Monthly Digest on the AUPSC - March 2021
Amani Africa
Date | March 2021
In March, Kenya was the chair of the PSC. A total of five substantive sessions were convened via video teleconferencing (VTC) during the month and one of the sessions had two separate agenda items. Although the month’s programme of work envisaged a session on the situation in South Sudan, the session was not convened during the month.
PSC Session on the Central African Republic
Amani Africa
Date | 16 February, 2021
Tomorrow (16 February) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 980th session on the situation in Central African Republic (CAR).
The Permanent Representative of Ghana is expected to make an opening remark in her capacity as chair of the month. The Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, and representative of the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) are expected to provide a briefing on the situation in CAR. The representative of CAR, the A3 and the UN are also likely to deliver a statement as per the usual practice.
The last PSC session on CAR was convened during its 972nd meeting held on 24 December 2020, few days before the election day. The presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 27 December in a context of rising tension as the opposition intensifies pressure on the government despite the call of the PSC on ‘all the parties to uphold the electoral calendar defined by the National Electoral Authority (ANE) and the Constitutional Court’. According to the information note submitted to the PSC ahead of tomorrow’s session, ‘out of a set of 5,408 polling stations, around 800 were unable to open due to threats made by armed groups’. In the 4 January, preliminary results the ANE announced incumbent president Faustin-Archange Touadéra was declared winner with 53.92 % of vote, which was later certified by the Constitutional Court.
Disagreement over the electoral process between the government and opposition political and armed forces in the country demanding postponement of the elections precipitated the most serious deterioration in the political and security situation of the CAR since the 2019 AU facilitated Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR- RCA). The turning point was the establishment on 15 December 2020 of the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an umbrella body of six armed groups,1 with strong backing from former President François Bozizé, who, after being ousted by the Séléka armed groups in 2013 and returned to CAR after six years of exile, has been under the UN sanctions list for ‘engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of CAR’ in the 2013 crisis.
Coming into existence not long after the rejection by the Constitutional Court of the candidacy of Bozizé for failing to meet the ‘good morals’ and ‘clean criminal record’ requirements for candidacy, CPC sought to implement the armed removal of the government. This has plunged the country once again into violent conflicts, as the CPS launched attacks capturing territories in parts of the country.
Despite PSC rejection during its 972nd session of ‘any idea or strategies aiming at unconstitutional political transition in the country,’ the members of the CPC launched attacks in various parts of the country including Bossangoa (25 December 2020) Bangassou (3 January), Damara (3 January), and Bouar and Grimari (7-9 January). The attempt of the CPC to violently capture the capital city Bangui on 13 January, which claimed the lives of many people including seven UN peacekeepers, was averted by the intervention of UN troops and the CAR military with backing from Rwandan and Russian troops. The CAR forces and MINUSCA also (reportedly backed by Rwandan and Russian troops) managed to repulse several attacks and recaptured key towns from the armed groups, notably Bangassou (some 450 miles from Bangui bordering DRC).
Despite their unsuccessful attempt to capture Bangui, the armed groups have besieged the capital city by blocking strategic roads. Of particular interest to the Council would be the blockage of Bangui-Garoua Boulaï corridor, the main supply route for the capital Bangui and the entire country. According to media reports, thousands of trucks have been stranded on the border with Cameroon carrying food, medicine and humanitarian aid, causing spike in food price (more than 50% rise in some places) and exacerbating the already dire humanitarian situation. The severe shortage of supplies including food items that this has resulted in raises the issue of the use by armed groups of starvation as a method of war, which constitutes violation of international humanitarian law.
The security deterioration ultimately forced the government to declare a 15-days state of emergency across the country on 21 January, which was extended for six months before its expiry on 4 February.
The eruption of the armed rebellion, which disrupted the conduct of the election in some parts of the country, represents a major blow to the 2019 APPR-RCA, particularly the pledge of the signatory armed groups in Article 5 ‘to renounce the recourse to weapons and violence’. Without urgent and firm collective action to arrest this situation, the peace agreement faces a major risk of collapse, reversing the security gains achieved.
Given the role of the AU and ECCAS as guarantors of the political agreement, tomorrow’s session offers the PSC with the opportunity to explore ways and means of salvaging the peace process. A welcome development that would interest the PSC in this respect is ECCAS decision to establish a ‘permanent mediation framework for a lasting peace in CAR’ and appoint a ‘Permanent Mediator of the Central Africa Crisis’ at the extraordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECCAS on the situation in CAR held on 26 December 2020. Also of interest for the PSC is the 8 January press release by armed groups not affiliated to the rebel CPC, which after consultation with the guarantors and facilitators of the political agreement, reassured their commitment to respect the APPR-RCA and called for the latter to invoke article 35 of the agreement relating to sanctions.
In the briefing from ECCAS representative, PSC members may be interested to know the progress towards the establishment and operationalization of the mediation framework as well as the appointment of a mediator.
Yet, confounding an already dire situation, a union of several political parties, Democratic Opposition Coalition (COD-2020), rejected the result and called for its annulment claiming widespread irregularity and low voter turnout because of insecurity. In a joint statement made on 5 January, Jean-Pierre Lacroix (UN Under-Secretary- General for Peace Operations), Smaїl Chergui (AU Commissioner for Peace and Security), Gilberto Da Piedade Veríssimo (President of the Commission of ECCAS), and Josep Borrell (High Representative of EU for Foreign Affairs) called for political actors to respect the final results of the presidential election, and engage in political dialogue. Similarly, the mini-summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), held on 29 January in Luanda, called on all parties to resolve differences through dialogue.
The worsening humanitarian situation is also likely to feature in the PSC discussion. According to the latest report by OCHA (United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), the violence internally displaced north of 240,000 while the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)) reported some 105,000 individuals fleeing to the neighboring countries, mainly to DRC, as of late January. OCHA’s report further highlights that in 2021, 2.8 million out of the total population 4.9 million (more than half of the population) require humanitarian assistance and protection.
Following the loss of lives of civilians, CAR partner forces and MINUSCA peacekeepers, the UN Security Council (UNSC), in a statement issued following the 18 January attacks, not only condemned the act but also warned parties that ‘attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes.’ It is to be recalled that the PSC during its 936th meeting convened on 10 July 2020, requested CAR’s government, together with MINUSCA and the two guarantors of the APPR-RCA to conduct an investigation of the attacks against government forces, MINUSCA, humanitarian agencies and civilians.
The expected outcome is a communique. The PSC is likely to take note of the final results of the December presidential election as proclaimed by the Constitutional Court on 18 January, and congratulate President Touadéra on his re-election. The PSC may reaffirm the APPR-CAR as the only peace framework within which the crisis in the CAR has to be resolved comprehensively. The PSC is expected to reiterate from its 972nd session its strong condemnation of the collusion of Bozizé ‘with some armed groups (in launching) a rebellion warfare against the government and UN peacekeepers (MINUSCA) which resulted in blatant human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity for which he will be held personally accountable.’ Also of significance for the PSC to follow is the recommendation in the information note for tomorrow’s session for the PSC to request the AU Commission, having regard to Article 35 of the APPR-RCA, ‘to set up its own sanction regime and implement it effectively, in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities, targeting all those, including former President Bozize, who are violating the peace agreement and International Humanitarian Law, those providing them with materiel aid, as well as those individuals, groups or entities involved in the trafficking of CAR’s mineral and other natural resources.’ The PSC may urge the armed groups for the immediate halt to the blockage of the Cameroon-Bangui corridor and welcome the efforts of MINUSCA, CAR and partner forces to restore this key road connection.
The Council may welcome the announcement of the newly re-elected president for an inclusive dialogue and may in this context call on all political actors in CAR to respond positively and engage in a constructive political dialogue to resolve their grievances. The PSC may call on ECCAS to work with the AU and others on its proposed establishment of a permanent mediation framework for supporting CAR political forces, with all regional and international coordinating their engagement, within the framework of the APPR-RCA. Paying tribute to MINUSCA peacekeepers, the PSC is expected to condemn the attacks against civilians and MINUSCA forces and reiterate the call it has made during its 936th session for investigation of the attacks to adopt appropriate sanctions against perpetrators. The Council may also express its grave concern over the deteriorating humanitarian situation and call international community to step-up the effort in providing humanitarian assistance, including by filling in the huge humanitarian financial gap due to the meager receipt of 8 percent of the requested US$ 444.7 million.
1(Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) of Ali Darassa, Patriotic Movement for the Central African Republic (MPC) of Al Khatim, the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation Movement (3R) of Abas Sidiki, part of the Popular Front for the rebirth of the Central African Republic (FPRC) led by Nourredine Adam, the anti balakas (Ailes Maxime Mokom and N’Gaissona) and the RJ Sayo Movement).
Briefing on the Situation in Somalia and the Future of AMISOM
Amani Africa
Date | 9 February, 2021
Briefing on the future of AMISOM and the upcoming elections in Somalia
Tomorrow (9 February) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its 978th session on the situation in Somalia and the activities of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The PSC is expected to consider the AU Commission Chairperson’s Report on Situation in Somalia and AMISOM.
The Chairperson’s Report, prepared in accordance with the communiques of the 848th and 923rd sessions of the PSC and paragraph 36 of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2520(2020), is expected to be introduced by the Peace and Security Department. Francisco Madeira, the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson (SRCC) and Head of Mission of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is also expected to provide update to the Council. As per the practice of the Council, it is expected that the representative of Somalia and Sudan, as Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will also make a statement during the partially open segment of the session. In addition the A3 members of the UN Security Council, UN Office to the AU, European Union and United Kingdom are expected to deliver their statements.
The session comes at a very delicate moment in the political situation in Somalia. The national elections scheduled to take place in 2020/2021 were set to be a key milestone in the stabilization and peacebuilding of the country. Although the initial ambition envisaged in the Constitution was to hold the elections on the basis of a direct vote by the electorate for the very first time, over the course of 2020 this ambition was lowered. It is to be recalled that after intense negotiation among the various political forces, a compromise was reached in August 2020 for using a revised national election model known as the “Electoral Constituency Caucuses”.
Despite the National Consultative Council agreement of 17 September 2020 on the holding of elections, Somalia’s political forces could not proceed to convene the elections as planned. The parliamentary election scheduled to take place in December 2020, meant to kick start the election season, was postponed at the very last minute. Similarly, the collapse of negotiations between President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmaajo” and other stakeholders held in early February 2021 (negotiation the AU and other partners welcomed) meant that the presidential election scheduled to take place on 8 February could not be held.
President Formajo, whose term expired on 8 February is said to have requested the support of the Somali Parliament to extend his term, but the Parliament ruled out the possibility of such an extension. The international community, including the African Union (AU), in their statement issued on 4 February 2021, had warned against any alternative outcomes, including a parallel process or partial elections, or other measures short of an agreed electoral process.
The situation has plunged the country into a constitutional crisis and a political limbo. Puntland’s leadership is reported to have said that it will no longer recognize the leadership of President Formajo after his term expires. Similarly, the Council of Presidential candidates, an umbrella group of Somali opposition leaders issued a statement announcing that they could not recognize President Formajo as Somalia’s president after the expiry of his term of office on 8 February. Indeed, the end of the term of the president without political agreement and the lack of a deal on a plan for an inclusive election is considered a major setback for the transitional process and peacebuilding in Somalia.
It is to be recalled that Parliament had adopted a resolution even at the expiry of mandate of both parliament and president the incumbents remain in place until successors are elected. Although it does not totally address the grave political uncertainty, this is expected to ensure a semblance of continuity of government and to forestall the emergence of a power vacuum.
At its 949th meeting and its last session during 2020 on the situation in Somalia, Council welcomed the review of the Somalia Transitional Plan (STP). A communique of the Somali Partnership Forum held on 7 December underlined that Somalia also needs to complete ongoing revisions to implement the Somalia Transition Plan (STP). While a revised STP document has been developed and the draft of this transmitted to the AU Commission, the document has as yet to be endorsed at the National Security Council and the high-level Security and Justice Committee. The adoption of the revised STP set the stage for the AU Commission to implement the request of the PSC for revising AMISOM’s Concept of Operation (CONOPs) for 2018-2021 to ensure they are aligned with the revised STP.
The security situation remains very concerning. Al Shabaab continues to intensify the perpetration of its attacks. According to a recent report on the activities of terrorist groups in Africa, there was a 33 percent increase in violence involving Al Shabaab from 1,310 in 2019 to 1,742 in 2020. Series of deadly terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by the group recently in Mogadishu and several other regions claiming the lives of many innocent civilians. Early this month, Al-Shabaab’s attack targeted Hotel Afrik in Mogadishu that left many people dead or injured. Despite progress made in building the Somali security forces, the mounting threat that Al Shabaab continues to pose presents a challenge to the planned drawdown and eventual withdrawal of AMISOM by end of 2021.
The briefing from SRCC is expected to provide update on the activities of AMISOM as outlined in the AUC Chairperson’s report and issues relating to the existence of conditions for continuing with the timeline on the drawdown and withdrawal of AMISOM. The Chairperson’s report notes that despite progress in SSF capabilities to conduct independent operations, the generation of forces specifically for the SNA remains slow. It is to be recalled that the PSC in its communique of the 923rd session, it has stressed the imperative need for a halt in further reduction of AMISOM uniformed personnel. In the context of the continued threat from Al Shabaab, the remaining gaps in the capacity of Somali security forces and the need for political consensus among Somali political forces and the development of a new electoral calendar on the one hand, tomorrow’s session presents an opportunity for the PSC to reflect on the need for a reconsideration of the plan on the benchmarks and timeline for further drawdown and exit of AMISOM. In the context of the expiration of the current mandate of AMISOM next May, the Chairperson’s report thus underscores the necessity to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the mission and the broader Somali environment.
It is to be recalled that the PSC had renewed the mandate of AMISOM for twelve months pursuant to its Communique adopted at its 923rd meeting held on 7 May 2020. However, the UNSC took a different decision extending the mission’s mandate only for ten months until 28 February 2021. That is why the UNSC is expected to renew the mandate of the mission later this month and the Penholder, UK, is proposing a ten-month extension of the mission’s mandate for the last time. On its part, the AU is in favor of a short technical extension for three months, to enable the AU to conduct its own independent assessment.
In its last meeting, the PSC, among others, urged the UNSC to agree on the modalities for an AU-UN co-leadership in undertaking the independent assessment with a view to ensuring the effective integration of the African views vis-a-vis the policy options pertaining to post-2021 international engagements with Somalia. However, the UN went ahead with the independent assessment alone and the team under the leadership of General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz has already finalized and submitted its report. Accordingly, UNSC members have received copy of the report, which will inform their decision in the course of this month to decide on the future of AMISOM based on the options proposed by therein.
As noted in the Chairperson’s report, the regional dynamics and the souring of diplomatic relations between Somalia and Kenya has further complicated the tense political atmosphere in Somalia. The IGAD Heads of State and Government who held their Extraordinary Summit in Djibouti in December last year, had discussed this issue behind closed doors. In this connection, President Guelleh of Djibouti was entrusted to verify allegations against Kenya of interference in the internal affairs of Somalia. The fact-finding mission visited both Kenya and Somalia and submitted its report. While Kenya accepted the outcome of the fact-finding mission, Somalia rejected it accusing the team of being “partisan, unfair, compromised and predetermined.” On its part, Djibouti issued a statement underscoring its neutrality on the matter and defending the objectivity of the fact-finding mission.
The excepted outcome of the session is a communique. The PSC may express serious concern over the prevailing political impasse and urge the Somali political stakeholders to work towards finding a compromise solution to preserve the gains made over the past decade and safeguard the security and stability of the country. In this respect, it may urge the need for Somali actors to avoid the emergence of power vacuum and to urgently agree on a new timeline and process on the holding of elections. The Council may express concern over the volatile security situation in Somalia and the continued attack by Al-Shabaab. Underscoring the continued critical role of AMISOM, the PSC may also urge for the mobilization of support for AMISOM. With respect to the STP, the Council may reiterate its previous decisions for its comprehensive review and urge that this process is completed without further delay to recalibrate the priority areas for AMISOM’s support and updating its CONOPS.
The PSC may condemn the latest attack in Mogadishu and express support and solidarity with Somalia. It may reiterate its position on halting further downsizing of AMISOM and appeal to the UNSC to consider its decision on the drawdown in light of the situation on the ground. The PSC may also underscore the need to review the timelines on the drawdown and exit of AMISOM in consultation with all stakeholders and having regard to the prevailing institutional capacity issues of SSFs, the political and security conditions in Somalia. To this end, it may request the need for conducting its own independent assessment with a view to formulate AU’s own informed view to be submitted for the UNSC for due consideration and integration of the views of the AU and the PSC. It may, therefore, call on the UNSC for a technical extension of AMISOM’s mandate for a further period of three months to allow time for discussion on the future of the mission and to ensure that the views of the AU are taken onboard.