Briefing by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
Amani Africa
Date | 05 November, 2020
Tomorrow (5 November), the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to receive a virtual briefing by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The Chairperson of the APR Panel of Eminent Persons, Fatma Zohra Karadja is expected to deliver the briefing. The briefing is expected to focus on the country review report of Mozambique. The representative of Mozambique may also make a statement.
The APRM has briefed the PSC for the first time on 19 December 2018 at the 819th PSC session. The second briefing by APRM was conducted on 5 March 2020 during PSC’s 914th session. Tomorrow’s briefing is taking place in line with PSC’s 914th session that decided to institutionalize the Council’s engagement with APRM by receiving briefings from the latter twice a year. It further requested the Commission, to organise a joint retreat to thoroughly review the various country reports undertaken in the past two years including the report of Mozambique. Hence tomorrow’s briefing will present the key findings of the country review of Mozambique. The country review report was peer reviewed by the APR Forum of Heads of State in February 2019 and the government of Mozambique has launched the Report in May 2020.
The country report which is anchored in the National Program of Action (NPOA) will shed light on the progress made on all the four pillars including: Democracy and Political Governance; Economic Governance and Management; Corporate Governance; and Socioeconomic Development. It would be of particular interest for PSC members to examine the developments under the first pillar on democracy and political governance. In this regard the report is expected to present the developments around normative frameworks that are aimed at expanding the political space.
On the other hand, despite such progress it may also touch upon the growing dissatisfaction in the Northern part of the country as well as the concerning trend of terrorism in the coastal province of Capo Delgado. It is to be recalled that the 929th session of the PSC, which welcomed ‘the outcomes of the Troika Summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation held situation in Mozambique, which are aimed at finding a in 19 May, 2020 in Harare, Zimbabwe, on the security lasting solution to the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism’, affirmed the readiness of the PSC to support SADC in its efforts to combat terrorism in the region’. Tomorrow’s session also presents an opportunity for the PSC to follow up on this and explore how best the AU can contribute to address the situation in Cabo Delgado, which has led to loss of lives, displacement and destruction.
Another key issues that is expected to be included in the briefing is the political development that transpired in the previous year and the work undertaken around national dialogue and the peace agreement between the Mozambican government and former rebel group RENAMO for which the AUC Chair was one of the guarantors of the agreement. This process was shortly followed by the national election. These developments and their implications in sustaining peace in Mozambique are key elements, which may be of interest for PSC members.
The policy measures and efforts under the other pillars including alleviation of poverty and reduction of inequality are also essential components to further consolidate the political cohesion in the country. In this respect, one area of policy interest for the PSC, which is linked to instability and conflict, is natural resource governance. Due to issues relating to weak financial management of revenues from extraction of resources, here are concerns that Mozambique faces the risk of the phenomenon of resource curse. It is also worth noting that there is vast proven gas reserves in the Rovuma basin off shore the Cabo Delgado province, the region affected by the operation of terrorist groups.
Policies and measures designed for social protection of certain groups including children, women and internally displaced persons are also expected to feature in the briefing. In addition to the four thematic areas, the country review further identifies crosscutting issues, which require particular attention including corruption, youth employment, environment and climate change. It is to be recalled that when cyclone Idie hit the east and south eastern cost of Africa, Mozambique was one of the countries that was hit hard by the destruction that the cyclone caused.
The report is also expected to provide insights on the process of the review including the consultations that were held during the visit of APRM’s Country Review Mission in the country 10 to 26 November 2018. A range of consultations was held with various groups including government representatives, CSOs, the President and the leaders of the two major political parties FRELIMO and RENAMO.
The second aspect of tomorrow’s briefing is expected to focus on the APRM’s ongoing initiatives being undertaken to respond to the global pandemic of Covid-19, in partnership with the AUC including the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). In this regard the briefing may discuss the recently launched Preliminary Report on Africa’s Governance Response to COVID-19. The report captures the continent’s early response and policies that have been adopted to fight the pandemic. The report also includes an assessment of the legal and institutional capacities of member states in disease prevention and containment measures including in relation to vaccine research and development as well as the ability to prepare and manage disasters. The report further presents recommendations targeted at member states and the AU. Particularly for member states it underlines the need for the protection of human rights while responding to the pandemic.
Indeed, since the last APRM briefing, the continent has witnessed significant governance issues connected with measures adopted in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. Tomorrow’s briefing may therefore shade some light on the COVID-19 related socio-economic and political crisis encountered by member states, particularly in relation with elections and protection of human rights, and elaborate opportunities within the framework of APSA-APRM collaboration, for resolving such challenges before they escalate into conflict or crisis situations.
In light of the compounded impact of political instability, economic crises, natural disasters and pandemics experienced in some parts of the continent region, tomorrow’s briefing may also set the stage for further reflection on the proper utilisation of AU institutions like the APRM and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) as well as appropriate pillars of APSA, in collaboration with modalities set up by relevant RECs/RMs to carry out early response to avert the impending crisis.
The expected outcome of tomorrow’s deliberation is a communiqué. The PSC may commend Mozambique for preparing the country progress report and for the efforts it has demonstrated in the various thematic areas. The PSC may call on building on the gains made in enhancing peace in the Mozambique and may in this respect underscore the imperative for collective action of Mozambique, SADC and the AU to address the threat of and actual presence of terrorist groups in Cabo Delgado. The PSC may also underscore the importance of strengthening the legal, financial and regulatory framework for natural resource governance in Mozambique to avoid risk of the [phenomenon of resource curse] in the country. It may also commend the APRM for its work and support to Mozambique as well as its work around COVID19 including the recently launched report. It may take note of the preliminary actions being taken by the APRM in order to support the efforts of the AU to strengthen the various governance systems to effectively respond to Covid-19 pandemic and promote experience sharing. The PSC may call on member states that have joined the APRM and encourage them to enhance the quality and regularity of their reviews. Council may also encourage member states that have not yet acceded the APRM, to do so. The PSC may further express its wish to receive similar country review reports in the future.
Consideration of the Situation in Libya
Amani Africa
Date | 3 November, 2020
Tomorrow (3 November) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to consider the situation in Libya. The session is expected to take place through VTC.
AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Smail Chergui and the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chairperson for Libya expected to brief the PSC. The Representative of Libya is also anticipated to make a statement. The United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) and the European Union (EU) are also expected to address the Council.
This is the first time that the PSC considers the situation in Libya since its February session on the situation in Libya held at a level of Heads of State and Government. Tomorrow’s session has come after the warring parties in Libya, the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the self-styled Libya National Army headed by the renegade General Khalifa Haftar, signed a permanent ceasefire on 23 October after talks in Geneva under the facilitation of the UN Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL).
It is to be recalled that in an attempt to avert further escalation of military confrontation among the rival external backers of the LNA and the GNA, Germany hosted an international conference aimed at establishing the conditions that enable the UNSMIL facilitate peace talks between Libya’s warring parties. The Berlin Conference that concluded with the adoption of a communique which outlined a peace plan organized around the six baskets: ceasefire, arms embargo, political process, security, economic and financial, international humanitarian law and human rights law matters.
Despite the official support expressed to the outcome of the Berlin Conference and the commencement of indirect talks for ceasefire in early February, the fighting continued unabated. The LNA imposed a blockade on the export of oil in Libya, seeking to deprive the GNA of its major source of revenue and further expanding the economic woes of the country. In the ensuing months, fighting continued unabated with the direct participation of the foreign backers of the two warring parties (UAE and Russia on the side of LNA and Turkey on the side of GNA).
It was only after the LNA lost the campaign to seize Tripoli in May and a stalemate emerged in June with the frontline of the fighting shifting to the strategic city of Sirte and major backers of Haftar, notably Russia and to a lesser extent UAE, accepting Haftar’s loss, that a terrain more favourable to the peace process has emerged. In the following months, diplomatic efforts have gained new momentum with the US playing a more active role taking advantage of the stalemate and the Speaker of the Tobruk based LNA aligned House of Representative (HoR), Aguila Saleh, assuming increasingly prominent diplomatic role. Signalling a path for signing of a ceasefire, in August Prime Minister Serraj and Speaker of the HoR Saleh issued separate statements calling for a ceasefire, the lifting of the oil blockade and a return to the political process.
In the fourth round of talks in Geneva in October, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission met face to face for the first time. This round culminated in the signing of a permanent ceasefire. According to the terms of the agreement, the ceasefire includes the departure of foreign fighters and mercenaries from all sovereign Libyan spaces (land, sea and air) within three months starting the same day. Calling for immediate suspension of foreign military training, including the departure of respective training personnel and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of armed elements, the agreement also expresses the intention to set up a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the agreement.
For tomorrow’s session, one of the major issues of interest for the PSC is the chances of success of the ceasefire agreement. There are positive signs. One of the major positive outcomes of the ceasefire agreement is the lifting of the blockade of oil export. Control over the oil fields and its revenues have been at the center of the struggle between adversaries racing for influence. The lifting of the oil blockade plays a key role in reviving the national economy, which will trickle down to the livelihoods of the ordinary citizens. The resumption of commercial flight from Libya to Benghazi after a hiatus of more than a year is also widely seen as a positive gesture.
While these are positive signs, they do not guarantee success. Indeed, in the face of the entrenched polarization of the parties and opposed interests of the external actors involved in the conflict, it is no exaggeration to say that the agreement stands on shaky grounds. It is difficult to see how some of the elements of the agreement notably that which calls for the expulsion of all foreign fighters from Libya in three months can be realistically implemented. Not surprisingly given its decisive role in ending Haftar’s military campaign for controlling Tripoli, Turkey expressed doubt on whether the parties will successfully heed the terms of the agreement. UAE, whose supply of weaponry and deployment of air power in support of the LNA was a major factor in escalating the conflict and precipitating the direct involvement of rival powers in the Libya conflict, is also a major factor.
In the context of the stalemate, one of the concerns for Libya is the risk of its de facto division, threatening the territorial integrity of the country.
A further complicating factor is the real risk of internal fragmentation on both sides to the conflict. Although Sarraj’s announcement of his plan to resign by end of October has since been retracted pending agreement on a negotiated new government, it has unleashed internal rivalries among those vying for succeeding him. In the Eastern front, Haftar’s diminishing clout due to blows from the Tripoli offensive is met by the rise of Aguila Saleh, the president of the opposition parliament based in the East. The recent move by the EU to delist him from the sanction blacklist has further reinforced Saleh’s power position in the Eastern bloc.
In the context of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, one development that is of particular interest for the PSC is the fifth-round meeting of the JMC that is expected to take place on 2-4 November in Libya for the first time.
Another development that would be of interest for tomorrow’s session include the first in-person meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), which is scheduled to take place on 9 November in Tunisia. This political track of the Berlin Conference outcome seeks to ‘generate consensus on a unified governance framework, and arrangements that will lead to the holding of national elections in the shortest possible timeframe in order to restore Libya’s sovereignty and the democratic legitimacy of Libyan institutions.’ A virtual meeting has been already kicked off in October.
Although its influence remains to be limited, the AU has continued its engagement on the situation in Libya both on its own and as one of the participants in the UNSMIL led peace process. It is to be recalled that the decision of the February 2020 AU Summit, Assembly/AU/Dec.792(XXXIII), provided for the establishment of a Contact Group, chaired by the Republic of Congo, deriving from the Members of the AU High Level Committee on Libya, and any other country the Chair of the Contact Group may wish to add, to provide political leadership, as well promote coordination of international efforts in the search for a solution to the Libyan crisis. Since then, the Contact Group met twice. The first meeting, held on 11-12 March in Oyo, the Republic of Congo with the participation of South Africa, Algeria, Chad and Egypt, decided to convene the Inter- Libyan National Reconciliation Conference, in July 2020, at the AU Headquarters, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in conformity with the decision of the AU Assembly adopted in 2018, although this did not materialize due, among others, the COVID19 pandemic. Most notably, it reiterated condemnation of foreign interference, the violation of the arms embargo, the presence, deployment and utilisation of foreign fighters on Libyan soil, saying that ‘such continued interference’ was ‘motivated by national interests and looting of Libyan natural resources.’
The second meeting of the Contact Group took place on 19 May. The Group ‘condemned the numerous violations of the International Humanitarian Law that could constitute war crimes, such as the attacks on hospitals and vital facilities, the persistent indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and the impediments to humanitarian access. It called upon all the parties to the conflict to comply with the obligations imposed by the International Humanitarian Law and to take the necessary measures to prevent and immediately put an end all those acts.’
The PSC at its 929th session expressed particular concern over the continued fighting in Libya, which, it said, ‘has undermined efforts against the COVID-19 pandemic and is also aggravating an already precarious socio-economic situation in the country, as well as worsening the plight of migrants and asylum-seekers’.
In a statement on 8 June, AU Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, called upon the ‘warring parties to ensure strict compliance with international humanitarian law’ and called ‘upon the Security Council to apply sanctions as provided for in various resolutions on the arms embargo’. In a statement issued on 23 October welcoming the signing of a permanent ceasefire, Mahamat expressed AU’s ‘readiness to assist in the implementation of the ceasefire and to contribute to create the necessary conditions for the resumption of dialogue between all Libyan stakeholders for a durable solution.’
A major issue of interest for PSC members in tomorrow’s session would be how the AU could ‘assist in the implementation of the ceasefire’ that Mahamat indicated. This is linked to one of the outcomes of the February 2020 summit decision on Libya which called for the dispatching of a military reconnaissance mission to Libya jointly with the UN and the announcement, by Chergui when declaring the establishment of an Inter-Departmental Taskforce on Libya on 17 February, as a follow up to this decision that the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) was charged to begin preparations for the deployment of a multidimensional mission once a ceasefire agreement is reached between the Libyan parties.
The other issue that may be of interest for PSC members is the follow up to the AU Assembly decision 792 for the to upgrade to the level of mission the current AU Liaison Office in Libya, and to equip it with the necessary political, diplomatic and military capacity, with a view to ensuring greater contribution and participation of the AU in the efforts. In this respect one notable development has been the offer of the UN Secretary General, within the framework of the AU-UN Framework Partnership for Peace and Security, to host the African Union Mission within UNSMIL, which the AU Contact Group on Libya welcomed.
In the course of the fighting, various violations of international human rights and humanitarian law have been perpetrated.
The expected outcome of the session is a communiqué. The PSC is expected to welcome the signing of the ceasefire between GNA and LNA under the framework of 5+5 Joint Military Commission and call upon the parties to honour the terms of the agreement. The PSC may also commend the positive steps taken by the parties in terms of the resumption of oil production and commercial flights between Tripoli and Benghazi and encourage their continued constructive engagements. The PSC may express its strong support for the successful convening of the upcoming in-person meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in Tunis, on November 9. The PSC may further reiterate its strong desire to assume a central role in resolving the Libyan crisis and encourage the AU to enhance active participation in the various tracks of the Libya peace process. It may also welcome the launching of the AU Contact Group on Libya and the two meetings that the Group held. In terms of the concrete role that the AU may play, the PSC may request the AU Commission to submit to the PSC proposals on how the AU can directly support implementation of the ceasefire agreement including as a follow up to the Assembly decision 792 and the assignment given to PSOD upon the establishment of the Inter-Departmental Taskforce on Libya to make preparation for deployment of a multidimensional mission for supporting implementation of ceasefire. The PSC may also reiterate its call on external actors involved in the conflict in Libya to desist from their destructive role and respect the independence and territorial integrity of Libya. In the light of the dire humanitarian condition and perpetration of numerous violations which may amount to war crimes, the PSC may also consider to establish a mechanism for monitoring and reporting on compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law standards for the protection of civilians in Libya.
Briefing by the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
Amani Africa
Date | 4 March, 2020
Tomorrow (5 March) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is expected to receive a briefing from the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on the reports of peer reviewed member states. The Chairperson of the African Peer Review Panel of Eminent Persons Ibrahim Gambari is expected to make a presentation.
The APRM has briefed the PSC for the first time on 19 December 2018 at the 819th PSC session. The PSC recognized ‘the importance of the APRM as one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting conflict prevention, as it contributes in addressing some of the structural root causes of conflicts’. Hence tomorrow’s briefing is expected to look into the role of APRM in early warning and on how in partnership with other African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) components it may contribute to conflict prevention efforts.
The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Panel of the Wise (PoW) are the two key components in the APSA that have the central mandate to avert conflicts and crises, escalation of tensions and relapses to conflict. Both CEWS and PoW report to the PSC and particularly CEWS has the responsibility of providing regular horizon scanning briefings on peace and security trends and imminent threats across the continent. Moreover, Peace and Security Department (Conflict Early Warning and Prevention Division) has developed Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF).
Towards operationalizing this framework, the Department has also developed the country structural vulnerability assessment (CSV A) and structural vulnerability mitigation strategy (SVMS). These existing instruments are also expected to serve as complementary mechanisms to APRM’s work in ensuring that the PSC adopts a more preemptive approach than a reactive conflict response.
In addition to the APSA elements, the PSC briefings by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) on election form another layer of conflict prevention mechanism particularly in relation to mitigating contested electoral processes and post-electoral violence. Hence, in the briefing the APRM may also highlight the extent to which harmonization can be created among the relevant actors both within the AUC and policy organs to provide regular briefing and reporting to the PSC.
Gambari’s presentation may also cover the outcome of the recently concluded workshop on ‘Positioning the APRM as an early Warning Tool For Conflict Prevention’. The meeting was held within the context of the AU 2020 theme, Silencing the Guns and anchored in the Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec.686(XXX) which welcomed the harmony and synergy between the APRM, the APSA, and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). One of the key outputs of the workshop, which will be presented by the APRM representative, is the APRM Framework on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention.
In addition to the coordination with APSA and AGA, the presentation may also cover the ways in which the APRM coordinates with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). Given the increasing centrality of RECs/RMs in the AU policy space and more particularly with the PSC, there is a need to also include RECs engagement in the wider conflict prevention roadmap. The PSC may recall its previous session with RECs, which has agreed to develop ‘modalities for undertaking early responses to looming crisis and expediting action to resolve/mitigate blown out crises/conflicts’. In this respect the coordination both at the PSC level but also at the decision making organ at the RECs level may provide a comprehensive and multi- layered approach.
The APRM Framework on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention is expected to serve as an overarching instrument to map the relevant actors that will work closely with the APRM and to solidify harmonization among them.
The second issue that may be considered tomorrow is around seeking clarity on the notion of popular uprising and on modalities of responses. In 2019 the PSC at its 871st held a brainstorming session on the concept of popular uprising. The PSC indicated the lack of an agreed upon definition of ‘popular uprising’ as well as the absence of an AU normative framework that articulates the concept. Nonetheless, popular uprising has increasingly shaped political transition and democratization in many African countries. Hence, recognizing the importance of the phenomenon and in order to address the conceptual and normative gap the Council has tasked the Commission in collaboration with the APRM to prepare and submit a draft AU framework on popular uprising.
When developing a conceptual framework it is important to also address issues related to legitimacy. Previous initiatives such as the AU High-level Panel on Egypt in June 2014 has made recommendations on what kind of conditions make popular uprisings compatible with existing AU norms. Building on such recommendations and through the technical expertise of DPA and the legal counsel the framework can be formulated and presented to the PSC. The APRM on its part may present key elements that need to be included in the draft AU framework. It may identify a number of measures to address structural causes leading to popular uprising as well as actions for effective response when such developments take place.
The presentation is also expected to highlight the various activities undertaken by the mechanism including the reviews of member states. In this regard it may stress the importance of not only increasing number of participating member states in the APRM but also expanding reviews of members and increasing the regularity of reviews.
The outcome of the recently concluded 29th Summit of the African Peer Review Forum of Heads of State and Government, which was held at the margins of the AU Summit, may also feature.
The expected outcome is a communiqué. The PSC may decide to institutionalize its engagement with the APRM through regular briefings. It may welcome the efforts towards strengthening APRM’s role as a conflict prevention tool and it may stress the need for harmonization with the relevant APSA and AGA components to ensure a more effective and coordinated conflict prevention approach. It may welcome the presentation on popular uprising and may call for the finalization of the draft framework to be considered and adopted. It may call for member states that have not acceded to the APRM to do so and complete their regular reviews.
Briefing on APRM Reports
Amani Africa
Date | 18 December, 2018
Tomorrow (19 December) the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) is scheduled to hold a briefing on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Reports. This session is organized on the request of the APRM secretariat and it is anticipated that a representative of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons will present the country review reports.
Initiated as a self-monitoring mechanism to which AU member states accede voluntarily, the APRM is a unique mechanism that produces reports of volunteering states based on agreed standards and processes involving self-appraisal and peer review. The reports present assessment of the performance of the state under review in four thematic areas: political and democratic governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic governance.
The number of member states that have subscribed to the APRM has now reached 38. The background note indicates that as at January 2018 twenty-three (23) of the 38 volunteering states have completed the first peer review process, while two (2) countries, namely Kenya and Uganda, have completed their first and second reviews.
The session is organized in accordance with a provision stipulated in the APRM Base Document of 2003 that mandates the APRM to present country review reports to the PSC. Most notably, Paragraph 25 of the APRM Base Document states that ‘six months after a report has been considered by the Heads of State and Government of the participating member countries, it should be formally and publicly tabled in key regional and sub-regional structures such as … the Peace and Security Council…’
Additionally, the presentation is also informed by the findings of the Progress Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on Institutional Reform of the AU. The Report, among others, noted the lack of utilization of the potential of the APRM to enable relevant AU organs to react in a timely manner in the area of conflict prevention, notably through APRM briefings to the AU PSC and the need for improving complementarity between the APRM and peace and security.
The experience of the APRM in implementing paragraph 25 of the Base Document indicates that the APRM has thus far established a practice of presenting country review reports before the Pan- African Parliament and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).
While there have been various occasions in which the PSC held sessions on governance issues, this is the first time for the APRM to come to the PSC for presenting reports of member states. From the perspective of the APRM the presentation of the reports can serve as mechanism for encouraging implementation of the recommendations of the reports.
This session is an initiative that stands to further deepen the synergy between the governance structures of the AU and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is to be recalled that the AU Assembly at its 30th Ordinary Session held in January 2018 acknowledged in Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.686(XXX) the role that the APRM stands to play as an early warning tool for conflict prevention on the continent furthering the synergy between the APRM, the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). Admittedly, given the multiplicity of governance processes within the AU, this initiative also gives rise to questions of duplication as well.
As indicated in the background note, the presentation of the review reports is expected to contribute to the realization of the role of the PSC, under Article 3(b) of the Protocol on the Establishment of the PSC, in the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. Although the link between internal governance and regional peace and security is acknowledged in the PSC Protocol, the background note underscores the importance of AU member states ‘critically acknowled(ging) the impact of domestic policies, not only on internal political stability and economic growth, but also on the promotion of peace, security and stability as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development’.
Research reports indicate that some of the APRM reports have indeed highlighted risks of crisis in countries under review and these risks subsequently materialized. A case in point that the researches highlight is the Kenya APRM Report, which warned against ethnic violence in 2006. However, the potential of the early warning role of the reports depends on the quality of the reports.
While the presentation of the APRM reports can innovatively be used for effectively operationalizing the early warning and response responsibility of the PSC under Article 3(b) of the PSC Protocol, whether or not such early warning can be acted upon for taking preventive action is incumbent on the PSC. The role that the APRM presentation of country review reports plays in effectively activating this responsibility of the PSC depends on whether as part of the presentation of the report the APRM offers the PSC practical options on how best the PSC can follow up the PSC relevant issues highlighted in the reports. From the perspective of the work of the PSC, instead of presenting the whole APRM report what would be useful is to draw the attention of the PSC to those issues pertaining to its mandate.
Tomorrow’s session being the first meeting of the PSC on APRM reports, which reports and how they are presented and the methodology for how the PSC deliberates on and follows up on the country review reports has as yet to be clarified. It is not clear, for example, whether the PSC will adopt a statement or communiqué highlighting the specific issues raised in the APRM reports presented and requesting each of the countries concerned to take necessary measures for addressing the issues. Perhaps, this would be one of the issues that can also be elaborated as part of the revision of the working methods of the PSC.
The expected result of the briefing is a communiqué. It is anticipated that the communiqué will establish the modus operandi between the APRM and the PSC, hence establishing the presentation of APRM reports a standing agenda of the PSC. This will clarify how the APRM reports will be presented and used by the PSC as part of the continental early warning system for the PSC to timeously take action for preventing conflicts. In terms of synergy and coordination, the communiqué could also envisage the importance of institutionally feeding the reports to the Panel of the Wise (PoW) for the PoW to use the reports in implementing its mandate.
Open Session: Celebration of Amnesty Month
Amani Africa
Date | 4 September, 2019
Tomorrow (5 September) the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is scheduled to hold an open session to commemorate the celebration of amnesty month. The discussion is expected to focus on the progress made on the implementation of the AU Master Roadmap on silencing the guns by 2020 mainly the challenges and perspectives, with a focus on the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Africa.
The Department of Peace and Security (PSD), particularly the representative of the Director of PSD and Acting Head of the Division on Defence and Security are expected to deliver briefing to the PSC. Also expected to make a statement is the Head of the UN Office to the AU. The Institute for Security Studies is expected to present as well.
Tomorrow’s session is taking place in line with the 2017 Assembly decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 645(XXIX), which after deliberating on the Inaugural Report of the PSC on the Implementation of the AU Master Roadmap on Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by the Year 2020, declared the month of September each year, up to 2020, as “Africa Amnesty Month” for the surrender and collection of illegally owned weapons/arms.
It is expected that tomorrow’s session will address three inter-related thematic issues. The first relates to Security Sector Reform/Governance (SSR/G). The tailored approach, account should be had to the second is the commemoration of the Amnesty Month. The last is the implementation of the AU Roadmap on Silencing the Guns by 2020.
In the presentation from the Head of the Defence and Security Division. particular attention is expected to be given to SSR including the AU SSR program and the AU SSR Policy framework. Tomorrows’ session follows the inauguration meeting of the AU steering committee on security sector reform, held from 3 September 2019 in Addis Ababa.
The Silencing the Guns Roadmap recognizes the challenges around SSR policies. The Roadmap calls on the need to promote ownership of national SSR Programs in member states and the need to stipulate clear obligations and timelines on SSR in peace agreement including putting in place adequate follow up mechanisms.
For PSC members it would be of interest to identify the challenges relating to SSR in Africa. One set of issues expected to be highlighted is the sensitivities of member states and wrong perceptions that SSR concerns only post-conflict situations. Studies also show that another challenge in SSR relate to civilian possession and use of small arms and weapons. The recent report by the AUC and Small Arms Survey ‘Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa’ has noted that civilian actors including individuals, private businesses and non- state armed groups hold almost 80% of small arms on the continent. Among the civilian held firearms only around 10% has been registered.
This is also an indication that security regimes in various African countries have been characterised by a range of non-state actors, including private security companies, local militias, guerrilla armies, community self-policing groups and others. With the lack or weakening monopoly use of force by the state particularly in countries affected by violence leads to the emergence of reliance by individuals and communities on self-organized security provision.
While a locally driven SSR is key in designing a tailored approach, account should be had to the transnational nature of insecurities. This also requires enhanced coordination among the security institutions of neighbouring countries including through the Regional Economic Communities/Mechanisms and the AU SSR processes.
Tomorrow’s session may also highlight that SSR is not solely a security matter and may call on for a comprehensive approach to reform encompassing state-society relationship. Therefore, its effective implementation may require the concerted efforts and cooperation among wide range of institutions in the government structure and the public at large.
There is also the challenge of effective formulation and proper implementation of SSR provisions in peace agreements. As the experiences of South Sudan and the Central African Republic show, this is one of the major sources of disruption of peace processes. In the light of the return of countries to conflict after signing of peace agreements, there is also interest in post-conflict reconstruction and development. Hence the PSC and participants may reflect on how to sustain peace including through enhanced consideration of the SSR dimension of peace and post-conflict processes.
In terms of the amnesty month, the recent report on small arms and light weapons referred to above highlighted the need for focusing on private possession and use of small arms and light weapons. In this regard the 860th meeting of the PSC stressed ‘the need for improved measures to regulate non-state actor possession of a small arms and light weapons, in order to prevent the diversion or misuse of weapons and encourages Member States to implement initiatives that are in line with the Africa Amnesty Month’.
However, there is a need for national level measures including the boosting of state-based provision of security services for encouraging the surrender of weapons in the hands of non-state actors and reporting on how and whether member states are observing the Amnesty month. Central to this is the need for finding ways of establishing or restoring the capacity particularly of states lacking effective provision of security to all their populations. This is directly linked to security sector governance as a measure of conflict prevention.
With respect to the AU Roadmap on Silencing the Guns, tomorrow’s session affords an opportunity for taking stock of where implementation of the Roadmap stands and the progress made towards achieving its ambitious objectives. Also important is the lessons to be learned from the process of elaboration and implementation of the Roadmap, including in terms of identification of areas of intervention and effective implementation of relevant measures. With 2020 only months away, it would be of particular interest to PSC members to discuss what will happen post-2020.
The expected outcome of the session is a press statement. The Council may highlight that the prospects for sustainable peace and stability are ensured by the extent to which SSR is anchored on the state of security broadly defined, instead of a narrow focus on certain security institutions. The PSC may reiterate its previous decisions for Member States and RECs/Regional Mechanisms to submit reports to Council, through the AUC, on the actions taken in implementing the Africa Amnesty Month, to feed in its report to the upcoming Assembly. With respect to the Roadmap on Silencing the Guns by 2020, the PSC could request the AU Commission to provide it with a comprehensive report reviewing implementation of the Roadmap and proposing on how the agenda on silencing the guns by 2020 will be followed up post-2020