two sides may also commend the EU’s sustained support for the MNJTF and broader peace, security, stabilisation, recovery and resilience efforts in the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>AOB (for information only) </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As in last year’s meeting, the agenda also includes an item under Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments, proposed by the EUPSC. While Cyprus, Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania are envisaged to lead the intervention on the side of the EU, no representation is envisaged from the side of the AU. As in past years, it is anticipated that the situation in Ukraine is expected to be the main focus of the intervention of the representatives of the four countries from the EU side.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The consultative meeting will conclude with closing remarks by the joint chairs of the consultative meeting, the EUPSC Permanent Chair and the AU PSC Chairperson.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Joint communiqué </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As host of the consultation, the PSC initiated a draft joint communiqué, which it finalised and shared with the EUPSC on the afternoon of 3 November. It is recalled that the two sides failed to adopt a joint communiqué between 2022 and 2024 due to disagreements over the inclusion of language referencing the war in Ukraine. Last year, however, they broke this trend and succeeded in adopting a joint communiqué, raising expectations that they will do so again at this year’s consultative meeting. It is anticipated that, while there will be no standalone statement or paragraph dedicated to Ukraine, the formulation used during the last consultative meeting will cover Ukraine in a list of conflict situations about which the two sides are concerned.</p>
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		<title>9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 05:40:33 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>4 November 2026</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/9th-informal-joint-retreat-of-the-au-psc-and-eupsc/">9th Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-1"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding one-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>9<sup>th</sup> Informal Joint Retreat of the AU PSC and EUPSC</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 4 November 2026</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (5 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 9<sup>th</sup> informal joint retreat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ahead of their 17<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting on 6 November.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Antonin Benjamin Biéké, Special Envoy of Côte d’Ivoire to the AU and PSC Chairperson for November, and Lene Vensild, Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, are expected to co-chair the informal seminar. Bankole Adeoye, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and a representative from the EU are also expected to address the retreat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The preparatory work has been undertaken by the PSC Committee of Experts (CoE). While there were initial engagements in October focusing in particular on the agenda for both the informal retreat/seminar and the annual consultative meeting, the CoE held the preparatory meetings on 2 and 3 November to work on allocation of speaking responsibilities and finalise work on the draft joint communique for the joint consultative meeting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since 2015, the PSC and EUPSC have institutionalised informal retreats ahead of their annual consultations to address thematic peace and security issues. This year’s retreat will cover four items: maritime security; AU/EU efforts on countering terrorism and violent extremism in Africa; AI governance, peace and security; and Women, Peace and Security.</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Maritime Security </strong></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The agenda envisages that Spain, Greece and Romania will take the lead in delivering intervention on the side of the EU. It is to be recalled that this agenda featured in last year’s informal retreat. It is worth recalling that this item also featured in the AU-EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025, whereby the ministers in their <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/44804-pr-joint-communique-21052025-1_250521_231618.pdf">Joint Communiqué</a>  ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As in the earlier retreat, the two sides are expected to review developments across Africa’s maritime domain, assess existing cooperation and identify priorities for strengthening joint responses. There are dynamic developments in the Mediterranean and Red Seas and in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans that affect the maritime interests of African states and the maritime and trade route interests of European states. As choke point geopolitics intensifies and the maritime domain acquires increasing economic significance, there is a rising need in Africa to secure and invest in Africa’s maritime zones and in both Africa and Europe to enhance the security of global trade routes. In terms of recent developments, it is expected that the impact of agreements on ports and maritime zones in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea may attract attention. The decline in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, supported by the Yaoundé Architecture and coordinated regional and international efforts, constitutes a major progress. Yet maritime insecurity has become increasingly complex, with persistent threats from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, trafficking, oil theft and transnational organised crime. In the Red Sea, some of the notable developments involve conflicts and geopolitical tensions, including the impact of the war between the US and Israel against Iran and the emergence of Houthi threats on the Red Sea, endangering major maritime corridors, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, forcing shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope and contributing to the resurgence of piracy activities off the Somali coast. The expansion of terrorist activities towards West Africa’s coastal states also raises concerns over maritime routes being exploited for arms trafficking, illicit financing and movement of fighters.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC side may highlight continental and regional frameworks, notably the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy, the African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, the Yaoundé Architecture and the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Particular attention may be given to <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/beyond-the-flag-off-building-a-sustainable-maritime-security-architecture-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/">progress</a> towards operationalising the Combined Maritime Task Force in the Gulf of Guinea, which the PSC considers an important step towards an African-led, ready-to-deploy maritime security capability. For its part, the EUPSC is expected to highlight its maritime engagements, including Operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA in the Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean, both mandated until February 2027; the Coordinated Maritime Presences initiative in the Gulf of Guinea; and the various maritime capacity-building programmes across the continent. Another recent development that may feature under this agenda item is the July 2026 EU–Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement for ASPIDES.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this background, a key issue for the retreat is how to leverage and boost existing African-led maritime governance frameworks and security arrangements at continental, regional and national levels for enhancing the safety of maritime trade routes, coordination between existing AU and EU maritime initiatives, particularly through intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, joint operational planning and capacity-building.</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">AU/EU Efforts on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is expected that Ethiopia, Cameroon, Somalia and Togo will take the lead in delivering the intervention from the AU PSC side, and Austria, Hungary and Slovakia from the EU side. Terrorism remains one of Africa’s most pressing security threats. Despite a global decline in terrorism-related fatalities, Africa has become the main epicentre of terrorist violence, accounting for around 70–75 per cent of global fatalities, according to a <a href="https://papsrepository.africanunion.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0acb0ecd-95c4-4fa6-8bca-cf53913cd09f/content">report</a> presented at the PSC’s 1354<sup>th</sup> session in July 2026.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC may highlight efforts to strengthen Africa’s counterterrorism architecture, including the AU Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa (2026–2030), initiatives to establish an African Arrest Warrant and a database of terrorist groups and their supporters, as well as the operationalisation of the PSC Subcommittee on Counter Terrorism. However, mistrust among neighbouring states and regional fragmentation continue to undermine cooperation against transnational terrorist threats. These challenges informed the PSC’s ministerial meeting on ‘<em>Good Neighbourliness and Regional Response to Security and Terrorism Challenges in Africa</em><em>,</em>’ held on the margins of the 81<sup>st</sup> UN General Assembly in September. At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1354.comm_en.pdf">1354<sup>th</sup></a> session, the PSC also expressed its grave concern about the ‘downturn in international cooperation, including the withdrawal of technical and financial support to peace support operations in Africa, attributed to the shift in national policies and escalating geopolitical fragmentation,’ a concern that the PSC is likely to raise during tomorrow’s engagement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">For its part, the EUPSC may highlight its extensive counterterrorism engagement in Africa, combining operational assistance with support for criminal justice institutions and prevention of violent extremism. According to <a href="https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/default/files/2026-03/european_union_-_contribution_to_sg_report_on_activities_of_the_un_system_in_implementing_the_un_global_counter-terrorism_strategy_2025.pdf">EU figures</a>, Africa receives 72 per cent of its €659 million counterterrorism and prevention programming. Through the European Peace Facility, the EU has supported AU missions in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin and the SADC mission in Mozambique, alongside bilateral military assistance. Its support also extends to counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, border security, countering terrorist financing and community-based prevention programmes, particularly in the Sahel, West African coastal states and East Africa. Recent initiatives include the €45 million SecFin Africa programme (2024–2028) targeting illicit financial flows and terrorist financing, and the €30 million Multidimensional Security and Stabilisation Programme (2024–2028), supporting security and criminal justice capacities in West Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this context, the retreat offers an opportunity to address gaps in coordination and the sustainability of counterterrorism efforts, particularly amid declining international financing for African-led peace operations, including the AU mission in Somalia. Beyond sustaining operational support and coordination, as well as the role that natural resources exploitation is playing in fueling war economies in affected regions, there are also major issues, including how to address the trust deficit that affects policy coherence both on the continent and between the AU and EU and the need for a shift from security-heavy instruments to investment in long-term interventions that address underlying conditions of fragility.</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;">AI Governance, Peace and Security</h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of leading interventions, it is envisaged that Poland and Latvia will speak for the EU and Nigeria, Algeria, Côte d’Ivoire and DRC are expected to lead in making interventions on the side of the AU. Artificial intelligence (AI) has gained increasing prominence on the agenda of the PSC. During tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC may highlight its efforts to establish a continental AI governance framework and the progress made so far. Its engagement on AI governance, peace and security began at its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1214.comm_en.pdf">1214<sup>th</sup></a> session in June 2024, which recognised AI’s potential for conflict prevention, early warning and peacebuilding, while raising concerns over the risks associated with its rapid development in the absence of adequate regulation. At that session, the Council requested a comprehensive study on the impact and implications of AI on peace, security, stability, democracy and development in Africa, and the establishment of a multidisciplinary Advisory Group on AI, peace, security and governance to propose continental governance options, including for military applications. The advisory group was established in March 2025.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1267.comm_en.pdf">1267<sup>th</sup></a> session, held at the ministerial level in March 2025, the PSC called for mainstreaming AI in peace support operations, early warning and preventive diplomacy, alongside the development of a Common African Position on AI and an African Charter on AI to guide its responsible use. At another ministerial-level meeting, its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1339.comm_en.pdf">1339<sup>th</sup></a> session in April 2026, the Council emphasised the need for Africa to shape, develop and control its own AI technologies to safeguard its sovereignty across the AI ecosystem. It also underscored the importance of digital and data sovereignty and requested the AU Commission to expedite the establishment of an African Fund for AI. Given Africa’s limited influence over the development of AI systems, the Council further stressed the need to strengthen Africa’s participation in international norm-setting through coordinated continental positions and strategic engagement in multilateral forums.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The retreat provides an opportunity for both sides to exchange experiences and explore practical areas of cooperation in AI governance, peace and security. Particular attention could be given to translating the AU’s growing policy commitments into institutional capabilities, including through capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and cooperation on the responsible use of AI in conflict prevention, particularly by exploring the integration of AI-enabled tools into the Continental Early Warning System. The discussions could also explore ways to strengthen coordination on emerging international AI norms, ensuring that African perspectives and priorities are adequately reflected in global AI norms and governance.</p>
<h4 style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Women, Peace and Security </strong></h4>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is expected that South Africa and Uganda will lead the AU’s intervention on this agenda, and Ireland, Malta and Italy will take the lead on the side of the EU. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has been a standing agenda item of the PSC since March 2010. Over the subsequent fifteen years, the Council held 28 dedicated sessions, progressively expanding its engagement from the protection of women in conflict to their meaningful participation in conflict prevention, mediation, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction. Key institutional developments include the Office of the AU Special Envoy on WPS, FemWise-Africa, the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35958-doc-continental_results_framework_wps_.pdf">Continental Results Framework (CRF)</a> for monitoring implementation, and the Swakopmund Process, a biennial, rotational platform for PSC engagement with WPS actors that has contributed to advancing gender parity policy for all AU-led and co-led mediation processes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This is an area on which there has been growing collaboration between the AU and the EU. The EU and individual EU member states have provided and remain major sources of support to AU’s work on the WPS agenda, including the work of the AU Special Envoy on WPS. In the context of the emergence of some powerful currents against gender equality and the WPS agenda, tomorrow’s retreat is likely to highlight the impact these developments are having and the responses to the threat these developments pose. In the context of these developments, discussions may focus on deepening the convergence between the AU and the EU for safeguarding the gains registered over the years and supporting initiatives to this end, building on existing collaboration between the AU and the EU. In view of the growing focus on bridging the gap between normative commitments and implementation, the discussion on this agenda is also expected to focus on ways of enhancing steps to translate normative and institutional investment into operational reality, not least of all in enhanced women&#8217;s participation in peace processes. As Amani Africa’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/Fifteen-Years-of-the-Women-Peace-and-Security-Agenda-at-the-AU-Peace-and-Security-Council.pdf">fifteen-year review</a> of the WPS agenda of the PSC underscores, the priority is to move beyond regular deliberations towards systematic implementation.</p>
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		<title>16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC</title>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2025 08:26:25 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>8 October 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/16th-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-the-eupsc-and-au-psc/">16th annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>16<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting between the EUPSC and AU PSC</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 8 October 2025</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (09 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 16<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting. This follows the 8<sup>th</sup> annual joint retreat taking place today in Brussels, Belgium, where the consultative meeting is also being held.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Opening remarks at the 16th consultative meeting are expected from Tebelelo Boang, Permanent Representative of Botswana to the AU and the AU PSC Chairperson for October, and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Delphine Pronk.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year’s consultative meeting comes against the background of three consecutive years of the AUPSC and the EUPSC being unable to adopt a joint communique due to disagreement over the language to be included with specific reference to the war in Ukraine. It is anticipated that this trend will finally come to an end during this year’s consultative meeting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The members of the PSC reviewed and provided inputs on the draft joint communiqué only yesterday 6 October after the draft was sent by the EU side to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October. The agenda for this year’s consultative meeting reflects continuity with past discussions, focusing on developments in the Horn of Africa—particularly Somalia/AUSSOM and Sudan—, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes Region. In addition, the two sides are expected to address broader global geopolitical developments under ‘Any Other Business’. Additionally, the final agenda included ‘Working lunch on Women, Peace and Security’ during which the AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security is scheduled to make a presentation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Horn of Africa </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Under the Horn of Africa agenda item, two situations are envisaged to receive particular attention: the situation in Somalia, including the deployment of AUSSOM, and the ongoing crisis in Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With Ethiopia and Eswatini leading the intervention of the PSC on <strong>Somalia and AUSSOM</strong>, the dominant concern remains the mission’s funding. AUSSOM is faced with an existential crisis, arising from mounting debts and the lack of a predictable and sustainable financing arrangement to sustain operations until its planned exit at the end of 2029.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU had pinned its hope on UN Security Council Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations as a viable framework for predictable financing. However, efforts to operationalise the resolution stalled in May after the UN Security Council failed to reach an agreement, primarily due to U.S. opposition to applying the resolution as a test case for AUSSOM.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AU has long explored alternative mechanisms, particularly the convening of a pledging conference. Following repeated delays—including earlier plans for Doha to host—progress was made on 25 September 2025 when the AU, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the UN, and the United Kingdom co-convened a High-Level Financing Event for AUSSOM on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. The AU has already committed an unprecedented amount of USD 20 million from its Peace Fund Crisis Reserve Facility for the mission’s 2025 operations, in addition to the provision of personnel and logistical enablers to strengthen operational effectiveness. The United Kingdom pledged GBP 16.5 million (USD 22 million), while Italy and Spain each appeared to commit USD 1 million. Additional, albeit modest, contributions are also anticipated from Japan and the Republic of Korea.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Given the nearly $200 million annual budget of AUSSOM, the pledges—though symbolically important—remain insufficient to bridge the gap. The co-chairs’ <a href="https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/co-chairs-summary-of-the-high-level-financing-event-for-the-african-union-support-and-stabilization-mission-in-somalia-aussom-25th-september-2025">summary</a> of the New York event underscored that ‘AUSSOM’s sustainability depends on closing the current financing gap, which remains substantial’. Yet, in the immediate term, there may be a possibility for significantly reducing the financing gap if the EU comes to the rescue of the mission through additional renewed support, considering the EU investment into this mission as the single largest contributor to AU missions in Somalia, providing close to <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/16/eu-support-to-somalia-council-approves-further-support-under-the-european-peace-facility-to-the-somali-national-army-and-to-the-military-component-of-the-african-union-transition-mission-in-somalia/">€2.7 billion</a> since 2007.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">While the EU has not yet announced a specific funding package for AUSSOM, following the signal from the EU during the pledging conference in New York, expectations remain high that the EU may make an announcement in the near future. Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to provide more clarity on the EU’s thinking in this respect.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, Somalia’s political landscape remains tense, with disagreements sparked by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s introduction of a ‘one person, one vote’ electoral model for the 2026 elections, replacing the long-standing clan-based indirect system. The move has generated friction with opposition figures and some of the federal member states, notably Jubaland and Puntland. These tensions risk diverting focus from the fight against al-Shabaab and, if left unresolved, could potentially escalate into violence.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is also expected that, despite the fact that the attempt to apply Resolution 2719 to AUSSOM did not succeed, reference will be made in the outcome document to the continued relevance of Resolution 2719 and the imperative for its implementation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With Tanzania and Algeria leading PSC’s intervention on <strong>Sudan</strong>, discussions are expected to focus on the security, political, humanitarian situations and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. Fierce fighting has continued around El-Fasher and the Kordofan region between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the political front, a particular point of concern for both counterparts will be the establishment of parallel governing structures and their implications for Sudan’s territorial integrity. In May 2025, SAF leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister and announced a technocratic government based in Port Sudan. In response, the RSF-led <em>Tasis</em> coalition declared its own parallel government in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, in July 2025, naming Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as Prime Minister, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo as head of a Presidential Council, and SPLM-N leader Abdel Aziz al-Hilu as his deputy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The PSC, during its <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1264.press_.stat_en.pdf">1264<sup>th</sup></a>, <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1292.press_.stat_en.pdf">1292<sup>nd</sup></a>, and <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1293.comm_en.pdf">1293<sup>rd</sup></a> sessions, firmly rejected the RSF’s creation of a parallel government and urged AU member states and the wider international community not to recognise it. Similarly, the 24 September 2025 Co-Chairs’ <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sudan-co-chairs%E2%80%99-statement-occasion-ministerial-meeting-coordinating-efforts-de-escalation_en">statement</a> issued by the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK following a ministerial meeting on Sudan ‘strongly’ rejected the establishment of parallel governing structures. In tomorrow’s meeting, the PSC and the EU PSC may reiterate the more neutral language of the co-chairs’ statement, rejecting the establishment of parallel governments in Sudan, while emphasising the need for a Sudanese-led and Sudanese-owned transition process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Signs of a more concerted diplomatic process gained momentum in September, though it remains fragile and without any breakthrough. On 12 September, the foreign ministers of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (the Quad) issued a <a href="https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/joint-statement-on-restoring-peace-and-security-in-sudan/">joint statement</a> calling for an initial three-month humanitarian truce leading to a permanent ceasefire, followed by the launch and conclusion of an inclusive and transparent transition process within nine months. The conflict parties did not heed the call.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On 24 September, the Quad’s foreign ministers met again on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York. That same day, the AU, EU, France, Germany, and the UK convened a ministerial meeting with relevant actors to discuss Sudan and coordinate efforts toward de-escalation and civilian protection. The Co-Chairs’ <a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sudan-co-chairs%E2%80%99-statement-occasion-ministerial-meeting-coordinating-efforts-de-escalation_en">statement</a>, while welcoming Quad’s joint statement, expressed support for the AU and IGAD’s efforts to coordinate international and bilateral initiatives to pressure all Sudanese parties towards a ceasefire, humanitarian action and political dialogue. While these peace initiatives are encouraging, the lack of coordination among various initiatives remains a major challenge to launching a credible single peace process for Sudan—a challenge that tomorrow’s meeting is likely to reflect upon further.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The two counterparts are also expected to discuss ways of increasing pressure on the warring parties to allow unhindered humanitarian access, urge foreign actors to refrain from fueling the conflict, and step up humanitarian assistance in response to what has become the world’s most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis—with over two-thirds of the population (30 million people) in need of assistance and more than 24 million facing acute food insecurity.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Great Lakes Region </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With The Gambia and Equatorial Guinea leading PSC’s intervention, on the Great Lakes Region, as before, the focus remains on the situation in eastern DRC and the renewed diplomatic efforts to address it—particularly the involvement of the US and Qatar alongside the AU and relevant regional blocs (SADC and EAC). Diplomatic activity has intensified since M23’s significant territorial advances in eastern DRC beginning in January, including control of mineral-rich Goma in North Kivu Province.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A major breakthrough was the US-brokered <a href="https://www.state.gov/peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda">peace agreement</a> signed between the DRC and Rwanda on 27 June 2025. The two parties agreed, among others, to refrain from acts of aggression; to immediately and unconditionally end state support to non-state armed groups; and to implement the Harmonised Plan for the Neutralisation of the FDLR and Disengagement of Forces/Lifting of Defensive Measures by Rwanda—an outcome of the Luanda process. To support implementation, a Joint Oversight Committee—composed of the two parties, the US, Qatar, Togo (as AU facilitator), and the AU Commission—has been operationalised and has convened three meetings so far, the latest held earlier this month. In parallel, Qatar has been facilitating direct peace talks between the DRC and M23 since late March. This separate but coordinated track with the US produced a preliminary peace agreement in July, but missed the mid-August deadline for a final deal. Talks are <a href="https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/10/joint-statement-on-the-third-joint-oversight-committee-meeting-for-the-peace-agreement-between-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-and-the-republic-of-rwanda#:~:text=On%20October%201%2C%202025%2C%20representatives,of%20the%20Joint%20Oversight%20Committee%20(">expected</a> to resume during the week of 6 October.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Meanwhile, in March, the joint EAC-SADC Summit appointed a Panel of Facilitators composed of five former Presidents to support the DRC peace process. On 1 August, the Co-Chairs of the Joint EAC-SADC <a href="https://www.eac.int/communique/3409-communiqu%C3%A9-meeting-of-the-co-chairs-of-the-joint-eac-sadc-summit-with-the-panel-of-facilitators-for-the-drc-peace-process">Summit</a> met the Panel in Nairobi and adopted a framework to merge the Nairobi and Luanda processes. They also decided on the immediate merger of EAC-SADC and AU structures into a single mechanism comprising the AU Mediator and the EAC-SADC Panel of Facilitators. The Summit further called on the AU Commission to ensure all other initiatives and stakeholders align with this African-led process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against this backdrop, tomorrow’s meeting will grapple with at least three issues. First, despite progress in implementing the US-brokered peace agreement, hostilities and hostile rhetoric persist, with the parties trading blame for obstructing peace efforts. Second, accountability in the region is critical in light of continued allegations of human rights violations against civilians, as evidenced in the 5 September <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffmk-drc/a-hrc-60-80-auv-en.pdf">report</a> of the Fact-Finding Mission on North and South Kivu. Third, there is also the issue of how the three peace initiatives could be consolidated into one credible process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Sahel and Lake Chad Basin</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria will lead the intervention of the PSC during tomorrow’s meeting. The security and political situation in the Sahel has continued to deteriorate since the last consultative meetings of the two organs in November 2024. JNIM and ISGS have intensified their attacks in the Central Sahel and expanded their operations into coastal West Africa. This worsening insecurity is compounded by protracted political transitions, with the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger consolidating power and extending military rule until 2030.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The approach of the AU and the regional body ECOWAS was primarily focused on the unconstitutional change of government, with no due regard to the priority issue of saving the countries from the existential threat facing them due to terrorism. In a departure from this flawed policy approach, at their second annual joint consultative meeting, they held in May, the PSC and ECOWAS <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/2nd-Comm.AUPSC-ECOWAS-MSC-2nd-AJCM-EN.pdf">agreed</a> to develop a security cooperation framework with the three countries to more effectively respond to the crisis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow’s consultative meeting is expected to discuss recent AU efforts, including the AU Commission Chairperson’s meeting with representatives of the three countries in May, the visit of Angola’s Foreign Minister as special envoy on behalf of AU Chairperson João Lourenço, and the July appointments of President Évariste Ndayishimiye of Burundi as Special Envoy for the Sahel and former Gambian Foreign Minister Mamadou Tangara as Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of MISAHEL. The meeting is further expected to deliberate on ways to step up engagement with the three countries to address the security crisis as a critical avenue for facilitating a return to constitutional order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On <strong>Lake Chad Basin</strong>, tomorrow’s discussion is expected to focus on the security and humanitarian situation in the Lake Chad Basin, the operations and support needs of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and the status of implementing the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience (RS-SRR). The EU has pledged €30 million over 18 months from January 2025 to strengthen MNJTF operations, while the AU Commission has also been providing support through the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund and equipment from the Continental Logistics Base. A key regional development of interest to the consultative meeting is Niger’s March announcement of its withdrawal from the MNJTF, raising fears that this could weaken the Force and create a security vacuum that can be exploited by terrorist groups active in the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year, beyond African peace and security issues, the agenda also reserves space for Any Other Business (AOB) to discuss global geopolitical developments. As an agenda proposed by the EU side, it remains unclear what the focus of the discussion on this agenda would be. However, there is increasing recognition that the major global geopolitical changes, characterised by, among others, the emergence of a multipolar world, are not without serious implications for both the AU and the EU and for their relationship. In this context, the flagrant breaches of international law norms, including international humanitarian law and related challenges to multilateralism and global governance reform, may also feature in the discussions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As noted earlier, for the past three years, the PSC and the EU PSC have been unable to adopt a joint communiqué, primarily due to disagreements over the language to be used on the war in Ukraine. As highlighted in our earlier <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/provisional-programme-of-work-of-the-psc-for-the-month-of-october-2025/"><em>insights on the PSC</em></a>, the recent AU–EU ministerial meeting held in May 2025 and the ongoing negotiations toward the outcome document of the forthcoming AU–EU Summit, expected in November 2025, have created optimism that both sides may reach common ground to adopt a joint communiqué this time. Indications are that the draft communiqué of the consultative meeting reproduced the formulation used in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/44804-pr-joint-communique-21052025-1_250521_231618.pdf">joint ministerial communiqué</a> which expressed support for ‘a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Sahel and in other major wars and conflicts around the globe, including Syria.’ With this, the two sides are expected to adopt a joint communiqué, ending the past three years of deadlock in adopting such a communiqué.</p>
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		<title>8th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/8th-informal-joint-retreat-of-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2025 06:56:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with EU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Thematic Insights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[PSC Meetings with EU Organs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2025]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=21867</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>7 October 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/8th-informal-joint-retreat-of-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/">8th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>8<sup>th</sup> Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 7 October 2025</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (08 October), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 8<sup>th</sup> informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 16<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 09 October. This year’s joint retreat and consultative meeting is set to be hosted by EUPSC in Brussels, Belgium.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Ahead of the joint retreat, the AU PSC, particularly at the level of the Committee of Experts, met in Brussels on 6 October to finalise consultation on the agenda and the assignment of roles in leading interventions by members of the PSC. With the draft communique initiated by the EU side relayed to the AU belatedly on Friday 3 October, this will also be the first time that the AU PSC gets a chance to view and discuss on the draft joint communiqué.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since 2015, the AUPSC and the EUPSC have institutionalised the practice of holding an informal joint retreat before their annual consultative meeting. Typically, the informal joint retreat focuses on current thematic issues. Tomorrow’s retreat is expected to focus on three key agenda items. The first one will be Peace Support Operations, with a focus on the implementation of United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 and complementarity between Africa-led operations and EU-Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. The second agenda item will focus on maritime security, and the third will address hybrid threats to peace and security, with a particular emphasis on cybersecurity, AI, and disinformation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Peace support operations constitute a major area of longstanding partnership between the AU and the EU. With the understanding that AU’s peace support operations are critical for advancing global public good and fill in critical gaps in the international peace and security architecture, the EU has been a leading partner of the AU, among others, in making significant financial contributions to AU peace operations. Following the end of the Africa Peace Facility and the inauguration of the European Peace Facility, there has been a shift in approach. Yet, tomorrow’s session is expected to build on the AU-EU ministerial joint communiqué commitment to ‘strengthen African security, defence capabilities and stabilisation, including the supply of military equipment through the European Peace Facility and the African Peace and Security Architecture.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of partnership on peace operations in Africa, the most notable recent development was the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2719 on the financing of AU-led peace operations. One concrete situation in respect of which there was strong convergence between the AU and the EU on the application of this resolution was the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Thus, EU-AU Foreign Ministers in the <a href="https://au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/44804-pr-joint-communique-21052025-1_250521_231618.pdf">Joint Communiqué</a> they adopted after their meeting on 21 May 2025 ‘recognised the need for adequate, predictable and sustainable international support for AUSSOM and supported the hybrid implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) pertaining to the framework for financing the AU PSOs by the UN [and] considered this as more pressing given the multiplicity of challenges facing the Federal Government of Somalia and the need to continue supporting the government and strengthening state institutions.’ Despite the consensus between the AU and the EU on the application of UNSC Resolution 2719, the UNSC failed to adopt a decision on the use of this resolution for financing the AU mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). With no alternative source of funding available, the AUSSOM is faced with an existential financial crisis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite the setback regarding the application of the Resolution for financing AUSSOM, the PSC is expected not only to affirm strong support for Resolution 2719 but also to call for strong commitment by all for the implementation of the resolution. The draft joint communiqué initiated by the EU side does not contain a dedicated language on Resolution 2719, which is viewed by members of the PSC as an omission that needs to be rectified. It is thus anticipated that the PSC will push for a formulation expressing strong support for and a joint call for advancing the implementation of the resolution in the joint communiqué to be adopted during the annual consultative meeting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The second sub-item of the first agenda item focuses on complementarity between African missions and EU missions/operations. The EU runs various missions and operations as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and CSDP in various parts of the continent, including three military operations (Central African Republic (CAR), Mozambique and Somalia) and five civilian missions (CAR, Gulf of Guinea, Libya, Mauritania and Somalia). In the theatres where African and EU missions operate in parallel, there is an opportunity for closer coordination and advancing complementarity. It is expected that during tomorrow’s retreat, the PSC and the EUPSC will exchange on opportunities not only for experience and information sharing but also for technical and logistical cooperation between the Africa-led missions and the EU-CSDP missions and operations operating in the same country.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other agenda item tabled for the AUPSC-EUPSC informal retreat is Maritime Security. From the Joint communiqué of the May 2025 AU-EU Summit, the ministers welcomed the ongoing cooperation between the two continents on enhancing maritime security in the ocean and sea bordering Africa and Europe. In this regard, they ‘renewed their commitment to maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and called for greater exchange of information, improvement of operational coordination and provision of enforcement capacity to protect sea lanes and combat transnational crimes, including drug trafficking and piracy. The ministers also committed to work together to end Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, take action to conserve and sustainably use the ocean and sea, as well as promote science-based management of marine resources.’ The upcoming consultations are likely to discuss the evolving maritime security threats critical to Africa&#8217;s blue economy, global trade routes and EU-Africa partnerships.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The engagement on this may build on the 23 April 1275<sup>th</sup> session of the PSC, which focused on the ‘Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.’ From the session’s <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1275.comm_en.pdf">communiqué</a>, it is notable that beyond endorsing the Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea <em>as a standing, ready-to-deploy force capable of rapid and coordinated regional responses</em>, the PSC underscored the importance of addressing the underlying drivers of maritime crime &#8211; poverty, weak governance and limited economic opportunities. This marked a welcome shift toward a holistic, preventive approach to maritime security, recognising that sustainable stability cannot be secured through military and law enforcement measures alone. By prioritising issues such as development deficits, corruption, youth unemployment and lack of sustainable livelihoods, the approach holds promise for building long-term resilience in coastal communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Finally, the last agenda item to be discussed at the AUPSC-EUPSC joint informal retreat is hybrid threats to peace and security, with particular focus on cybersecurity, AI and disinformation. Hybrid threats encompassing cybersecurity breaches, AI-driven manipulations and disinformation campaigns have escalated globally and across Africa as well, posing a threat to stability. According to INTERPOL’s 2025 Africa Cyberthreat Assessment <a href="https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2025/New-INTERPOL-report-warns-of-sharp-rise-in-cybercrime-in-Africa">Report</a>, a growing share of reported crimes in Africa is cyber-related. The report goes further and highlights that, despite the rising caseloads, most African states surveyed still lack essential IT infrastructure to combat cybercrime. Just 30 per cent of countries reported having an incident reporting system, 29 per cent a digital evidence repository and 19 per cent a cyberthreat intelligence database.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Regarding AI and disinformation, the AU Commission Chairperson noted in a <a href="https://au.int/pt/node/44544">speech</a> earlier this year that ‘with AI’s ability to spread rapidly, …complex ethical and security concerns now exist.’ He cautioned that ‘[l]eft unchecked, AI will amplify these threats, exploiting disinformation, cyber-attacks, and even autonomous weapons,’ adding that disinformation and hate speech in the online space have become ‘most dangerous accelerators of conflicts.’ Accordingly, the AUC Chairperson counselled that ‘[o]ur response must be to pursue a balanced approach—one that maximises AI’s benefits while mitigating its risks.’ It is expected within this context that the two sides would exchange respective experiences, both in terms of the nature and trend of the threat posed by cybersecurity, AI and disinformation, and in terms of the tools being used and developed to respond to these threats.  Issues that may feature include closing AI governance gaps, harmonising early warning systems for AI-driven misinformation and expanding capacity-building for digital literacy and fact-checking. By integrating African perspectives into the development of global AI norms and governance, as well as advancing joint action for countering hybrid threats, the consultations can ensure the adaptation of the AU’s and EU’s governance and peace and security instruments to these emerging domains.</p>
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		<title>PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1284TH MEETING</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1284th-meeting-2/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2025 07:55:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with EU Organs]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[2015]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>19 JUNE 2025</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/peace-and-security-council-1284th-meeting-2/">PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL 1284TH MEETING</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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		<title>15th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and EU PSC</title>
		<link>https://amaniafrica-et.org/15th-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-the-psc-and-eu-psc/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2024 11:15:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=19770</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>21 November 2024</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/15th-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-between-the-psc-and-eu-psc/">15th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and EU PSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>15<sup>th</sup> Annual Joint Consultative Meeting between the PSC and EU PSC</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 21 November 2024</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (22 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union Political and Security Committee (EU PSC) will convene their 15<sup>th</sup> joint annual consultative meeting in Addis Ababa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The informal joint retreat the two organs customarily convene ahead of their joint annual consultative meeting with the aim of facilitating constructive dialogue through informal engagements, was held earlier this year in March 2024 at the request of the EU PSC. In the joint informal retreat, the AUPSC and the EUPSC exchanged views on conflict prevention, mediation and post-conflict strategies and financing of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The AUPSC and EU PSC also used the informal retreat to deliberate on their working methods.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Ahead of the consultative meeting, the representatives of the AU and the EU are set to hold a meeting at the level of directors on 21 November. On that same day, at the level of the PSC, the Committee of Experts of the PSC is scheduled to hold a final preparatory meeting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is envisaged that the meeting commences with welcoming remarks by the co-chairs, Jean Leon Ngandu Ilunga, Permanent Representative of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November and Delphine Pronk, Permanent Chair of the EU Political and Security Committee.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Considering that this meeting comes at the heels of two consecutive joint annual consultative meetings without a jointly issued communiqué, as a result of divergence particularly as it related to disagreements concerning responses to the Russia – Ukraine war, it is expected that this meeting will focus on thematic and continental security related agenda items of common interest and pathways for enhanced cooperation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite some divergences, the broader scope of the AU – EU relationship suggests a commitment to regional stability and security areas where both organs’ interests intersect. Shifting the conversation to mutual areas of interest could allow both sides to sidestep their differences while advancing shared peace and security priorities on files of common interest. The agenda items for this year’s meeting show that they will focus on regional and country-specific situations of concern for both organs. These are: the situations in Somalia and the implementation of the UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023), Sudan, Sahel and Lake Chad Basin and Great Lakes Region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Somalia</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As it has become a common practice of the PSC, it is anticipated that different PSC member states take the lead in making interventions on the different agenda items on behalf of the PSC. On Somalia, it is anticipated that Uganda along with Egypt will take lead in making the intervention from the side of the PSC. On the part of the EUPSC, France along with Italy is envisaged to take the lead.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With respect to Somalia, the issue that is expected to attract the most attention is the transition from the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). This transition comes amidst rising piracy incidents along Somlaia’s coast, driven in part by shifting shipping routes due to Red Sea security concerns linked to the Middle East crisis.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are two issues that are sure to dominate the meeting. The first relates to the lack of clarity and disagreement surrounding troop-contributing countries in the context of the transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM. Following the between Ethiopia and Somalia that were sparked by the signing of a MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, Somalia responded by insisting that it opposes the participation of Ethiopia, which is a major troop contributor to ATMIS, in the AUSSOM unless Ethiopia retracts the MoU. The post-ATMIS process has turned into a major regional flashpoint following the express reference welcoming Egypt’s offer to contribute to AUSSOM in the communique of the <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/wp-content/uploads/1225th-PSC-Communique-on-CONOPS-for-the-AU-Led-Mission-in-Somalia-Post-ATMIS-EN.pdf">1225<sup>th</sup></a> session of the PSC. This provoked an expression of alarm by Ethiopia about the risk of the situation endangering regional peace and security. There is a shared interest between the AU and the EU, given the considerable investment the EU put into supporting the AU mission in Somalia and its interest in preventing the unravelling of the situation in Somalia and the region, to urge that the countries refrain from taking measures or making pronouncements that escalate tension. They may also reiterate the AU PSC communique of its 1238 session that directed<strong><em> ‘</em></strong>the African Union Commission to undertake consultation with AU Member States that have expressed readiness to contribute troops to AUSSOM’ and requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission ‘to use all available preventive diplomacy tools to urgently find an amicable/peaceful solution to the differences between the Federal Republic of Somalia and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia based on the respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The second issue concerns the financing of AUSSOM. On the part of the AU, the preferred source of funding is UNSC Resolution 2719 as stated in the various PSC communiqués.  The EU, which has been the major source of funding for AU mission in Somalia, also supports this position. It has indicated that it does not anticipate to contribute more than Euro 60 million. Yet, considering that there is no consensus in the UN Security Council on the use of Resolution 2719, one of the issues in tomorrow’s meeting is whether the EU would be amenable for considering to provide a substantial portion of the funding for AUSSOM as a measure for bridging between the time of the deployment of AUSSOM and the activation of Resolution 2719 as seems to be proposed by the US.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Sudan </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Sudan is another critical agenda item expected in the consultative meeting. It is anticipated that Egypt along with Uganda and Morocco would take the lead in making interventions on the side of the PSC. From the side of the EUPSC, Ireland and Cyprus are expected to take the lead.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The hostilities between the SAF and RSF have escalated into a humanitarian emergency with widespread reports of indiscriminate attacks on civilians, SGBV and violations against children, famine, displacement and violations of international humanitarian law. The conflict has resulted in a large scale crisis in the region with recent reports indicating that nearly 25 million people are in dire need of humanitarian assistance and over 14<strong> </strong>million people forcedly displaced internally and into neighbouring states. High Representative Josep Borrell recently described the situation as one that is ‘<a href="https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-press-remarks-high-representative-josep-borrell-after-meeting-17_en">becoming desperate</a>’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AUPSC and EUPSC are expected to express deep concerns over worsening conditions, condemning attacks on civilians, including recent mass killings and rapes in Sudan’s El-Jazirah state. The two bodies are likely to emphasise based on respective existing pronouncements the urgent need for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to halt the violence and ensure the protection of civilians while reiterating that a civilian-led government remains the only sustainable solution to the crisis. They are also expected to underline the importance of accountability for those responsible for atrocities. Additionally, the councils are anticipated to highlight the necessity of a coordinated international response to address the massive humanitarian needs. And stress the urgency of providing immediate humanitarian aid while supporting Sudan’s path toward long-term peace and stability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Sahel and Lake Chad</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Nigeria along with Morocco and Cameroon is expected to take the lead in making interventions on the side of the AU on the situation in the Sahel. It would be Hungary along with Luxembourg that would take the lead on the side of the EUPSC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Sahel’s complex security, governance and humanitarian crisis has long been a focal point for AU and EU security agendas. Since the last AUPSC – EUPSC session, the military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have announced their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) this setback in regional integration and security was further compounded by the dissolution of the G5 Sahel initiative and the withdrawal- upon the request of the host- of the UN’s 10-year mission in Mali, MINUSMA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In light of these developments, it is expected that the two sides will express concern over the worrying security situation in the region and the attendant deteriorating humanitarian situation. They may echo existing pronouncements on the need for countries in political transition in the Sahel to adhere to the transitional timelines. They may also express the need for coordinating engagements in responding to the situation in the region and express support for the role of ECOWAS and the AU in advancing stability and the resolution of the constitutional crisis in the three Sahelian countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The need for maintaining lines of communication and engaging the authorities in these countries may also underscored. Emphasis is also expected to be made on the need for enhancing support for people affected by the humanitarian situation in the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On Lake Chad, Cameroon along with Nigeria is expected to take the lead in making intervention on the side of the PSC. In Lake Chad, despite gains by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the splinter groups Islamic State&#8217;s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) factions, the security and humanitarian situations remain critical, with millions of civilians in urgent need of assistance. The AU PSC and EU PSC are expected to recognise the importance of a cohesive multidimensional regional approach to address the security and humanitarian crisis in the region. Cognizant of the threats the region faces from terrorism and violent extremism, coups and unconstitutional changes of government, it is also expected that the two organs will emphasise the need for enhancing security, civilian protection and humanitarian relief.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Great Lakes Region</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On Great Lakes, Angola is expected to take the lead in making interventions on the side of the AUPSC while Belgium along with Romania will take lead on the side of the EUPSC. The discussion on the Great Lakes Region is expected to focus on the situation in Eastern DRC. The two organs will likely focus on terrorism, proliferation of armed groups, illegal exploitation of natural resources and the progress with the Luanda process. The EU’s renewed strategy for the GLR may also feature.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Since the last consultations between the two organs, the Luanda process has revived with the 30 July 2024 signing of a ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda. However, the security situation in eastern DRC has remained volatile with armed groups continuing to perpetrate atrocities. It is thus expected that the AUPSC and EU PSC may express deep concern over the insecurity prevailing in Eastern DRC and the deteriorating humanitarian situation. They may condemn the various armed groups engaged in acts of violence in the region and the support that is extended to these armed groups wreaking havoc in the region. They may also commend the Luanda process and the progress achieved thus far in the talks under the auspicious of the Luanda process. In this respect, they may welcome the ceasefire agreement negotiated between DRC and Rwanda on 30 July 2024 within the framework of the Luanda process. They may also urge both DRC and Rwanda to maintain their commitment to and engage constructively in the Luanda process for achieving a conclusive peace agreement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The agenda also allocates a slot for AOB. Beyond the foregoing issues that are on the agenda of the PSC, it is anticipated that representatives of the EUPSC would raise from the floor the war in Ukraine. This is a pressing issue of existential proportion particularly for members of the EUPSC from Eastern Europe. In their intervention, it is expected that EU representatives may underscore their expectation that the annual consultative meeting should not be focusing on African peace and security issues only and need to reflect on peace and security issues of concern in Europe as well with a focus in particular on Ukraine. They may emphasise that the blatant breach of the fundamental UN Charter and international law principles of state sovereignty and inviolability of the territorial integrity of states are matters of concern for all members of the international community and should be condemned.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Yet, while members of the PSC may empathise with the concerns of the EUPSC, there has been no change in their position from the last two years. Most notably, While AU member states may share the view that the invasion of one country by another and the breach of the sovereignty of one country by another is contrary to the UN Charter and international law and don’t support the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, they lack a common AU position to enable the PSC on adopting any measure against this particular breach of international law. In view of this, if EU member states insist on the inclusion of reference as a condition for the adoption of a joint communique, it is possible that the two sides may end up repeating the last two consultative meetings, thereby ending their meetings without adopting a joint communiqué.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">However, aside from the issue of Ukraine, the two Councils share common interests and perspectives on most of the issues relating to the various agenda items of the consultative meeting. This may therefore be the moment for the two sides to decide on whether they should continue to be stuck on an issue in respect of which they face incompatibility arising from mandate gaps affecting the AU PSC and held themselves back from pronouncing themselves on all the issues on the agenda of the consultative meeting on which they do not have differences.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the light of the dilemmas this poses and the strongly held policy position, the two sides are left with four options and scenarios. The first option is the repeat of the last two consecutive consultative meetings. This is the scenario of each clinging to its position and agree to disagree. This is in a way a well-known experience. The second option is they agree to adopt a joint communique with the EUPSC having the possibility of attaching as <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/will-the-au-and-the-eu-peace-and-security-organs-once-again-fail-to-adopt-joint-communique-of-their-annual-consultative-meeting/">annexe</a> their views on Ukraine. This is the scenario of tampered compromise which in some ways allows both sides to uphold their policy position with some adjustment. The third option is to adopt a joint communiqué in which there would be no reference to Ukraine and focusing exclusively on the agenda of the consultative meeting. The other and fourth scenario is the AU PSC relents on its existing position and agrees to a reference to Ukraine in the joint communiqué.</p>
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		<title>14th Annual Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC</title>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 06:36:40 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>03 May 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/14th-annual-consultative-meeting-of-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/">14th Annual Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="wpb-content-wrapper" id="wpb-content-root"><div data-parent="true" class="vc_row row-container" id="row-unique-5"><div class="row unequal col-half-gutter double-top-padding double-bottom-padding single-h-padding full-width row-parent"><div class="wpb_row row-inner"><div class="wpb_column pos-top pos-center align_left column_parent col-lg-12 single-internal-gutter"><div class="uncol style-light font-555555"  ><div class="uncoltable"><div class="uncell" ><div class="uncont no-block-padding col-custom-width" style=" max-width:996px;" ><div class="empty-space empty-half" ><span class="empty-space-inner"></span></div>
<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>14<sup>th</sup> Annual Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 03 May 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (03 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 14<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting, preceded by the 6<sup>th</sup> joint retreat taking place today. The EU will be hosting this year’s round of meetings, which will be taking place in Brussels, Belgium.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The joint consultative meeting between the AUPSC and EUPSC has been taking place since the inaugural meeting held in 2008. Convened within the framework of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the annually convened joint consultative meeting of the two organs mainly serves to discuss thematic and conflict related agendas of common interest.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Chairperson of the AUPSC and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uganda to the AU, Ambassador Rebecca Amuge Otengo and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Ambassador Delphine Pronk are expected to make opening remarks to start off the 14<sup>th</sup> consultative meeting. This year’s meeting is expected to address three region specific situations of concern in Africa. These will be situations in the Great Lakes Region (GLR), the Horn of Africa and the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin (LCB).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Sahel and LCB</em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The situation in the Sahel and LCB was one of the agenda items that featured in the previous joint annual consultative meeting. On this specific item, it is expected that Senegal will take the lead speaking on behalf of the AUPSC while Morocco, Nigeria, Cameroon and Tunisia will be supporting speakers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Sahel region continues to experience complex security and humanitarian crises. Terrorist groups have continued to stage string of attacks in Burkina Faso, including the most recent attacks that claimed the lives of 44 civilians in north-eastern part of the country, near the Niger border. The attacks against civilians by various armed groups has intensified in the country. On 20 April, the UN has reported the killing of 150 civilians by armed men in uniform. Similarly, in Mali, civilians continue to be targets of terrorist attacks. The UN Secretary-General’s latest report (<a href="https://undocs.org/S/2023/236">S/2023/236</a>), which was presented to the Security Council on 12 April, characterized the security situation in Mali as ‘volatile’ with surging clashes between non-state armed groups, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, mainly in the Gao and Menaka regions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The protracted and deadly conflicts involving terrorist groups and the compounded effects of climate change, socio-economic and governance challenges have unleashed a dire humanitarian crisis. According to United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, over 24 million people in the Sahel needed assistance in 2022, which is estimated to be six million more than in 2021. While the humanitarian needs are high, a concerning trend is the limited humanitarian access and the dwindling resources for assistance that hinders the delivery of assistance to vulnerable populations and exposes humanitarian personnel to high risks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of the threat of expansion of conflicts involving terrorist groups, one of the most worrying trends is the geographic spread of the insecurity from the Sahel to the littoral states of West Africa. This has triggered the establishment of the Accra Initiative. In December 2022, the 62<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary session of ECOWAS Summit, highlighting the urgent need for ‘more effective coordination and structured harmonization of the different counter-terrorism initiatives in the region’, agreed to establish a regional force to combat terrorism and deter unconstitutional changes of government. The envisaged regional force will be an additional arrangement to the already existing plethora of multilateral security frameworks, including the G5 Sahel Joint Force and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The two sides are also expected to discuss the transitional processes towards restoration of constitutional order in Mali and Burkina Faso. It is to be recalled that the PSC for the first time held an informal consultation with countries affected by coups and held exchanges with representatives of these countries, including Burkina Faso and Mali on 26 April. This is the first encounter for the PSC to have direct engagement with these countries and may inform PSC’s approach to the discussion on the transitions in these two Sahelian countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The complex security situation in the Sahel is further compounded by the deepening geostrategic tension playing itself out in this region. While there are various factors for the major diplomatic breakdown between Mali and France, the emergence of the Wagner Group as the preferred security partner of Mali as Mali kicks out France and cancels longstanding security agreement with France and the Group’s involvement in Burkina Faso have transformed the Sahel into a major theatre of geostrategic rivalry. This geostrategic tension has come to increasingly affect regional and international diplomatic efforts for stemming the tide of increasing insecurity in the region. It has eroded trust between these countries and countries in the region and is one of the factors that soured relations in G5 Sahel leading to Mali’s withdrawal from it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Against the background of the foregoing, the consultative meeting is expected to discuss not only the current state of the security situation but also how best the two Councils work together to address the challenges facing regional and international peace and security diplomacy in the region including the issues that have put the future of the UN Mission in Mali on the balance and how to lesson, through the provision of effective multilateral security partnership, the dependence of Sahel countries on the Wagner Group that is having its heavy toll on civilians and may further undermine regional security in the long term. In the medium to long-term, it is expected that the two sides would indicate their expectation to get useful strategic guidance from Joint Strategic Assessment being undertaken by the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel led by former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou and which was formally launched by AU, UN, ECOWAS, and the G5 Sahel in September 2022.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The second aspect of the agenda is the situation in the Lake Chad. While the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism in the region, violence against civilians has increased steadily over the past year. As of January 2023, the crisis in the region has affected 11 million people depending the humanitarian crisis including four million facing severe food insecurity and more than 2.5 million displaced population. Despite the dire needs, humanitarian action continues to face challenges not only in relation to access but also due to decreasing humanitarian funding, which may in part be due to the large-scale commitment of resources to the crisis in Ukraine including resources that would otherwise have been used for meeting humanitarian needs in other settings. In 2022, in the Lake Chad, only 55% of the required funds were received to provide humanitarian assistance to affected population.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Beyond the military response to the threat of terrorism, responding to the broader challenges requires development and humanitarian interventions. Towards providing a more sustained response and in terms of addressing the immediate and long-term needs, the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS) remains critical.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Similarly, the third high level conference on the Lake Chad held in Niamey in January 2023 further reinforced the importance of complementarity of various actions and interventions and called for a harmonized response supported by humanitarian, stabilisation and development actors.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Horn of Africa </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With respect to the Horn of Africa, Uganda will be taking the lead in delivering PSC’s intervention while Djibouti, Namibia and Zimbabwe will assume supportive role representing the AUPSC. As the consultative meeting is happening at the time when the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) marked the first anniversary of its operation in April, the PSC and EUPSC may take the opportunity to evaluate the progress and challenges of the mission over the last one year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The ‘Somalia-led and owned offensive’ against Al Shabaab since August 2022 has registered notable military and political gains. While Somali local militias or community defence forces along with Somali Security Force (SSF) take the lead in the offensives, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) not only provided critical logistical support but also carried out successful joint kinetic operations with the SSF as part of the execution of its mandate pursuant to PSC communique 1068 (2022) and the UN Security Council Resolutions 2628 (2022). Al Shabaab has come under enormous pressure and suffered military defeats, particularly in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states, with its operational capability degraded and control of several towns and villages lost to the SSFs. This also paved the way for the handover of Forward Operating Basis (FOBs) as part of the security transition in line with the ATMIS Concept of Operations (CONOPs) and the Somalia Transition Plan (STP). The first of FOBs handover took place in January when ATMIS transferred Maslah FOB to the federal government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">EU being the main financial contributor to ATMIS, the consultative meeting is likely to focus on the funding shortfall that the mission has continued to face as well as the financial implication of the delay of the 2000 troops drawdown until 30 June 2023. The funding shortfall of ATMIS for 2022 was around €25.8 million (US$32 million). The shortfall has considerably increased for 2023, standing at US$89 million. In March of this year, Bankole reportedly <a href="https://apnews.com/article/somalia-african-union-force-alshabab-funding-20ae63975a3b51da9956d85df5e82a7d">appealed</a> to bilateral and international partners to help fill the indicated shortfall, further warning that if ATMIS does not have the funds to operate effectively in the coming months before the scheduled handover of security responsibility to SSF in December 2024, ‘it may mean that al-Shabaab will eventually take over the responsibilities of a state in Somalia.’ It is worth underscoring that much of the success that AMISOM /ATMIS registered in Somalia owes its main resource base to the funding that the EU provided under the now defunct Africa Peace Facility. This has developed, by any standard, to be one of, if not the most successful, peace and security partnership with AU and EU complementing each other harnessing their comparative advantages. There is growing concern in EU about heavy dependence on its resources and the lack of similar commitment and contribution from others. The EU has also been encouraging the AU to make at the very least symbolic financial contribution towards PSOs. While the AU has initiated processes highlighting its commitment to make financial contributions through the revitalization of its Peace Fund, this has as yet to be translated into committing symbolic financial contribution demonstrating burden sharing in the financial sphere. Of course, beyond funds, one thing that is not adequately highlighted but worth mentioning in terms of AU’s contribution to international peace and security is its enormous burden sharing through its peace support operations, which pay through lives and limbs as well as the various social and other costs resulting from loss of such lives and limbs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The peace process in Ethiopia, particularly the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, is also expected to feature in the consultative meeting. Apart from the encouraging progress made in silencing the guns, reports from recent engagements from various international actors with and media reports of the interim administration of Tigray major remaining issues include addressing the enormous needs of people affected by the war for humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation support and the remaining challenges of the departure of forces other than the Ethiopian army from Tigray.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The conflict in Sudan is expected to be the other item expected to dominate the consultative meeting. The ongoing fighting that broke out on 15 April in Khartoum between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is claiming the lives of hundreds of people, destroying civilian infrastructure, and leaving millions of people stranded without adequate access to amenities and necessities. Wide range of actors are putting diplomatic pressure on the two conflicting parties to commit to a ceasefire and immediately resume dialogue, but fighting has continued to escalate, risking a full-blown civil war. In a conversation with Mo Ibrahim on 29 April, the former Prime Minister of Sudan warned that the conflict in the country could become worse than the civil wars in Syria and Libya. The concern about this grave risk is very legitimate given existing faultlines, fragility of state institutions and the huge risk of the conflict becoming a site of regional and global geostrategic confrontation as different foreign parties take sides as the war becomes protracted.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Considering the enormous humanitarian consequences of this fighting and the frightening implications of its continuation, the most urgent imperative the consultative meeting is sure to focus on is how to secure effective ceasefire and launch peace talks for a permanent cessation of hostilities. While the phone calls and statements to the two sides continue to be made by regional and international actors, the AUPSC and EUPSC are expected to take stock of the state of the diplomatic efforts and how best to bolster and sustain these efforts further and to seek ways and means of creating conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance in Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong><em>Great Lakes Region (GLR) </em></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Burundi will be taking the lead in relation to the GLR on behalf the AUPSC while Tanzania and South Africa will play supportive role on the file. With the full revival of the March 23 Movement (M23) in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the GLR has been experiencing heightened insecurity and increasing humanitarian crisis. The tension between DRC and Rwanda which ignited over Rwanda’s alleged support to the M23 rebel group has been escalating throughout the last few months of 2022 and early 2023, with little to no progress attained in restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. Despite fortified regional efforts to respond to M23 insurgency and activities of other armed groups in eastern DRC including the deployment of the East African Community (EAC) regional force, conflict between M23 and the Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) remains unresolved. However, the intensity of fighting seems to have faded and some territories have been handed by the M23 to the EAC force. There is however increasing hostility against the EAC force from DRC. This has recently led to the resignation of the Force Commander of the EAC Force who accused Kinshasa of undermining the mission. Welcoming advances made through the military intervention deployed by the EAC and expressing support to the Nairobi and Luanda processes, the AUPSC and EUPSC may emphasise the need for fortifying efforts geared towards political solution of the crisis in eastern DRC and stress the importance of strengthening mediation to restore diplomatic relations between DRC and Rwanda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another pertinent issue that requires attention is also the coming general election in the DRC which is scheduled to take place in December 2023. Months from the commencement of the elections, DRC President Tshisekedi has conducted reshuffling of government, appointing his former Chief of Staff as minister of economy and former vice president Jean-Pierre Bemba as defence minister. Tshisekedi’s suggestions in early March of possible delays to the elections in eastern provinces due to insecurity has already provoked criticism from the prominent opposition leader, Martin Fayulu. Voter registration was also extended by the Electoral Commission on 15 March. Noting these developments, the two counterparts may emphasise at the coming consultative meeting, the need to ensure political tensions over the timely conduct of the general elections do not further compound the already complex security situation in the country.</p>
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		<title>6th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 May 2023 09:57:08 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>02 May 2023</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/6th-informal-joint-retreat-of-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/">6th Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span><strong>6<sup>th</sup> Informal Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC </strong></span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 02 May 2023</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (02 May), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 6<sup>th</sup> informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 14<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 03 May. This year’s joint retreat is expected take place in Brussels, Belgium.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The practice of convening an informal joint retreat ahead of the annual consultative meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC was institutionalised starting from 2015. Since then, the two counterparts have regularly held these retreats which are meant to facilitate constructive dialogue by presenting the platform for consultative engagement based on identified thematic issue(s). The coming informal joint retreat is expected to feature two agenda items. The first one will be global peace and security concerns, with a focus on issues surrounding multilateralism. The second agenda item will focus on the financing of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), including through access to UN assessed contributions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated, the world today faces complex challenges that necessitate joint action and multilateral solutions. Arms proliferation, transnational organised crimes, spread of terrorism, climate change, global economic shocks and cybersecurity are some of the security threats that have clear transboundary effect and cannot be effectively addressed in the absence of a well organised global approach. Despite this, we witness growing scepticism about multilateralism with nationalist sentiments and individualistic tendencies increasing globally. While this trend started a while ago, it became particularly acute during the COVID-19 pandemic during which some parts of the world such as Africa were left to fend for themselves despite the mantra ‘we are all in this together’. The rise of protectionism and the failure of advanced countries to show solidarity by sharing essential medical supplies including therapeutics and vaccines and vaccines technology blew a major blow to people’s faith in multilateralism. The situation was further aggravated by the lack of collective action that fairly responds to the socio-economic fallouts that the pandemic triggered. As if these were not enough, the war in Ukraine and the responses it triggered added a more dangerous dimension with economic shock waves and deepening bug power confrontation threatening to plug the world into further division and even a nuclear catastrophe. All of these and the various other conflicts in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa highlight not only the failure of the prevailing multilateral system to deliver on some of its most basic roles and the need for its urgent transformative reform. Questions such as how to make the multilateral system more inclusive and representative (for example through the reform of the archaic and increasingly failing UN Security Council), how to ensure consistent and effective collective enforcement of international norms and how to achieve the call of Secretary General for a new Bretton Woods moment and the enhancement of the role of regional organizations are some of the issues that are of pressing concern for this first agenda item of the 6<sup>th</sup> informal joint retreat.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">One of the key issues in this regard that may receive some attention at tomorrow’s informal joint retreat is the use of sanctions and coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. While the use of Chapter VII to impose sanctions has to an extent been an effective tool for maintaining international peace and security, both sanctions under Chapter VII and more so unilateral sanctions have also lately come under criticism for having counterproductive impact on nations’ ability to effectively defend themselves and pursue their development agendas. For the AU, as elaborated in the outcome of the 35<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly [<a href="https://www.iri.edu.ar/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/a2022africaDoc21UAAsambleaDecisions-Declarations-and-Resolution-of-the-Thirty-Fifth-Ordinary-Session-of-the-Assembly-of-the-Union.pdf">Assembly/AU/Res. 1(XXXV)</a>], unilateral coercive measures and sanctions have proven not only to have ‘disproportionate and indiscriminate human cost’, but also impede on the right to development particularly by constraining trade and investment relations and negatively impacting post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. Additionally, given the major reversals being experienced in the state of peace and security both in Africa and globally, it may interest for tomorrow’s informal consultation that the AUPSC and the EUPSC explore ways of enhancing effective conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic and other means within the framework of Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter (on ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’ and ‘Regional Arrangements’, respectively) as critical measure for restoring the effectiveness of the multilateral system to meet the promise of the UN Charter to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Aside from these issues, it is also possible that EUPSC members will make remarks regarding the war in Ukraine, within the framework of the agenda item on global peace and security concerns. It is to be recalled that the EU proposed to discuss the Ukraine war as one of the agenda items of the previous joint retreat. However, on the side of the AU, the topic was considered to be beyond the mandate of the PSC for discussion at the joint retreat. Eventually, the lack of agreement on the inclusion of a reference became a deal breaker as the annual consultative meeting ended without the adoption of a joint communique. Discomfort on the part of AU member states on the matter still persists and it would be interesting to see if the convening of the meeting in Brussels will lead to the inclusion of a language on the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The other agenda tabled for the AUPSC-EUPSC informal retreat is the perennial issue of financing of AU PSOs, which is not actually totally separate from the first agenda. AU PSOs serve and contribute to the global public good of maintaining international peace and security. It is this recognition of the role of AU PSOs that led to the establishment by the EU of its most celebrated financial instrument – the Africa Peace Facility. This facility more than any other served as the fuel critical to both the establishment and effective take off of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the launch of over a dozen peace support operations that tremendously contributed to the maintenance of international peace and security, albeit at heavy loss of the lives of PSO personnel which only African troop contributors are willing to bear. The lack of effective, predictable and sustainable funding has severely undermined the use of AU PSOs. The resultant vacuum that this situation has left has led to not only the proliferation of poorly functioning, military heavy, ad hoc and politically expedient self-defence based operations but also the increasing resort of countries seeking robust security cooperation to private military companies. These are developments that not only take place with little regard to multilateral frameworks but also in the case of the Wagner Group in a manner that undermines various tenets of multilateralism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The discussion on the agenda is coming on the heels of the adoption of the African Consensus Paper on predictable, adequate, and sustainable financing for the AU peace and security activities by the AU Assembly at its 36<sup>th</sup> ordinary session held in February of this year. On 28 April, the UN Secretary-General also released the much-anticipated report on progress made towards the fulfilment of commitments set out in UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 2320(2016) and 2378(2017), which were adopted to advance the issue of sustainable and predictable funding for AU PSOs using UN assessed contributions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Members of the EUPSC are likely to be interested to get clarity on what AU’s 25 percent commitment to the PSOs means as envisaged in the Consensus Paper. It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly agreed to cover 25 percent of its PSOs budget in January 2015 as part of the effort to take charge of its own budget. According to the Concept Note, it appears that the commitment is not to cover 25 percent of the total budget of PSOs but to dedicate the same percent of AU’s annual budget to cover the ‘preparation stage’ of AU PSOs while expenses required for the ‘employment and post-employment stages’ of the PSOs are expected to be covered by the UN through its assessed contribution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Consensus Paper further explains activities that fall within the category of ‘preparation stage’ stating that the 25 percent of the Union’s annual budget will cover costs related to strategic planning, mission specific pre-deployment training, mission-specific technical assessments and fact-finding missions, recruitment and selection process of mission personnel, pre-deployment verification of personnel and equipment, negotiations and signing processes for the MoU between the AU and Police/Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCC), negotiations and signing processes for AU-Host Country Status of Forces/Mission Agreements, negotiations and signing processes for Letters of Assists between the AU and Countries Contributing capabilities for AU-Led PSOs.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In terms of the operationalization of the AU Peace Fund, the PSC members may also highlight the commitment the AU Assembly displayed at its 36<sup>th</sup> ordinary session in February of this year, where it decided to the immediate use of the Peace Fund and its Crisis Reserve Facility to support the deployment and operations of East African Community regional force in eastern DRC, as well as to contribute towards filling the financial gap in ATMIS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The informal retreat is also an opportunity to assess the status of the implementation of the tripartite AU-EU-UN project on AU Compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF). Launched in November 2022, the project aims to enhance AU’s capacity to ensure that its PSOs are continuously planned and conducted in compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Given that the compliance issue was one of the sticking points during the negotiation to adopt UNSC resolution on financing AU PSOs in 2018 and 2019, the work undertaken under this project is expected to strengthen AU’s position in the negotiation expected to resume this year. The informal meeting serves as an occasion to build and renew the consensus for access to UN assessed contributions for AU PSOs authorized by the UNSC.</p>
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		<title>13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC</title>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Jun 2022 10:29:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[PSC meetings with EU Organs]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>10 June 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/13th-annual-joint-consultative-meeting-of-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/">13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>13th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting of the AUPSC and EUPSC</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 10 June 2022</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (10 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 13<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting, preceded by the 5<sup>th</sup> joint retreat taking place today. With AU hosting this year’s round of meetings, the consultative meeting will be taking place physically, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The AUPSC and EUPSC have been convening joint consultative meetings since 2008 in the context of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. These meetings mainly serve to discuss thematic and conflict related agendas of common interest to the two counterparts. Within that framework, previous joint consultative meetings have addressed thematic issues such as migration and terrorism and violent extremism as well as country/region focused situations including conflicts and crises in Libya, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and others.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This year’s joint consultative meeting is expected to commence with opening remarks by Chairperson of the AUPSC and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Congo to the AU, H.E Ambassador Daniel Owassa and the Permanent Chair of the EUPSC, Ambassador Delphine Pronk. The meeting is expected to address four country/region specific situations. These are situations in the Great Lakes Region (GLR), the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) and Sahel Region, Libya, and Somalia. It is to be recalled that the Sahel Region and Somalia were also on the agenda of the previous joint consultative meeting convened on 26 October 2020, along with the situation in Sudan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In relation to the GLR, Burundi is expected to be the lead speaker on behalf of the AUPSC. Insecurity in the GLR continues to be a matter of grave concern despite positive developments having been recorded in the areas of cooperation, integration and dialogue in the region. Dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda paving the way for reconciliation, and the normalisation of relations between Rwanda and Uganda through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2019 as well as the recent reopening of the Gatuna border are some of the examples of encouraging trends in regional cooperation and integration which may be welcomed. On the other hand, the AUPSC and EUPSC may take note of the recent tensions between Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda and call up on all relevant stakeholders including the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) for the DRC to engage both sides within the framework of the Nairobi process before the tensions grow any further. In this respect, AUPSC and EUPSC may also welcome the initiative of the AU Assembly that tasked the President of Angola, as Chairperson of the ICGLR, to engage both countries and the initiatives taken by Angola’s President meeting with the leaders of both countries. As a measure of de-escalation, the two bodies may also welcome the report on the release of the two Rwandan soldiers taken from the border with the DRC.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the security and humanitarian track, the operation of ‘negative forces’ in eastern DRC continues to destabilise the region creating a cycle of forced displacement. Intensified military activities of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an armed group implicated for affiliation with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and the resumption of military activities by the March 23 (M23) Movement have particularly been major causes for concern in the early months of 2022. In late March, following the resumption of its activities, M23 expanded its operations over North Kivu at an alarming rate leading to the displacement of thousands of people. By the end of May 2022, the number of displaced persons as a result of the recent fighting in North Kivu had reached over 72,000. Operations by the ADF in North Kivu and Ituri provinces have also resulted in widespread violence against civilians including abductions and destruction and pillage of properties. According to data presented by the UN, the number of civilian deaths between June 2021 and March 2022 increased to at least 1,261 from 559 recorded for the period from June 2020 to March 2021, in North Kivu province. In this regard and as necessary measure for containing the crises involving these armed groups, the AUPSC and the EUPSC may also welcome and urge Kenya, as host of Nairobi process initiated to deal with the threat these negative forces present both through a diplomatic track and a security track, to convene the participants of the process towards supporting Rwanda and DRC in the effort to deescalate the growing tension between them and work on achieving political resolution of their disputes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">On the LCB and Sahel region, it is expected that Nigeria will take the lead speaking in representation of the AUPSC while Cameroon will be a supporting speaker on the agenda. The LCB and Sahel region are experiencing deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions. Despite the death of Abubakar Shekau – leader of Boko Haram’s Jama’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihad (JAS) faction – in May 2021, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a splinter Boko Haram faction took the opportunity to expand its operations by taking over former JAS territories and fighters. Taking an approach aimed at establishing itself as a better alternative to State authority, ISWAP’s attacks have mainly been targeted against government forces and infrastructures while it extorts funding from civilian communities in its areas of operation, in exchange for essential services. Fighters from JAS have on the other hand continued attacks against civilian populations. Terrorist insurgency and spread of violent extremism in the Sahel region also continue to frustrate military efforts including operations by the G5 Sahel Joint Force. A recent development worth reflecting on is also the decision of Malian transition authorities to withdraw from the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force and its consequent impact on regional security.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Despite some success attained in degrading insurgencies in the region, emerging trends in the means and methods used by terrorist groups have demonstrated the need for a more enhanced focus on non-military approaches that address, what our <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/the-growing-threat-of-terrorism-in-africa-a-product-of-misdiagnosis-and-faulty-policy-response/">latest report</a> called, the political and socio-economic pathologies that create grievances enabling the emergence and growth of terrorist insurgencies. The need for prioritising a multipronged political, socio-economic and humanitarian strategy towards whose fulfilment the security instruments are geared cannot be overemphasised. The important role of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the need for enhancing support for the implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region (RSS) also remains key.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">According to the UN, violence and insecurity across countries in the LCB has severely frustrated basic social services and natural resources leaving about 11 million people depending on humanitarian aid. As of April 2022, 4.1 million people in the region are facing food insecurity with 300,000 children severely malnourished. The insecurity induced humanitarian crisis in Sahel also continues to intensify. Burkina Faso in particular is faced with severe humanitarian condition, with the number of internally displaced persons reaching over nearly 2 million in 2022.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In addition to security challenges, 2021 and early 2022 have seen the Sahel region’s political situation characterised by the upsurge in unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) and prolonged transitions. Coups in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Mali have occupied much of the AUPSC’s deliberations while relevant regional bodies – mainly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) – have also been actively engaged in efforts aimed at returning constitutional order in these countries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With regards to Libya, Morocco will be the lead speaker from AUPSC’s side. The challenging political context, the fragile security situation and the dire condition of migrants are the main areas of concern the AUPSC and EUPSC may reflect on in relation to the situation in Libya. On the political front, the lack of agreement on the necessary legal framework for the conduct of the general elections which were scheduled to take place on 24 December 2021 have resulted in the postponement of the elections indefinitely. This has led to the challenge against the legitimacy of the interim Prime Minister based in the capital by the east-based House of Representatives which appointed a new Prime Minister, leading to the country’s slide back to having parallel governments. While the rivalry between the two executives has not yet turned into full armed conflict, it has already rekindled economic, political and military disputes. The halt of the unification process of parallel security forces which was already facing significant challenges entails serious concerns to the sustainability of the October 2020 ceasefire agreement. Moreover, Russia has officially recognised the east-based government, reigniting divided foreign support for the two executives and taking the country back to the pre-October 2020 situation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The challenge for AU and EU is to achieve a shared concern and perception of threat about the continuation of the crisis in Libya. Africa, particularly countries in the Sahel, have born and continue to bear the brunt of the fall out from the military campaign that precipitated the collapse of Libya in 2011. The marginalization of the AU from active role in the effort for resolving the crisis in Libya remains a source of disaffection in Addis Ababa. For the EU, the deterioration of the political situation in Libya creates complications in the context of the confrontation with Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. First, it hampers Europe’s plans to reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas by resorting to Libya as one of the main hydrocarbon suppliers. Second, the impasse between Libya’s executives and the resulting insecurity will further fuel the migration crisis in the region. According to the International Organisation on Migration (IOM), the number of displaced persons in various parts of Libya had reached 635,051 by the end of January 2022. Given that no one actor can on its own address the complex political and security crisis in Libya, it is of particular significance that the AUPSC and EUPSC affirm the interest of each for the resolution of the crisis and the need for full involvement of the AU in the multilateral effort for achieving political resolution and national reconciliation in Libya.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Regarding Somalia, Djibouti will be lead speaker while Uganda will assume the role of supporting speaker from the side of the AUPSC. In Somalia, the completion of the much delayed parliamentary and presidential elections, with the appointment of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has been a welcome progress. The final reconfiguration of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is another milestone met in 2022 although the funding requirements for the new mission remain unmet. While the EU was a principal funder of AMISOM and has already committed to continue financing AU’s peace support efforts in the spirit of the Joint AU-EU vision for 2030, EU’s proposed funds for financing ATMIS are said to fall short of the required amount. Despite the progress noted in the political situation and AMISOM’s transition, the security situation in Somalia remains volatile with Al-Shabaab sustaining its activities and carrying out intensified attacks throughout the country. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in its various areas of operation has particularly been a notable trend in Al-Shabaab’s more recent attacks. In addition to civilian causality and humanitarian toll due to insecurity, Somalia is also experiencing an escalating severe drought. According to the latest UN data, 4.8 million people are currently facing severe food insecurity while 4.2 million people are experiencing life-threatening water shortages.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The expected outcome of the meeting is a joint-communiqué. With regards to the GLR, the AUPSC and EUPSC may urge the international community to strengthen support for the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). They may further highlight the importance of exploring parallel non-military approaches aimed at addressing underlying root-causes of conflict and instability in the region and commend countries of the GLR for the formation of the Contact and Coordination Group which is aimed at overseeing non-military measures to assist in the neutralisation of armed groups in eastern DRC. Regarding the LCB, in addition to reaffirming their commitment to support the Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and LCBC, the AUPSC and EUPSC may emphasise the importance of sustained support for the implementation of the Stabilization Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin in order to address the security and humanitarian crisis in the region in a comprehensive manner. Regarding Libya, they may stress the need for sustained efforts between the AU, EU and UN, with active and full participation of the AU, for the adoption of a comprehensive plan providing concreate steps towards resolving the dispute between the two parallel governments and providing the framework for the conduct of elections. They may also call on all relevant stakeholders including the UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to sustain the momentum on the implementation of the action plan adopted in October 2021 for the gradual and sequenced withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries from the country. With respect to the political situation in the Sahel region, the two Councils may emphasise the importance of addressing the common underlying root causes of coups in the region such as democratic and governance deficits, manipulation of constitutional term limits, damaged state-society relationships and grave violations of human rights and freedoms. They may further stress the instrumentality of addressing root causes for resolving the security challenges in the region including the high rate of terrorist insurgency. On Somalia, the two may welcome the completion of the national elections and congratulate the newly elected President. They may reflect on how sustainable, predictable and sufficient funding for ATMIS can be secured including through contributions through joint mobilisation of resources, including by leveraging the EU Peace Facility, which provides the lions share of financial support for ATMIS.</p>
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		<title>5th Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Amani Africa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jun 2022 12:15:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://amaniafrica-et.org/?p=10941</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>9 June 2022</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org/5th-joint-retreat-of-the-aupsc-and-eupsc/">5th Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</a> appeared first on <a href="https://amaniafrica-et.org">Amani Africa</a>.</p>
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<div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h1 class="font-555555 fontsize-189933 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-color-165108-color" ><span>5th Joint Retreat of the AUPSC and EUPSC</span></h1></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="vc_custom_heading_wrap "><div class="heading-text el-text" ><h2 class="font-555555 fontsize-182326 fontheight-131383 fontspace-160099 font-weight-600 text-accent-color" ><span>Date | 9 June 2022</span></h2></div><div class="clear"></div></div><div class="uncode_text_column" ></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Tomorrow (9 June), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the European Union (EU) Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) will convene their 5<sup>th</sup> informal joint retreat, which will be followed by the 13<sup>th</sup> annual joint consultative meeting to be convened on 10 June. This year’s joint retreat is expected take place physically, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Starting from 2015, the AUPSC and EUPSC have institutionalised the practice of convening informal joint retreats ahead of their joint annual consultative meetings, with aim of facilitating constructive dialogue through informal engagements. As such, the joint retreats mainly serve the two organs to discuss issues of partnership and exchange views on how to enhance cooperation on various aspects of peace and security. The last time the two convened a joint retreat was in 2018, ahead of the 11<sup>th</sup> joint consultative meeting, which constituted their 4<sup>th</sup> joint retreat. In 2020, although the 12<sup>th</sup> joint consultative meeting between the two bodies took place, the joint retreat was not convened, making this year’s retreat the 5<sup>th</sup> one.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Two main agenda items are expected to feature at this year’s joint retreat – first the issue of multilateralism, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy and second, the sustainability of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). From the AUPSC side, there was interest in discussing the issue of humanitarian situation in the continent. However, given that the thematic issue was considered to be beyond the mandate of the EUPSC, the topic was not taken forward in the final agenda for the retreat. On the other hand, the EU proposed to discuss the war in Ukraine as one of the agenda items of the joint retreat. Similar to the EUPSC, it was considered to be beyond the mandate of the PSC for discussing it in the joint retreat. It is however expected that individual members of the EUPSC would in their intervention raise the war in Ukraine.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The first agenda item expected to feature at the 5<sup>th</sup> joint retreat is envisaged to focus on multilateralism, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. In ways more than one, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy are in crisis in Africa, as in other parts of the world. As highlighted in our report on Major Peace and Security Issues in Africa, the number and geographic spread of conflicts in Africa has grown exponentially.  Further highlighting the precarious state of peace and security on the continent, Africa witnessed the largest number of coups (five) since AU came into existence in a matter of 10 months period between April 2021 and February 2022. The PSC in the communique of its 1000<sup>th</sup> session expressed ‘deep concern over the persistence and resurgence of conflict and crisis situations in some parts of the Continent, including the growing threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism and armed groups.’ All these are on account of the persistence or further deterioration and expansion of existing protracted conflicts such as those in Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali and the eruption of new conflicts or crisis situations include those in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. AU Commission Chairperson in his opening address to the 35<sup>th</sup> AU Assembly warned that these trends raise ‘serious questions about the future of our flagship project to silence the guns’.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">There are at least three issues that the worrying peace and security trends and the challenges they pose to conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy give rise to. The first of this concerns the adequacy and effectiveness of the approach to the management and resolution of existing protracted conflicts. In the face of lack of sustained collective continental and international support and diplomatic attention as well as failure of national actors to assume their responsibilities for achieving peace, both peace support operations and mediation efforts as currently deployed are struggling to deliver. The second issue relates to the effective operation of conflict early warning and early response systems. While information on potential risks of conflicts is ubiquitous, there are questions on the quality of early warning reports and their timely communication for decision-makers. There is also the issue of the formation of common understanding among various decision-making actors both within the AU and between the AU and various security actors including RECs/RMs and multilateral partners such as the EU. The existence of quality early warning without catalyzing such shared understanding would not trigger early action. The third issue that perhaps presents the most serious challenge to conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy is the refusal or reluctance of concerned states to cooperate for actions for conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy. This is due to the pervasive culture of denialism and the increasing use of the defense of sovereignty. As AU Commission Chairperson rightly pointed out, ‘a restrictive, even dogmatic reading of the intangible principle of the sovereignty of the Member States raises an iron wall against any intervention by the continental organization, either as a preventive measure through early warning, or as a remedy when the crisis breaks out.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the light of the foregoing and against the background of the 6th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of AU and EU which took place from 17 to 18 February 2022, it is right that the two bodies focus on addressing the challenges facing conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy as part of a commitment for multilateralism and find ways of investing in and enhancing the effective use of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy in Africa including through enhancing regular interaction, joint analysis and exchange as well as complementary actions for prevention and preventive diplomacy, by among others focusing on channeling resources to social spending and addressing governance and development fragilities and linking the provision of support for transitions to concrete governance reforms and investment in provision and expansion of social services. Equally important is the imperative of the provision of both high-level and sustained diplomatic attention and resources support for preventive diplomacy and mediation or peacemaking processes. Success of the informal retreat on this theme would depend on the specific commitments that the two make for joint action and the mechanisms they put in place for delivering on such specific commitments along the foregoing lines.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The second agenda item to be discussed at the 5<sup>th</sup> joint retreat is the issue of ensuring sustainability of AU PSOs. An issue which may also be of central focus in the discussion on financing AU PSOs is the end of the EU funding through the Africa Peace Facility (APF) and what it could mean for collective African decision making on peace and security and AU leadership in peace efforts. The shift from APF to the European Peace Facility (EPF) which aims to explore the option of financing African peace efforts through bilateral agreements has been cause for concern among African stakeholders, not only in terms of its implications to multilateral engagement of the two continents, but also with respect to the financing gap it would entail for AU PSOs. With agreement on accessing UN assessed contributions for financing AU PSOs still pending, the funding gap created due to the shift from APF to EPF will surely have a significant impact on the capacity of AU PSOs that previously benefited from the APF scheme.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is also to be recalled that at the 6<sup>th</sup> Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of AU and EU which took place from 17 to 18 February 2022, the two Unions adopted a joint vision for 2030 which includes commitment to support ongoing discussions on the utilisation of United Nations (UN)-assessed contributions for financing AU PSOs authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The importance of ensuring sustainable and predictable financing for AU-led PSOs including through UN-assessed contributions also remains a key point of discussion at AUPSC-UNSC consultative meetings while the AUPSC continues to dedicate sessions to deliberate on the issue. Despite the weight that has been given to the issue, reaching agreement on a UNSC Resolution on utilising UN assessed contributions to co-finance AU PSOs has proven to be an on-going challenge. While the adoption of a ‘zero-draft African consensus paper on accessing sustainable and predictable financing for AU peace and security activities’ has been a welcome progress, agreement on a final version of the consensus paper is yet to be achieved. At the forthcoming joint retreat, the AUPSC and EUPSC may reflect on the primary responsibility of the UNSC for ensuring global peace and security, including in Africa, which serves as the basis for financing of AU PSOs through UN assessed contributions. In addition, the AUPSC may particularly wish to draw attention to the human cost Africa continues to pay as the most invaluable contribution to international peace and security, whose significance has never been appreciated in discussions on Africa&#8217;s contributions.</p>
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