Tomorrow (10 March), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1335th session to receive an update on the situation in Madagascar. Although the agenda was initially framed as ‘Coordinated AU–SADC Support for Madagascar,’ its focus has since shifted, with SADC indicating that there has been no substantive coordination initiated between the two sides.

The session will commence with an opening statement by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month of March, Mahlaba Ali Mamba, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Eswatini to the AU, followed by a statement from Bankole Adeoye, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS). Mohamed Idris Farah, Special Envoy to the Republic of Madagascar, and a representative of the Republic of South Africa, in its capacity as Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, are also expected to deliver statements.

Tomorrow’s session marks the fourth meeting of the PSC to consider the situation in Madagascar in the context of the political crisis the country has faced since anti-government protests began in late September 2025, culminating in the military seizure of power on 14 October 2025. The PSC convened two emergency sessions within 48 hours in October, at its 1305th and 1306th meetings, as three weeks of protests took a dramatic turn when members of the elite Army Personnel Administration Centre (CAPSAT) unit of the military expressed support for the protesters and eventually assumed power. During its 1306th session held on 15 October 2025, it is recalled that the PSC suspended Madagascar from participation in all AU activities until constitutional order is restored in the country.

The PSC last considered the Situation in Madagascar on 20 November 2025 at its 1313^th meeting. In its communiqué, the Council underscored the urgent need for ‘continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of the situation in Madagascar’ and explicitly mandated the ‘undertaking of a Field Mission in early 2026 to gather first-hand information on the realities on the ground.’ During its 1306^th session, the PSC demanded ‘a swift and full return to constitutional order through a civilian-led transitional government, and the organisation, as soon as possible, of free, fair, credible and transparent elections’ and directed ‘the AU Commission, in close cooperation with SADC, to provide the requisite support to Madagascar to ensure a swift return to constitutional order.’ It should also be recalled that at its 1305^th meeting, the PSC called on the Government of Madagascar to urgently organise an all-inclusive political dialogue as the only viable path towards consensual and sustainable solutions to the socio-economic and political challenges currently facing the country; stressing on the reactivation of the implementation of the 2011 Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar, enacted into Malagasy law under Act Number 2011-014 of 13 December 2011. The Council went further and urged for coordinated support towards the restoration of peace and stability in Madagascar under the auspices of the AU and SADC, among other decisions.

Tomorrow’s session is particularly important in light of the divergence between the PSC and SADC regarding the characterisation of the October 2025 military seizure of power and the response adopted. While the PSC, at its 1306th session, decided to suspend Madagascar on the grounds of unconstitutional change of government, SADC opted instead to dispatch a fact-finding mission. Subsequently, the Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government, held in December 2025, directed the Transitional Government of Madagascar to submit a dialogue-readiness report and a draft National Roadmap by 28 February 2026. The Summit further approved, by March 2026, the deployment of the SADC Panel of Elders, led by former President Joyce Banda of Malawi, and called for coordination with the AU and broader international partners to avoid fragmentation of efforts. In late January 2026, the Panel of Elders commenced its mission in Antananarivo to facilitate an inclusive dialogue.

In this context, tomorrow’s session is timely, as it provides an opportunity to reinforce the imperative of coordination and complementarity between the AU and the regional bloc, SADC, to ensure coherent political messaging and the coordinated mobilisation of the necessary technical and financial support, including through Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), for a consensual, inclusive, and time-bound transition process towards the swift restoration of constitutional order. Such a process should be consistent with AU norms, including Article 25(4) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The session is also in line with Paragraph 5 of the PSC’s 1313^th Communiqué and Paragraph 13 of the SADC Communiqué adopted during its December 2025 extraordinary summit, which both stress the imperative of ‘enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity’. In addition, it offers an opportunity to receive updates on the respective diplomatic measures undertaken by the AU and SADC in accompanying Madagascar towards the restoration of constitutional order, as well as to discuss emerging challenges and ways forward in coordinating efforts.

One of the updates from the SADC side in this regard could be the engagement undertaken on 20 January by the SADC Executive Secretary, Elias M. Magosi, with the leadership of Madagascar and Seychelles on regional priorities, peace and development. The Executive Secretary paid a courtesy call on General Maminirina Eli Razafitombo, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and substantive Minister of National Defence of Madagascar. The visit took place ahead of his formal meeting with Colonel Randrianirina. Discussions focused on the ongoing transitional governance process, the importance of an inclusive national dialogue, and efforts to stabilise essential services, including water and energy infrastructure. Madagascar also reaffirmed its decision to step aside from the SADC Chairmanship due to the ‘exceptional national context,’ while reiterating its commitment to the Community’s values and principles.

During his meeting with Randrianirina, the Executive Secretary was briefed on progress in constitutional reforms and preparations for future democratic elections. The President confirmed that the report requested by the SADC Extraordinary Heads of State and Government Summit in December 2025 would be submitted by the end of February 2026. He further emphasised that electoral reform remains a priority. While Parliament ‘currently functions as a unicameral legislature, institutional reforms will be informed by the outcomes of the inclusive national dialogue process.’

Meanwhile, the military authorities have been consolidating power and launching diplomatic engagements. Following the swearing in of the military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, as Madagascar’s new president in October 2025, and the appointment of Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo as the country’s prime minister, the commander of the CAPSAT unit pledged elections in 18 to 24 months after his swearing in. Since ‘assuming office,’ Randrianirina has embarked on a series of high-level diplomatic visits. His recent visit to France came directly on the heels of a visit to Moscow, where he secured military equipment and the dispatch of Russian instructors to train Malagasy forces, including in drone warfare. Despite the optics, Randrianirina has been quick to downplay any geopolitical friction. Before departing for Paris, he emphasised that his engagements with Russia and France are entirely independent of one another, framing them as part of a results-oriented foreign policy designed to secure tangible benefits for his citizens.

The two nations committed to a ‘renewed, balanced and forward-looking partnership anchored by a two-year roadmap that aligns with Madagascar’s transition timeline and focuses on several key areas: strengthening diplomatic channels and mutual respect through enhanced political relations, accelerating investment and infrastructure to support economic development, and continuing collaborative efforts to promote regional stability through security and defence cooperation. In this context, President Emmanuel Macron reinforced France’s support for a return to constitutional order, emphasising the importance of holding free and transparent elections within the established timeframe.

It is worth noting that Madagascar’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean and its vast reserves of nickel and cobalt have turned the island nation into a focal point for global powers. As China, India and Russia ramp up their local presence, maintaining influence has become a critical priority for French diplomacy. By adding Russia and France to a list of visits that already includes the UAE and South Africa, Antananarivo is signalling that it is no longer wedded to a single patron, but is instead seeking every available avenue for investment and support.

On the other hand, the ousted Malagasy President Andry Rajoelina met King Mswati III of Eswatini in February, a development that appeared to anger the Malagasy authorities. This prompted Madagascar’s military leader, Colonel Michael Randrianirina, to issue a statement expressing his ‘strongest condemnation’ of the visit, describing it as ‘politically unacceptable.’

The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is likely to emphasise the importance of ensuring enhanced coordination, harmonisation and complementarity of efforts between the AU, SADC, and the Indian Ocean Commission, as well as other relevant regional and international organisations, in order to facilitate a smooth political transition in Madagascar. The PSC is also likely to emphasise its previous decision on the need for continued vigilance and monitoring of the evolution of situation in Madagascar, and the need for undertaking a Field Mission, as soon as practicably possible, to gather first-hand information on the realities of the situation on ground, which is critically necessary in informing the next steps the Council may need to take in supporting the transition process. Council may also emphasise the need for the Government of Madagascar to holistically address the structural root causes of the multidimensional challenges facing the country, using a ‘whole of government- whole of society’ approach that brings on board all critical Malagasy stakeholders, including women and the youth. Finally, it may also encourage the Malagasy authorities to undertake trust and confidence-building measures to facilitate the conduct of the national dialogue in a conducive environment, to respect the timetable set transition with a view to returning to constitutional order and democratic governance; and to establish an inclusive, consensual and objective roadmap, with short and precise deadlines, relating to the transition and the return to constitutional order.