Cyber Security – Impact on Peace and Security in Africa
Cyber Security – Impact on Peace and Security in Africa
Date | 13 April 2023
Tomorrow (13 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1148th session to discuss the impacts of cyber threats to peace and security in Africa.
The session opens remarks by Abdelhamid Elgharbi, Permanent Representative of Tunisia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April followed by a statement of AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye. The AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL); the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA); the AU Department of Infrastructure and Energy; AU Office of the Legal Counsel and the United Nations (UN) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are also expected to participate in the session.
It was at its 850th session that the PSC, recognising the growing relevance of cyberspace in Africa and the importance of ensuring the safety and security of this space, decided to commit an annual meeting on cyber security. Although this decision hasn’t been regularly implemented, the PSC has dedicated various sessions to the theme, including the 1097th session which last addressed concerns related to cyber security in Africa. Among other critical points, the 1097th session drew attention to the need for enactment of necessary legislations and regulations at national, regional and continental levels to govern issues related to cyberspace. Tomorrow’s session serves to follow up on efforts being deployed to mainstream cybersecurity in all peace and security mechanisms of the AU, Regional Economic Community and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and member states.
This session is coming against the background of the major cyberattack against the AU cyber infrastructure. Early in March, the AU was forced to suspend various operations following a massive cyberattack on its data centre, compromising various IT assets and user devices. This attack has led to not only the disruption of the ordinary functioning of the AU but also the loss of data. As a clear illustration of the susceptibility of African infrastructure to cyberattacks and the enormous costs that such attacks occasion, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to seek information on the source of the attack, the scale of damage caused and the measures required for rebuilding and instituting protective measures to address the vulnerabilities in the AU system that were exploited for orchestrating the attack.
There is also anecdotal data that the extent of threats to the cyberspace in Africa is increasing. This is mostly on account of the weak cyber security arrangements. According to the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)’s 2021 Africa Cyber Threat Assessment Report, over 90 percent of companies in Africa operate without the necessary cyber security protocols. Many African institutions and businesses have also come under cyberattack over recent years and continue to be susceptible to the perpetration of various cybercrimes.
The impacts of this are multifaceted. One of the many negative consequences of unprotected cyberspaces is that they result in considerable financial loss as well as data theft, including those related to intellectual property and protected business information. At a larger scale, such form of cyber threats manifest in the form of infrastructural sabotage affecting critical social and economic activities, including trade and commerce. Reports have indicated that in recent years, such form of sabotages have particularly been escalating in the continent, specifically targeting national banks and maritime infrastructures. Ultimately, this will have an adverse impact on Africa’s endeavours to advance economic development. As emphasised by the PSC at its 850th session, a secure cyberspace is a necessary precondition for ‘reaping the dividends of the digital transformation of Africa and the world and for promoting economic development throughout the Continent’.
Another and perhaps more grave consequence of weak cyber security practices in government and non-governmental institutions in Africa is the fertile ground it creates for anti-peace activities ranging from espionage, to organised crimes and the use of digital space for incitement of violence. With little to no measures put in place to secure the cyberspace, anti-peace entities including terrorist organisations will have ease not only in accessing sensitive data and classified government information, but also in diverting finances to fund their activities, plan their attacks as well as recruit and train others to join their network. It also opens the space and creates the opportunity for the spread of misinformation and incitement of violence, particularly in settings characterised by polarised political tension and dissent. Terrorist groups’ usage of cybercriminals to raise funds through cryptocurrencies and exploration of the dark web by human trafficking networks to lure in travellers through fake tour agency accounts are also among the cyber threats in Africa identified by AFRIPOL.
The imperative for a more robust cybersecurity in Africa will only continue to rise as the continent continues to expand its reliance and use of cyber operated technologies not only for socio-economic activities but also for security purposes as the expansion of the use of drones and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as other artificial intelligence (AI) for enhancing military operations shows. As far as the use of such technologies, particularly what are known as autonomous weapons systems (which Africa is not in possession of), is concerned, Africa has the responsibility for promoting the development and strict enforcement of rules that ensure effective human control over and full responsibility of states for how such technologies are used as the surest means for averting not only breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law rules but also damages that may result from hacking of such technologies.
Africa’s internet and telecom market which has experienced a major boost in recent years is only expected to grow significantly in the near future to accommodate the demands of the continent’s massive population. While this creates great opportunities to advance Africa’s socio-economic and developmental aspirations, it also expands further the nature and extent of cyber threats expected to be experienced. If relevant strategies are not put in place well in advance to avert, manage and effectively respond to these threats, the continent may be facing complex peace and security challenges. According to the 2021 Global Cybersecurity Index, only 29 African countries have introduced cyber security legislation while the remaining majority are yet to adopt relevant rules and regulations to deal with this specific area of concern. This indicates the need for heightened awareness among member states of developments in Africa’s cyberspace and their commitment to take solid steps towards securing it, including through the adoption of relevant normative standards to regulate the safe and secure utilisation of cyberspace.
At the continental level, the AU has already adopted key legal instruments and frameworks relevant to the regulation of cyberspace and for ensuring cyber security in Africa, including the AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention); the 2020-2030 Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa; the AU Data Policy Framework and the AU Interoperability Framework for Digital ID. In line with the decision of the Executive Council’s 32nd Ordinary Session [EX.CL/Dec.987(XXXII)], the AU has also established the Cyber Security Expert Group (AUCSEG) which is charged with providing advice to the AU Commission on matters related to cyber security. Few member states such as Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho and South Africa have also made commendable strides towards securing the cyberspace through the adoption of Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Acts. Despite these encouraging developments, the current efforts to respond to cyber threats are largely disproportional to the magnitude of the challenge in Africa.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC is expected to express grave concern over the recent cyberattack the AU experienced and commend AFRIPOL and other relevant AU organs for committing the necessary efforts to resolve the issue. It may emphasise that with growing digitalisation and socio-economic development come increasing cyber threats and as such, call on member states to mainstream cyber security throughout all of their digital endeavours. The PSC may take note of the increasing significance of the digital space for trade and commerce in Africa and call on all relevant stakeholders including member states and the private sector to protect transactions by investing on cyber security measures. It may stress the importance of establishing the normative framework for cyber security and urge member states to adopt the necessary legislation to regulate cyberspace in a manner compatible with human rights norms guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms. It may urge member states to ensure responsible use of emerging technologies in efforts aimed at enhancing military capabilities and to put in place the necessary cyber security measures to avert hacking and diversion of such technologies. It may also highlight the need to ensure implementation of existing continental legal frameworks for the protection of cyberspace including the Malabo Convention. It may further encourage RECs/RMs to contribute to cyber security efforts through enactment of relevant strategies for enhancing regional collaboration in taking action against cyber threats. The PSC may call on the AU Commission, AFRIPOL, CISSA working with relevant expert bodies to develop guidance for member states, RECs/RMs and AU institutions on identifying vulnerabilities for cyberattacks and instituting effective cybersecurity measures to avoid the kind of attacks the AU experienced recently.
Prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa
Prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa
Date | 6 April 2023
Tomorrow (06 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 1147th session, which will be in-person open session on the theme ‘prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa’.
Following opening remarks by Abdelhamid El Gharbi, Permanent Representative of Tunisia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Presentations are also expected by the representative of Rwanda, the Special Advisor of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, and the representative of the European Union (EU).
Tomorrow’s session is to be convened in line with the Communique of the PSC adopted at the 678th session of April 2017, which decided to convene annually in April an open meeting on the prevention of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa. It forms part of the annual commemoration of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda that will be observed on 7 April in accordance with the AU Assembly Decision [Assembly/ AU / Dec.695] of 2 July 2018 as well as the Communique of the PSC adopted at its 761st session. As noted in the concept note, the main objective of the annual session is for ‘the PSC, AU Member States and other key stakeholders to reflect and continuously devise means to collectively prevent the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa’.
Various decisions have been taken by the PSC since 2017 to effectively address the challenge of the ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa. These include: reinvigorating the early warning mechanism (836th session); including an analysis on indicators of hate crime and risk factors for them to escalate to genocide in the Report of the PSC on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa (836th session); constructing AU Human Rights Memorial dedicated to victims of human rights violations in Africa (989th session); appointing an AU Special Envoy on the Prevention of Hate Crimes and the Crime of Genocide (989th session); developing a shared definition of what constitutes ‘hate speech’ and ‘hate crimes’ (1088th session); undertaking a review of the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Report of the OAU International Panel of Eminent Personalities on the 1994 Rwanda Genocide and the Surrounding Events by the Panel of the Wise (1088th session); establishing an Annual African Forum on the prevention of ideology of hate, hate crimes and genocide (1088th session); and creating an African Centre for the Study of Genocide (1088th session). It would be important for the PSC to follow up on the status of the implementation of these decisions at tomorrow’s session. Among others, considering that 2024 marks 30 years since the occurrence of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsis, it would be of interest for members of the PSC to plan for a continental comprehensive stock taking exercise for reaffirming the commitment to never again as enshrined in Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU.
Experiences from the Rwanda and elsewhere in the world clearly highlight that genocide and other atrocity crimes do not occur as isolated event but are often results of sustained hate speech. Hate speech and hate propaganda were identified as catalysts of the genocidal violence in Rwanda. As noted in the concept note prepared for the session, in Rwanda, the ‘genocide ideology was propagated when political leaders using state machinery started branding a section of their own population – the Tutsi – as the ‘other’, ‘enemy of the State’, ‘cockroaches’ who were to be exterminated.’ Indeed, as highlighted in PSC’s 678th session, deliberate tendencies of discrimination, marginalization, tribalism and manipulation of ethnicity often create conducive conditions for hate crimes and ideologies of genocide to thrive.
The nature of hate speech has evolved in complexity as a result of the digital turn, particularly with the widespread use of social media that has dramatically changed the ‘pace and reach of its spread’. This was noted by the PSC on several occasions including at its 836th session, which expressed its ‘deep concern’ over the negative use of social media that contributes to amplify hate speech, hate crimes, and ideology of genocide. Despite that these platforms claim to have invested in safety and security measures including building their capacity to catch hateful and inflammatory content, reports are raising the alarm over the use of social media by different actors to stoke violence particularly in a fragile context.
Countering the rising tide of hate speech and the attendant consequences requires taking effective preventive and mitigation strategies. It is important that Member States put in place the necessary legal framework to punish hate speeches and hate crimes, but this should also strike the right balance with the fundamental human right to freedom of expression. While there is a need to regulate online content, governments also should not fall into the common tactic of internet/social media shutdown as this kind of measure undermines range of human rights, including the right to freedom of speech. Instead, spreading counter-speech that disseminates accurate information and that fosters unity and tolerance is regarded as the proper response to ensure that hate is not the dominant narrative. In addition to these, tomorrow’s session is expected to emphasize on the need to develop comprehensive strategies that focused not only on mitigation measures, but also on prevention to address the scourge in a more sustainable way.
First and foremost, there is a need to address root causes and drivers of ideology of hate, genocide and hate crimes. Socio-economic and political marginalization, competing aspirations, and contested historical narratives often sow the seeds of mistrust and fear among different groups, which leads to polarization and tension. Accordingly, building credible state institutions, fostering peaceful and inclusive societies including through national dialogue, deepening democracy and participatory as well as inclusive governance, and ensuring equitable and inclusive socio-economic developments could be highlighted as important steps in addressing the underlying causes and drivers of hate.
Second and related to the first is the imperative of leveraging education, both in formal and non-formal settings, as a tool for addressing all forms of intolerance, discrimination and hate while simultaneously building a generation that embrace cultural diversity and promote peaceful coexistence.
Third, there is also a need to enhance prevention strategies at all levels (national, regional, and continental) through early warning system that would enable us to detect early signs of genocide and other atrocity crimes. Equally important is translating the early signs into early response, although denialism and a very restrictive interpretation of the principle of sovereignty by Member States have proved to be a challenge in that regard.
Fourth and importantly, there is a need for the establishment of an inclusive system of governance that is representative of all sectors of society and their interests. More often than not, the sense of alienation, exclusion and discrimination in a context of power contestations is what creates the setting for the emergence of identity-based antagonism, precipitating hate speech and incitement of violence. It is of paramount importance that the conditions of bad governance and lack of inclusiveness is also addressed.
The expected outcome of the session is likely to be a communique. As in the previous sessions, PSC may express its concern over the persistent trend of the ideologies of hate, genocide and hate crimes in Africa, and in that regard, it may highlight the importance of developing comprehensive strategies to counter the ideologies of hate, genocide, and hate crimes. It may condemn in the strongest terms denialism and revisionism of the genocide against Tutsi as this threatens the perpetuation and manifestations of hate speech and crimes. As part of the effort to counter hate speech and crimes, PSC may highlight different measures, including encouraging Member States to establish/strengthen their legal framework to combat the scourge and meet their international obligations, as well as ratify/accede to relevant international legal instruments notably the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. While stressing the importance of the responsible use of the media, and in particular the social media, PSC may also remind Member States about the need to ensure that measures to combat hate speech and hate crimes do not violate accepted principles and standards of human rights. In relation to enhancing the prevention strategies, PSC may reiterate the need for addressing structural causes and drivers of hate speech and hate crimes including through credible national dialogue, education, and other national initiatives to entrench the culture of peaceful coexistence and democracy, and foster national unity and reconciliation. It is also expected to re-emphasize the importance of enhancing AU’s early warning mechanism to detect early warning signs and take early response before hate speech and crimes degenerate into violent conflicts and genocide. Furthermore, considering the various decisions of the PSC that have been taken since 2017 to effectively address the scourge of hate speech and hate crimes and considering that 2024 marks the 30 years commemoration of the 1994 genocide, PSC may request the AU Commission to plan a high-level and comprehensive stocktaking on progress made and challenges faced in implementing never again.
Cash strapped African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) starts its second year facing uncertain financial future
Cash strapped African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) starts its second year facing uncertain financial future
Date | 4 April 2023
Bitania Tadesse
Program Director, Amani Africa
Zekarias Beshah
Training and Research Coordinator, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
This month marks exactly one year since the transition of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). On 8 March 2022, at its 1068th session, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), in one of the notable highlights of its work during 2022, ‘authorized’ ATMIS to take effect as of 1 April 2022. Unlike other peace support operations, ATMIS is authorised with a defined expiry date, hence expected to end by 31 December 2024 upon the full assumption of security responsibilities by the Somali Security Forces (SSF). The communiqué of 1068th session is one of, if not, the longest Communiqués of the PSC with 33 paragraphs, capturing various aspects of the reconfiguration and phased implementation of the mandate of ATMIS.
In the work of the PSC in 2022, ATMIS, along with the situation in Somalia, received a lion’s share of PSC’s agenda. Indeed, as Amani Africa’s review of the PSC for 2022 revealed, out of the 17 sessions dedicated to the East and Horn of Africa region, a region that received the largest percentage of PSC’s engagement both in sessions and field visits in 2022, the situation that received the most attention with seven sessions was Somalia/AMISOM/ATMIS. Much of PSC’s intense engagement on Somalia/ATMIS had to do with the transition of AMISOM to ATMIS and the reconfiguration and effective operationalization of a reconfigured ATMIS. Within this context, the most recurrent issue, both at the start of ATMIS and subsequently, is the funding of the mission.
Pursuant to the communiqué of the 1068th session of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2628, ATMIS military component maintains current AMISOM size of 18,586 troops during Phase I, and the first drawdown of 2000 troops was expected to take place at the end of this Phase slated for 31 December 2022. As indicated in Amani Africa’s March 2022 monthly digest, the phased drawdown of ATMIS forces, as outlined in the communiqué of the PSC’s 1068th session, would not be linear but contingent on developments on the ground including security and preparation of the SSF at the requisite number and capacity to take over responsibility. It thus came as no surprise that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) requested the postponement of the first drawdown scheduled for December 2022. The PSC in the 1121st session convened on 11 November 2022 expressed support for FGS’s request to extend the timeline for the drawdown of the 2000 troops from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023. Despite this change, the PSC affirmed the timelines for subsequent drawdowns and eventual exit of ATMIS on 31 December 2024.
During the one year period, ATMIS continues to make progress in the execution of its mandate working closely with FGS and the reconfiguration and incremental transfer of its responsibilities, although it suffers from lack of a Force Commander for unduly prolonged period of time. ATMIS played critical role in securing the presidential election and the peaceful transfer of power to the elected President in June 2022. While it is not taking a lead role in the new offensive launched against Al Shabaab apparently on account in part of the funding problem, ATMIS provides logistical support including air cover and medical evacuation for the local forces and SSF executing the offensive.
ATMIS also faced the worst that such a mission can experience. It sustained its first and one of the worst attacks that the AU Mission sustained in recent years, leading to the death of 30 Burundian soldiers when on 3 May Al Shabaab hit the ATMIS base in the village of El-Baraf, about 150 kilometres north of Mogadishu. As an attack that clearly highlights the heavy price that ATMIS personnel pay in the line of duty, the PSC underscored the need for enhancing ‘the capacity of ATMIS, including by availing the Mission with all necessary human, material, technical and financial resources, including force enablers and multipliers, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate.’
Even in the face of such fatal attacks, ATMIS started its journey and remains with a significant funding shortfall. The seriousness of this shortfall is of such a nature that one of the recurrent themes that featured throughout PSC’s sessions on ATMIS is the financing of ATMIS. Its 1075th session was particularly dedicated to the financing issue where PSC noted with ‘deep concern’ the commencement of the mission without the required resources. Despite the direct funding by the European Union (EU) (€120 million) and the United Kingdom (UK) (€29.6 million), the mission’s budget deficit for the year 2022 was around €25.8 million. This funding shortfall has increased further for 2023.
With the aim to address the budget shortfall, PSC sought different options in various of its sessions including an appeal to the UN Security Council to hold a special session on financing ATMIS and the SSF (1075th session); a call on EU and other partners to establish a financial support package (1075th session); and a request on AU Commission and UN, along with IGAD and partners, to jointly organize international pledging conference by March 2023 (1121st session). The PSC also stressed, in all its communiques adopted at the sessions on ATMIS, the need for accessing UN assessed contributions for sustainable and predictable funding necessary for the effective execution of the mandate of the mission.
While no breakthrough has emerged and many of these options such as the convening of pledging conference are as yet to be tried, the AU Commission along with FGS during the week of 20 March undertook a roadshow in an effort to inject urgency to mobilize funds to make up for the funding shortfall. This involved travels to and holding of convening with partners in New York and Washington DC for soliciting action to resolve the dire funding gap facing ATMIS. These took place during the week leading to the one year anniversary of ATMIS on 1 April. Talking to people who were in these meetings in New York, there was no indication of any new pledges. Those already contributing expressed frustration about lack of engagement of countries such as China and gulf countries for making contributions.
On its part while the AU is set to use the Conflict Reserve Fund (CRF) of the AU Peace Fund towards ATMIS as decided by the AU Assembly, the scale of the shortfall is such that during the PSC session held last month (March 2023), AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye indicated that the AU would be forced to bring forward the June 2023 timeline for the first drawdown of ATMIS. Noting that the mission is in a dire financial situation, Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Rosemary DiCarlo, warned the situation poses a significant risk to the security transition and could threaten hard-won gains. Although in the words of DiCarlo the common objective of realizing ATMIS mandate depends on predictable, sustainable and multi-year funding for ATMIS and adequate resourcing for the Somali security transition, ATMIS faces very uncertain financial future notwithstanding the heavy price its personnel pay in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is to be seen whether there will be successful follow up to the PSC’s reiteration, under its most recent communique of the 1143rd session, of its earlier calls for the convening of a special session by the UN Security Council and the convening of a pledging conference by the UN Secretary General and the AU Commission Chairperson.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
Cash strapped African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) starts its second year facing uncertain financial future
Cash strapped African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) starts its second year facing uncertain financial future
Date | 4 April 2023
Bitania Tadesse
Program Director, Amani Africa
Zekarias Beshah
Training and Research Coordinator, Amani Africa
Solomon Ayele Dersso, PhD
Founding Director, Amani Africa
This month marks exactly one year since the transition of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). On 8 March 2022, at its 1068th session, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), in one of the notable highlights of its work during 2022, ‘authorized’ ATMIS to take effect as of 1 April 2022. Unlike other peace support operations, ATMIS is authorised with a defined expiry date, hence expected to end by 31 December 2024 upon the full assumption of security responsibilities by the Somali Security Forces (SSF). The communiqué of 1068th session is one of, if not, the longest Communiqués of the PSC with 33 paragraphs, capturing various aspects of the reconfiguration and phased implementation of the mandate of ATMIS.
In the work of the PSC in 2022, ATMIS, along with the situation in Somalia, received a lion’s share of PSC’s agenda. Indeed, as Amani Africa’s review of the PSC for 2022 revealed, out of the 17 sessions dedicated to the East and Horn of Africa region, a region that received the largest percentage of PSC’s engagement both in sessions and field visits in 2022, the situation that received the most attention with seven sessions was Somalia/AMISOM/ATMIS. Much of PSC’s intense engagement on Somalia/ATMIS had to do with the transition of AMISOM to ATMIS and the reconfiguration and effective operationalization of a reconfigured ATMIS. Within this context, the most recurrent issue, both at the start of ATMIS and subsequently, is the funding of the mission.
Pursuant to the communiqué of the 1068th session of the PSC and the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2628, ATMIS military component maintains current AMISOM size of 18,586 troops during Phase I, and the first drawdown of 2000 troops was expected to take place at the end of this Phase slated for 31 December 2022. As indicated in Amani Africa’s March 2022 monthly digest, the phased drawdown of ATMIS forces, as outlined in the communiqué of the PSC’s 1068th session, would not be linear but contingent on developments on the ground including security and preparation of the SSF at the requisite number and capacity to take over responsibility. It thus came as no surprise that the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) requested the postponement of the first drawdown scheduled for December 2022. The PSC in the 1121st session convened on 11 November 2022 expressed support for FGS’s request to extend the timeline for the drawdown of the 2000 troops from 31 December 2022 to 30 June 2023. Despite this change, the PSC affirmed the timelines for subsequent drawdowns and eventual exit of ATMIS on 31 December 2024.
During the one year period, ATMIS continues to make progress in the execution of its mandate working closely with FGS and the reconfiguration and incremental transfer of its responsibilities, although it suffers from lack of a Force Commander for unduly prolonged period of time. ATMIS played critical role in securing the presidential election and the peaceful transfer of power to the elected President in June 2022. While it is not taking a lead role in the new offensive launched against Al Shabaab apparently on account in part of the funding problem, ATMIS provides logistical support including air cover and medical evacuation for the local forces and SSF executing the offensive.
ATMIS also faced the worst that such a mission can experience. It sustained its first and one of the worst attacks that the AU Mission sustained in recent years, leading to the death of 30 Burundian soldiers when on 3 May Al Shabaab hit the ATMIS base in the village of El-Baraf, about 150 kilometres north of Mogadishu. As an attack that clearly highlights the heavy price that ATMIS personnel pay in the line of duty, the PSC underscored the need for enhancing ‘the capacity of ATMIS, including by availing the Mission with all necessary human, material, technical and financial resources, including force enablers and multipliers, in order to enable it to more effectively discharge its mandate.’
Even in the face of such fatal attacks, ATMIS started its journey and remains with a significant funding shortfall. The seriousness of this shortfall is of such a nature that one of the recurrent themes that featured throughout PSC’s sessions on ATMIS is the financing of ATMIS. Its 1075th session was particularly dedicated to the financing issue where PSC noted with ‘deep concern’ the commencement of the mission without the required resources. Despite the direct funding by the European Union (EU) (€120 million) and the United Kingdom (UK) (€29.6 million), the mission’s budget deficit for the year 2022 was around €25.8 million. This funding shortfall has increased further for 2023.
With the aim to address the budget shortfall, PSC sought different options in various of its sessions including an appeal to the UN Security Council to hold a special session on financing ATMIS and the SSF (1075th session); a call on EU and other partners to establish a financial support package (1075th session); and a request on AU Commission and UN, along with IGAD and partners, to jointly organize international pledging conference by March 2023 (1121st session). The PSC also stressed, in all its communiques adopted at the sessions on ATMIS, the need for accessing UN assessed contributions for sustainable and predictable funding necessary for the effective execution of the mandate of the mission.
While no breakthrough has emerged and many of these options such as the convening of pledging conference are as yet to be tried, the AU Commission along with FGS during the week of 20 March undertook a roadshow in an effort to inject urgency to mobilize funds to make up for the funding shortfall. This involved travels to and holding of convening with partners in New York and Washington DC for soliciting action to resolve the dire funding gap facing ATMIS. These took place during the week leading to the one year anniversary of ATMIS on 1 April. Talking to people who were in these meetings in New York, there was no indication of any new pledges. Those already contributing expressed frustration about lack of engagement of countries such as China and gulf countries for making contributions.
On its part while the AU is set to use the Conflict Reserve Fund (CRF) of the AU Peace Fund towards ATMIS as decided by the AU Assembly, the scale of the shortfall is such that during the PSC session held last month (March 2023), AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Bankole Adeoye indicated that the AU would be forced to bring forward the June 2023 timeline for the first drawdown of ATMIS. Noting that the mission is in a dire financial situation, Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Rosemary DiCarlo, warned the situation poses a significant risk to the security transition and could threaten hard-won gains. Although in the words of DiCarlo the common objective of realizing ATMIS mandate depends on predictable, sustainable and multi-year funding for ATMIS and adequate resourcing for the Somali security transition, ATMIS faces very uncertain financial future notwithstanding the heavy price its personnel pay in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is to be seen whether there will be successful follow up to the PSC’s reiteration, under its most recent communique of the 1143rd session, of its earlier calls for the convening of a special session by the UN Security Council and the convening of a pledging conference by the UN Secretary General and the AU Commission Chairperson.
The content of this article does not represent the views of Amani Africa and reflect only the personal views of the authors who contribute to ‘Ideas Indaba’
International Day on Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action
International Day on Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action
Date | 3 April 2023
Tomorrow (03 April), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to convene its 1146th session in commemoration of international day on mine awareness and assistance in mine action, with a specific focus on impacts on peace and security in Africa.
Following opening remarks by Abdelhamid Elgharbi, Permanent Representative of Tunisia and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of April, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), Bankole Adeoye, is expected to make a statement. Representatives of the Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations (UN) Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may also deliver statements at the session.
The last time the PSC convened a session under the theme ‘mine action in Africa’ was on 01 April 2022, which constituted its 1072nd meeting. The session served to emphasise the importance of developing inclusive approaches in Africa to raise awareness around the risks and dangers of landmines. Having regard to the significance of coordination and collaboration to achieve the aim of eliminating landmines from the continent, the PSC at that session underscored the need to establish a continental mechanism for mine action to coordinate member states’ efforts and requested the AU Commission to finalise the AU Mine Action and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Strategies and submit to the PSC for its consideration. Tomorrow’s meeting presents the opportunity to follow up on the implementation of these and other previous decisions of the PSC.
Although mine action efforts have demonstrated some success over the years in some parts of the continent, there has been alarming increase in the use of landmines and explosive devices in multiple African countries in recent years. In the Central African Republic (CAR) for instance, the threat of explosive devices has shown a worrying rise since 2021. According to data recorded by the UN, the years 2021 and 2022 have demonstrated a significant increase in the use of explosive devices in CAR as compared to 2020. UN’s report indicates that in 2021, 44 incidents involving explosive devices were recoded, resulting in 30 deaths and 48 injuries while in 2022, 54 incidents were recoded which killed 12 people and injured 46. The most recent data recorded as of 10 March 2023 indicates 20 incidents involving explosive devices, which have claimed the lives of 9 people. In April 2022, anti-personnel mines were also discovered in CAR for the first time. Having regard to 2020 when the UN recorded only two incidents of usage of explosive devices in CAR which resulted in no casualties, the figures recorded over the recent years are cause for serious alarm. They indicate increased exposure of civilian population to areas affected by landmines and even ongoing use of landmines in recent years. It would therefore be of interest for PSC members to call for the establishment of the factors behind these worrying trends in the use of landmines in CAR in order to take targeted measures to contain and eventually end this scourge.
Mali is another country that has been experiencing increasing threat of landmines, mainly IEDs. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), significant increase has been noted in the use of IEDs in Mali since 2017 which was initially concentrated in the central parts of the country but gradually continued to expand to other parts, particularly to the country’s western regions. In January 2023, representing one of the more recent incidents of IED explosions in the country, 16 people were killed and 25 were injured in explosions concentrated mainly in the Mopti and Ségou regions. The 2022 Landmine Monitor Report further indicates the use of antivehicle mines in Mali during the 2021-2022 reporting period. Reports from earlier years have also alluded the use of antipersonnel mines in Mali, mainly by non-state armed groups.
One of the most concerning spikes in the use of IEDs is perhaps the one currently being witnessed in Somalia. As part of its change in tactics of insurgency, Al-Shabaab has increased its focus on expanding the use of various forms of IEDs, including vehicle-borne IEDs and remotely detonated ground IEDs. In the period from January to March 2023, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) data shows a 120% increase in the use of IEDs and remote explosives by Al-Shabaab in parts of Somalia, as compared to the previous reporting period of October to December 2022. In the first two weeks of March 2023 alone, remote explosions perpetrated by Al-Shabaab reportedly constituted nearly 60% of the total events of violence recorded in Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle regions.
The use of IEDs in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, has been indicative of a more worrying trend – the possible existence of an active regional network enabling the use of external assistance in building capacity for manufacturing IEDs at insurgent bases in the region. Reports have demonstrated that IS sponsored training and financial support in late 2020 could have a direct link with the introduction of IEDs in Cabo Delgado in 2021, the same year the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) considerably increased its use of IEDs in eastern DRC and border territories of Uganda, suggesting the existence of a wider regional network connecting ADF and insurgents operating in northern Mozambique that, among others, facilitates the spread of the explosive devices into Mozambique.
Further to the security risk it imposes, the increasing use of IEDs in these countries is also a serious impediment to the provision of timely and effective humanitarian assistance to populations affected by conflict and crisis. For example, in CAR, not only are the main victims of explosive devises civilians – with nearly three quarters of the victims reported in 2022 and 2023 being civilians – but also the presence of explosives in various parts of the country has been a major deterrent limiting humanitarian access to civilian populations. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), over 900,000 people targeted for humanitarian assistance in 2023 are at risk of delayed or suspended aid as a result of access constraints emanating from suspected presence of explosive devices in the concerned areas.
The trends observed in these and other conflict settings in Africa signal the increasing utilisation of mines as well as growing sophistication in the means and methods of warfare particularly in terms of use of IEDs deployed by non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations. They also signify the ease with which these actors access the required resources and expertise in the manufacturing of mines, particularly IEDs. There is hence need to devote increased attention to identifying and addressing the underlying factors facilitating access to resources used in the development of explosive devices in concerned member states. Among others, this will require proper regulation of national weapons’ stockpiles to avert smuggling of state-owned explosives and materials that can be used in making new explosive devices. It further calls for the strengthening of inter-state collaboration and coordination to halt cross border trafficking of explosives and to prevent exchange of technical expertise as well as financial assistance in their development.
While drawing attention to the increasing spread of IED usage in the continent is pertinent, it also remains critical to emphasise the continuing significance of ensuring full clearance of antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) through destruction of national stockpiles in line with the 1997 Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, particularly in the context of states in post-conflict phase. According to the 2022 Landmine Monitor Report, five of the seven states parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty that are known or believed to have mine contamination in their territories but have not provided information or recognised their clearance obligations under the treaty, are African countries. A significant number of African member states are also falling behind on their obligations to ensure full landmine clearance by 2025 in line with the 2014 Maputo Action Plan. This signals to the need to strengthen mine action efforts in the continent including through enhanced mobilisation of funds for mine clearance activities at the national, regional and continental level.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s session is a Communiqué. The PSC may express grave concern over the increasing spread of IEDs in Africa and their wide usage among non-state armed actors and terrorist groups. It may call for the AU Commission to work with relevant RECs and UN entities to examine the factors behind this worrying trend and to develop strategies specific to each affected country for addressing this scourge. The PSC may also call for the inclusion and expansion of counter IEDs capabilities in the AU Transition Mission in Somalia and to the support that the AU Mission to Mali and Sahel provides to Mali as well as the mobilization of capabilities for detecting and clearing landmines to the CAR and other countries specifically affected by landmines. It may also call on member states to ensure secure storage of state-owned explosives and enhanced regulation of stockpiles, including complete destruction of antipersonnel landmines. It may further underscore the importance of fortified coordination between member states in combating the cross-border transfer of explosives and in the removal of landmines from border areas. It may note the grave humanitarian cost of explosive devices, including curtailing humanitarian access to populations in need and in that respect, call on all relevant stakeholders to explore alternative approaches including air-based provision of humanitarian assistance while deploying mine action capacities to clear areas affected by mines impeding humanitarian access. The PSC may also call on states parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty to fulfil their obligations under Article 5 relating to the destruction of antipersonnel mines and urge those member states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty. It may further emphasise the importance of enhancing mine action funding to enable member states meet their clearance obligations outlined under Article 5 of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty as well as the Maputo Action Plan.
